for the purpose of making them his own, or of deriving profit from them, but simply to aid the thief in carrying them off, he is guilty of the crime of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen.' So one may be convicted of receiving, under the New York statute, who with guilty knowledge receives a receipt designed as a means of depriving the owner of the whole or part of the goods, although the purpose be not to deprive him of the specific goods, but to defraud him into the payment of a reward for the restoration of them.' § 312. Who may commit.— One who receives stolen goods may be convicted, although he also assisted in the theft.* But one who receives stolen goods, not from the thief, but from the receiver, must have received them under circumstances connecting him with the theft, in order that he may be convicted of receiving. The statute of Michigan has enlarged the common-law offense, by making those who aid the principal felon equally guilty with him. Where goods have been stolen from the bailee of the owner, the owner may make himself criminally liable by fraudulently receiving them from the thief. And where a person directs another to receive property lost or stolen, the latter who receives the property from the thief, knowing it to be stolen, is liable to indictment." 1 State v. Rushing, 69 N. C. 29; 12 Am. Rep. 641. People v. Wiley, 3 Hill 194 5 What circumstances warrant a reasonable doubt of the fact, essential to a conviction for receiving stolen goods, that the accused knew, at the time, they were stolen,- see May v. People, 60 Ill. 119; Andrews v. People, Id. 354. 3 Jenkins v. State, 62 Wis. 49. 4 Foster v. State, 106 Ind. 272. People v. Reynolds, 2 Mich. 422. 6 People v. Wiley, 3 Hill 194. 'Caskells v. State, 4 Yerg. 149; Wright v. State, 5 Id. 154. The defendant agreed with a small boy that the latter should take his grandfather's money and hide it at the stable, and that the defendant should go at night and tap on the door, and the boy would run out and shoot at him for a blind. This arrangement was carried out, but the boy could not find the money. Several days afterward the boy took the money to a place two and a half miles distant, and gave it to the defendant. Held, that a conviction of the defendant as principal was error.— -Able v. Com. 5 Bush. 698. § 313. Affidavit or complaint.-Swearing in an affidavit that certain goods of a specified value, have been stolen by some person or persons unknown, and that from probable cause, the owner suspects that said goods are concealed in a trunk belonging to A. and B., does not constitute a charge of larceny, but of knowingly concealing stolen goods. A complaint for receiving stolen goods may be sufficient, although it states by implication only, that the property was stolen from another than the defendant." 1 § 314. Venue of the offense.-In California, where on a trial for grand larceny it was proved that defendant was not in the county where the offense was committed at the time of its commission, and did not participate in the theft, but afterward, knowing that the property was stolen, received it in the county where he resided, and aided in selling, it was held that he could not be convicted of larceny in the first mentioned county, and that he was not an accessory after the fact, but liable as a receiver of stolen goods.' In Maine, an instruction to the jury that if they believed from the evidence that the defendant bought, received, or aided in concealing property as set forth in the indictment, he at that time knowing the same to have been stolen, it would be their duty to convict, notwithstanding the original larceny was committed in Massachusetts, was held correct under the statute (R. S. ch. 156, § 10). In New York, a person may be tried and convicted of receiving and having stolen property in any county where the prisoner either received the property at first, or at any time afterward had it. In Tennessee, where A. stole cotton in W. county, which he delivered to B. in M. county, the latter knowing at the time that it had been stolen; and subsequently B. sent some of the cotton through W. county; it was held that the offense of receiving was complete in M. county, and 1 Field v. Ireland, 21 Ala. 240. 2 State v. McLaughlin, 35 Kan. 650, that its subsequent removal to W. county did not constitute a second offense of receiving stolen goods.' § 315. Indictment, generally.—In Alabama, the offense of concealing, or aiding to conceal, a stolen horse or mare, knowing the same to have been stolen, and buying or receiving a stolen horse or mare, knowing the same to have been stolen, cannot be charged disjunctively in the same count." In Florida, an indictment under sub-chapter 4, section 39 of chapter 1637, Laws of 1868, charging that the defendant "feloniously did buy, receive and have, and did then and there aid in the concealment of certain stolen property of," etc., knowing the said property to have been feloniously stolen, etc., is good, the words "and have" being mere surplusage, and not liable to mislead the defendant. The indictment in such a case might be either for the buying or the receiving, or the aiding in the concealment of the stolen property; but where it combines all these offenses in one count, it is but one offense, and the punishment is no greater than when but a single charge, as of buying, is made and established.' In Iowa, an indictment is not assailable for duplicity, merely for setting out the same transaction-as here, receiv-. ing and concealing stolen money—in forms varied to meet the testimony. The Code, § 3911, defines the offense of receiving stolen goods as receiving any stolen goods or any obtained by robbery or burglary. An indictment, therefore, need not charge that the goods were obtained by burglary. In Louisiana, an indictment charging larceny in one count, and receiving stolen goods in another is valid; but, under a single count charging larceny, a conviction of receiving stolen goods cannot be maintained. In Maryland, the offense of receiving stolen goods is a misdemeanor. In such a case, it is not necessary to allege in the indictment that the property in 1 Roach v. State, 5 Coldw. 39. 2 Barber v. State, 34 Ala. 213. 3 Bradley v. State, 20 Fla 738. 4 State v. Brannon, 50 Iowa 372. ⚫ State v. Lane, 68 Iowa 384. • State v. Moultrie, 33 La. Ann. 1146. question was feloniously received, nor need such indictment charge that the traverser received the stolen goods for the purpose of converting them to his own use. But the indictment should charge that the same were unlawfully received.' In Massachusetts, an indictment for receiving stolen goods, knowing the same to have been stolen, need not add the words "taken and carried away.' And it need not state the place of the larceny.' In Michigan, it is not necessary for the information to allege that the prosecution is for a first offense of that character, nor that the act of stealing the property received by defendant was not a simple larceny, nor that defendant has made no restitution or satisfaction of any kind to the owner of the property. Nor, when judgment follows upon a plea of guilty, need any of these matters appear in the judgment. In North Carolina, a count for the larceny of a horse, concluding at common law, may be joined with a count for the statutory offense of receiving the same; and the indictment thus drawn will warrant a general verdict of guilty. In Ohio, under Rev. St. § 6858, providing that one who knowingly receives stolen goods "shall be deemed guilty of larceny and punished accordingly," an indictment is sufficient which charges that the accused "unlawfully and fraudulently did receive" certain goods "then lately before stolen,' the accused" then and there well knowing said property to have been stolen, as aforesaid;" and it is not necessary to add the averment that in manner and form aforesaid the accused did steal, take and carry away the goods. In Texas, a conviction for receiving stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen, may be had under an indictment for theft; but a con 1 State v. Hodges, 55 Md. 127. 2 Com. v. Lakeman, 5 Gray 82. 4 People v. Caulkins, 67 Mich. 488. In Missouri, an indictment charged that defendant received certain goods, the property of a corporation named, "before then feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away from another," defendant then knowing said goods to have been so feloniously stolen. etc. Held, that these averments were not contradictory. (Following State v. Honig, 78 Mo. 249.)-State v. Jacobs, 39 Mo. App. 122. State v. Lawrence, 81 N. C. 522. Whiting v. State, 27 N. E. Rep. 96. viction for theft cannot be sustained on proof showing the offense to be the receiving of stolen property, knowing it to be such.' And the indictment need not allege the facts going to constitute the original theft.' In Virginia, an indictment under the statute which makes the receiving of stolen property, with knowledge that the same has been stolen, larceny may either charge the accused specially as receiver or may simply charge him with the larceny. The latter would seem to be the better practice.' In Wisconsin, an information for the offense described by Rev. St. § 4417, as buying, receiving or concealing stolen money, goods or property, knowing them to have been stolen, which fails to state that the goods were stolen, but sets out the guilty knowledge, is good on motion in arrest under Rev. St. § 4669, providing that indictments for statutory offenses shall be good, after verdict, if they use the words of the statute, or others of the same meaning, and section 4706, providing that an information shall not be abated for any error, when the case may be rightly understood by the court, but may on motion be amended.* § 316. Charging the intent.—The indictment should allege that the stolen goods were received with intent to deprive the owner of them; otherwise the indictment will be bad, and the defect may be taken advantage of by demurrer, writ of error, or motion in arrest of judgment. If the indictment * * * * * * 1 Campbell v. State, 9 Tex. App. 125: Vincent v. State, 10 Tex. App. 330. 2 Brothers v. State, 22 Tex. App 447. An indictment charged that the accused "did then and there fraudulently receive from Had White, and did fraudulently conceal, certain property, to-wit, $450 in money, the same being the property of Geo. Miller, which said property had been theretofore acquired by another, in such manner as that the acquisition thereof comes within the meaning of the term "theft" and the said John Moore then and there received and concealed the said property, well knowing the same to have been so acquired, against the peace and dignity," etc. Held, sufficient to charge the offense of fraudulently receiving and concealing stolen property.- Moore v. State, 12 S. W. Rep. 407, 2 Price v. State, 21 Gratt. 846. Pelts v. State, 3 Blackf. 28; People v. Johnson, 1 Parker, 564. An allegation that the defendants feloniously bought, or received two horses, of the |