Illustration.

Rainer printed a scandalous libel, reflecting both on the House of Lords and on the House of Commons, called "Robin's Game, or Seven's the Main;" he was tried in the Court of King's Bench, fined £50, and sentenced to be imprisoned for two years and until he should pay such fine.

R. v. Rainer, 2 Barnard. 293; Dig. L. L. 125.

On three occasions the House of Commons has voted a particular publication a scandalous and seditious libel, and a breach of privilege, &c., and petitioned the Crown to direct the Attorney-General to prosecute the author, printers and publishers thereof. But, strange to say, on each occasion such prosecution has been unsuccessful: the jury in each of the three cases having acquitted the prisoner. (R. v. Owen (1752), 18 Howell's St. Tr. 1203, 1228; R. v. Stockdale (1789), 22 Howell's St. Tr. 238; R. v. Reeves (1796), Peake, Add. Ca. 84; 26 Howell's St. Tr. 530.) Hence the House of Commons now invariably deals with offenders itself.

The House of Lords can inflict fine and imprisonment for any length of time. In former days the pillory was sometimes added; e.g., in the case of Thomas Morley in 1623, and of William Carr in 1667, who were sentenced to stand in the pillory for libelling individual peers.

The House of Commons can inflict fine and imprisonment, and, in the case of a member, expulsion. One unfortunate member, Arthur Hall, suffered all three penalties in 1581 for publishing a book disparaging the authority of the House of Commons, and reflecting upon certain individual members-see Hallam, Const. Hist. Vol. I. c. v. the first instance of a libel being punished by the House. But in the case of a commitment by the House of Commons, the imprisonment can only last till the close of the existing session. The prisoner must be liberated on prorogation (Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 A. & E. 114; Grissell's case, Aug. 1879). It is otherwise with the House of Lords.

The Speaker's warrant is a perfect answer to any writ of habeas corpus, and fully justifies the Serjeant-at-arms and his officers in arresting the offender, and protects them from any action of assault

or false imprisonment (Howard v. Gosset, 10 Q. B. 359; Burdett v. Colman, 14 East, 163). It will not be scanned too strictly by the courts of law, nor set aside for any defect of form (R. v. Paty, 2 Ld. Raym. 1108; R. v. Hobhouse (1819), 2 Chit. 210). Thus, the libel for which the prisoner was committed need not be set out in such warrant (Burdett v. Abbot, 14 East, 1; see 1 Moore, P. C. C. 80); though the libel must always be set out at full length in either an indictment (Bradlaugh and Besant v. The Queen, (C. A.) 3 Q. B. D. 607; 48 L. J. M. C. 5; 26 W. R. 410; 38 L. T. 118), or a statement of claim (Harris v. Warre, 4 C. P. D. 125; 48 L. J. C. P. 310; 27 W. R. 461; 40 L. T. 429). Still less will any court of common law inquire into the propriety of the commitment or hear it argued that the act complained of did not amount to a contempt, or that the privilege of the House alleged to have been broken does not exist (Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 A. & E. 165, 195). The Queen's Bench Division cannot bail a prisoner committed for a contempt of the House of Commons (Hon. Alex. Murray's Case, 1 Wilson, 299).

The House is the best judge of its own privileges, and of what is a contempt of them. But if on the face of the warrant it plainly and expressly appears that the House is exceeding its jurisdiction, it will be the duty of the High Court to order the release of the prisoner. (9 A. & E. 169; Hawkins, 3 Pl. Cr. II. 15, 73, p. 219; R. v. Evans and another, 8 Dowl. 451.)

The House may commit for any contempt of one of its committees, or of the members of any such committee; instances of such committals occurred in 1832, 1858, and 1879.

So in America the House of Representatives has a general power of committing for contempt, whether the offender be a member or a stranger (Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204). But, as with the English House of Commons, the imprisonment terminates at the adjournment or dissolution of Congress.

But with subordinate legislative bodies it is different. No power of committing for contempt is inherent in them (Kielley v. Carson, 4 Moore, P. C. C. 63; Fenton v. Hampton, 11 Moore, P. C. C. 347, overruling dicta of Lord Denman, C.J., in Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 A. & E. 114; of Parke, B., in Beaumont v. Barrett, 1 Moore, P. C. C. 76); although they have, of course, power to preserve order during their deliberations, which involves a power to remove from the

Chamber any person obstructing their proceedings, or otherwise guilty of disorderly conduct in the presence of the House itself, and if the offender be a member, to exclude him for a time, or even to expel him altogether. Such latter power is necessary for self-preservation; and is quite distinct from the judicial power of sentencing the obstructive to a term of imprisonment as a punishment for his misconduct (Doyle v. Falconer, L. R. 1 P. C. 328; 36 L. J. P. C. 37; 15 W. R. 366; Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Macpherson, L. R. 3 P. C. 268; 7 Moo. P. C. (N. S.) 49; 39 L. J. P. C. 59; Barton v. Taylor, 11 App. Cas. 197; 55 L. J. P. C. 1; 55 L. T. 158). Thus the House of Assembly of Newfoundland (Kielley v. Carson, 4 Moore, P. C. C. 63); the Legislative Council of Van Diemen's Land (Fenton v. Hampton, 11 Moore, P. C. C. 317); the House of Keys in the Isle of Man (Ex parte Brown, 5 B. & S. 280; 33 L. J. Q. B. 193; 12 W. R. 821; 10 L. T. 453); and the Legislative Assembly of the Island of Dominica (Doyle v. Falconer, L. R. 1 P. C. 328; 36 L. J. P. C. 33; 15 W. R. 366), possess no inherent powers to commit for contempt.

But though such a power is not inherent in any inferior legislature, it may be expressly granted by statute; thus the Legislative Assembly of Victoria possesses this privilege by virtue of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 55, s. 35, and the Colonial Act, 20 Vict. No. 1 (Dill v. Murphy, 1 Moore, P. C. C. (N. S.) 487; Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Victoria v. Glass, L. R. 3 P. C. 560; 40 L. J. P. C. 17; 24 L. T. 317). Also, it is said that such a power may be acquired by prescription, acquiescence and usage. (Per Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in Burdett v. Abbot, 14 East, 137, and Cockburn, C.J., in Ex parte Brown, 5 B. & S. 293.) And it is by virtue of such acquiescence and usage that the Jamaica House of Assembly has the power of committing a libeller, if indeed it has such power at all (Beaumont v. Barrett, 1 Moore, P. C. C. 80, as explained by Parke, B., in 4 Moore, P. C. C. 89).

(v.) Words defamatory of Courts of Justice and of Individual

Judges.

(a) Superior Courts.

It is a misdemeanour to speak or publish of any judge of a Superior Court words which would be libellous and actionable per se, if written and published of any other public officer.

It is also a misdemeanour to speak or publish words defamatory of any court of justice or of the administration of the law therein, with intent to obstruct or invalidate its proceedings, to annoy its officers, to diminish its authority and dignity, and to lower it in public esteem.

Such words, whether spoken or written, are punishable on indictment or information, with fine or imprisonment or both. They are also in every such case a contempt of court punishable summarily by the Court itself with fine or commitment.

Such words are also indictable under the Statutes of Scandalum magnatum (3 Edw. I. c. 34; 2 Rich. II. c. 5; 12 Rich. II. c. 11; ante, c. IV. pp. 134, 135), as well as at common law.

It is immaterial whether the words be uttered in the presence of the Court or at a time when the Court is not sitting, and at a distance from it (Crawford's Case, 13 Q. B. 630; 18 L. J. Q. B. 225; 13 Jur. 955); nor need they necessarily refer to the judges in their official capacity.

But "there is no sedition in just criticism on the administration of the law. . . . A writer may freely criticise. the proceedings of courts of justice and of individual judges-nay, he is invited to do so, and to do so in a free, and fair, and liberal spirit. But it must be without malignity, and not imputing corrupt or malicious motives." (Per Fitzgerald, J., in R. v. Sullivan, 11 Cox, C. C. 50.) "It certainly is lawful, with decency and candour, to discuss the propriety of the verdict of a jury, or the decisions of a

judge, .... but if the extracts set out in the information contain no reasoning or discussion, but only declamation and invective, and were written, not with a view to eluci date the truth, but to injure the characters of individuals, and to bring into hatred and contempt the administration of justice in the country," then the defendants have transgressed the law, and ought to be convicted. (Per Grose, J., in R. v. White and another, 1 Camp. 359, n.)

Illustrations.

To say that a judge had been bribed, or that in any particular case he had endeavoured to serve his own interests, or those of his friends or of his party, or wished to curry favour at Court, or was influenced by fear of the Government or of any great man, or by any other side-motive other than a simple desire to arrive at the truth and to mete out justice impartially, is a seditious libel.

See R. v. Lord George Gordon, 22 Howell's St. Tr. 177.

To call the Lord Chief Justice "a traitor and a perjured judge," and to allege that a recent judgment delivered by him was treason, is a misdemeanour. R. v. Jeffe (1632), 15 Vin. Abr. 89.

Hutton, J. v. Harrison, Hutton, 131.

To say that the Lord Chief Justice disgraces his high station and prevents justice being done, is a misdemeanour.

R. v. Hart and White (1808), 30 How. St. Tr. 1168, 1345; 10 East, 94.
R. v. Wrennum (1619), Popham, 135.

Butt v. Conant, 1 Brod. & Bing. 548; 4 Moore, 195; Gow, 84.

Hurry sued Watson for a malicious prosecution, and recovered damages £3,000: the corporation of which Watson was a member thereupon resolved "that Mr. Watson had been actuated by motives of public justice in prosecuting Hurry," and voted him £2,300 towards payment of his damages. The Court of King's Bench granted an information against the members of the corporation.

R. v. Watson & others, 2 T. R. 199.

[That the vote of money was an improper employment of the corporate funds is very probable; but so far as the mere words of the resolution are concerned, I see no misdemeanour. They appear to me to be but a temperately worded statement that the corporation differed from the jury in their opinion of Mr. Watson's conduct.]

Besides such indictable offences, many other acts and words are contempts of court. Thus it is contempt of court to insult the judge, jury or witnesses, to obstruct any officer of the Court in the execution of his duty, to express contempt for the process of the Court, to calumniate the parties concerned in any cause, to prejudice the