Lumby v. Allday, 1 C. & J. 305; 1 Tyr. 217; and see Doyley v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 835; 5 Scott, 40; 3 Hodges, 154; Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, 11 App. Cas. 127; 55 L. J. Q. B. 539; 54 L. T. 882.) Where the Statute of Limitations is relied on as a defence, but proof is given that one copy has been sold by the defendant within the last few months, the judge is not bound, it is said, to direct the jury to limit the damages to the injury which the plaintiff may be supposed to have incurred from that single publication, but they will take all the circumstances into their consideration. (Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185; 19 L. J. Q. B. 20; 14 Jur. 110; 3 C. & K. 10.) The jury in assessing damages ought not to take into consideration the question of costs. That is a matter entirely for the judge (post, p. 365). Unless he interferes, a farthing will carry costs as much as £1,000. (1 Times L. R. 413.) It is for the jury to say, if they find for the plaintiff, to what extent he has been damaged, irrespective of the effect, if any, which their verdict may have on the subsequent action of the judge. (Per Bramwell, B., L. R. 1 Q. B. 691, 692.) The amount at which general damages are to be assessed lies almost entirely in the discretion of the jury; the courts will never interfere with the verdict merely because the amount is excessive. A new trial will only be granted where the verdict is so large as to satisfy the court that it was perversely in excess or the result of some gross error on a matter of principle; it must be shown that the jury either misconceived the case or acted under the influence of undue motives. So, again, where the damages awarded appear strangely small, a new trial will not be granted, unless it is clearly proved that the jury wholly omitted to take into their consideration some element of damage; or unless the smallness of the amount shows that the jury made a compromise, and did not really try the issue submitted to them. (Falvey v. Stanford, L. R. 10 Q. B. 54; 44 L. J. Q. B. 7; 23 W. R. 162; 31 L. T. 677; Kelly v. Sherlock, L. R. 1 Q. B. 686, 697; 35 L. J. Q. B. 209; 12 Jur. N. S. 937; Forsdike and wife v Stone, L. R. 3 C. P. 607; 37 L. J. C. P. 301; 16 W. R. 976; 18 L. T. 722.) But where the plaintiff is entitled to substantial damages, and the verdict in his favour cannot be impeached except on the ground that the damages are excessive, the court has power to refuse a new trial, on the plaintiff alone, and without the defendant, consenting to the damages being reduced to such an amount as the court would consider not excessive, had they been given by the jury. (Belt v. Lawes (C. A.), 12 Q. B. D. 356; 53 L. J. Q. B. 249; 32 W. R. 607; 50 L. T. 441.) II. SPECIAL DAMAGE WHERE THE WORDS ARE NOT ACTION ABLE PER SE. Special Damage is such a loss as the law will not presume to have followed from the defendant's words, but which depends, in part at least, on the special circumstances of the case. It must therefore be proved by evidence at the trial; and should always be explicitly claimed on the pleadings. In the vast majority of cases proof of special damage is not essential to the right of action. Thus it is not necessary to prove special damage (i.) In any action of libel. (ii.) Whenever the words spoken impute to the plaintiff the commission of any indictable offence. (iii.) Or a contagious disease. (iv.) Or are spoken of him in the way of his profession or trade; or disparage him in an office of public trust. Such words, from their natural and immediate tendency to produce injury, the law adjudges to be defamatory, although no special loss or damage is, or can be, proved. Though even in these cases, if any special damage has in fact accrued, the plaintiff may of course prove it to aggravate the damages. But in all cases not included in any of the above four classes, proof of special damage is essential to the cause of action; for the words are not actionable per se. The words do not, apparently and upon the face of them, import such defamation as will of course be injurious; it is necessary, therefore, that the plaintiff should aver and prove that some particular damage has in fact resulted from their use. Such damage, being essential to the action, must have accrued before action brought. A mere apprehension of future loss cannot constitute special damage. "I know of no case where ever an action for words was grounded upon eventual damages which may possibly happen to a man in a future situation," says De Grey, C. J., in Onslow v. Horne, 3 Wils. 188; 2 W. Bl. 753. It must also be the natural, immediate, and legal consequence of the words which the defendant uttered. (See Remoteness of Damages, post, pp. 325-336.) The special damage necessary to support an action for defamation, where the words are not actionable in themselves, must be the loss of some material temporal advantage. The loss of a marriage, of employment, of custom, of profits, and even of gratuitous entertainment and hospitality, will constitute special damage; but not mere annoyance or loss of peace of mind, nor even physical illness occasioned by the defamatory charge. Such loss may be either the loss of some right or position already acquired, or the loss of some future benefit or advantage the acquisition of which is prevented. Thus, if the defendant causes a servant to lose his situation, or prevents his getting one, by maliciously giving a false character; in either case an action will lie, though the words be not actionable per se. So if he prevent either a new comer from going to the plaintiff's shop, or an old customer from continuing to deal there, that will be sufficient special damage. But the plaintiff must always clearly prove that the loss is the direct result of defendant's words, and not the consequence of some independent act, some spontaneous resolve, of a third person. Illustrations. Anthony Elcock, citizen and mercer of London, of the substance and value of £3,000, sought Anne Davis in marriage; but the defendant præmissorum haud ignarus, accused her of incontinency, wherefore the said Anthony wholly refused to marry the said Anne. Held, sufficient special damage. Verdict for the plaintiff for 200 marks. Davis v. Gardiner, 4 Rep. 16; 2 Salk. 294; 1 Roll. Abr. 38. Holwood v. Hopkins, Cro. Eliz. 787; post, p. 333. So if a man lose a marriage. Matthew v. Crass, Cro. Jac. 323. Nelson v. Staff, Cro. Jac. 422. In consequence of defendant slandering the plaintiff, a dissenting minister, his congregation diminished; but this was held insufficient, as it did not appear that the plaintiff lost any emolument thereby. Hopwood v. Thorn, 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 8 C. B. 293; 14 Jur. 87. But see Hartley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130, post, p. 308. "If a divine is to be presented to a benefice, and one, to defeat him of it, says to the patron, that he is a heretic, or a bastard, or that he is excommunicated,' by which the patron refuses to present him (as he well might if the imputations were true), and he loses his preferment, he shall have his action on the case for those slanders tending to such end." Davis v. Gardiner, 4 Rep. 17. Loss of a situation will constitute special damage. Martin v. Strong, 5 A. & E. 535; 1 N. & P. 29; 2 H. & W. 336. Or of a chaplaincy. Payne v. Beuwmorris, 1 Lev. 248. If, however, the dismissal from service be colourable only, the master intending to take the plaintiff back again, as soon as the action is over, and having dismissed him solely in order that he might show special damage at the trial; this is no evidence that the plaintiff's reputation has been impaired, but rather the contrary. If, therefore, no other special damage can be proved, the plaintiff should be nonsuited. Coward v. Wellington, 7 C. & P. 531. If a man be refused employment through defendant's slander, this is sufficient special damage. Sterry v. Foreman, 2 C. & P. 592. So, if a person who formerly had dealt with the plaintiff on credit refuses, in consequence of defendant's words, to deliver to the plaintiff certain goods he had ordered until plaintiff has paid for them. Brown v. Smith, 13 C. B. 596; 22 L. J. C. P. 151; 17 Jur. 807; 1 King v. Watts, 8 C. & P. 614. So, if the agent of a certain firm going to deal with the plaintiff be stopped and dissuaded by the defendant, and this, although such firm subsequently became bankrupt, and paid but 12s. 6d. in the £, so that had plaintiff obtained the order he would have lost money by it. Storey v. Challands, 8 C. & P. 234. The loss of the hospitality of friends gratuitously afforded is sufficient special damage. Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taunt. 39; 3 Smith, 135. Davies and wife v. Solomon, L. R. 7 Q. B. 112; 41 L. J. Q. B. 10; 20 W. R. 167; 25 L. T. 799. So is the loss of any gratuity or present, if it be clear that the slander alone prevented its receipt. Bracebridge v. Watson, Lilly, Entr. 61. Hartley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130. In consequence of defendant's words, a friend who had previously voluntarily promised to give the plaintiff, a married woman, money to enable her to join her husband in Australia, whither he had emigrated three years before, refused to do so. Held, sufficient special damage. Corcoran and wife v. Corcoran, 7 Ir. C. L. R. 272. The defendant said of a married man that he had had two bastards: "by reason of which words discord arose between him and his wife, and they were likely to have been divorced." Held, that this constituted no special damage. Barmund's Case, Cro. Jac. 473. The plaintiff was a candidate for membership of the Reform Club, but upon a ballot of the members was not elected; subsequently a meeting of the members was called to consider an alteration of the rules regarding the election of members; before the day fixed for the meeting, the defendant spoke certain words concerning the plaintiff which "induced or contributed to inducing a majority of the members of the club to retain the regulations under which the plaintiff had been rejected, and thereby prevented the plaintiff from again seeking to be elected to the club." Held, that the damage alleged was not pecuniary or capable of being estimated in money, and was not the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's words. Chamberlain v. Boyd (C. A.), 11 Q. B. D. 407; 52 L. J. Q. B. 277; 31 W. R. 572; 48 L. T. 328; 47 J. P. 372. So where the words are not actionable per se, and no pecuniary damage has followed, no compensation can be given for outraged feelings, nor for sickness induced by such mental distress, even though followed by a doctor's bill. Allsop v. Allsop, 5 H. & N. 534; 29 L. J. Ex. 315; 6 Jur. N. S. Lynch v. Knight and wife, 9 H. L. C. 577; 8 Jur. N. S. 724; 5 . Loss of the consortium of a husband is special damage. Per Lords Campbell and Cranworth in Lynch v. Knight and wife, 9 H. L. C. at p. 589. But not merely of the society of friends and neighbours. Medhurst v. Balam, cited in 1 Siderfin, 397. Barnes v. Prudlin or Bruddel, 1 Lev. 261; 1 Sid. 396; 1 Ventr. 4; 2 Keb. 451. Hence, even the fact that the plaintiff has been expelled from a religious society of which she was a member, will not constitute special damage. Roberts et ux. v. Roberts, 5 B. & S. 384; 33 L. J. Q. B. 249; 10 Jur. Though there is an old case in which a vicar in open church falsely declared |