viction.

And it devolves on the accused to rebut the presumption of guilt thus raised, by showing his possession to be innocent and rightful.'

§ 169. Indiana.— Evidence that stolen property was found upon defendant is always admissible; but the strength of the presumption which it raises against him depends upon all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. If the jury find, from the evidence, that the property described, or some portion of it, was stolen, and that it was soon thereafter found in the possession of defendant, who failed to account for its possession, or who gave a false account of his possession, it is their duty to find him guilty, unless such possession is explained by the attending circumstances, or from his character or habits of life they have a reasonable doubt of his guilt. The accused is not bound to satisfy the jury that he came honestly by the property, but only to raise a reasonable doubt whether he had not so come by it. He may rebut the presumption of guilt without explaining how he came by the goods. And this may be done by slight evidence. To charge the jury that such is the presumption of law is erroneous.' Any circumstances which may have a legitimate and proper bearing in enabling the jury to determine how he came to have possession should be received when offered for that purpose. But the presumption is not rebutted by evidence of previous good character only."

8

1 Comfort v. People, 54 Ill. 404; Sahlinger v. People, 102 Ill. 241; Smith v. People, 103 Ill. 82.

Waters v. People, 104 Ill. 544.

Engleman v. State, 2 Ind. 91; 52 Am. Dec. 494.

Smathers v. State, 46 Ind. 447. See Tuberville v. State, 42 Ind. 490; Jones v. State, 49 Ind. 549.

'Hall v. State, 8 Ind. 439.

Clackner v. State. 33 Ind. 412.

Smith v. State, 58 Ind. 340.

8 Way v. State, 35 Ind. 409.

Where the only

'Wagner v. State, 107 Ind. 71; 57 Am. Rep. 79. evidence connecting the defendant with the larceny was the finding of part of the recently stolen goods in a room jointly occupied by him and another person, and more particularly under the control of the latter, who was not charged with the larceny,- held, that the evidence was not sufficient to justify a conviction.-Turbeville v. State, 42 Ind. 490. The court

2

§ 170. Iowa. One in whose possession property recently stolen is found, is presumed in law to have stolen it, unless he shows that he came honestly into possession thereof.' And to connect defendant with the larceny charged, evidence that stolen property other than that charged was found in his possession is admissible. Thus, on trial for larceny of a harness, it may be shown that while defendant's premises were being searched for stolen fence wire, the harness was found.* Defendant's possession need not be exclusive in order to be a circumstance tending to show guilt." But the defendant can only be required to adduce evidence which creates a reasonable doubt whether he honestly came into possession. An instruction that he must overcome the presumption arising from such possession by a preponderance of evidence is erroneous." Thus, one charged with larceny may explain his possession by showing what was said to him at the time he acquired possession. Where bills found upon the person of one charged with stealing them have no particular marks of identification, but their general appearance is similar to those stolen, defendant must account for his possession of those found upon him." But where it has been shown

instructed the jury that the recent possession of stolen goods should be deemed evidence of guilt. Held, that the failure to instruct that such possession should be shown to have been exclusive was not error, where the evidence showed that a portion of the goods were concealed about the person of the accused.-Galvin v. State, 93 Ind. 550.

1 State v. Hessians, 50 Iowa 135; State v. Golden, 49 Iowa 48; State v. Hallett, 63 Iowa 259; Johnson v. Miller, 63 Iowa 530; State v. Jordan, 69 Iowa 506.

2 State v. Ditton, 48 Iowa, 677.

3 State v. Schaffer, 70 Iowa, 371.

State v. Pennyman, 68 Iowa 216. On indictment for the larceny of cattle, where the evidence shows that defendant, when not working elsewhere, worked and lived at his father's house, which he called "home," and does not show that he had any other home, evidence that the cattle were found there is competent as tending to show that they were in defendant's possession, and to show that they had not strayed.-State v. Van Winkle, 80 Iowa 15.

State v. Richart, 57 Iowa 245; State v. Emerson, 48 Iowa 172; State v. Hopkins, 65 Iowa, 240; State v. Peterson, 67 Iowa, 564; State v. Manley, 74 Iowa 561.

6 State v. Jordan, 69 Iowa 506.
'State v. Buckley, 60 Iowa 471.

that a number of bank notes of the same denomination as those stolen were found in defendant's possession, evidence that two or three months before he had bank notes of this denomination is incompetent, unless it is shown that the notes found are the same notes.'

§ 171. Kansas.- On a trial for larceny of a horse, resting largely upon circumstantial evidence, testimony of witnesses that they saw defendant, recently after the larceny, in the possession of a horse, is admissible, without fully identifying it as the horse that was stolen. The weight of such testimony is for the jury. Where the larceny is clearly shown, a recent possession by defendant is proved by the State, and a very recent possession is admitted by him, coupled with an explanation by him of the manner of acquiring that possession, the jury may be warranted in acting upon that admission of possession, while, at the same time, from his subsequent statement and conduct, and all the circumstances of the case, giving no credence to his explanation of acquiring possession.'

§ 172. Kentucky.- Unexplained possession soon after the theft is sufficient evidence to support a conviction; and when there is evidence of such possession the verdict must stand, though there is some conflict as to the identity of the property. A conviction for the larceny of a watch found in defendant's possession will not be disturbed, where the evidence shows that he denied having any watch, although evidence offered by him tends to show that he obtained it in pledge for money loaned, and that he used it openly. On the separate trial of one jointly indicted with two others, it having been shown that part of the stolen property.was found in defendant's possession, it was proper to show that part of it was also found in the possession of each of his co-defendants, when from the testimony of all the defendants it appeared

they were together during the night on which the theft was perpetrated.'

$173. Louisiana.-In the absence of direct evidence of the taking, proof that the property was shortly afterwards found in the accused's possession established a presumption that he stole it, which the burden is on him to rebut." And his account is not to be taken as true simply because the prosecution does not rebut it."

§ 174. Maine. Evidence having been introduced tending to show that the trunk in which the stolen goods were found belonged to the defendant, envelopes directed to him and a pardon found in the trunk are admissible as tending to prove his connection with the goods."

It

§ 175. Massachusetts.-Recent unexplained possession of stolen property may justify a conviction." And defendant's possession some time after the theft is competent evidence, in connection with other sufficient evidence, of his guilt, but is of far less weight than possession recently after the larceny. may be proved that goods not described in the indictment were taken at the same time and found in the defendant's possession; and the jury may take to their room, with the goods alleged to have been stolen, the goods that were taken at the same time."

§ 176. Michigan.-Possession immediately after the theft may sometimes be almost conclusive of guilt, but the presumption weakens as the period of time between the theft and the possession increases, and may scarcely arise at all if others besides the accused have had equal access with himself to the

1 Branson v. Commonwealth, 17 S. W. Rep. 1019.

State v. Daly, 37 La. An. 576.

State v. Kimble, 34 La. An. 392.

4 State v. Lull, 37 Me. 246.

' Com. v. Deegan, 138 Mass. 182.

6 Com. v. Montgomery, 11 Met. 534; 45 Am. Dec. 227. S. P., in North Carolina, State v. Johnson, 1 Winst. 238; 86 Am. Dec. 434.

Com. v. Riggs, 14 Gray 376.

place where the goods were found.' The jury may be charged that they may consider as evidence of guilt the recent possession of the stolen property by the defendant, coupled with the . fact that he was in a situation to steal it; that the circumstances did not explain how he came in possession by any honest course, and that he was in a position to account for his possession, if it was an honest one." On trial for larceny of a yoke of oxen, testimony tending to show that the oxen had

been seen in defendant's possession shortly after their disappearance is competent, although, when offered, a case of larceny had not been made out, as the State had not closed its testimony.'

177. Minnesota. The recent possession of stolen property is a circumstance to be submitted to the jury, in connection with other evidence of guilt; and the court cannot properly say, in any case, that evidence of good character, or the fact that the possession was undisguised and open, is a satisfactory

1 Gablick v. People, 40 Mich. 292. 'People v. Wilson, 30 Mich. 486.

'People v. La Munion, 64 Mich. 709. About three days after the larceny of goods they were found in defendant's possession and that of another person who were trying to sell them to a second-hand dealer. They had the goods in defendant's satchel, though he denied having anything to do with them, saying that he went with the other man, who claimed the goods as his own, and to whom he loaned the satchel to assist him in selling them. He alleged that he only carried the goods at the other person's request. Defendant claimed to have known the other man for four years, but did not give his name. The alleged owner of the goods identified them, and his evidence was uncontradicted. Held, that it was not error to charge that defendant virtually admitted that the goods were stolen, and that he and another man had them in their possession, but undertook to explain the nature of his possession, and that it was for the jury to say whether they believed the explanation.—People v. Walters, 76 Mich. 195. On trial for larceny of a watch, it was shown that the owner was found dead in a house of prostitution, and that defendant, the bar-tender in the place, denied all knowledge of the watch which was missing; but, when arrested, it was found on his person. He then explained, and afterwards testified, that deceased had pledged it to him for a loan. Several inmates of the house gave evidence tending to corroborate this story, of whom one was an employe,—a bad character and ex-convict,-with whom defendant was heard concocting this defense. Held, that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty.-People v. Hawksley, 82 Mich. 71.