the United States for the suppression of the slave trade, had abated. The high character we had acquired, for our early and unceasing labors in that great cause, was not indeed destroyed for that could not be easily effected; but our motives were exposed to misconstruction, and are now misrepresented by those who do not understand the structure of our Government. Such, sir, was the consequence of this third attempt to surrender the control of our conduct in the support of our rights, or the discharge of our du ties, to foreign association: such the penalty of disregarding the warning voice of Washington-"never abandon our own to stand on foreign ground." Such are among the least evils that have, sooner or later, in a greater or less degree, been the consequence of political connexions between different nations, at all times, and in all places. Permit me to refer the Senate to a transaction of the same character between other States. In 1815, the Plenipotentiaries from the five great European Powers, viz: England, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, convened at Vienna, declared to the world that they would unite their means for the effectual suppression of the slave trade. The settlement of those means was deferred to a future period. At the conference of the Plenipotentiaries of the same Powers, in 1818, at Aix la Chapelle, an attempt was made to agree upon the means necessary to effect their declared object. Then occurred, what always will occur, except in cases of great emergency-like the recent coalitions among the Powers of Europe against that of Napoleon, when the very existence of several of the allied powers, was involved-the difficulty of agreeing upon the terms of co-operation among nations having different interests, feelings, prejudices, and views. England proposed the extension of the right of search, as the only means adapted to the end. Negotiation was commenced and continued, until, finally, the measure proposed by England was refused, or evaded, by all the Powers, and the conference dissolved, leaving the celebrated declaration made at Vienna unexecuted, and producing naught but mutual distrust and dissatisfaction. Thus shewing how easy it is for nations to unite in the avowal of a general principle-how difficult to agree upon the means of enforcing it. So will it be with us and our South American friends and neighbors. There may be little difficulty in uniting in avowing as a principle, that these continents are no longer fit subjects for European coloni zation, or to protest against the interference of Europe in the affairs of Spanish America. But the moment we proceed to stipulate as to the means of enforcing it, difficulties will occur that, in all human probability, will impair the friendly relations now existing between us. They will occur first in the negotiation, and, if these are surmounted, certainly in the application of the principles established, when the time for their application unhappily occurs.

But I cannot consent to trespass longer upon the time of the Se nate in pushing the discussion of this point further, although vari ous considerations, operating against the measure, press upon my mind. If it were proposed to form a connection with any European Power, such as now designed with the Spanish American States, it is hoped and believed, that the measure would not meet with one approving voice-shall I say-on this floor? No, not in the country. But it has been supposed that the United States ought to pursue a different policy with respect to the States in this hemisphere. It is true, Mr. Monroe in his message, makes a distinction of this character, although he by no means carries it to the extent proposed. If he did, all that the distinction could derive from that circumstance, would be the weight of his opinion, always considerable, but never decisive. The question still recurs, is the distinction founded in principle and policy? If it be, it must arise from one of two reasons: either the character of the Governments of the Spanish American States, or their local situation; or, perhaps, from both. The United States have hailed the emancipation of those States with satisfaction; they have our best wishes for the perpetuity of their freedom. So far as we could go to aid them in the establishment of their independence, without endangering the peace, or embarrassing the relations of our country, we have gone. More than that ought not to be asked. Nor has it. Sensible of the embarrassments which their invitation might produce, they declined to proffer it until advised that we desired to receive it. Next to being right, it is important to Governments, as well as individuals, to be consistent. Has the character of these Governments been the principle upon which we have hitherto acted in relation to those States It has not. Mexico and Brazil were the last to shake off their dependence on foreign authority. They were among the first whose independence we acknowledged. Mexico was, at the period of its acknowledgment, under the dominion of the Emperor Iturbide, and Brazil, of its Emperor, Don Pedro. As a special compliment to the Emperor of Mexico, we sent, or rather intended to send to his Court, one of the most distinguished men of the nation, (General JACKSON.) At the Court of the Emperor Don Pedro, we have our Minister; whilst in the Republic of Peru-the Power with which the first of the treaties, in virtue of which the Congress of Panama is to be held, was concluded- we have not yet been represented. Do our principles admit that we should adopt the measure proposed with such reference, and upon such grounds? What are those principles? That man is capable of self-government; that the People of every country should be left to the free selection of such form of Government as they think best adapted to their situation, and to change it as their interests, intheir own judgments, may seem to require. Wherein consists our objections to

the Holy Alliance? Because they confederate to maintain Governments similar to their own by force of arms, instead of the force of reason, and the will of the governed. If we, too, confederate to sustain,by the same means, Governments similar to our own, wherein consists the difference, except the superiority of our cause? What is their avowed motive? Self-preservation and the peace of Europe. What would be ours? Self preservation and the peace of America. I wish to be understood. I detest as much as any man, the principles of the Holy Alliance. I yield to no man in my anxious wishes for the success of the Spanish American States. I will go as far as I think any American citizen ought to go, to secure to them the blessings of free Government. I commend the solicitude which has been manifested by our Government upon this subject, and have, of course, no desire to discourage it. But I am against all alliances, against all armed confederacies, or confederacies of any sort care not how specious, or how disguised; come in what shape they may, I oppose them. The States in question have the power and the means, if united and true to their principles, to resist any force that Europe can send against them. It is only by being recreant to the principles upon which their Revolution is founded; by suffering foreign influence to distract and divide them; that their independence can be endangered. But, happen what may, our course should be left to our choice, whenever occasion for acting shall occur. If, in the course of events, designs shall be manifested, or steps taken in this hemisphere by any foreign Power, which so far affect our interest or our honor, as to make it necessary that we should arm in their defence, it will be done there is no room to doubt it.

I

The decision of that question may safely be left to those who come after us. That love of country and of freedom which now animates our public councils, is not confined to us, or likely to be come extinct. We require neither alliance nor agreement to compel us to perform whatever our duty enjoins. Our national character is our best and should be our only pledge. Meanwhile, let us bestow upon our neighbors, the young Republics of the South, the moral aid of a good example. To make that example more salutary, let it exhibit our moderation in success, our firmness in adversity, our devotion to our country and its institutions, and,above all, that sine qua non to the existence of our Republican Government-our fidelity to a written Constitution.

The local situation of the States in question does not alter the principle, but only bears upon the expediency of the measure. What is the reason why foreign connections were deprecated by Washington, and have, since his day, been avoided by our country? It is because, between foreign Governments and our own, there are diversities in situation, interest, feeling, prejudice, and views, which

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* preclude the probability of preserving the relations we may form with them, and greatly increase the contingencies by which our country may become involved with others. Apply this reason to the Governments of New Spain. Wherein consists the similarity between our condition and theirs, except that we are both in this hemisphere, and that, at this time, most of them have Republican forms of Government, but with powers very different from ours? We are unlike in all other things. The difference between us is infinitely greater, and the intercourse less, and more difficult, than between us and several of the States of Europe. Recent circumstances have increased the danger of political connection, in the form of alliances, of any sort, with them. The supposed pacific views of the Emperor Alexander afforded the strongest security against the interference of the Powers of Europe in their affairs. His death has certainly involved that matter in doubt and difficulty. The commencement of the war between Brazil and Buenos Ayres, ascertained since this subject has been before us, has multiplied greatly the danger of the step, and should induce us to pause while the matter is yet subject to our control. Although we have not before us the treaty between Colombia and Buenos Ayres, it is understood that a similar one to those we have, has been entered into between those Powers. If so, if the confederation is so far completed, then will the other Spanish American States be bound to make common cause with Buenos Ayres in the war with Brazil. The Emperor Don Pedro is the lawful successor to the thrown of Portugal; the territory of Brazil is guarantied by Portugal, and that of Portugal by England. If such is the case, and so, speaking from general recollection, I understand the facts to be-how very probable is it that the casus fœderis, the interference of any European Power with affairs of Spanish America, will soon occurupon the happening of which, we are to plunge this, now free and happy country, the object of the envy and the admiration of the world, into war, for the protection of the interests of our neighbors, and to testify, at this late day, our devotion to free principles. Sir, our good fortune may guide us in safety through these difficulties. I hope it may be so-but my fears are stronger than my hopes. I pray to Heaven that those fears may never be realized; that those who now move Heaven and earth to press this ill omened measure to its consummation, may never have occasion to rue the day of its adoption.

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