Statute as a whole: Statutes should be so construed, if practicable, that one section will explain and support and not defeat or destroy another section. (Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U. S., 242.)

The same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional; and if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected. Unless it be impossible to avoid it, a general revenue statute should never be declared inoperative in all its parts because a particular part relating to a distinct subject may be invalid. (Field v. Clark (1892), 143 U. S., 649; 38 Int. Rev. Rec., 285.) Retroactive operation: A statute is construed as prospective unless the intention is clearly expressed that it is retroactive. (Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S., 108; T. D. 1685.)

Presumption: When an act of Congress is claimed to be unconstitutional, the presumption is in favor of its validity, and it is only when the question is free from any reasonable doubt that courts should hold an act in violation of that fundamental instrument upon which all the powers of the Government rest. (Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S., 509.)

The presumption is in favor of every legislative act. (Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat., 419; T. D. 1786.)

The Supreme Court will not conclude, in the absence of language admitting of no other construction, that Congress intended that penalties should be enforced through the secret findings and summary action of executive officers, contrary to the guarantees of due process of law and trial by jury. (Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S., 557; T. D. 3354.)

A statute purporting to declare the intent of an earlier act might be of great weight in assisting a court when in doubt, though not entitled to control judicial action. (United States v. Stafoff, 260 U. S., 477; T. D. 3424; Brooks v. United States, 260 U. S., 477; T. D. 3424; United States v. Remus, 260 U. S., 477; T. D. 3424.)

When applying provisions of sixteenth amendment and income tax laws enacted thereunder, United States Supreme Court regards matters of substance, and not mere form. (Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S., 242; T. D. 3609; Same v. White, 265 U. S., 242; T. D. 3609.)

Where a word has a judicially settled meaning, it will be presumed that Congress, in using that word in an act, used it in that sense. (United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S., 179; T. D. 3535; Same v. Anderson, 263 U. S., 179; T. D. 3535.)

The literal meaning of words employed in statutes levying taxes is most important, for such statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. (United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S., 179; T. D. 3535; Same v. Anderson, 263 U. S., 179; T. D. 3535.)

Where the words used in a statute levying taxes are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. (United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S., 179; T. D. 3535; Same v. Anderson, 263 U. S., 179; T. D. 3535.)

In adopting language used in an earlier act, Congress adopts the construction given by Supreme Court to that language. (Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. S., 144; T. D. 3595; Howard v. Casey, 265 U. S., 144; T. D. 3595; Crocker v. Malley, 265 U. S., 144; T. D. 3595.)

Statutes levying taxes are not extended by implication beyond clear import of language used, and in case of doubt are construed most strongly against Government. (Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. S., 144; T. D. 3595; Howard v. Casey, 265 U. S., 144, T. D. 3595; Crocker v. Malley, 265 U. S., 144; T. D. 3595.)

Though repeals by implication are not favored, a later statute repeals a former one, when clearly inconsistent with the earlier enactment. (United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S., 450; T. D. 3205.)

A later penal statute repeals former ones, where it practically covers the same acts and fixes a less penalty. (United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S., 450: T. D. 3205.)

The provisions of statutes imposing taxes are not to be extended by implication. (United States v. Field, 255 U. S., 257; T. D. 3150.)

In applying the provisions of the sixteenth amendment and the income tax laws enacted thereunder, matters of substance are to be regarded and forms are to be disregarded. (United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S., 156; T. D. 3270.)

Laws are not to be construed as applied to cases which arose before their passage, unless that intention be clearly declared, since there is absolute prohibition against such laws when their purpose is punitive, and the situa

tion which impels prohibition in such cases exacts clearness of declaration in other cases. (Shwab r. Doyle, 258 U. S., 529; T. D. 3339.)

The income tax acts are not to be extended by implication to incomes not reasonably within its language, even though it may be Congress had a general intention to tax all incomes. (Smietanka r. First Trust & Savings Bank, 257 U. S., 602; T. D. 3321.)

Constitutional amendment 16, like laws authorizing and imposing taxes, is to be taken as written, and not extended beyond meaning indicated by language used. (Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 1'. S., 028; T. D. 3728. )

Provision constituting part of taxing statute must be interpreted liberally in favor of taxpayer. (Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 Uo. 8., 346: T. D. 4009.)

TIME WHEN AN ACT TAKES EFFECT

A law of Congress which contains no provision as to the time when it shall take effect commences and takes effect as a law from the moment it receives the approbation of the President. As a general rule, it is not competent to go into the division of a day. (3 Op. Atty. Gen., 82.)

For most purposes the law regards the entire day as an indivisible unit. But when the priority of one legal right over another, depending on the order of events occurring on the same day, is involved, this rule is necessarily departed from. (National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U. S., 686.)

In the absence of proof there is a presumption that an act was signed on the first minute of the day when it took effect, but it is competent to show by proof the exact time when the law was approved by the President, and when this is made to appear the law can only be given effect from that time. (Carriage Co. v. Stengel, 87 C. C. A., 210; 95 Fed., 637: Nunn r. William Gerst Brewing Co., 99 Fed., 939.)

The case of United States v. Iselin (87 Fed., 194) contains a very full discussion of the subject by the Board of General Appraisers.

When necessary to determine conflicting rights courts of justice will take cognizance of the fractions of a day. (Louisville r. Savings Bank (1881). 104 1. 8., 469.)

The act of March 3, 1875, took effect from the time it was approved and not at the commencement of the day. (Salmon v. Burgess, 97 l. 8, 381; 25 Int. Rev. Rec.. 31.)

When the act of August 28, 1894, went into effect. (Burr r. United States, 159 U. S., 78.)

The act of July 24, 1897, became a law only from the moment of its approval by the President, which was 6 minutes past 4 o'clock p. m. (Washington time) on July 24, 1897. (United States v. Iselin, 87 Fed., 194; United States v. Stoddard, 89 Fed.. 699; affirmed by the United States circuit court of appeals, 91 Fed., 1005; 34 C. C. A., 175.) The Government, on the advice of the Attorney General, acquiesced in said decisions without seeking to prosecute any appeal to the United States Supreme Court. (T. D. 20627; T. D. 20700.)

The act of June 13, 1898, known as the "war-revenue act." took effect on the day next succeeding the day of its passage-that is, on June 14, 1898, except as otherwise provided for. (Sec. 51.)

The act of April 12, 1902 (war-revenue repeal act), took effect July 1, 1902, except as otherwise specially provided for in section 10.

The act of August 5, 1909 (Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act). took effect, unless otherwise specially provided, on the day following its passage.

The act of October 3, 1913, the Revenue Act of 1916 (act of September 8, 1916), and the Revenue Act of 1917 (net of October 3, 1917) took effect upon the day following their passage, unless otherwise specifically provided.

The Revenue Act of 1918 (act of February 24, 1919) was signed at 6.55 p. m., and took effect on the day following its passage, unless otherwise specifically provided.

The Revenue Act of 1921 (act of November 23, 1921) was signed at 3.55 p. m., and took effect upon its passage, unless otherwise specifically provided. The Revenue Act of 1924 (act of June 2, 1924) was signed at 4.01 p. m.. and took effect upon its enactment, except as otherwise provided therein. The Revenue Act of 1926 (act of February 26, 1926) was signed at 10.25 a. m., and took effect upon its enactment, except as otherwise provided therein.

PROVISIONS RELATIVE TO ACTS OF REPEAL

SEC. 12, R. S. Whenever an act is repealed, which repealed a former act, such former act shall not thereby be revived, unless it shall be expressly so provided.

SEC. 13, R. S. The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.

This provision (sec. 13, R. S.) has been upheld by the courts as a rule of construction applicable, when not otherwise provided, as a general saving clause to be read and construed as a part of all subsequent repealing statutes, in order to give effect to the will and intent of Congress. (Hertz v. Woodman. 218 U. S., 205 (T. D. 1636), quoting United States v. Reisinger, 128 U. S., 398; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U. S., 452.)

Repeals by implication are not favored, particularly in revenue laws, and will only be held to exist when the repugnance is positive, and then only to the extent of the repugnance. (United States v. 100 Barrels Spirits, 12 Int. Rev. Rec., 153.)

Nothing is better settled than that repeals, and the same may be said of annulments, by implication, are not favored by the courts, and that no statute will be construed as repealing a prior one, unless so clearly repugnant thereto as to admit of no other reasonable construction. (Cope v. Cope, 137 U. S., 682, and cases cited.)

A later statute covering the whole subject matter of a former one where the objects of the two statutes are the same operates as a repeal. (United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S., 546. See also United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall., 88.)

When a later statute is a complete revision of the subject to which the earlier statute related and the new legislation was manifestly intended as a substitute for the former legislation, the prior act must be held to have been repealed. (United States v. Ranlett and Stone, 172 U. S., 133.)

INTERNAL REVENUE COLLECTION DISTRICTS

(Effective April 1, 1927)

Alabama.-Collector's office, Birmingham.
Alaska. (Part of Washington district.)
Arizona.-Collector's office, Phoenix.
Arkansas.-Collector's office, Little Rock.

California. First district, collector's office, San Francisco; sixth
district, collector's office, Los Angeles.
Colorado.-Collector's office, Denver.
Connecticut.-Collector's office, Hartford.
Delaware.-Collector's office, Wilmington.

District of Columbia.-(Part of Maryland district.)
Florida.-Collector's office, Jacksonville.

Georgia.-Collector's office, Atlanta.

Hawaii.-Collector's office, Honolulu.

Idaho.-Collector's office, Boise.

Illinois. First district, collector's office, Chicago; eighth district, collector's office, Springfield.

Indiana.-Collector's office, Indianapolis.

Iowa.-Collector's office, Dubuque.

Kansas.-Collector's office, Wichita.

Kentucky.-Collector's office, Louisville.

Louisiana.-Collector's office, New Orleans.

Maine.-Collector's office, Augusta.

Maryland.-Collector's office, Baltimore.

Massachusetts.-Collector's office, Boston.

Michigan.-Collector's office, Detroit.

Minnesota.-Collector's office, St. Paul.

Mississippi.-Collector's office, Jackson.

Missouri.-First district, collector's office, St. Louis; sixth district, collector's office, Kansas City.

Montana.-Collector's office, Helena.
Nebraska.-Collector's office, Omaha.

Nevada.-Collector's office, Reno.

New Hampshire.-Collector's office, Portsmouth.

New Jersey. First district, collector's office, Camden; fifth district, collector's office, Newark.

New Mexico.-Collector's office, Albuquerque.

New York.-First district, collector's office, Brooklyn; second district, collector's office, customhouse, New York; third district, collector's office, 250 West Fifty-seventh Street, New York; fourteenth district, collector's office, Albany; twenty-first district, collector's office, Syracuse; twenty-eighth district, collector's office, Buffalo.

NOTE.-Fourth Michigan district abolished, effective close of business January 31, 1927. Territory consolidated with first Michigan district and designation of first Michigan district changed to district of Michigan.