register of newspaper proprietors, purporting to be certified by the registrar or his deputy for the time being, or under the official seal of the registrar, shall be received as conclusive evidence of the contents of the said register of newspaper proprietors, so far as the same appear in such copy or extract without proof of the signature thereto or of the seal of office affixed thereto, and every such certified copy or extract shall in all proceedings, civil or criminal, be accepted as sufficient primâ facie evidence of all the matters and things thereby appearing, unless and until the contrary thereof be shown.

This is a very valuable provision, and will greatly facilitate proof of publication in all cases of newspaper libel. (But see note to sect. 11.)

16. Recovery of penalties and enforcement of orders.]—All penalties under this Act may be recovered before a court of summary jurisdiction in manner provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts.

Summary orders under this Act may be made by a court of summary jurisdiction, and enforced in manner provided by section thirty-four of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879; and, for the purposes of this Act, that section shall be deemed to apply to Ireland in the same manner as if it were re-enacted in this Act.

17. Definitions.]-The expression "a court of summary jurisdiction" has in England the meanings assigned to it by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879; and in Ireland means any justice or justices of the peace, stipendiary or other magistrate or magistrates, having jurisdiction under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts.

The expression "Summary Jurisdiction Acts" has as regards England the meanings assigned to it by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879; and as regards Ireland, means within the police district of Dublin metropolis the Acts regulating the powers and duties of justices of the peace for such district, or of the police of that district, and

elsewhere in Ireland the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851, and any Act amending the same.

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By sect. 50 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, the expression, "a Court of Summary Jurisdiction," is defined to mean any justice or justices of the peace or other magistrate, by whatever name called, to whom jurisdiction is given by, or who is or are authorized to act under, the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, or any of such Acts."

By the same section, the expression "Summary Jurisdiction Acts" is defined to mean the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 43), and the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), and any Act, past or future, amending either of them.

18. Provisions as to registration of newspaper proprietors not to apply to newspaper belonging to a joint stock company.] -The provisions as to the registration of newspaper proprietors contained in this Act shall not apply to the case of any newspaper which belongs to a joint stock company duly incorporated under and subject to the provisions of the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1879.

This is a mistaken and mischievous provision. Many newspapers now are published by limited liability companies, with names that suggest no connection between the company and the paper. For instance, the Graphic is published by "H. R. Baines & Co., Limited." Assuming that it were possible that a libel should appear in the Graphic, how could the person libelled discover whom to make defendant? Owing to this section there would be no entry at all at Somerset House to assist him.

19. Act not to extend to Scotland.]—This Act shall not extend to Scotland.

The law of Scotland was said to be less stringent on the subject than that of England or Ireland.

20. Short title.]-This Act may for all purposes be cited as the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881.

The SCHEDULES to which this Act refers :

SCHEDULE A.

[Set out in the note to sect. 9, ante, p. 388.]

SCHEDULE B.

[Set out in the note to sect. 11, ante, p. 389.]

CHAPTER XIV.

THE LAW OF PERSONS IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES.

We have hitherto dealt with the plaintiff and defendant as individuals under no disability, who sue and are sued singly and in their own right. I propose in this chapter to examine the rights and liabilities arising from personal disability or special personal relations with others, both in civil and criminal cases.

It will be convenient to divide this chapter into the following heads:

1. Husband and Wife.

2. Infants.

3. Lunatics.

4. Bankrupts.

5. Receivers.

6. Executors and Administrators.

7. Aliens.

8. Master and Servant; Principal and Agent.

9. Corporations and Companies.

10. Partners.

11. Other Joint Plaintiffs.

12. Joint Defendants.

1. Husband and Wife.

Whenever words actionable per se are spoken of a married woman, she may sue alone, or she may join

her husband as co-plaintiff, in which case he will be entitled to recover in the same action for any special damage that may have occurred to him. When the words are not actionable per se, she may sue, provided she can show that some special damage has followed from the words to her. That special damage has accrued to her husband in consequence of such words will not avail her; he alone can sue for such damage, although it is her reputation that has been assailed.

Hence, if words not actionable per se be spoken of a married woman and damage ensue to the husband, none to her, she cannot sue, but he can. The damage to him is in fact the sole cause of

action.

This right of the husband to sue for words defamatory of his wife is somewhat anomalous, for his reputation is in no way assailed; and though he has sustained damage, is it not damnum sine injuria? Generally speaking, if words defamatory of A., but not actionable in themselves, produce damage only to B., neither A. nor B. can sue. But the reputation of a husband is so intimately connected with that of his wife, that he has always been allowed to sue whenever he has received damage, just as though the words had been spoken of himself.

That this is law, is clearly laid down in Siderfin, 346, under the year 1667 :-"Nota, si parols queux de eux m ne sont Actionable mes solement in respect del collateral dams. sont płe. (parlés) del feme covert, Le Baron sole port L'action, et si le feme soit joyn ove luy le Judgment serra pur ceo arrest, coment soit apres verdict." (And see Harwood et ux. v. Hardwick et ux. (1668), 2 Keble, 387; Coleman et ux. v. Harcourt (1664), 1 Levinz, 140; Grove et ux. v. Hart (1752), Sayer, 33; B. N. P. 7.) In the case of Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. D. 91; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; 24 W. R. 487; 34 L. T. 500, the wife's name was struck off the record by the judge at the trial, and the husband recovered for the damage to his business caused by words not actionable per se, spoken of his wife; though there it is true the Court bases its judgment on the fact that Mrs. Riding helped her husband in the shop, and was therefore his servant or assistant as well as his wife.

By the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75), s. 1, sub-s. (2), a married woman is now

capable of suing and being sued, either in contract or in tort, or otherwise, in all respects as if she were a feme sole, and her husband need not be joined with her as plaintiff or defendant, or be made a party to any action or other legal proceeding brought by or taken against her; and any damages or costs recovered by her in any such action or proceeding shall be her separate property; and any damages or costs recovered against her in any such action or proceeding shall be payable out of her separate property, and not otherwise." A married woman, therefore, may now sue for libel or slander without her husband or any next friend; and she cannot be ordered to give security for the costs of the action, even although she have at the time of action no separate estate, and there be nothing upon which, if she fails, the defendant can issue available execution. (In re Isaac, Jacob v. Isaac (C. A.), 30 Ch. D. 418; 54 L. J. Ch. 1136; 33 W. R. 845; 53 L. T. 478; Threlfull v. Wilson, 8 P. D. 18; 48 L. T. 238; Severance v. Civil Service Supply Association, 48 L. T. 485.) This section enables a married woman to sue alone for a tort committed against her before the Act came into operation. (Weldon v. Winslow (C. A.), 13 Q. B. D. 784; 53 L. J. Q. B. 528; 33 W. R. 219; 51 L. T. 643.) And as she could not sue alone before the commencement of the Act (January 1st, 1883), the Statute of Limitations does not commence to run against her till that date. (Weldon v. Neal, 32 W. R. 828.)

Formerly a married woman was always bound to join her husband as co-plaintiff, otherwise the defendant might plead in abatement. But the action was still regarded as solely hers. If she died, it abated; if he died, the action survived to her and she continued it as sole plaintiff. No damages could be recovered in such an action for any pecuniary loss suffered by the husband; if the words were not actionable per se, and the female plaintiff could show no damage to herself, they were non-suited.

The husband was formerly obliged to bring a separate action for any damage he had sustained. But by the Common Law Procedure