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Printed, for the PROPRIETORS, by Knight and Compton, Cloth Fair.




(From JANUARY to JUNE, 1807.)

BY adverting to our last Historical Sketch, prefixed to the Twenty fifth Volume of our Review, our readers will find that we formed a jult estimate of the Russian character, and that we knew how to appreciate the htuation 10 which Buonaparte, by his natural temerity, and by an implicit reliance on his favourite deity, Chance, which had too long siniled upon him, had reduced himself. Subsequent events have fully justified all the conclufions which we then drew from an attentive consideration of the relative Nate of the belligerent powers, and of the actual htuation of the diferent itates of Europe. It has been our invariable opinion, from the very commencement of the French revolution, that there always existed, and that there still exists, fufficient ability to crush the revolutionary hydra which has long threatened the civilized world with ruin, and that nothing but the will has been wanted to give action and effect to that ability. Did a doubt remain on the subject, we would refer for its solution to the noble Itand which Rullia, aided only by the scanty remnant of the broken forces of Prusia, has made against the savage hordes of France. All that we predicted, respecting the vigour and efficacy of their exertions, has been completely fulfilled. They have already " exacted severe vengeance, in the morasses of Poland, for the defeat which they sustained in the plains of Moravia." These soldiers, whom the Corlican tyrant stigmatized as a barbarous and undisciplined rabble, have taught him to feel their superiority in discipline as well as in courage. In every action which has yet been fought, they have beat him by a display of skill and a knowledge of tactics as much as by their cool, steady, and determined bravery, and by their unfhaken fortitude. Prudence and vigour combined to mark all the operations of the Russian army, from the opening of the campaign to the battle of Eylau. In that action the Russians manifested an union of all the talents and endowments which are requisite to form great generals and goud Toldiers. The Corsican was out-generalled, (to use a vulgar exprernon) as well as exceeded in every other point that was necessary to ensure success. The fickle Goddess, Fortune, forsook him ; victory fled from his izandard, and, fuperior only in numbers, in all other respects inferior, he bad the mortification to find his plan disconcerted, his efforts fruitless, bis bopes blasted, and his force diminished by more than forty thousand men, though reduced, by the magic power of his revolutionary pen, to five thoua' Jand! The position of the Russians 'at Eylau was the belt ibat cound be taken for the protection of Koning foerg, on the one hand, and of Dantzic on the other; and had Buonaparte succeeded in his attempt to get in their rear, and then to drive them from the field, those towns would have been left, in a great measure, at his mercy. The: sublequent conduct of the Rubians has been eminently prudent. They have fo tiationed themselves as to give effectual protection io the Pruffian polis, and to receive the immense reinforcements which constantly join them. It is true, indeed, ihat the

rench also receive accellions of Itrength; but, when the Rufians are once wrong enough to move forwards, in conjunction with the Pruflians, whore umbers too are considerably increased, the consequence of a . victory will APP, VOL. XXVI,

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be decisive. Leaving their wounded behind them, they will then rush foro ward, with the same impetuohty which Suwarrow displayed in Italy; drive the enemy before them from place to place, and give him no rest, till expelled from Germany. Nor will the effect of a defeat, on the other hand, be equally decisive in favour of France. The Ruflians are not less resolute in retreat, than impetuous in pursuit; they will defend every inch of ground; and should Buonaparte prove successful in every attack, and drive them back to their own frontier, his own numbers will, to a certainty, be fo thioned, as to reduce him to the necessity of retracing his steps; while the approach of a fresh army from Russia will enable his enemy again to advance. This conclusion will appear obvious to every one who has attended to the memorable campaign of Suwarrow in Italy, and to the recent operations of the Rulians in Poland. The Cofacks, too, which attend their army, are most furmidable to the French, whom they incessantly harass, by night and by day, laughtering great numbers by a mode of warfare to which they are liitle accustomed, and which, naturally enough, they very much dread.

The King Of PRUSSIA must now, from neceflity not less than from interest, remain firm to his engagements 10 conclude no treaty with the Corsicani, without the concurrence of his Ruflian protector, and his Britith ally; and means will now be supplied to enable him to arm any number of his well-difpored subjects, to augment the general force. Had he yielded to the proposals of Buonaparte, Frederick William had, ere this, ceased to be a munarch, and had funk into a degraded vassal of the most inexorable, the most merciless, the most fanguinary, of tyrants. As it is, though difpofleffed of the greater part of his dominions, he is still a King, and will be reitored to the poffeffion not merely of his territory, but of his independence and his power alfo. Even should the Russians, contrary to all hope and expectation, fuftain a defeat, and be driven 'back beyond their own frontier, he may not only retreat with them, and find a sure and honourable asylum in the dominions of Alexander, but be certain, at no diftant period, to recover his own.

The King of Sweden, with a heroism almost peculiar to himself, anci which perpetually makes us regret that his means are not equal to his fpia rit, fers all the power of France at defiance, and contributes more than his portion towards the emancipation of Europe. The check which his troops recently received, from a miscalculation of the enemy's force, was not sufficient to induce this gallant Prince to fanction the disgraceful armistice concluded by his General, Von Effen. He has, on the contrary, reinforced his army, and again prepared to take the field; and whatever skill and courage can achieve, we may confidently predict, will be accomplished by the Swedes, under the guidance of such a Sovereign. They will serve materially to keep a part of the French force employed, and so to prevent it from joining the main army; and, in the event of a victory gained by the Rullians, he will effectually harass the French in their retreat.

Austria, meanwhile, who holds, as it were, the balance of Europe in her hands, remains a mere spectator of the surrounding scene. Whether this passiveness be the result of any secret understanding with Russia, or whether it be the consequence of a settled system of inaction, a short time will suffice to demonstrate. If the former, she is waiting till Ruflia shall be able to push forward with her whole force, when the Austrian army may ad

sance in the rear of the French from Bohemia, and cut off their retreat. Such a step would, at once, crush the tyrant, and rescue subjugated Europe from his iron yoke. If the latter be the case, if by a perseverance in the same timid and mistaken policy wbich has lately marked his conduct, the Emperor Francis, deaf alike to the suggestions of wisdom, the voice of experience, and the dictates of self-preservation, mould refolve to remain neuter, and to limit his impotent efforts to the preservation of his neutrality, his Gtuation will be perilous. Should France prove ultimately victorious, his ruin will be certain, and in the fate of Sardinia, Naples, and Prussia, he may read his own. And should Ruflia prevail in the conteft, the Imperial Alexander will not look with an eye of fatisfaction on a line of conduct which, he will know, could only be dictated by fear or by tirachery. And what reistance Austria could make to the conqueror of France it would be difficult to conjecture. At all events, the will have made a formidable enemy, where the might have secured a most powerful friend; and, if no immediate loss of territory or of power thould pniue, the will, at lealt, be placed in a state of constant unealines and alarm, between Russia on the one side, and France on the other; while the will have furfeited all pretendons to character and all claim to respect-a confideration of primary importance to a great nation.

We have no futficient data on which to form any thing like a rational opinion as to the conduct which Austria, thus situated, will pursue. It has been generally supposed that Francis himself is of a pacific difpofition; that the Archduke Charles, who has conceived some disgust at the English (whether lince Mr. Adair has resided at Vienna, or before, we know not), has confirmed him in his sentiments; and that the Queen (whom he has lately toli) exerted her influence over him for the purpose of persuading him to adopt a system of policy more consonant with his dignity, and more conducive to his security: If this supposition be correct, and if no change of circumstances has occurred to produce a corresponding change of dirposition, there is little to hope from the exertions of Austria. But we have tome reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement; and are more inclined to believe,.that the influence and firmness of the Rullian Emperor will ultimately lubdue all other influence in the mind of Francis; an effect which the departure of Mr. Adair from Vienna, and the circuintiances which gave rise to it, will contribute, not a little, to produce.

In Sicily, the last refuge of the exiled King of Naples, where, it might Daturally be expected, all would unite in one common effort for selfdefence, and in one common sentiment of indignation against the Tyrant of Europe, and of gratitude to those who enable them to retiit his final exertions for their utter destruction, firange to say! the fame fpirit of party prevails, which, at the beginning of the French revolution, obtain. ed among the einigrants from that devoted C untry. There fublifis in that iQand three ditierent parties;-the King's party, the Queen's party, and the party of ibe Nobles; the last of which is infected with revolutionary ideas, and, as far as they are capable of attachment, are attached to the deltroyers of their country. Such reptiles oughi iu be crushed; and the fooner they are configned to the gallows, the better. While the English troops remain there, however, no bad consequences can enfue irón this discord. If we cait our eyes opon the Turkish Empire, we fall there behold the

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