right of property either in the land or in goods upon the land, there might be an irrevocable right of entry, but when the contract stands by itself it must be either a conveyance or a license subject to be revoked.

Judgment affirmed.

BAXTER v. BUCHHOLZ-HILL TRANSPORTATION

COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

No. 882. Submitted February 24, 1913.-Decided March 10, 1913,

The decree in a case is the dominant act and cannot be given a greater effect than it purports to have and than would be warranted by the opinion that the court finally reached.

The fact that a court in dismissing a libel without prejudice to a new

suit expressed a decision on the merits, which it afterwards, on motion, excluded, does not make the decree as finally entered a decision on the merits.

While a matter is still in its breast, the court may change its opinion

and do so by changing the decree,

Writ of error to review, 206 N. Y: 173, dismissed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Arthur English, for defendant in error, in support. of motion to dismiss or affirm.

Mr. Charles C. Burlingham, Mr. Norman B. Beccher and Mr. Ray Rood Allen for plaintiff in error, in opposition thereto.

Memorandum opinion by direction of the court. By MR. JUSTICE HOLMES.

This is an action brought by the Buchholz-Hill Transportation Company, defendant in error, against Baxter for failing to use due diligence in locating and marking a sunken coal barge with a buoy, as he had agreed to, by reason of which failure a tug ran into the wreck and was sunk. It is alleged that the owners of the tug libelled the barge in the admiralty, that the Buchholz-Hill Company answered and filed a petition to bring in Baxter under the 59th Admiralty Rule, that the District Court entered a decree against the barge but gave costs to Baxter without prejudice to a new action against him; and that the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decree. The defendant set up the decree dismissing the libel as against him, alleging that the decision was upon the merits and that the decree, in so far as it purported to be without prejudice. was not warranted by law. The Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals both held the plea bad. 142 App. Div. 25. 206 N. Y. 173.

The defendant relies upon the fact that the Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion expressed a decision upon the merits. The Macy, 96 C. C. A. 146. 170 Fed. Rep. 930. But upon motion it so far changed its view as to exclude such a decision and to leave it open to the company to bring a new action. The matter was still in the breast of the court; it was free to change its opinion if it saw fit, and it was free to do so by changing the decree without delivering a new opinion to explain what the decree made manifest. If it thought, rightly or wrongly. that the collateral question of the present defendant's liability could not be tried in that case, it properly embodied its decision in the decree. The decree is the dominant act and cannot be given a greater effect than it purports to have and than would be warranted by the opinion that the court finally reached.

Writ of error dismissed.

227 U.S.

Syllabus.

KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. CARL.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS.

No. 16. Argued October 22, 1912.-Decided March 10, 1913.

Under the Carmack Amendment an interstate carrier comes under liability not only for its own default but also for loss and damage upon the line of any connecting carrier. Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186.

Under the Carmack Amendment a stipulation for limitation of liability, if unauthorized as to the initial carrier, is ineffective also as to a connecting carrier, and if valid as to the initial carrier, is valid as to a connecting carrier.

The Carmack Amendment does not forbid a limitation of liability in case of loss or damage to a valuation agreed upon for the purpose of determining which of two alternative lawful rates shall apply to a particular shipment.

The Carmack Amendment manifested the purpose of Congress to bring contracts for interstate shipments under one uniform rule or law and therefore withdraw them from the influence of state regulation. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491. An agreement to release a carrier for part of a loss of an interstate shipment due to negligence is no more valid than one for complete exemption, neither is such a contract any more valid because it rests on consideration than if it were without consideration; but a declared value by the shipper for the purpose of determining the applicable rate based upon valuation is not an exemption from either statutory or common-law liability.

Under the Act to Regulate Commerce a carrier who has filed rate sheets which show two rates based upon valuation is legally bound to charge the applicable rate.

A shipper who declares either voluntarily or on request the value of the article shipped so as to obtain the lower of several rates based on valuation is estopped upon plain principles of justice from recovering any greater amount.

A shipper, who has declared a value to get the lower of two rates, cannot be allowed to introduce evidence aliunde so as to recover a larger amount as the true value; it would encourage undervaluations and result in illegal preferences and discriminations.

Statement of the Case.

227 U.S.

Where the duly filed tariff sheets show different rates based on valuation, the shipper must take notice of the applicable rate and actual want of knowledge is no excuse; his knowledge is conclusively presumed.

A carrier cannot contract with a particular shipper for an unusual service unless he make and publish a rate for such service equally for all. Chicago & Alton Ry. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155.

An administrative rule of the Interstate Commerce Commission is that valuation and rate are dependent each upon the other.

In this case the valuation agreement of the contract was expressed in usual form, was conclusive on the shipper, and does not offend the Carmack Amendment.

91 Arkansas, 97; 121 S. W. Rep. 932, reversed.

ACTION by the holder of a bill of lading issued by the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway for two boxes and one barrel containing "household goods" received at Lawton, in what was then the Indian Territory, a station on the line of the railway company, for transportation to Gentry, Arkansas, a station on the line of railway of plaintiff in error. One of the boxes was never delivered, and the shipper sued to recover its value.

The defense was that the plaintiff had, in order to obtain the lower of two freight rates, shipped the boxes under an agreement that the goods, in case of a loss, should be valued at five dollars per hundred-weight, and that it, as a succeeding carrier in the route, was entitled to the benefit of that limitation of value. The total weight of the two boxes and barrel was four hundred pounds, and the weight of the box lost was not over two hundred pounds. The limitation of liability was in the form of a release signed by the shipper and was delivered to the primary carrier on receipt of the bill of lading.

The relevant parts of the bill of lading were in these words.

"LAWTON, 10-8-1907. "Received from J. M. Carl, in apparent good order, by the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company

the following described packages marked and numbered as per margin, subject to the conditions and regulations of the published tariff of said Company, to be transported over the line of this railroad to and delivered, after

payment of Freight, in like good order to the next carrier (if the same are to be forwarded beyond the line of this Company's road), to be carried to the place of destination; it being especially agreed that the responsibility of this Company shall cease at this company's depot at which the same are to be delivered to such carrier; but this Company guarantees that the rates of Freight for the transportation of said packages from the place of shipment to shall not exceed - per and charges advanced by this Company, subject to the following conditions:

"It is further especially agreed that for all loss or damage occurring in the transit of said packages the legal remedy shall be against the particular carrier or forwarder only in whose custody may be actually at the happening thereof, it being understood that the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company assumes no other responsibility for their safe carriage or safety than may be incurred on its own road.