LARCENY AND KINDRED OFFENSES. PART I. LARCENY AND RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS. CHAPTER I. WHAT CONSTITUTES LARCENY, GENERALLY. §1. Definitions. 2. Necessity of, and what constitutes a taking. 3. Conversion after possession obtained by consent of owner. 4. Obtaining possession by threats. 5. Taking under claim of title. 6. Bona fide purchase from thief, or vendor without title. 7. The Texas rule. 8. Larceny of animals. 9. What is a single offense. 10. Attempts to commit larceny. 11. Who is a principal offender. 12. Who is an accessory or accomplice. §1. Definitions.- "Larceny" is derived from the Norman French "larcyn," Latin "latrocinium," and signifies the felonious, wrongful, and fraudulent taking and carrying away by any person, of the personal goods of another, with the felonious intent to convert them to his own use and make them his property, without the consent of the owner.' The taking must be without the least color of right or excuse,' against the will of the owner, and from his actual or constructive possesIt must be done fraudulently and secretly, so as not sion ̧a 1 State v. South, 4 Dutch. 28; 75 Am. Dec. 250; Rap. & L. Law Dict.; 2 Russ. Cr. 123; Quitzon v. State, 1 Tex. App. 65. Fields v. State, 6 Coldw. 524. 8 Hite V. State, 9 Yerg. 198, 357. Where property is received and carried away, with a felonious intent, from a person who is the agent for or who stands in the position of the owner in respect to the possession, although the owner has never had the actual possession, yet the possession of such only to deprive the owner of his property, but also to attempt to leave him without knowledge of the taker.' § 2. Necessity of, and what constitutes a taking. To make one guilty of larceny he must have taken the property, or have assisted in the taking.' Thus the selling of property as his own, which the prisoner knows to be his wife's,' or the selling of an animal at large upon a range, without first getting possession of it, to one who never took possession, or the enticing of a hog a short distance on the owner's premises, by dropping corn, and then abandoning it,' do not amount to larceny. But a temporary possession by the thief, though but for a moment, is sufficient to constitute a taking,' which is accomplished by simply laying hold of, grasping or seizing the thing, animo furandi, with the hands or otherwise.' Violence is not essential; fraud may supply the place of force." The taking being complete, there need be no sale or other disposal of the thing taken by the taker, to make him guilty of larceny. But every fraudulent taking is not larceny, and it is erroneous so to charge without more. 10 § 3. Conversion after possession obtained by consent of owner. One who receives from another money to which he knows he is not entitled, and which he knows has been paid to him by mistake, and conceals such overpayment and appropriates the money to his own use, intending thus to cheat and person is deemed his, and the crime is larceny. People v. McDonald, 43 N. Y. 61. 1 State v. Ledford, 67 N. C. 60. Wright v. State, 18 Tex. App. 358. 3 Watkins v. State, 60 Miss. 323. Hardeman v. State, 12 Tex. App. 207; Madison v. State, 16 Tex. App. 435. But see Doss v. State, 21 Tex. App. 505; 57 Am. Rep. 618. 5 Edmonds v. State, 70 Ala. 8; 45 Am. Rep. 67; Minter v. State, 26 Tex. App. 217. But see State v. Wisdom, 8 Porter 511; State v. Jones, 65 N. C. 395; State v. Wilkerson, 72 N. C. 376; Cross v. State, 64 Ga. 443. Harrison v. People, 50 N. Y. 518; 10 Am. Rep. 517; Lundy v. State, 60 Ga. 143; Williams v. State, Id. 368. 'Gettinger v. State, 13 Neb. 308. 8 Com. v. James, 1 Pick. 375. 9 Davis v. State, 10 Lea 707; Davenport's Case, 1 Leigh 588. 10 Purtell v. State, 43 Tex. 483. defraud the owner thereof, is guilty of larceny.' So, one who, on receiving a bill to be changed, puts it in his pocket with the fraudulent intent of converting it to his own use, and who refuses to deliver the change on demand, is guilty of larceny.' And so is one who obtains goods by falsely representing himself to be purchasing as agent of another to whom the goods are charged, and sells them, appropriating the proceeds—at least in those jurisdictions where false pretenses and larceny are no longer distinct offenses.' So also, if a person receiving a conditional delivery of property from the owner, upon an understanding that he is forthwith to pay a certain sum of money therefor, wrongfully retains and carries off such property against the consent of the owner, he thereby becomes a trespasser, and if he does it animo furandi, he is guilty of larceny. And where one uses for his own purposes a certified check delivered to him only to purchase silver for a bank, his intent at the time of taking the check, to steal it, renders him guilty of larceny; the check remaining the property of the bank.. The rule is that when the mere possession of a chattel is fraudulently obtained, a conversion in pursuance of an intent formed at the time, is larceny; as where one obtains possession of goods with the owner's consent, under pretense of finding a purchaser, but with a real intent to convert them to 1 Wolfstein V. 414; State v. People, 13 N. Y. Supreme Ct. 121; Bailey v. State, 58 Ala. Williamson, 1 Del. Cr. 155; State v. Ducker, 8 Oreg. 394; 34 9 · Levy phy - People, 104 Ill. 528; Commonwealth v. Barry, 124 Mass. 325; Hil v. State, 79 Ala. 259; Farrell v. People, 16 Ill. 506; Mur debrand v. People, 56 N. Y. 394; 3 N. Y. Supreme Ct. 82; 8 Id. 19; 15 Am. Rep. 435; Walters v. State, 17 Tex. App. 226; 50 Am. Rep. 128. Contra, People v. Special Sessions Justices, 26 Hun 537; reversed 90 N. Y. 12. 3 Harris V. State, 81 Ga. 758; Weyman v. People, 6 Thomp. & C. 697; 4 Hun 511. State v. Anderson, 25 Minn. 66; 33 Am. Rep. 455; Shipply v. People, 86 N. Y. 375; 40 Am. Rep. 551. › People v. Abbott, 53 Cal. 284. United States v. Rodgers, 1 Mack. 419; State v. Brown, 25 Iowa 561; State v. Hall, 76 Iowa 85; People v. Camp, 56 Mich. 548; Bassett v. Spofford, 45 N. Y. 387; Macino v. People, 19 N. Y. Supreme Ct. 127; People v. Rice, (N. Y. App.) 29 N. E.146. |