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after the crime, some miles from the place where the crime was committed, as shoes that were in the house burglarized, as such evidence tends to connect the defendant with the offense. An instruction that the possession of the property by defendant recently after it had been stolen, unless satisfactorily accounted for by defendant, raises a presumption of his guilt, is in violation of the constitutional provision which prohibits the court from charging the jury with reference to matters of fact. So, an instruction that such possession unexplained at a time immediately following the time when the property was stolen, supported by other circumstances and other evidence tending to show guilt, was a strong circumstance in the case, is error. Whether the possession was strong evidence, or only slight evidence tending to show guilt, was a matter for the jury to pass upon, and not a question for the court to determine.'

(c) Georgia.-In this State it has been held that possession, soon after a burglary, of the stolen property, unaccounted for, raises a presumption of guilt on which a conviction may be based. Thus evidence that the stolen articles were found the next morning in the possession of defendant, who gave a false account as to how he obtained them, is sufficient to warrant a conviction; but proof that the stolen goods were found in a room occupied by defendant and another is not conclusive that they were in the possession of either. And an instruction that if the jury find that a burglary has been committed, and that defendant was shortly after found with the identical goods stolen, and did not satisfactorily explain how he got them,

1 People v. Lowrey, 70 Cal. 193. 2 People v. Mitchell, 55 Cal. 236. 3 People v. Ah Sing, 59 Cal. 400. Lundy v. State, 71 Ga. 360.

Wynn v. State, 81 Ga. 744.

Shropshire v. State. 69 Ga. 273. Where a burglary and a larceny of wheat were committed together,-held, that the prisoner's possession of the wheat twelve days thereafter, not satisfactorily explained, was a circumstance to be considered on his trial for burglary. Bryan v. State, 62 Ga 179. Where the defendant was found in possession of goods recently stolen from a tailor's shop, and made contradictory statements of the manner by which he got them, and was also in possession of a key freshly filed

then they might find him guilty, is correct.' But it is error to instruct the jury that unexplained possession of stolen property would alone warrant the conviction of a defendant charged with burglary; and a charge that "the jury must be satisfied that he did not get possession of them by committing any burglary or larceny, but that he got possession of them in an honest way" is error.' The true rule seems to be that recent possession, not satisfactorily explained, of goods stolen from the house at the time the alleged burglary was committed, may be sufficient as a basis of conviction of burglary, where the burglary has been established, and the jury believe from all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty.'

(d) Illinois. Unexplained possession of the fruits of a burglary, immediately or soon after the crime was committed, is presumptive evidence of the guilt of the person having such possession; and will warrant a conviction of the burglary, unless overcome by circumstances or other evidence;' but such

down so as to fit the door of the shop exactly, and where the goods stolen were in the shop at dusk when the tailor locked the door, and when the tailor returned at sunrise the next morning the goods were gone, and no window or other mode of access to the shop was open or broken into, so that the thief must have entered at the door ;—held, that the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict for burglary in the night-time, and that such verdict was not contrary to law. Smith v. State, 62 Ga. 663. Where an indictment for the burglary of a railroad depot follows the terms of Code § 4386, defining burglary as breaking into and entering a building where valuable goods are stored, with intent to commit a felony, evidence that the railroad company had been in possession of certain goods; that these were taken from the depot; and that defendant was found in possession of some of them,-is admissible, though the indictment does not allege that any goods were stolen, or that any felony was comnitted, in the depot.-Stokes v. State, 84 Ga. 258. It was shown that a dwelling had been broken open and some bacon and meal stolen. The articles were found in defendant's possession, and at first she denied taking them, but afterwards, being told that she had better confess it if she took them, she confessed in the presence of three men that one P. helped her to burst in the door, and they got the meat and meal, and carried them off and divided them. Held, that a verdict of guilty was warranted.-Matthews v. State, 86 Ga. 782, 804.

1 Brown v. State, 61 Ga. 311; Davis v. State, 76 Ga. 16.

Falvey v. State, 85 Ga. 157.

Mangum v. State, 13 S. E. Rep. 558.

4 Magee v. People, 28 N. E. 1077.

Smith v. People, 115 Ill. 17; Longford v. People, 25 N. E. Rep. 1009.

evidence of possession by the accused is not necessary to convict.'

(e) Indiana.- Where it appears, on the trial of an indictment for burglary and larceny, that the accused was in the immediate locality where the alleged burglary was committed, both before and after its perpetration, and that he had possession of, and sold or otherwise disposed of goods which were the proceeds of the burglary, a verdict of guilty will not be disturbed because of the absence of evidence that the accused broke into the building where the burglary was committed.' (f) Iowa. An early case holds that the mere possession of stolen property shortly after a burglary is not prima facie evidence of guilt.' The presumption arising from such possession is not sufficient to warrant a conviction for burglary with intent to steal. But where a larceny and a burglary were committed by the same person at the same time, possession is prima facie evidence that the possessor was guilty of both

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(g) Kentucky.-Evidence of a series of house-breakings

1 Garrity v. People, 107 Ill. 162 On trial for burglary, consisting in breaking into a car and taking therefrom a quantity of bacon, evidence that the car when broken into was near defendant's house; that a quantity of bacon corresponding in weight and number of pieces to that taken from the car was found the next day in defendant's cellar; and that the cellar door and a pair of pantaloons of defendant's were then found covered with grease,―is, in the absence of evidence showing that defendant obtained the bacon honestly, sufficient to identify the property. Shope, J., dissenting.- Longford v. People, 25 N. E. Rep. 1009.

? Dawson v. State, 65 Ind. 442.

State v. Reid, 20 Iowa 412.

4 State v. Shaffer, 59 Iowa 290; State v. Tilton, 63 Iowa 117.

State v. Rivers, 68 Iowa 611. On an indictment for burglary, it appeared that the store of one M. was broken open in the night, and a number of revolvers, cartridges, razors and knives stolen therefrom. About a month afterwards defendants were arrested outside of the state for another offense and upon one of them were found three new knives and a cartridge-box having on it M.'s cost-mark in his own handwriting; and where the other had been lying were found two revolvers and seven knives. Afterwards, under a straw-pile near the same place were found razors, revolvers and knives, some of which M. and his clerk identified as having been taken from his store on the night when the burglary was committed. Held, that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a verdict of guilty.-State v. Jennings, 79 Iowa 513; State v. Ray, Id. 765.

occurring about the same time, the finding afterwards in defendant's possession of all the property taken, some of the articles concealed in his house and about his person, with the facts that he gave inconsistent accounts of how he acquired the property, and sold portions at an unreasonable price, and that he was actually seen in one of the houses, is sufficient to justify a conviction of housebreaking.'

(h) Massachusetts.-The recent possession, unsatisfactorily accounted for, of property stolen at the commission of a burglary, is presumptive evidence of guilt to be weighed by the jury. The fact that the indictment for breaking and entering contains no allegation that such property was stolen is immaterial. Thus, under an indictment charging that the defendant broke and entered a shop and stole certain articles therefrom, at the same time, jointly with his brother, it is proper to show that the two brothers occupied rooms at their father's house at the same time; that some of the stolen articles were found in the house, part of them in the room occupied by the brother, and part mingled with the defendant's property, and that some of the property was found in the defendant's room at another place."

(i) Michigan.-Evidence that money stolen at the time of the burglary was found on the person of the defendant is admissible; but it seems that the mere possession of articles stolen is not prima facie evidence of guilt of the burglary."

(j) Mississippi.-On one's trial for burglary and larceny,

1 Johnson v. Com. 15 S. W. Rep. 671. Com. v. McGorty, 114 Mass. 299.

3 Com v. Parmenter, 101 Mass 211. People v. Carroll, 54 Mich. 334.

5 Stuart v. People, 42 Mich. 255; People v. Gordon, 40 Mich. 716. On a trial for the burglary of a store, the people sought to show that certain discolored coin, found in the possession of the wife of an alleged accomplice, was taken from the safe in the store. The accomplice was called as a witness, shown some money found in the safe after the burglary, and asked if it resembled that taken from his wife. He replied in the negative, and testified that he had given his wife the money several weeks before the burglary. Held, that his testimony not having been contradicted, it was error to instruct the jury that they might identify the money by comparing it with that known to have been taken from the safe.-People v. Marks, 51 N. W. Rep, 638.

his recent possession of the stolen property raises a presumption of guilt.'

(k) Missouri.-Recent possession of goods stolen in a burglary is evidence of guilt of the burglary. Possession of part is evidence of the theft of the whole.' So defendant's exclusive possession of property recently stolen by burglars is presumptive evidence of his being guilty of both burglary and larceny, but his possession jointly with another person is no proof of his guilt; and possession, five or six weeks after the crime was committed, is not presumptive evidence of guilt.'

(1) Nevada. The mere fact of one of two parties indicted for burglary being in possession of money identical in kind and denomination with that which was stolen, is not sufficient evidence to convict him, in the absence of proof that he knew the money to have been stolen, when he received it, or was connected with the commission of the crime."

(m) New York.—On the trial of an indictment for burglary and larceny, it is not erroneous for the court to charge the jury that the finding of the stolen property shortly after it was taken, is presumptive evidence of the guilt of the person in whose possession it was found, it being competent, under the indictment, to convict the prisoner either of simple larceny or of burglary and larceny. It is not erroneous for the court in such case to refuse to charge that the finding of the property in the possession of the defendant unaccompanied by any suspicious circumstances, was no evidence that she committed the burglary; it being some evidence of that fact even if not prima facie, of her guilt of the burglary.'

(n) Ohio. The facts that a building was burglariously entered, and goods stolen therefrom were soon afterwards found in possession of the accused, do not, alone, raise a presumption of law that he is guilty of both the burglary and larceny. But these facts, taken with other indications of guilt as his refusing to account for the means of such pos

1 Harris v. State, 61 Miss. 304.

State v. Owens, 79 Mo. 619.

State v. Warford, 16 S. W. Rep. 886.

4 State v. Jones, 19 Nev. 365.

* Jones v. People, 6 Parker, 126; Davis v. People, 1 Id. 447.

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