constantly play Santa Claus until the time comes for paying the bills. Frankly, I haven't had any letters lately from any of my constituents wanting a tax increase.

Mr. ČEDERBERG. I don't have any, either.

Mr. LATTA. I think that is something we ought to reckon with. I don't have any grandchildren, but I don't want to further place any liabilities on them. I don't want to increase the national debt limit more than the $465 billion we have now. That is a lot of money, and that is a lot of interest. There are only two ways we can go: Either increase taxes or raise the national debt. I think these individuals who are saying today that they want to go right ahead on our spending spree and spend all of this money that the President has impounded, or refused to spend, use whatever term you like, ought to face up to that and tell the people back home that they are either for increasing the national debt and paying interest on that debt, or for a tax increase. I think we ought to be forthright about it. I think that is the issue, and I think the American people ought to hear it. I am sorry they were not here to hear your statements, because I think you pointed this up very well.

Mr. CEDERBERG. Thank you.

Mr. LATTA. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to clear up this television business. I have heard several remarks made about them not being here this afternoon. They were invited to be here.

Mr. CEDERBERG. Don't misunderstand me, Mr. Chairman. You didn't have anything to do with this.

The CHAIRMAN. They were invited to be here all day, and they are invited tomorrow. Whether they will show up tomorrow, I don't know. We have no control over the television.

Mr. CEDERBERG. This happens regularly in our full Appropriations Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Long?

Mr. LONG. Mr. McSpadden just went out and inquired about the television. We understand they were not impounded, but they had an urgent call to the Watergate.

Mr. CEDERBERG. I understand they are over with Mr. Meany around the hall.

Mr. LONG. I have three or four rather serious questions

I gather you completely believe in the authority of the President to impound funds?

Mr. CEDERBERG. It doesn't make any difference what I believe.

Mr. LONG. Do you?

Mr. CEDERBERG. Yes.

Mr. LONG. Where do you think he gets this authority, Mr. Cederberg?

Mr. CEDERBERG. Most Presidents have used great discretion in the exercise of that authority.

The words have been used many times, "to faithfully execute the laws." To faithfully execute laws relating to the economy of the country requires him to take certain action. This is nothing new. Let me give you what the former Director, Charles Shultz, Director of the Budget under the previous administration, had to say.

When he was asked where the legal authority was to withhold, here is what he said, and that had to do with the highway trust funds: "Basically, it is the general power of the President to operate for the welfare of the economy and the Nation in terms of combating inflationary pressures." That is what he said.

Also, his successor, Charles Zwick, said the same thing on the same issue, and he referred to an opinion by Ramsey Clark, Acting Attorney General, who declared that the Secretary of Transportation had the power to defer the ability of highway construction funds which had not yet become the subject of contractual obligations by the Federal Government in favor of a State.

Mr. LONG. I don't think necessarily because there are precedents for it that gives them the authority or makes it right. I don't think it has, to my knowledge, ever really been legally contested to determine whether or not they do have that authority.

Mr. CEDERBERG. I think that is a fair statement. There have been some questions that run around the perimeter of it, but never really got to the question. I would hate to think what would happen to the country if that authority of impounding funds was taken away.

The President, by necessity, has to have some discretion in the exercise of the administration of government.

Mr. LONG. Certainly the Anti-Deficiency Act to a fairly general extent gives him that authority. In your mind, does this extend to him the right to do away with complete programs?

Mr. CEDEDBERG. It includes, I would think, the right to reserve on those programs for a given period of time until action is taken on his new budget.

Mr. LONG. Which would mean in effect to do away with those programs and not execute those programs at all.

The next logical step would be that if a particular legal situation or factual situation arose, and it is decided not to execute one program and spend the money for that program, that the next logical step might be to spend money that has not been appropriated at all. That is the next logical move in this regard. There has been at least a hint on the part of the President that something close to that was approaching. He seems to have moved away from it.

If you read the first press conference he had after the end of the war in Vietnam and the beginning of the peace settlements, he indicated that perhaps he didn't say this specifically, but I gained the impression, and I know a number of other people did at the time-perhaps the money was available for aid to North Vietnam. This has never come out since that time. They have now admitted that it requires a congressional act in order to make this money available in an appropriation by the Congress. But I think a number of people got the other impression.

Do you think this goes so far that if circumstances seemed to justify it and he made a commitment in North Vietnam to go ahead and make that money available to North Vietnam at the present time without any action on the part of the Congress, that he could do it?

Mr. CEDERBERG. No, but we have plenty of precedents during the Johnson administration of transfer of funds in particular areas of foreign aid. I don't know whether the President would have that authority or not. If he does, I wish he wouldn't execute it.

Getting back to whether a President can cut a program or refuse to spend the money, I suppose the best example is when the Congress tried to force so many Air Force wings on the late President Truman, and he said "Go ahead and force them on me. I am not going to spend the money anyway." And he didn't.

Mr. LONG. There is no question but that it is a complicated matter. Going a step further with respect to spending money not appropriated, where the President didn't have the authority to send the naval forces of America around the world, he said:

I have the money to send them halfway, and I will worry about Congress getting them back.

Mr. CEDEGBERG. I am not worried so much about holding down spending as I am about increasing spending when you have a deficit that will run over $25 billion this year. I would be very much more concerned about holding things down, holding the line a little bit, so that we don't have an increase in inflation, or taxes. That is what I would like. To me that would make a little more attractive proposition. Mr. LONG. The removal of all power of the President to impound funds is, of course, something that I don't think any of us here are willing to say ought to be done. Otherwise I don't think the Congress would have passed the Antideficiency Act. I think it is a matter of degree rather than anything else. Let's look at the other side of it. We have taken extreme examples here with respect to situations if he did not impound. Let's assume, for example, that the sense of the Congress and the sense of the Nation was that there was a very strong military need, a need for a particular military action to be taken, and the Congress passed an appropriation for that military need and for that specific action to be taken, and then the President of the United States impounded those funds.

I wonder where we would be under those circumstances?

Mr. CEDERBERG. I don't think we will ever have to worry about that, but I will give you my opinion.

The President under the Constitution is the Commander in Chief, and he has a lot of latitude in this position as to what kind of actions he wants to take or participate in. I think you do run into a different problem. He wears a different hat as Commander in Chief of the defense forces. I would find it hard to believe that the Congress would pass certain legislation and say "You have to spend so much money to invade," or take a certain defense action.

Mr. LONG. I would think that is true under the current attitude that exists. Of course, we don't know what will happen in the future in that regard. Very possibly the Congress could become the one with the sense of urgency in these national matters.

Mr. CEDERBERG. You would be hard pressed to turn over the fact that he is considered the Commander in Chief of the military.

Mr. LONG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clawson.

Mr. CLAWSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cederberg, it is nice to have you before us, to get a little different slant than we had this morning. After listening to my good friend and colleague from Louisiana, I would like to clarify a point. This bill does not address itself whatever to increased spending or transfer

of funds, or spending by the President; does it? It is only to the impoundment of funds, and not spending?

Mr. CEDERBERG. That is exactly right.

Mr. CLAWSON. So it has nothing to do with whether he is going to spend more money in Vietnam or any place else.

Mr. CEDERBERG. He can't spend more than the Congress gives him. Mr. CLAWSON. It has nothing to do with the increased spending, but only with the impounding of moneys.

Mr. CEDERBERG. That is right. This is a bill that commands him to spend.

Mr. CLAWSON. If the President impounds any funds he has to give a report to the Congress within 10 days thereafter.

On page 2 of your statement you indicate that "impoundment” is a very ambiguous term, and talk even about delay in spending funds, which would mean, as I interpret your statement, that immediately, if he delays the obligation or the spending of the money, or having it already under contract, he is under orders to report to the Congress, even if it were allocated quarterly. Am I correct?

Mr. CEDERBERG. I alluded to that in my testimony. As a matter of fact, to comply with the words of this bill we would be weighted down with paperwork like no one has seen before.

Mr. CLAWSON. I gather that from page 2, where you say the bill would require a report to Congress on every such action. Have there been any cost studies or any estimates of the number of such actions. that might have to come before you?

Mr. CEDERBERG. No; not that I have seen. You might ask the Director of the Office of Management and Budget who will testify, I understand. He might be able to give you some idea. But there are hundreds of actions taken not only at the Cabinet level, but all the way down through the Government, in the various agencies.

Mr. CLAWSON. Every bureaucracy of the Federal Government would be involved in this kind of delay action under the terms of this bill. Mr. CEDERBERG. Absolutely, every one.

Mr. CLAWSON. A bureaucrat clear down the line who might defer action on one particular obligation authority, or appropriation, would have to come in with his report within 10 days from the time this was delayed.

Mr. CEDERBERG. That is the way I interpret it.

Mr. CLAWSON. Thank you.

I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

If not, thank you. We appreciate your testimony very much, Mr. Cederberg.

Mr. CEDERBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciated the opportunity to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. Tomorrow morning at 10:30 in the Foreign Affairs Committee, the hearings will continue with other Members of Congress. If we get started on time tomorrow morning, we will be through earlier.

(Whereupon, at 4:15, p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene Thursday, March 29, 1973, at 10 a.m.)

IMPOUNDMENT REPORTING AND REVIEW

THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 1973

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON RULES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 2172, Rayburn Office Building, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman of the committee) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I might say at the opening that we will have the same procedure on questioning as we had yesterday.

Our next witness this morning is the distinguished Congressman from Texas, Congressman Pickle.

If you care to proceed sir, the committee will be glad to hear from

you.

STATEMENT OF HON. J. J. (JAKE) PICKLE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Chairman and my distinguished colleagues, I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you today the courses available to us in dealing with the problem of Executive impoundment of lawfully appropriated funds.

Mr. Chairman, I have a statement of some 15 minutes or a little more. I would like to divide my statement, one part into the history of impoundment problems, and, second, the bill I am proposing. My statement might be a little longer than some of the other witnesses before the committee, but since I was one of the principal authors of an impoundment bill, I would like permission to insert my entire remarks for the record, including extraneous materials, and then to possibly skip some of the pages in order to save as much time as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it may be submitted that way. Mr. PICKLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The first point I want to make is that Presidential power to impound, or not spend, lawfully appropriated funds is neither clear cut nor inherent.

It exists in the final analysis only at the will and with the consent of this U.S. Congress. It is in our power today, as always, to define the limits of lawful impoundments or even to state when or whether they are legal at all.

The President and his officers at the Office of Management and Budget have claimed that the Presidential authority to impound funds