plaintiff "has been most disgraceful and dishonest, and the result has been to diminish materially the available assets of the estate." Held. that the occasion was privileged, and that, though the words were strong, they were, when taken in connection with the facts, such as might have been used honestly and bona fide by the defendant; for the plaintiff's conduct was equivocal, and might well be supposed by the defendant to be such as he described it and that the judge was right in directing a verdict to be entered for the defendant, there being no other evidence of actual malice. Spill v. Maule (Exch. Ch.); L. R. 4 Ex. 232; 38 L. J. Ex. 138 17 W. R. 805; 20 L. T. 675. The defendant tendered to Brown at Crickhowell two £1 notes on the plaintiffs' bank; which Brown returned to him saying, there was a run upon that bank, and he would rather have gold. The defendant the very next day went into Brecon and told two or three people confidentially that the plaintiffs' bank had stopped, and that nobody would take their bills. Held, that this exaggeration of the report was some evidence of malice to go to the jury. Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & Cr. 247; 6 D. & R. 296; 1 C. & P. 475. And see Senior v. Medland, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1039. A gentleman told the second master of a school that he had seen one of the under-masters of the school on one occasion coming home at night "under the influence of drink," and desired him to acquaint the authorities with the fact. The second master subsequently stated to the governors that it was notorious that the under-master came home "almost habitually in a state of intoxication." There was no other evidence of malice. Held, that the Lord Chief Justice was right in not withdrawing the case from the jury. Hume v. Marshall, Times for November 26th, 1877. (ii.) As to the method of communication employed. If the mode and extent of a privileged publication be more injurious to the plaintiff than necessary, this may be evidence of malice in the publisher. Though the words themselves would be privileged if addressed only to the few individuals concerned, yet the privilege may be lost if the defendant deliberately chooses to publish them to the general public, or to any one who has no corresponding interest in the communication. Letters as to plaintiff's private affairs should not be published in the newspapers, however meritorious the writer's motive may be. Confidential communications should not be shouted across the street for all the world to hear. (Wilson v. Collins, 5 C. & P. 373.) Defamatory remarks, if written at all, should be sent in a private letter properly sealed and fastened up; not written on a postcard, or sent by telegraph; for two strangers at least read every telegram; many more most post-cards. (Williamson v. Freer, L. R. 9 C. P. 393; 43 L. J. C. P. 161; Whitfield v. S. E. Ry. Co., E. B. & E. 115; Robinson v. Jones, 4 L. R. Ir. 391.) There is no privilege attaching even to correct and accurate reports of public meetings. (Davison v. Duncan, 7 E. & B. 231; 26 L. J. Q. B. 104; Popham v. Pickburn, 7 H. & N. 897; 31 L. J. Ex. 133; Purcell v. Sowler, 2 C. P. D. 215; 46 L. J. C. P. 308; 25 W. R. 362; 36 L. T. 416.) But where printing a report is the usual and necessary method of communication between the directors and shareholders, the privilege will not be lost merely because the compositors and journeymen printers employed were not shareholders. (Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton and Oil Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 262.) So with an advertisement inserted in a newspaper defamatory of the plaintiff; if such advertisement be necessary to protect the defendant's interests, or if advertising was the only way of effecting the defendant's object, and such object is a legal one, then the circumstances excuse the extensive publication. But if it was not necessary to advertise at all, or if the defendant's object could have been equally well effected by an advertisement which did not contain the words defamatory of the plaintiff, then the extent given to the announcement is evidence of malice to go to the jury. (Brown v. Croome, 2 Stark. 297; and Lay v. Lawson, 4 A. & E. 795; overruling, or at least explaining, Delany v. Jones, 4 Esp. 191.) The law is the same as to posting libellous placards (Cheese v. Scales, 10 M. & W. 488); or having a libellous notice cried by the town crier. (Woodard v. Dowsing, 2 Man. & Ry. 74.) So with a privileged oral communication, it is important to observe who is present at the time it is made. A desire should be shown to avoid all unnecessary publicity. It is true that the accidental presence of an uninterested bystander will not alone take the case out of the privilege, and there are some communications which it is wise to make in the presence of witnesses; but if it can be proved that defendant purposely chose a time for making the communication when others were by, whom he knew would act upon it, this may be some evidence of malice. The question for the jury in such cases is: Was the charge against the plaintiff made bond fide, and, if so, was it made before more persons or in stronger language than necessary? (Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 A. & E. 380; Fowler and wife v. Homer, 3 Camp. 294.) Illustrations. The defendant in a petition to the House of Commons charged the plaintiff with extortion and oppression in his office of vicar-general to the Bishop of Lincoln. Copies of the petition were printed and delivered to the members of the committee appointed by the House to hear and examine grievances, in accordance with the usual order of proceeding in the House. No copy was delivered to any one not a member of Parliament. Held, that the petition was privileged, although the matter contained in it was false and scandalous; and so were all the printed copies: for, though the printing was a publication to the printers and compositors, still it was the usual course of proceeding in Parliament; and it was not so great a publication as to have so many copies transcribed by several clerks. Lake v. King, 1 Lev. 240; 1 Saund. 131; Sid. 414; 1 Mod. 58. See Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton and Oil Co., Limited, L. R. 4 Q. B. 262; 10 B. & S. 226; 38 L. J. Q. B. 129; 17 W. R. 498, ante, p. 242. If libellous matter, which would have been privileged if sent in a sealed letter, be transmitted unnecessarily by telegraph, the privilege is thereby lost. Williamson v. Freer, L. R. 9 C. P. 393; 43 L. J. C. P. 161; 22 and An Irish Court will take judicial notice of the nature of a post-card, will presume that others besides the person to whom it is addressed will read what is written thereon. Robinson v. Jones, 4 L. R. Ir. 391. Defendant having lost certain bills of exchange, published a handbill, offering a reward for their recovery, and adding that he believed they had been embezzled by his clerk. His clerk at that time still attended regularly at his office. Held, that the concluding words of the handbill were quite unnecessary to defendant's object, and were a gratuitous libel on the plaintiff. Damages £200. Finden v. Westlake, Moo. & Malk. 461. The justices were about to swear in the plaintiff as a paid constable, when defendant, a parishioner, came forward and stated that the plaintiff was an improper person to be a constable. Held, that the fact that several other persons besides the justices were present, as usual, did not destroy the privilege attaching to such bona fide remark. Kershaw v. Bailey, 1 Ex. 743; 17 L. J. Ex. 129. Where a master about to dismiss his servant for dishonesty calls in a friend to hear what passes, the presence of such third party will not destroy the privilege. Taylor v. Hawkins, 16 Q. B. 308; 20 L. J. Q. B. 313; 15 Jur. 746. Where a master discharged his footman and cook, and they asked him his reason for doing so, and he told the footman, in the absence of the cook, that "he and the cook had been robbing him," and told the cook in the absence of the footman that he had discharged her "because she and the footman had been robbing him." Held, that these were privileged communications as respected the absent parties, as well as those to whom they were respectively made. Manby v. Witt 18 C. B. 544; 25 L. J. C. P. 294; 2 Jur. N. S. 1004. That defendant caused the libel to be industriously circulated is evidence of malice. Gathercole v. Miall, 15 M. & W. 319; 15 L. J. Ex. 179; 10 Jur. 337. A shareholder in a railway company himself invited reporters for the press to attend a meeting of the shareholders which he had summoned, and at which he made an attack against one of the directors. Held, that the privilege was lost thereby. Parsons v. Surgey, 4 F. & F. 247. And see Davis v. Cutbush and others, 1 F. & F. 487. Defendant accused the plaintiff, in the presence of a third person, of stealing his wife's brooch; plaintiff wished to be searched; defendant repeated the accusation to two women, who searched the plaintiff and found nothing. Subsequently, it was discovered that defendant's wife had left the brooch at a friend's house. Held, that the mere publication to the two women did not destroy the privilege attaching to charges, if made bona fide; but that all the circumstances should have been left to the jury. Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 A. & E. 380 ; 4 Jur. 458; 3 P. & D. 209. And see Amann v. Damm, 8 C. B. N. S. 597; 29 L. J. C. P. 313; 7 Jur. N. S. 47; 8 W. R. 470. The defendant was a customer at the plaintiff's shop, and had occasion to complain of what he considered fraud and dishonesty in the plaintiff's conduct of his business; but instead of remonstrating quietly with him, the defendant stood outside the shop-door and spoke so loud as to be heard by every one passing down the street. The language he employed also was stronger than the occasion warranted. Held that there was evidence of malice to go to the jury. Damages 40s. Oddy v. Lord Geo. Paulet, 4 F. & F. 1009. And see Wilson v. Collins, 5 C. & P. 373. The mere fact that the defendant volunteered the information is, when it stands alone, no evidence of malice; but if there be any other circumstances raising a presumption of malice, then it may weigh with the jury. In fact, if the judge and jury agree in thinking the defendant's interference was officious and uncalled for, the privilege is lost, and no inquiry need be made as to the existence of express malice. In Brooks v. Blanshard, 1 Cr. & M. 779, 3 Tyrw. 844, Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., says, "It is not merely because a communication is confidential that it is privileged, if it is volunteered by the party making it." But in every case, whether volunteered or not, the question is, Was the communication fairly warranted by the exigency of the occasion? If so, the jury should find for the defendant, unless there be some other evidence of malice. No doubt it will often require a greater exigency to warrant the defendant in volunteering the information than in merely answering a confidential inquiry. But still in all cases where the duty to speak is clear, it is defendant's duty to go and tell the person concerned, if he does not come to the defendant. For it may well be that he has no suspicions, and will never come and inquire. But in cases where there can be any doubt as to defendant's duty to speak, there the fact that the defendant took the initiative may tell against him. Thus it is usual for a former master to give the character of a |