If it ap is competent evidence to show title or ownership. pear from the receipt that the money was paid by another person, as agent of the alleged owner, parol evidence is admissible to prove that the contract was made by the agent for his principal.' But where defendant's guilt was dependent on the ownership of the property once owned by himself and another, to whom the State alleged he had sold it, the latter should have been called, as the best evidence procurable of the real ownership. Proof that the property alleged to have been stolen was taken from the person of another, without any claim of right upon the part of the defendant, is sufficient proof of ownership. Proof that the owner of the stolen property was commonly known by the name ascribed to him in the indictment is sufficient, though it was not his real name.* To sustain an accusation of theft of animals, ownership can be proved independent of a bill of sale; and exclusive possession, care, management and control of such property is sufficient proof of ownership. But where stolen bank notes have been 1 Oakley v. State, 40 Ala. 372. An indictment charging property in a piece of stolen meat to be in A., is sustained by proof that B. had cut it off a larger piece and laid it on the counter, and A. had paid for it, and it was stolen before A. took it up.-State v. Robinson, 35 La. An. 964. On the trial of K. for the larceny of certain articles of clothing, M. testified that she had lost the articles mentioned in the indictment, and that the stolen goods were hers; and B. testified that while tracking K. on the morning of the theft, he had found a bundle containing the articles named in the indictment. Held, that the evidence sufficiently established the ownership and identity of the stolen property.-People v. Keane, 43 Cal. 638. " Hunter v. State, 13 Tex. App. 16. People v. Nelson, 56 Cal. 77. Taylor v. State, 27 Tex. App. 44. Dodd v. State, 10 Tex. App. 370. On trial of M. for theft of a horse, alleged to belong to G., evidence that G. won M.'s money at cards; that M. sold and delivered the horse to G., and wagered the purchase-money paid him by G., who won it in the further progress of the game; and that M. in the next night, without G.'s knowledge or consent, surreptitiously took the horse from the possession of G.-held, to sustain the allegation of G.'s ownership, and to support the conviction.-Mathews v. State, 9 Tex. App. 138. On the trial of an indictment for the theft of a horse alleged to belong to an owner unknown to the grand jury, the evidence showed that the name of the supposed owner, though known to State's witnesses at the time of the trial, was not known to them when they testified before the grand jury, and that the grand jury made unavailing inquiry for the name. Held, that this evidence countervailed and frustrated the defense of variance be found in a place designated by the prisoner, and handed to the person from whom they are alleged to have been stolen, the prosecution cannot prove that the latter "received them as his own;" nor does the death of the alleged owner before the trial render such evidence proper.1 So also, the record of a judgment in a civil case, showing title in a certain person, is not evidence in a criminal case for larceny. The parties are not the same.' And where defendant was indicted for stealing a horse, the hearsay declarations of a party that a horse in the possession of a witness was the horse of the prosecutor are inadmissible.' And evidence that the alleged owner of the horse went to the livery stable where he was, and took him away in defendant's absence, claiming to own him, is inadmissible in the absence of any testimony by the alleged owner himself as to the ownership and identity of the horse.* § 146. Showing constructive possession by owner.-A charge of larceny may be sustained by showing the stolen property to have been in the constructive possession of the owner; and property placed in a particular place, and inadvertently forgotten by the owner, is constructively in his possession, so as to enable a charge of larceny to be sustained against one who, under such circumstances, appropriated it. Occupancy of a house is sufficient evidence of ownership to sustain the allegation that the prisoner entered such person's dwelling-house. And the testimony of a consignee that goods were sent through a carrier to him is sufficient evidence that 6 tween the allegation and the proof.—Jorasco v. State, 8 Tex. App. 540. An indictment charged defendant with the theft of a horse, alleged to be the property of "Columbus C. Littlefield." Held, that proof of property in "Christopher C. Littlefield" was admissible on the trial when it had been shown that the person named in the indictment was as certainly known to friends and acquaintances of the vicinity by that name as by the name of "Christopher C. Littlefield." Bell v. State, 25 Tex. 574; Lott v. State, 24 Tex. App. 723. 1 Sayres v. State, 30 Ala. 15. Hill v. State, 22 Tex. App. 579. State v. Hargrave, 97 N. C. 457. * Cannada v. State, (Tex.) 16 S. W. Rep. 341. Lawrence v. State, 1 Humph. 228; 34 Am. Dec. 644. the goods, while in the hands of the carrier, were in the constructive possession of the consignee, and may be submitted to the jury in support of an indictment charging larceny of the property of the consignee.' 4 § 147. Showing alleged owner's special property.-The stolen goods may be proved to be the absolute or special property of the alleged owner.' Thus, proof of ownership will be made out by showing that the person alleged to be the owner had a special property, or that he held the article to do some act upon it, or for the purpose of conveyance, or in trust;' or had the goods in his possession by loan from and contract of purchase with the general owner. Proof that the alleged owner bought the stolen goods at a sheriff's sale subject to a mortgage after condition broken, and that he had the rightful possession, will support an allegation of ownership.* where property having a general owner is in the possession of a special owner, and the indictment charges both property and possession in the general owner, it is not sufficient to show a taking from the special owner." But 148. Joint and separate ownership.-An indictment alleging that the stolen goods were the property of A., is not 1 Com. v. Sullivan, 104 Mass. 552. State v. Furlong, 19 Me. 225; Dignowitty v. State, 17 Tex. 521; 67 Am. Dec. 670. State v. Somerville, 21 Me. 14; 38 Am. Dec. 248. ♦ State v. Pettis, 63 Me. 124. An indictment for stealing a watch alleged that it was the property of A. It was proved that B. was the general owner of the watch, but that he had exchanged it with A. for a few weeks, and that it was stolen while in A.'s possession. Held, that as A. had a special property in the watch, there was no variance.-Yates v. State, 10 Yerg. 549. Where it was proved that the stolen property was taken from the possession of the alleged owner, but the evidence was conflicting as to the character of his possession, and the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury, that if they were in any doubt whether the property belonged to him or to the government, they must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt, and acquit him," which charge the court refused to give without the quali fication, "that if he had possession of the property as agent or bailee, they should convict the defendant," it was held that there was no error.-Miller v. State, 40 Ala. 54. Robinson v. State, 1 Ga. 563. Littleton v. State, 20 Tex. App. 168. sustained by proof that they are the property of A. and B., who are partners, and were stolen while in A.'s possession,' unless it appears from the evidence that such property was in the possession and under the control of A., under some arrangement of the parties creating a special property in A.' And the same is true where the indictment charges that the property stolen belonged to two, and the proof is that it belonged to one only.' Thus when stolen goods are alleged to have belonged to three executors, a conviction cannot be had on proof that the ownership was in two of them only. And an indictment for stealing goods of three persons named is not supported by proof of stealing goods of each of them in which they had no joint interest. In Massachusetts, however, under the statute, if the indictment charge the stealing of the property of A., and the proof is that A. and B. own the property as tenants in common, the variance is not material.' same rule obtains in Texas." And the $149. Property held in trust.-Proof that the person alleged to be the owner held the property for the purpose of conveyance, or in trust for the benefit of another, will support an allegation of ownership; or where it is shown that the complainant at the time the offense was committed, held possession of the goods under a loan from, or contract with the owner; or where the alleged owner is shown to have had the custody of them for another with authority to sell them and account to such other for the proceeds." 10 11 1 Com. v. Trimmer, 1 Mass. 476; Hogg v. State, 3 Blackf. 226; State v. McCoy, 14 N. H. 364; State v. Owens, 10 Rich. 169; State v. London, 3 Rich, N. S. 230; State v. Burgess, 74 N. C. 272. * State v. Wilson, 6 Oreg. 428. Brown v. State, 35 Tex. 691. Parmer v. State, 41 Ala. 416. 'State v. Ryan, 4 McCord 16; 17 Am. Dec. 702. * Genl. St. ch. 172, § 12. * Com. v. Arrance, 5 Allen 517. * Clark v. State, 26 Tex. App. 486. 'State v. Somerville, 21 Me. 14. 10 State v. Pettis, 63 Me. 124, Appleton, C. J., and Barrows, J., dissenting. 11 People v. Smith, 1 Parker 329. the ownership of the property stolen must be proved as laid,' and if the alleged owner was a married woman at the time of the commission of the offense, it is error, and the prisoner must be acquitted.' But an indictment for stealing wheat as the property of S. is supported by proof that the barn, from which the wheat was stolen, belonged to S.'s wife, but that S. usually sold the crops, etc., of the farm for his own use with her consent, and that she never claimed to exercise any ownership over them.' § 151. Corporate property.- On the trial of an indictment for stealing the property of a corporation it is sufficient to prove that the company known by the name given in the indictment is a corporation de facto, doing business as such.* The charter of the corporation need not be produced in order to prove its incorporation. This is sufficiently proved by evidence that it carries on business as such. Thus, on a trial for stealing a clock from the trustees of a church incorporated according to the provisions of the general statute, and so proved on the trial, it is sufficient to prove who were the trustees of it at the time of the larceny, without producing the record of any other than the original election of trustees under it. And on trial, in Massachusetts, for larceny, the property stolen being alleged to be in "the District Telegraph Company, a corporation duly established by law," a copy of the statutes of New York, containing the general law, and also an attested copy of the articles of association, under which the company was organized, from the office of the Secretary of State of New York, where the law required the original to be deposited, was held competent evidence.' In Vermont, where an insurance agent was charged with larceny from a foreign company, it was held not necessary to prove that the company 'Jones v. Com. 17 Gratt. 563. 2 Hughes v. Com. 17 Gratt. 565. State v. Jackson, 1 Del. Cr. 561. 4 People v. Barric, 49 Cal. 342; Smith v. State, 28 Ind. 321; State v. Col. lens, 37 La. Ann. 607. State v. Grant, 104 N. C. 908; Murphy v. State, 36 Ohio St. 628. State v. Livingston, 1 Del. Cr. 71. 'Com. v. Whitman, 121 Mass. 361. |