REPORT OF THE GENERAL OF THE ARMY. HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, SIR: I now have the honor to submit to you the following annual reports: 1st. Of Adjutant-General Drum, including tables which exhibit in great detail the organization of the Army according to existing laws; of the actual strength of organizations and distribution of troops; and statements of enlistments, casualties, recruitment, number of trials, &c., with comments and recommendations of which I will treat in due order. 2d. Of Inspector-General Sacket, giving results of the actual inspections of the various posts; of money accounts, property returns, and everything which contributes to the efficiency of the military establishment, with certain recommendations which I shall likewise consider in the proper place. The above are the only two heads of the staff bureaus who report to me; all others are construed as branches of the War Department, and report direct to the Secretary of War. I also transmit herewith the very full and exhaustive reports of all the commanding generals of divisions and departments, which record the changes made since their last annual reports, with a narrative of events which are most useful to the parties in interest and to the future historian. These are as follows: 3.-Military Division of the Missouri, Lieutenant-General Sheridan. 3 A.-Department of Dakota, Brigadier-General Terry. 3 B.-Department of the Platte, Brigadier-General Crook. 3 C.-Department of the Missouri, Brigadier-General Pope. 3 C.-Report of Colonel Hatch. 3 D.-Department of Texas, Brigadier-General Augur. 4.-Military Division of the Atlantic, Major-General Hancock. 4 A.-Department of the East, Major-General Hancock. 4 B.-Department of the South, Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General Hunt. 5.-Military Division of the Pacific and Department of California, Major-General McDowell, followed by 5 a, b, and c. 5 A.-Department of the Columbia: 1, Colonel and Brevet BrigadierGeneral Wheaton; and 2, Brigadier-General Miles. 5 B-Department of Arizona, Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General Willcox. I also submit herewith (6) the reports of Brig. Gen. O. O. Howard, Department of West Point, and (7) of Colonel and Brevet Major-General Getty, commanding Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia. All these are so full and interesting that I am sure they will receive your careful perusal. For a short time, viz, from January 31, 1881, to May 9, 1881, a Military Division "of the Gulf" was constituted by President Hayes, embracing Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and the Indian Territory, with Major-General Schofield in command; but as this division was found to fulfill no useful military end, it was discontinued by President Garfield, leaving boundaries as they existed before. These boundaries generally conform to political lines, and are the result of long experience, clearly limiting and defining the authority and consequent responsibility of each commanding general. Whilst the troops have been kept very busy during the past year, no serious Indian or other war has occurred, but great progress has been made in collecting and locating Indians, hitherto hostile, on their proper reservations. Sitting Bull and his adherents, who had fled into British territory, are now held at Fort Randall, Dak., as prisoners of war, and the Utes have been moved to a new reservation in Utah, as fully described in the reports of Generals Terry and Sheridan. The sudden outbreak of a part of the Apaches in Arizona is explained in the reports of Generals Willcox and McDowell. In the latter case it was found necessary to re-enforce for a short time the usual garrisons in Arizona by a strong detachment from New Mexico, under Colonel Mackenzie, of the Fourth Cavalry. The guilty Apaches are now held as prisoners for trial. Some have escaped into Mexico, whilst the greater part of the tribe remains on their reservation at San Carlos, under their proper civil agent. I will append to General McDowell's report copies of all papers necessary to illustrate this event. All these annual reports, with justice, dwell on the fact that our companies are too small for efficient discipline and for economical service. There are in the Army 430 companies, which are necessarily widely scattered over our vast domain, to guard property and to prevent, as far as foresight can, complications and troubles of every variety and kind-at one time protecting the settlers against Indians, and again Indians against the settlers. When these occur it is always sudden, and re-enforcements have to be hurried forward from great distances, and always at heavy cost for transportation of men, horses, wagons, and supplies. This cost in the aggregate will, in my judgment, be more than sufficient to supply an increase of 20 per cent. of private soldiers— all that I would ask for at this time, because I believe this increase will add little, if any, to the annual cost of the Army, and yet give great relief to our overtaxed soldiers. In the last ten years our frontiers have so extended, under the protection of our small Army, as to add at least a thousand millions of dollars to the taxable wealth of the nation; has enabled emigrants to settle up remote parts of the country, and is a principal cause of the great prosperity which is felt throughout all parts of the country. When the national Treasury was poor and loaded with debt, the Army endeavored, gracefully, to submit to overwork, but they now appeal for relief, and I do most earnestly ask the honorable Secretary of War to apply to Congress to repeal that clause of existing law which limits the enlisted force of the Army to 25,000 men, and to enact that each and every company in the Army may be enlisted to at least 50 privates, making 62 enlisted men and 3 officers to each of the 430 companies, thus increasing the Army proper to 26,660 enlisted men, which number in practice will probably never exceed 25,000. This should form the combatant force; and, as experience and universal practice have demonstrated the necessity for another or non-combatant force, I further urge that special provision be made by law for each of the following separate and distinct purposes, viz: Which number, added to the 26,660 before explained, will make a total enlisted force of every nature and kind of 30,449. By section 1115, Revised Statutes, the number of enlisted men of all arms of service is limited to 30,000; but for some years, in appropriation bills, the number has been further restricted to 25,000, which, in my judgment, has resulted in no real economy, and has imposed on the private soldiers of the Army too much manual labor and an undue proportion of risk to life and health. In this connection I submit statement of the actual strength of enlisted men in the Regular Army, compiled from returns received at the Adjutant-General's Office up to October 15, 1881, as follows: Permanent and recruiting parties, music boys, and recruits in depots.. 1,251 Ordnance Department.. West Point detachments.. Prison guard............ Hospital stewards.. 421 406 192 68 Signal detachment. Non-combatants..... 171 112 149 300 494 3,781 Total enlisted force of the Army of the United States, October, 1881.... 23,596 There are 120 companies of cavalry, 60 of artillery, and 250 of infantry. By dividing the total force of each arm of service by the number of companies, we have the average strength of company For cavalry, 58 enlisted men. For artillery, 40 enlisted men. For infantry, 41 enlisted men. These numbers embrace 12 non-commissioned officers and musicians, leaving only 46, 28, and 29 privates, respectively-numbers so small that the companies are almost ridiculous, compelling commanding officers to group two and even four companies together to perform the work of one. I also invite attention to the absurdity of styling in orders the companies of foot artillery, armed with muskets and without guns, "batteries." They are not batteries in any intelligent sense. The same as to "troop" for cavalry. All should be styled what they are in fact, "companies." Nearly every general officer commanding troops on the frontier asks in his annual report for a larger increase than I have herein indicated, but this may be better accomplished by giving to the President the right to increase, at his discretion, the companies most exposed to danger to any number of privates, not exceeding 100, limited always in practice by the actual appropriations of money rather than by a fixed number of men. In the report of Inspector-General Sacket you will find two points worthy of notice. He represents that his corps of officers is now limited to five, which is too small a number for the important duties which devolve on them. The inspector-general must necessarily be stationed in Washington, and should have at least one competent assistant with him. Then there are now, and probably always will be, three geographical divisions and nine departments, each of which ought to have an inspector-general. This would necessitate 14 officers in all—an increase in this corps of nine majors, each of whom should have the right to employ one clerk, with the same compensation which is now allowed to paymasters' clerks. I cordially unite with General Sacket in this latter recommendation, and further, that the President be allowed to select any increase of officers in the Inspector-General's Department from the majors and captains of the line. This is the only increase of commissioned officers asked for in the whole Army, and would, in fact, only be an increase of the same number of lieutenants needed to fill the vacancies occasioned by the promotion of the nine majors. The second recommendation is in regard to officers' servants. I, myself, have seen occasions when no officer could afford to hire a servant, because a servant's wages exceeded the officer's pay; and as a rule the government compels its officers to live in remote places where no servant will go, of his own free will, for any wages. It is simply impossible for an officer to hire a servant at a hundred places where troops must necessarily be; and on one occasion, two years ago, in Western Montana, I had an escort of a company of cavalry, where, as soon as we reached camp, the captain and lieutenants had to pull off their coats, gather wood and water, cook their own meals, and groom their own horses. I honor labor as much as any man, and never was ashamed to cook my own meal or saddle my own horse; but no officer can habitually do this work and properly supervise his company and command. No soldier should ever be compelled to do menial labor without compensation, or without his own consent; but if a soldier is willing to cook and wash for his captain, and to groom his horse, for pay, there is no reason why he should be forbidden to do it, and I recommend that the law be repealed, or modified so as to read: SEC. 1232. No officer shall use an enlisted man as a servant, in any case whatever, without proper compensation, or without his own consent and that of his commanding officer. With this modification no wrong is possible to any soldier, and the officer will not be compelled, as now, to do menial service or to violate the law. There is a subject of great importance, needing Congressional action, which has hitherto been discussed and will bear repetition. In the early days of the republic nearly every city and harbor on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, as well as on the lakes, wanted a fort for protection against public enemies. These were built and still remain the property of the United States, and the Army is charged, in one way or another, with their care and preservation. Very many of them are now absolutely of no use, present or prospective, and should be disposed of. I will not mention names, because of local feeling. Every such city or town, from Maine to Texas and from Duluth to Lake George, has a local pride in its fort and garrison, and if in times past such a fort was built by the United States, any attempt to withdraw the garrison or remove the flag is met by local opposition, often impossible to overcome. I recommend that you apply to Congress for authority to submit the whole question of coast defense to a board of high officers of all arms of service, to consider the whole question, with instructions to report to the Secretary of War what coast forts shall be maintained, what sites shall be retained for future use, and what may be absolutely sold; and further, that authority be granted the President to sell the same, subject to any conditions which Congress may impose. In like manner, inland, a great number of military posts and stations have either been reserved from the public domain, or have been purchased, which, by the progress of settlement, have become obsolete; yet they need a military guard for protection. These are worse than useless, because they absorb a large fraction of the small Army, which ought to be free for action. For these I would recommend a similar, |