of any trader, "He is not able to pay his debts." Drake v. Hill, Sir T. Raym. 181; 2 Keble, 549; 1 Lev. 276; Sid. 424. Hooker v. Tucker, Holt. 39; Carth. 330. Morris v. Langdale, 2 Bos. & Pul. 284. Orpwood v. Barkes (vel Parkes), 4 Bing. 261; 12 Moore, 492. of a farmer, "He cannot pay his labourers." Barnes v. Holloway, 8 T. R. 150. To impute insolvency to an innkeeper, even though at that date innkeepers were not subject to the bankruptcy laws. Whittington v. Gladwin (1825), 5 B. & C. 180; 2 C. & P. 146. Southam v. Allen, Sir T. Raym. 231. But it is not actionable to say merely, "A. owes me money," if no words be added imputing that A. is unable to pay the debt. Per Bramwell, B., 4 F. & F. 321, 322. So if the defendant's words impute to the plaintiff dishonesty and fraud in the conduct of his trade, such as knowingly selling inferior articles as superior, or wilfully adulterating his wares, they will be actionable per se. Though all bona fide complaints by a customer of the goods supplied to him are of course privileged. (Crisp v. Gill, 29 L. T. (Old S.) 82; Oddy v. Lord Geo. Paulet, 4 F. & F. 1009.) If the words merely impugn the goods the plaintiff sells, they are not actionable unless they fall within the rules relating to Slander of Title, post, p. 147; for they are but an attack on a thing, not on a person. (Fenn v. Dixe (1638), 1 Roll. Abr. 58; Evans v. Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624; 13 L. J. Q. B. 120; Harman v. Delany, 2 Str. 898; Fitz. 121; 1 Barnard. 289, 438.) But often an attack on a commodity may be also an indirect attack upon its vendor; e.g. if fraud or dishonesty be imputed to him in offering it for sale. (See Jenner v. A'Beckett, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; 41 L. J. Q. B. 14; 20 W. R. 181; 25 L. T. 464; Burnet v. Wells (1700), 12 Mod. 420; Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav. 112; 17 L. J. Ch. 142; 12 Jur. 149.) Illustrations. Thus, it is actionable without proof of special damage : To say of a trader, "He is a cheating knave, and keeps a false debt-book." Crawfoot v. Dale, 1 Vent. 263; 3 Salk. 327. Overruling Todd v. Hastings, 2 Saund. 307. Or that he uses false weights or measures. Griffiths v. Lewis, 7 Q. B. 61; 14 L. J. Q. B. 197; 9 Jur. 370; 8 Q. B. 841; 15 L. J. Q. B. 249; 10 Jur. 711. Bray v. Ham, 1 Brownlow & Golds. 4. Stober v. Green, ib. 5. Prior v. Wilson, 1 C. B. N. S. 95. To say to a cornfactor, "You are a rogue and a swindling rascal, you delivered me 100 bushels of oats, worse by 6s. a bushel than I bargained for." Thomas v. Jackson, 3 Bing. 104; 10 Moore, 425. To say of a tradesman that he adulterates the goods he sells. Jesson v. Hayes (1636), Roll. Abr. 63. To say of a contractor, "He used the old materials," when his contract was for new, is actionable, with proper innuendoes. Baboneau v. Farrell, 15 C. B. 360; 24 L. J. C. P. 9; 1 Jur. N. S. 114; 3 C. L. R. 142. Sir R. Greenfield's Case, Mar. 82; 1 Viner's Abr. 465. See Smith v. Mathews, 1 Moo. & Rob. 151. To say of an auctioneer or appraiser who had valued goods for the defendant, "He is a damned rascal, he has cheated me out of £100 on the valuation." Bryant v. Loxton, 11 Moore, 344. Ramsdale v. Greenacre, 1 F. & F. 61, ante, p. 69. To say of a butcher that he changed the lamb bought of him for a coarse piece of mutton. Crisp v. Gill, 29 L. T. (Old S.) 82. Rice v. Pidgeon, Comb. 161. But to call a tradesman "a rogue," or "a cheat," or "a cozener," is not actionable, unless it can be shown that the words refer to his trade. To impute distinctly that he cheats or cozens in his trade is actionable. Johns v. Gittings, Cro. Eliz. 239. Cotes v. Ketle, Cro. Jac. 204. Terry v. Hooper, 1 Lev. 115. Savage v. Robery, 5 Mod. 398; 2 Salk. 694. Surman v. Shelleto, 3 Burr. 1688. Fellowes v. Hunter, 20 Up. Can. Q. B. 382. Brady v. Youlden, Melbourne Argus R., ante, p. 69. [N.B.-Lancaster v. French appears to go a little further than the other cases cited but if so, it must be taken to be so far overruled by them.] So to say to a pork butcher, "Who stole Fraser's pigs? You did, you bloody thief, and I can prove it—you poisoned them with mustard and brimstone," was held not actionable (the jury having found that the words were not intended to impute felony); for there was nothing to show that they were spoken of the plaintiff in relation to his trade. Sibley v. Tomlins, 4 Tyrwhitt, 90. So to say of a grocer, "His shop is in the market," is not actionable, in the primary sense of the words at all events. Ruel v. Tatnell, 29 W. R. 172; 43 L. T. 507. It must be averred and proved that the plaintiff carried on his trade at the time the words were spoken; else the words cannot be spoken of him in the way of such trade. (Bellamy v. Burch, 16 M. & W. 590.) Moreover the trade or employment must be one recognised by the law as a legitimate means of earning one's living. Illustrations. A stock-jobber could not sue for words spoken of him in the way of his trade, so long as that trade was illegal within the 7 Geo. II. c. 8, s. 1 (Sir John Barnard's Act; now repealed by 23 & 24 Vict. c. 28). Morris v. Langdale, 2 Bos. & Pul. 284. Collins v. Carnegie, 1 A. & E. 695; 3 N. & M. 703. If the plaintiff avers that he carries on two trades, it will be sufficient to prove that he carries on one, if the words can affect him in that one. Figgins v. Cogswell, 3 M. & S. 369. Hall v. Smith, 1 M. & S. 287. Where insolvency is imputed to one member of a firm, either he or the firm may sue, for it is a reflection on the credit of both. Harrison v. Bevington, 8 C. & P. 708. Cook and another v. Batchellor, 3 Bos. & Pul. 150. Foster and others v. Lawson, 3 Bing. 452; 11 Moore, 360. A married woman, carrying on a separate trade, may sue without joining her husband for any tort affecting such separate trade or her credit therein. Summers v. City Bank, L. R. 9 C. P. 580; 43 L. J. C. P. 261. And see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, ss. 1, 12, post, pp. 395, 397. IV. Words actionable only by reason of Special Damage. No other words are actionable without proof of special damage. Thus, to accuse a man of fraud, dishonesty, immorality, or any vicious and dishonourable (but not criminal) conduct, is not actionable, unless it has produced as its natural and necessary consequence some pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. Illustrations. Thus, the following words are not actionable without proof of special damage: "Thou art a scurvey bad fellow." Fisher v. Atkinson, 1 Roll. Abr. 43. "A rogue, a villain, and a varlet" (for these, and words of the like kind, are to be considered as "words of heat "). Per cur. in Stanhope v. Blith, 4 Rep. 15. "A runagate rogue." Cockaine v. Hopkins, 2 Lev. 214. "A common filcher." Goodale v. Castle, Cro. Eliz. 554. "A cozening knave." "A liar." Brunkard v. Segar, Cro. Jac. 427; Hutt. 13; 1 Vin. Abr. 427. Kimmis v. Stiles, 44 Vermont, 351. "A cheat." Savage v. Robery, 2 Salk. 694; 5 Mod. 398. "You are a swindler." Savile v. Jardine, 2 H. Bl. 531. Black v. Hunt, 2 L. R. Ir. 10. "He is a rogue and a swindler; I know enough about him to hang him." Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211; 4 M. & P. 796. "He is a rogue, and has cheated his brother-in-law of upwards of £2,000." Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87. Thy credit hath been called in question, and a jury being to pass upon it, thou foistedst in a jury early in the morning; and the lands thou hast are gotten by lewd practices." Nichols v. Badger, Cro. Eliz. 348. "This gentlemen has defrauded us of £22,000." Needham v. Dowling, 15 L. J. C. P. 9. Richardson v. Allen, 2 Chit. 657. "The conduct of the plaintiff's was so bad at a club in Melbourne, that a round robin was signed urging the committee to expel them; as, however, they were there only for a short time, the committee did not proceed further.” Chamberlain v. Boyd (C. A.), 11 Q. B. D. 407; 52 L. J. Q. B. 277; 31 W. R. 572; 48 L. T. 328; 47 J. P. 372. "I have seen the plaintiff; and from what I have seen and heard, I think it is my duty to urge you" (plaintiff's husband) "to send for one or two doctors to see her; some opinion ought to be taken as to the state of her mind." Weldon v. De Bathe, 33 W. R. 328. To say 66 You cheat everybody, you cheated me, you cheated Mr. Saunders," is not actionable unless it be spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his profession or trade. Davis v. Miller et ux., 2 Stra. 1169. Lucas v. Flinn, 35 Iowa, 9. To call a man a "blackleg" is not actionable unless it can be shown that word was understood by the bystanders to mean "a cheating gambler liable to be prosecuted as such." Barnett v. Allen, 3 H. & N. 376; 4 Jur. N. S. 488; 27 L. J. Ex. 412; 1 F. & F. 125. In an American case the difficulty caused by absence of special damage was surmounted by suing in trespass :-A man who, instead of walking along the street, stops on the pavement opposite the plaintiff's freehold shop using insulting and abusive language towards the plaintiff, and persists in such conduct, though requested to move on, is a trespasser, and the jury in an action of trespass may award substantial damages, though no special damages be proved, anl although the abusive words be not actionable per se. (Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barbour (New York) Reports, 390.) For as one of the public he was only entitled to use the highway for passing and repassing. (Doraston v. Payne, 2 Sm. L. Cas. (8th ed.) p. 142.) And evidence of his language while committing a trespass is properly admitted to show in what spirit the act was done. (Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442.) "Where a wrongful act is accompanied by words of contumely and abuse, the jury are warranted in taking that into consideration and giving retributory damages." Per Byles, J., in Bell v. Midland Rail. Co., 10 C. B. N. S. 287, 308; 30 L. J. C. P. 273; 9 W. R. 612; 4 L. T. 293. Words imputing adultery, profligacy, immoral conduct, &c., even when spoken of one holding an office or carrying on a profession or business, will not be actionable, unless they "touch him" in that office, profession, or business. Thus, if alleged of a beneficed clergyman they will be actionable, because if the charge were true it would be ground for degradation or deprivation, as it would prove him unfit to hold his benefice or to continue in the active duties of his profession. (Gallwey v. Marshall, 9 Ex. 294; 23 L. J. Ex. 78.) But if the same words were spoken of a trader, or even of a physician or a schoolmistress, they would not be actionable without proof of special damage, as they do not necessarily affect the plaintiff in relation to his trade or profession. The imputation must be connected with the professional duties of the plaintiff. Illustrations. Words imputing adultery to a physician were laid to have been spoken "of him in his profession," but there was nothing in the declaration to connect the imputation with the plaintiff's professional conduct. Held, that the words were not actionable without special damage. Ayre v. Craven, 2 A. & E. 2; 4 N. & M. 220. To impute prostitution to a schoolmistress is not actionable per se. Per Twisden, J., in Wharton v. Brook, Ventr. 21. Wetherhead v. Armitage, 2 Lev. 233; 2 Show. 18; Freem. 277; 3 And words imputing immorality to a trader or his clerk are not actionable without special damage. Lumby v. Allday, 1 Cr. & J. 301; 1 Tyrw. 217. Nor are words imputing to a staymaker that his trade is maintained by the prostitution of his shopwoman. Brayne v. Cooper, 5 M. & W. 249. But now see Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. D. 91; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; 24 |