fraudulent undervaluation of the property, other creditors have no legal
ground of complaint.
-Repauno Chemical Co. v. Victor Hardware Co., 101 Fed. 948.
42 C. C. A. 106
It is the rule of law in Missouri that if a trustee in a deed of trust given
to secure creditors is privy to, or has knowledge of, a fraudulent intent
on the part of the grantor in executing the instrument, such knowledge
will invalidate the instrument as to the beneficiaries, and generally he is
the agent of his cestui que trust in all matters pertaining to the manage-
ment and control of the trust property; and if he has any active duties
to perform with respect thereto, and is not merely the repository of the
title, having no previous connection with the property, whatever knowl-
edge or notice impairs his legal title also impairs the equitable title of the
beneficiaries.
-Batavia v. Wallace, 102 Fed. 240.....
Under the rule in Missouri that notice to a grantee of facts and cir-
cumstances sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the fraudulent intent
with which the conveyance was made by his grantor is not equivalent to
actual knowledge of such intent, which must be found as a fact when in
issue, yet such notice will warrant an inference of knowledge unless it is
shown that the inquiries suggested thereby were made, and proved un-
availing.
--Batavia v. Wallace, 102 Fed. 240......
§ 2. Remedies of creditors and purchasers.
A letter addressed by a creditor to a mercantile agency, stating that she
did not intend to push a debtor named, as he had ample time, and was
meeting his notes as they became due, is not admissible in evidence on
behalf of other creditors of such debtor in an attack upon a conveyance
by the debtor to the writer of the letter, in the absence of evidence that
the letter was ever communicated to the other creditors.
-Repauno Chemical Co. v. Victor Hardware Co., 101 Fed. 948....
42 C. C. A. 106
In the whole range of the law there is no class of cases in which a jury
should be allowed greater latitude in forming an opinion based upon in-
ference than in cases of fraudulent conveyances involving the question
of fraudulent intent, and knowledge thereof on the part of another, and
such cases should be submitted to the jury if there are any badges of
fraud, or circumstances which are calculated to excite a suspicion in the
mind of a reasonable person that the transaction was not entirely fair
and honest.
-Batavia v. Wallace, 102 Fed. 240......
Regulation of rates, see "Carriers," § 1.
See "Indictment and Information."
The impaneling of a grand jury in Alaska is governed by the statutes
of Oregon, extended by act of congress to that territory; and under such
statutes, which provide that no challenge shall be allowed to an indi-
vidual juror except for some one of the grounds of disqualification enu-
merated, it was not error to refuse to discharge a grand juror from the
panel on a challenge for actual bias made by an accused, whose case
would come before such jury, but the rights of the accused were suffi-
ciently protected by a direction to such juror not to take part in or vote
upon that particular case.
-Jackson v. United States, 102 Fed. 473.
Of public lands, see "Public Lands."
In civil actions, see "Appeal and Error," § 8.
Injuries at railroad crossings, see "Railroads," § 5.
Land acquired by a husband in the territory of Washington prior to
any legislation regarding community property, and which therefore be-
came his separate property, remained so, nor did such legislation have the
effect to vest the wife with a community interest therein because of its
subsequent increase in value, or because of improvements made with the
proceeds of crops raised thereon, though produced by the joint labor of
both husband and wife.
-Seeber v. Randall, 102 Fed. 215...
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
Consolidation of indictments, see "Criminal Law," § 2.
For particular offenses, see "Assault and Battery," § 1; "Conspiracy," § 1;
"Embezzlement"; "Public Lands," § 1.
§ 1. Formal requisites of indictment.
The designation of the grand jurors in an indictment found in the dis-
trict court for the district of Alaska as "the grand jurors of the United
States of America, selected, impaneled, sworn, and charged within and
for the district of Alaska," is not a substantial error which vitiates the
indictment; and under the Code of Oregon (Hill's Ann. Laws, § 1280),
also, such defect must be disregarded, as not tending to the prejudice
of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.
-Jackson v. United States, 102 Fed. 473...
...........42 C. C. A. 452
The conclusion of an indictment returned in the district court for the
district of Alaska, “against the peace and dignity of the United States,"
is proper; the only laws in force in the territory, and which an accused
can be charged with violating, being those provided by the congress of
the United States.
-Jackson v. United States, 102 Fed. 473............42 C. C. A. 452
The entitling of an indictment returned in the district court for the
district of Alaska, "In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Alaska," although inaccurate, is merely a clerical or technical
error, which does not vitiate such indictment, either upon general prin-
ciples, or under the statute of Oregon in force in the territory.
-Jackson v. United States, 102 Fed. 473....
Of patent, see "Patents," § 5.
Of trade-mark, see "Trade-Marks and Trade-Names," § 1.
Infringement of trade-mark or trade-name, see "Trade-Marks and Trade-
Names," § 1.
Jurisdiction of appeal in cases involving construction of United States consti-
tution, see "Courts," § 1.
Railroad crossing, see "Railroads," § 2.
§ 1. Subjects of protection and relief.
While the owner of a patent may lawfully warn others against infringe-
ment, and, by means of circulars or letters distributed among agents and
customers of a manufacturer of goods claimed to infringe, give notice of
his rights as he understands them, and of his intention to enforce them by
suits, when done in good faith, the sending of such notices and circulars
in bad faith, and without any intention of bringing the suits therein
threatened, but solely for the purpose of destroying the business of such
manufacturer, constitutes a fraudulent invasion of property rights, against
which the party injured is entitled to relief in equity by injunction.
-A. B. Farquhar Co. v. National Harrow Co., 102 Fed. 714.
§ 2. Preliminary and interlocutory injunctions.
Where a state board of transportation had made an order requiring a
railroad company to appear before it and show cause why a reduction in
certain freight rates should not be made, and a temporary injunction was
sought by a supplemental bill to restrain the board from entering upon
such hearing, which relief was based on the ground that the board had no
power to order a reduction in rates it was held that an order denying a
temporary injunction was properly entered-First, because the relief
sought by the supplemental bill was based upon grounds which were so
far doubtful that it would have been unwise to grant a temporary injunc-
tion; and, second, because it was doubtful whether the relief sought by
the supplemental bill could be obtained otherwise than by an original bill.
-Higginson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 102 Fed. 197.
§ 3. Writ, order, or decree, service, and enforcement.
A restraining order that neither forbids nor commands the doing of any
specific act, but simply repeats the general admonitions of the interstate
commerce act, should not be granted, since such an injunction does not
give any additional sanction to the statute, but leaves all vital questions
concerning violations of the law to be tried by proceedings for contempt,
instead of being tried in the usual manner before a court and jury.
-Southern Pac. Co. v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co., 101 Fed. 779; Colo-
rado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., Id....42 C. C. A. 12
See "Assignments for Benefit of Creditors"; "Bankruptcy."
Of bank, effect on deposits, see "Banks and Banking," § 1.
In civil actions, see "Trial," § 3. .
Statements of insured as part of res gestæ, see "Evidence," § 1.
1. Extent of loss and liability of insurer.
Where an application for insurance against accident represents the
applicant as an importer and dealer in Chinese merchandise and con-
tractor for Chinese labor, and it is agreed in the application and policy
that for any injury received in any occupation classed by the company as
more hazardous than that named in the application the insured shall be
entitled to recover only such amount as the premium paid would purchase
at the rates fixed for such increased hazard, the fact that the insured
made a full disclosure of the business in which he was engaged to the
agent of the company who solicited the insurance, and that the latter
had full knowledge of the increased risk when the policy was issued, will
not render the company liable for more than the amount of insurance that
may be purchased with the premium paid for such increased hazard.
-Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Back, 102 Fed. 229...
Where, in an action on an accident policy, defendant averred in its
answer that the business of foreman of Chinese labor, in which insured
was engaged at the time of the accident, was classified as a special risk,
and was much more dangerous than that described in the application of
insured, and that the premium paid would have purchased a less amount
of insurance than that agreed to be paid in the policy issued, such aver-
ments, if proved, would deprive plaintiff of his right to recover on the
policy more than the amount of insurance that the premium paid would
purchase in the increased risk.
-Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Back, 102 Fed. 229.
§ 2. Actions on policies.
The undisputed evidence showed that about four months before the
death of plaintiff's intestate defendant issued to him a policy of insurance
upon his life, and transmitted it to its general agent for the state of Texas
for delivery; that the deceased accepted the policy, but by agreement the
agent paid for him the first premium, and retained possession of the
policy; that about 60 days thereafter defendant received the first semi-
annual premium, while deceased was in good health, and retained the
same until advised of the death of intestate. Held, that the court properly
instructed the jury to find for plaintiff.
-United States Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, 102 Fed. 722..42 C. C. A. 601
INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT.
Review on appeal or writ of error, see "Appeal and Error," § 8.
Where a life insurance policy for one year provided that the premium
should be paid in four installments, and that the policy should embrace
four separate insurance contracts, and should not remain in force after
any one period unless installments for the succeeding period were paid,
such policy should have been stamped as a contract of insurance for one
year, and the placing of additional stamps on the policy as the install-
ments were paid did not satisfy the law.
-Buckalew v. United States, 102 Fed. 320...
The provision of the war revenue act of 1898, imposing a stamp tax
on express receipts, neither authorizes nor prohibits an increase of rates
by an express company to cover the cost of the stamp required; and the
action of a state railroad commission authorized by statute to prescribe
rates for carriage between points within the state, in prohibiting an ex-
press company from adding the cost of the revenue stamp to the maxi-
mum rates prescribed, is within its jurisdiction and powers, and can
only be set aside by the courts on the ground that the rates so com-
pelled are so low as to be violative of constitutional rights.
-Trammell v. Dinsmore, 102 Fed. 794; Dinsmore v. Southern Exp.
Co., Id.....
...42 C. C. A. 623
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
Regulation of freight or passenger rates, see "Carriers," § 1.
On appeal or writ of error, see "Appeal and Error," § 9.
Review, see "Appeal and Error."
Where the record in a cause removed from a state court to the federal
court fails to show the facts on which the jurisdiction rests,-as that
plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states, the judgment
therein cannot for such reason be collaterally attacked by one who is a
party to the suit, though it may b reversed upon a direct proceeding for
that purpose.
-Haug v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 102 Fed. 74....42 C. C. A. 167
An order dismissing a cause, upon motion, on the ground that the com-
plaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, is a
final judgment, under the practice of North Dakota, and cannot be col-
laterally attacked, however erroneous it may be.
-Haug v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 102 Fed. 74....42 C. C. A. 167
§ 2. Merger and bar of causes of action and defenses.
Where an action is dismissed upon motion of defendant because the
complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,
plaintiff cannot afterwards maintain an action to enforce the same right,
where the legal effect of the complaint in the two cases is identical, and
all evidence going to the merits of the action which would have been com-
petent under the one would likewise be competent under the other.
-Haug v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 102 Fed. 74....42 C. C. A. 167
§ 3. Conclusiveness of adjudication.
A defendant in an action at law to recover possession of land, who
claimed under a legal title accompanied by possession, both antedating the
title under which the plaintiff claimed, is concluded as to his claim by a
judgment for the plaintiff, which necessarily determines the invalidity
of his title; and he cannot make such title the basis of a subsequent suit
in equity to restrain the enforcement of such judgment.
Rachal v. Smith, 101 Fed. 159.
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