holder; and it is not necessary to the offense that he should have had any intent to steal the note at the time it was handed to him.' So where the obligee of a bond, at the request of the obligor, handed it to him to look at, when he immediately threw it into the fire, it was held that if the obligor intended to benefit himself by depriving the obligee of his property, it was larceny. But where the maker of a note, claiming that the title to land for which he had given the note was not good, obtained possession of the note by trick, for the purpose of canceling it, it was held that he was not guilty of larceny.' 2 § 38. Larceny by paramour of owner's wife. It is larceny for a man who elopes with another's wife to take the latter's goods, though with the consent and at the solicitation of the wife. And personal ornaments purchased by a wife on her husband's credit, but without his authority, for which he afterwards pays, and which he never gave to her as her own, though she took and retained possession of them, are community property, and her possession being that of her husband, the taking thereof with her consent, by one knowing the facts, is larceny. But a wife cannot be guilty of larceny for stealing the goods of her husband, and another woman, even if 1 People v. Call, 1 Denio 120; 43 Am. Dec. 655. State v. Deal, 64 N. C. 270, Rodman, J., dissenting. People v. Schuyler, 6 Cow. 572. On a trial for larceny in stealing a bond belonging to A., which the prisoner claimed was taken with the consent of A.'s wife, it was proved that the prisoner knew that A. owned the bond, and that A. was in the vicinity of the house and would return to it in a short time. It was held not erroneous to submit the question to the jury, whether upon all the evidence the prisoner believed the wife had any right to dispose of the bond, and to instruct them that if the wife had no such right, and the prisoner did not believe that she had any, her consent to his taking the bond furnished no defense to him.-People v. Cole, 43 N. Y. 508; affi'g 2 Lans. 370. The prisoner hired a cart and told the owner to go to prosecutor's house and to convey furniture for the woman there to another address. The furniture was loaded into the cart, on its arrival, in the presence of prosecutor's wife, and without his knowledge taken to the address given, whither the prosecutor's wife went, and where the prisoner afterwards joined her, and they lived together there, using the furniture. Held, that there was evidence on which the jury might convict prisoner of stealing the furniture.-Regina v. Flatman, 42 L. T. 159. animus furandi is imputed to her, cannot be guilty of larceny for acting conjointly with the wife in taking the goods.' 2 § 39. Larceny by public officer.- Money collected by a sheriff for taxes is the property of the county in his hands, and he may be guilty of larceny by converting the same to his own So also the ordinary of a county may be legally convicted as accessory before the fact, of larceny of county property in his charge, from the court-house. But a constable who sells at private sale, goods levied on by him under an execution, does not hold the proceeds as bailee for the plaintiff in the writ, and on converting the latter to his own use, cannot be convicted of larceny from the plaintiff." 3 CHAPTER VI. WHAT PROPERTY IS THE SUBJECT OF LARCENY. § 40. In general; must have value. 41. Bills, notes and bonds. 42. Bank notes. 43. Receipts, releases, books of account. 44. Railroad tickets. 45. Things savoring of the realty; derelict property, etc. 46. Animals. 47. Larceny of one's own property. 48. Larceny of property jointly owned. § 40. In general; must have value.— While to be subject of larceny a thing must be of some value, still it may be worth less than the smallest coin; and where an indictment charged the value of a padlock stolen to be thirty cents, but 1 Lamphier v. State, 70 Ind. 317. 4 Zschocke v. People, 62 Ill. 127. there was no distinct proof of any specific value, evidence that it had a key in it, and was used in fastening a door, was held sufficient to show that it was of some value.' But it is not larceny to take another's letter which has no value, and does not import any property in possession of the person from whom it is taken.' A printed list of names and dates is a chattel, but not a "writing containing evidence of any existing debt," within the statutory definition of the subjects of larceny. Its value, as a statutory subject of larceny, is its market value, i. e. what it is capable of being sold for at a fairly conducted sale. Under a statute defining larceny as the "felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving away the personal property of another," taking, with felonious intent, books containing a phonographic report of the testimony taken on a trial, and having no value except for such report, is larceny; such books being personal property, and having no market price, their value to the person who can use the testimony is the proper standard of value. Under a statute making the feloniously taking of "anything of value" larceny, manure is the subject of larceny; and so is a coffin in which the remains of a human being are interred." 41. Bills, notes and bonds. At common law, choses in action are not subjects of larceny;' and bonds, bills, or notes, being of no intrinsic value, and not importing any property in possession, but only the evidence of property could not be stolen; but statutes have placed them on the same footing as the money they were intended to secure," provided they are, at the time of the taking, valid and subsisting securities; "and eras 1 Wolverton v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 909; People v. Wiley, 3 Hill, 194. Payne v. People, 6 Johns. 103. 2 State v. James, 58 N. H. 67. 4 Territory v. McGrath, 5 Utah, 525. Ball v. White, 39 Ohio St. 650. State v. Doepke, 68 Mo. 208. Culp v. State, 1 Port. 33; 26 Am. Dec. 357; Warner v. Com., 1 Pa. St. 154; 44 Am. Dec. 114. U. S. v. Davis, 5 Mason 358; Greeson v. State, 5 How. (Miss.) 33; State v. Casados, 1 Nott & M. 91. 'State v. Wilson, 3 Brev. 196. 10 Wilson v. State, 1 Port. 118. ure of a surety's name on a note with the principal's consent does not invalidate it as to the latter, and it may still be the subject of larceny. A note payable in chattels may be the subject of larceny. Under a statute declaring that the larceny of bills obligatory shall be punished in the same manner as the larceny of any goods or chattels, the felonious taking, etc., of one such bill is punishable as larceny.' A due bill is an "obligation," within the meaning of a statute making an "order, bill of exchange, bond, promissory note, or other obligation" the subject of larceny, but one cannot be convicted of larceny of a due bill which has previously been paid. County orders are not bills of exchange, the stealing of which is made a felony by the Pennsylvania statute.* § 42. Bank notes.-Bank notes are not the subject of larceny at common law, and an indictment will not lie for stealing them under a statute making promissory notes the subjects of larceny. But bank bills and United States treasury notes have been made subjects of larceny by the statutes of the several States;' which statutes apply to United States treasury notes and national bank notes, although they were not in existence when the statutes were passed. Thus, abstracting bank notes from a justice's court where they were regu1 People v. Call, 1 Denio 120; 43 Am. Dec. 655. People v. Bradley, 1 Buff. (N. Y.) Superior Ct. 576. S. was tried and convicted for stealing a promissory note for $258.33, the property of A. and C. It appeared that A. and C. made the note to S.'s order, and delivered it to him under the mistaken impression that $258.33 was due him, whereas only $175 was owing to him. The mistake being discovered, S. gave back the note to A. and C. unstamped and unindorsed, in exchange for another note for $175. Afterwards, on the same day, S. purloined the former note, caused it to be stamped and indorsed, and tried to collect it. Held, that S. was not guilty of larceny of "a note" or of "a valuable security," within the meaning of the statute. The note was unstamped, in the hands of the makers, and void.-Scott v. Queen, 2 Can. Supr. Ct. 349. 3 Com. v. Messinger, 1 Binney 273; 2 Am. Dec. 441. * State v. Campbell, 103 N. C. 344. Warner v. Com., 1 Pa. St. 154; 44 Am. Dec. 114. 6 Culp v. State, 1 Port. 33. But see Damewood v. State, 1 How. (Miss.) 262. Sallie v. State, 39 Ala. 691; Com. v. Rand, 7 Met. 475; 41 Am. Dec. 455; McDonald v. State, 8 Mo. 283. * Sansbury v. State, 4 Tex. App. 99. larly filed as part of the papers, was held larceny within the penal code of Arkansas.' But an indictment for stealing paper money must conclude against the form of the statute." Stealing a forged bank-bill would be no larceny.' 6 § 43. Receipts, releases, books of account.-In New York common receipts are not "personal property" within a statute defining larceny; nor can they be the subject of larceny. Nor can a satisfaction-piece of a mortgage be the subject of larceny. But it is otherwise as to accountable receipts, or receipts for money to be accounted for, receipts for property in store, and ship receipts. Taking a receipt or other instrument from the hands of the person who has given it, before it has taken effect by delivery, is not larceny. Where, therefore, a creditor got his debtor to sign a receipt, and under pretense that he was about to pay him, and then took it from him with a criminal intent without paying him, it was held that he was not guilty of larceny.' In South Carolina, where A. promised B. to pay him for work, a certificate given by B. to C., stating that C. had paid for the work, and that B. had no claim therefor on A., was held a receipt or release within the statute and the subject of larceny. In Minnesota, a warehouse receipt issued by a railway company, though not showing legal authority in the company to issue it, is subject to larceny, where the company would be liable on it to a bona fide holder as against whom it would be estopped to assert its want of authority. In Massachusetts, a memorandum book of accounts is the subject of larceny within the statute." § 44. Railroad tickets. A passenger railroad ticket in a ticket office of the company is not a subject of larceny at 1 Wilson v. State, 5 Ark. 513. 2 State v. Dill, 75 N. C. 57. State v. Smart, 4 Rich. 356; 55 Am. Dec. 683. People v. Griffin, 38 How. Pr. 475. People v. Stevens, 38 Hun (N. Y.) 62. 'People v. Bradley, 4 Parker 245. People v. Loomis, 4 Denio 380. State v. Wilcox, 3 Brev. 96. State v. Loomis, 27 Minn. 521. 10 Com. v. Williams, 9 Metc. 273. |