owner, and the stealing of the said produce;' and horse stealing, and the stealing of other property.' So a count for larceny in the first degree may be joined with a count for robbery in the first degree, where it is reasonably clear on the face of the indictment that both counts embrace the same acts; and a count charging the theft of a certain yearling, with one charging the illegal branding of the same animal. Again a count charging larceny as a bailee is properly joined to a count charging robbery of the same property.' In cases of misdemeanors, several distinct offenses of the same kind may be joined in the same indictment, and a separate sentence should be passed on each count on which defendant is found guilty. Where a count for larceny and a count for embezzlement are joined, if the count for larceny be good that will support a general verdict of guilty, although the count for embezzlement be bad.' In Massachusetts, distinct larcenies, and also distinct offenses of receiving stolen goods may be joined in the same indictment in different counts; and the ordering of separate trials or an election by the prosecution is in the discretion of the court. In New Jersey, larceny and embezzlement may be charged in different counts; and they should be tried and passed upon by the jury and court as several offenses." But in Georgia, a count for robbery cannot be joined with a count for larceny from the person, or with a count for cheating and swindling." Where one charged with larceny pleads to the whole complaint, and is convicted, it is immaterial that the complaint charged distinct larcenies in different counts. Where, however, the law provides that an indictment must charge but one offense, an information charging larceny in one

1 State v. Sheppard, 33 La. An. 1216.

2 Barton v. State, 18 Ohio 221.

3 People v. Rose, 52 Hun 33.

4 Welhausen v. State, 18 S. W. Rep 300.

5 Appeal of Shutte, 130 Pa. St 272.

6 Burrell v. State, 25 Neb. 581.

'Murphy v. People, 104 Ill. 528.

8 Com. v. Hills, 10 Cush. 530; Com v. Sullivan, 104 Mass. 552. Stephens v. State, 21 Atl. Rep. 1038.

10 Doyle v. State, 77 Ga. 513.

11 Commonwealth v. Holmes, 137 Mass 248.

11

count and embezzlement of the property in another is demurrable.'

$115. Charging larceny and receiving stolen goods.An indictment may properly charge the defendant with larceny, and with receiving the same goods knowing them to have been stolen;' and an indictment thus drawn will warrant a general verdict of guilty. So, where there has been an examination before a magistrate on a complaint and a warrant charging a larceny of goods, and the accused is held for trial, the information may contain a count for receiving stolen goods; but under a single count charging larceny, a conviction for receiving cannot be sustained. If, however, a party fails to object in the court below, to an indictmeut containing two counts for larceny and two counts for receiving stolen property, on the ground that they refer to separate and distinct offenses, such objection, after a verdict of guilty on the larceny counts, will not be considered in the appellate court."

§ 116. Charging larceny of several articles belonging to one owner. Where a person by one united, continuous and indivisible act, steals several distinct articles, such as a horse, buggy and harness, a count in the indictment for the larceny

1 People v. DeCoursey, 61 Cal. 134. An indictment charging that the defendant did embezzle, steal, take and carry away, certain goods, is not bad for duplicity. The word embezzle may be rejected as surplusage —Com. v. Simpson, 9 Metc. 138 So an indictment charging that defendant did "unlawfully, fraudulently and feloniously kill, take, steal and carry away," etc., a hog, is not liable to the objection of charging two separate and distinct offenses, viz: malicious mischief and theft; on the ground that the effect of the language is to charge the defendant with first killing the hog, and then stealing his dead body.-Thompson v. State, 30 Tex. 356. And an indictment charging defendants with "burglary committed as follows," and then stating facts constituting the crime of larceny, is good as an indictment for the latter offense -State v. Coon, 18 Minn 518.

* State v. Stimpson, 45 Me. 608; Hampton v. State, 8 Humph. 69; Keefer v. State, 4 Ind. 246; State v. Crosby, 4 La. An. 434; State v. McLane, Id. 435; Bennett v. People, 96 Ill. 602; Kennegar v. State, 120 Ind. 176; People v. Infield, 1 N. Y. Cr 146.

State v. Lawrence, 81 N. C 522; Cook v. State, 16 Lea 461.

* Brown v. People. 39 Mich. 37.

State v. Moultree, 33 La. An. 1146.

• Thompson v. People, 4 Neb. 524.

of the horse, buggy and harness is not obnoxious to the charge of duplicity. Such act constitutes only one crime, and all the articles stolen are properly named in the same count. If the different articles had been stolen at different times, it would present a different question.' And an indictment which charges, in one count, the taking at one time, of three different articles of property of the same person, and which sufficiently describes two of the articles, is good, though the description of the third article is defective. But in Texas, an indictment charging in a single count the theft of a horse, and also of other property, is bad for duplicity, the punishment being different for the two offenses. It is no cause for demurrer that an indictment contains counts for separate and distinct larcenies. In Missouri, the prosecution may elect to proceed for part of several articles charged in the indictment to have been stolen. A plea of guilty to a charge of the larceny of several articles as one act, and for a use to which all were to be put, is an admission of the larceny of all of them.* Where the indictment charges defendant with stealing specified articles and "other, things of the goods and chattels of L." it is too late, after verdict, to object to the sufficiency of the description of the articles stolen.' But where two or more crimes are involved in a single act, but one indictment will lie. A person who steals a wagon and horse harnessed in it, and is indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced for the larceny of the wagon alone, cannot be afterward prosecuted for the theft of the horse."

1 Waters v. People, 104 Ill. 544; State v. Faulkner, 32 La. Ann. 725; State v. Snyder, 50 N. H. 150; State v. McCormack, 8 Or. 236; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555.

2 Reid v. State, 88 Ala. 36.

8 Heineman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 44; Hickman v. State, Id. 441.

4 State v. Lockwood, 58 Vt. 378.

State v. Donnegan, 34 Mo, 67.

People v. Town, 53 Mich, 488.

State v. Anderson, 42 La. An. 590.

8 State v. Augustine, 29 La. An. 119. An indictment for larceny charged that the defendant, on, etc., at etc., "divers articles of personal property, gold and silver coins, national bank notes and United States treasury notes, commonly called 'greenbacks,'" each and all particularly described and the values thereof alleged, and all of a certain aggregate value, of the per

§ 117. Charging larceny of articles belonging to different owners. The spoils of a single larcenous act may all be included in one count, and the indictment is not thereby bad for duplicity,' and this may be done notwithstanding the articles stolen are the property of different persons,' provided the time and place of the taking of each are the same.' Or there may be as many different indictments against the thief as there are owners of the property. But the value of each article and the name of each owner must be separately and specially alleged. And only one conviction can be had for the larceny of goods belonging to different persons, where the larceny consists of a single act. Whether the count is double depends on whether it charges more than one larceny, and whether there was more than one larceny depends on whether there was more than one taking, and not on the number of articles taken, nor on their ownership.' An indictment which in one count alleges the goods stolen to be the property of certain persons, and in other counts states the owners to be different persons, does not charge different offenses, but only the same offense in different forms. The rule is not affected by a statute

sonal goods and property of one W. S., “then and there being found, did feloniously take, steal and carry away, contrary," etc. Held, sufficient, on motion to quash.-Lamphier v. State, 70 Ind. 317.

1 State v. Stevens, 62 Me. 284.

2 State v. Hennessy, 23 Ohio St. 339; Lorton v. State, 7 Mo. 55; State v. Morphin, 37 Id 373; State v. Nelson, 29 Me. 329; Bell v. State, 42 Ind. 335; Hoiles v. United States, 3 MacArth. 370; 36 Am. Rep. 106; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573; State v. Hennessey, 23 Ohio St. 339; Cash. v. State, 10 Humph. 111. And see State v. Hogan, R. M. Charlt. 474; Com. v. McChord, 2 Dana 243; Irving v. State, 8 Tex. App. 46; Dodd v. State, 10 Tex. App. 370. * Fulmer v. Commonwealth, 97 Pa. St. 503; People v. Lyman, 2 Utah T. 30.

4 State v. Thurston, 2 McMull. 382; Com. v. Sullivan, 104 Mass. 552; State v. Lambert, 9 Nev. 321.

* State v. Merrill, 44 N. H. 624; Hope v. Com. 9 Metc. 134. Contra, Clifton v. State, 5 Blackf. 224; State v. Murphy, 8 Id. 498.

Hoiles v. United States, 3 MacArth. 370; 36 Am. Rep. 106. Compare Hudson v. State, 9 Tex. App. 151; 35 Am. Rep. 732.

* State v. Newton, 42 Vt. 537.

8 People v. Connor, 17 Cal. 354; Bell v. State, 42 Ind. 335. An indictment for larceny of one parcel of cotton, charging the ownership as "one hundred pounds of cotton, the property of C., one hundred pounds of cotton the property of G." Held, after verdict, to show "a sufficient matter to

affixing a heavier penalty to the stealing of one than of another of the articles.' If an indictment contains several counts, each charging the larceny of property of a different person, the court is not bound to assume that the larcenies were one and the same offense, although alleged to have been committed on the same day.'

§ 118. Joinder of defendants.- Where several unite in an attempt to steal from the person, they may be jointly indicted; and under an indictment alleging that they all thrust their hands into the pocket, they may all be convicted, though the proof shows that only one of them did so.' Where several combine to commit larceny, it is immaterial whether they were previously acquainted, if they were then confederating for the felonious purpose, or whether they designed to procure the property in order to share it or for the benefit of one of them. In Massachusetts, one who steals goods may be jointly indicted with the receiver of them. But in California, an indictment which charges one person with the larceny of goods, and another person with feloniously receiving, having, and aiding in concealing the same, knowing them to be stolen, is bad as charging two distinct offenses against different parties. In New York, where several are jointly indicted for grand larceny, they have no right to require that another whose name is included in the indictment shall be tried with them.' Under the statutes of that State an indictment against several defendants, charging grand larceny—a felony—is good without averments showing the degrees of guilt, whether as principal in the first or second degree, or as accessory before or after the fact."

enable the court to proceed to judgment," within N. C. Rev. Code, ch. 35, § 20.-State v. Simons. 70 N. C. 336.

' Com. v. Adams, 7 Gray 43; Com. v. O'Connell, 12 Allen 451.

6 People v Hawkins, 34 Cal. 181.

'Armsby v. People, 2 N. Y. Supreme 157.

In re Roberts, 24 Fed. Rep. 132.