possession of it at the time of the taking.' But a mere temporary custody is not such a possession as requires the consent of the custodian to be negatived.' If the ownership is alleged to be in two, the want of consent of both to the taking must be alleged and proved;' and the indictment must negative the consent of each owner. It is not enough to negative merely their joint consent.* That the indictment alleged conjunctively, that the property was taken without the knowledge "and" consent of the owner, instead of disjunctively, as in the language of the statute, that it was taken without the knowledge "or" consent of the owner, is no such defect as will authorize the trial court to sustain a motion to quash.* § 73. Charging the offense in different ways.—Under N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 279, an indictment for grand larceny may charge, "in separate counts," that the crime was "committed in a different manner or by different means. Such an indictment, under Minn. Pen. Code § 415, should charge the act constituting the alleged larceny so as to inform the accused in which one of these different ways he is charged with having committed the offense. In such a case the prosecutor will not be compelled to elect on which count he will proceed; but it is otherwise where the evidence tends to show that distinct larcenies are embraced in the indictment. An 1 Bowling v. State, 13 Tex App. 338; Johnson v. State, 39 Tex. 393; Bland v. State, 18 Tex. App. 12; Bailey v State, Id. 426; Frazier v. State, Id. 434. 'Bailey v. State, 18 Tex. App. 426; Burns v. State, 35 Tex. 724 'Williams v. State, 19 Tex. App 276; Williams v. State, 23 Tex. App. 619. Taylor v. State, 18 Tex App. 489. An indictment for theft alleged that defendant took five cattle from the possession of E., their owner, and eight cattle from the possession of W., their owner, "without the consent of the said owners." Held, that the indictment was sufficient, though it did not allege want of consent as to each owner, joint ownership and possession not being alleged.-Smith v. State, 21 Tex. App. 133; Id., 21 Tex. App. 96. An indictment under Mass. Gen. Stat. ch. 161 § 38-making embezzlement simple larceny-which avers that the property embezzled was the property of A, B, and C, sufficiently negatives the consent of each owner, by averring that it was without the consent of A, B, and C.-Commonwealth v. Smith, 116 Mass. 40. 5 Hammel v. State, 14 Tex. App. 326. 'People v. Rice, 59 Hun 616. State v. Henn, 39 Minn. 464. * Engleman v. State, 2 Ind. 91. A grand juror's complaint charged that indictment charging the defendant with "stealing, taking, and leading or driving away" animals stolen, is not bad as charging the offense in the disjunctive.' § 74. Following the language of the statute.- Larceny being a common law offense in most jurisdictions, an indictment in the common law form is generally sufficient. Thus, under Va. Code, ch. 192, § 796, which declares that if a free person obtain by any false pretense or token from another, with intent to defraud, money or other property, he shall be deemed guilty of the larceny thereof, etc., an indictment for larceny may be either in the form of an indictment for larceny at common law, or it may charge the specific facts which the act declares shall be a larceny.' But in South Carolina, an indictment that charges the stealing of corn "in the field," is fatally defective as an indictment under a statute which makes stealing “from the field" a felony.' A., at, etc., on the 21st day of November, 1857, with force and arms, one buffalo robe of the value of eight dollars, of the goods and chattels of B., of, etc., feloniously did steal, etc., and that said A, at, etc., on the 21st day of November, 1857, did then and there, feloniously steal, etc., one other buffalo robe of the value of eight dollars, of the goods and chattels of B., against the peace and contrary to the statute. Held, not a ground for arrest of judgment on account of duplicity.—State v. Holmes, 28 Conn. 230. 1 People v. Smith, 15 Cal. 408. 2 Leftwich v. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. 716. 3 State v. Schuler, 19 S. C. 140. CHAPTER XII. DESCRIBING THE STOLEN PROPERTY. § 75. General rules. 76. Bills, notes, checks and coupons. 77. Money; coin. 78. Bank bills or notes. 79. Describing bank bills as promissory notes. 80. Name of bank need not be stated. 81. Treasury notes and national currency. 82. Horses, mares, geldings, etc. 83. Cattle, hogs, etc. 84. Oysters and fish. 85. Growing crops and vegetables. 86. Ores and minerals. 87. Inconsistent descriptions; amendment; aider by verdict. 88. Miscellaneous cases. § 75. General rules. A general description of the thing stolen is sufficient;' but it should be described with reasonable certainty; that is, with such certainty as will enable the jury to say that the goods proved to have been stolen are the same as those charged in the indictment, and that the court can see that they are the subject-matter of the offense alleged.' When the description of the property shows it to be personal, there need be no allegation that it is such. The indictment must describe the articles stolen by the names they usually bear, and specify the number and value of each species or particular kind. Where one is charged with burglary and also larceny, he cannot be convicted of the larceny of other property than that charged in the indictment to have been stolen. Only 4 1 State v. Smart, 4 Rich. 356; 55 Am. Dec. 683; Dignowitty v. State, 17 Tex. 521; 67 Am. Dec. 670. 2 State v. Morey, 2 Wis. 494; 60 Am. Dec. 439. * People v. Jackson, 8 Barb. 637; People v. Freeman, 1 Idaho T. 322. Mountjoy v. State, 78 Ind. 172; Jones v. State, 51 Miss. 718. State v. Longbottoms, 11 Humph. 39; State v. Clark, 8 Ired. 226. as such a description of stolen property should be alleged as the proof suffices to sustain. If that be indefinite it should be alleged that a better one cannot be given.' Thus an indictment for stealing a hat need not describe it as a black or white hat, or a felt or beaver. When the thing stolen is in its raw or unmanufactured condition, it may be described in the indictment by its name, and as so much in quantity, weight, or measure. But if it be worked up into a specific article, and remain so when stolen, it must be described by the name by which it is generally known. The cast iron top of an iron box which was stolen separate from the box, may be described one pound of iron," although it may weigh more or less than a pound. An indictment charging that the defendant stole a parcel of oats is sufficient. So is one for stealing one bridle, of the value of, etc. And the same was held as to an indictment which charged the stealing of a book, of the value of three dollars, without giving the title of the book." Where objection is made that the indictment does not accurately describe the property, the same should not be quashed, if the objection is not applicable to all the property described. The proper way to save the question is to object to the admission of any evidence concerning the property alleged to have been improperly described. Upon trial of an indictment which, in describing the property sets forth that a more particular description is to the jurors unknown, an instruction asking that if the jury should find that the grand jury had a full description, they should acquit, is properly refused." § 76. Bills, notes, checks and coupons.-An indictment for larceny averring the felonious taking and carrying away of a bill of exchange directing the payment of money, alleging the value, and setting out the draft in its very words, is sufficient, 1 Statum v. State, 9 Tex. App. 273. 2 State. v. Martin, 82 N. C. 672. * State v. Brown, 1 Dev. 137. • Com. v. Gallagher, 126 Mass. 54. 3 although it does not aver that there was money due upon the draft, or secured thereby, or remaining unsatisfied thereon, or which might, in some contingency, be collected thereon.' Under a statute making promissory notes the subject of larceny, they may be described in the same manner as other things which have an intrinsic value; and it is not necessary to add the words "for the payment of money." An indictment is also good which alleges the larceny of a piece of paper, stating its value without further description.' But where an indictment alleged that the defendant feloniously stole, took and carried away sundry promissory notes for the payment of money, of the value of $80, of the goods and chattels of the said M., it was held bad for uncertainty. The description of property stolen, as "one promissory note" or as "one due bill" is sufficient. It is sufficient to describe the property as a check or order for the payment of money, giving the signer's name, owner, date, value, and where payable.' It is a sufficient allegation of its value to say that it was "of the value of $20.97," that being equivalent to saying that the instrument called for at least that amount of money. Although when one is indicted for the larceny of a written instrument, it is not necessary, under the laws of Missouri, to set out a copy of such instrument, yet, an indictment for stealing a check should describe the same with sufficient minuteness of detail to enable the accused to know what particular check is intended.' An indictment under Tenn. Code, § 4693, charging larceny of coupons as taken from "the bonds of the state of Tennessee," is sufficient, as meaning, ex vi termini, lawful and valid bonds. 4 'Phelps v. People, 13 N. Y. Supreme Ct. 401; 72 N. Y. 334. * Com. v. Brettun, 100 Mass. 206. See Com. v. Campbell, 103 Id. 436. A promissory note alleged to have been stolen was proved on the trial to have been payable with semi-annual interest, and all taxes that should be assessed on the amount of money represented by it. An information for the theft in describing the note, omitted those particulars. Held, that the variance was not material.-State v. Fenn, 41 Conn. 590. * Stewart v, Com. 4 Serg. & R. 194. 4 Com. v. Henry, 2 Brews. 566; Com. v. Byerly, Id. 568. 5 State v. Pierson, 59 Iowa, 271. |