tle," "one beef cattle" is a sufficient description of the animal.' The expression a beef, or one beef, in an indictment for stealing it, means an animal of the cow kind; a beeve; and may be a sufficient description of an animal stolen. It does not necessarily mean beef dressed for market.' Where the personal pronoun "it," in an indictment for the theft of two animals, was used in reference to them in charging the intent, it was held to have been correctly used in the singular number as referring to the property in the animals, and not to the animals themselves. Under a statute making it an offense to steal a hog, an indictment charging that defendant stole a certain hog is sufficient in the description of the property; identifying the individual hog stolen is matter of evidence,* In an indictment for theft of an estray, the animal stolen need not be described as "coming within the meaning of an estray. But an indictment for theft of cattle charging that defendant "did then and there willfully and fraudulently steal from H. one animal of the cattle species, of the value of ten dollars, against the peace and dignity of the state," is defective in substance. It charges no more than a conclusion of law, whereas it should charge the acts, omissions and intents which constitute the offense of theft." 84. Oysters and fish.-A person who has planted oysters has an absolute property in them, and an indictment for stealing them need not aver that they were reclaimed.' In an indictment for stealing shad it is not necessary to allege that they were dead when stolen, for when a fish or animal 1 Duvall v. State, 8 Tex. App. 370. 'Moore v. State, 2 Tex. App. 350. 3 Goodson v. State, 32 Tex. 121. Grant v. State, 2 Tex. App. 163. McGee v. State, 43 Tex. 662. • Insall v. State, 14 Tex. App. 145. The following descriptions have been held sufficient in Texas: "One certain calf of the neat-cattle kind.”—Grant v. State, 3 Tex. App. 1. "One head of neat-cattle of the value of $12."State v. Murphy, 39 Tex. 46. "Certain neat-cattle, to-wit: one beef of the value of fifteen dollars, the property of" a person named.-State v. Garrett, 34 Tex. 674; Short v. State, 36 Tex. 644. State v. Taylor, 2 Dutch. 117. is called by the same name, either dead or alive, it is competent to prove the stealing of it in the dead state without alleging it.' § 85. Growing crops and vegetables.-In Alabama, an indictment that defendant "feloniously took and carried away fifty ears of corn, the same being a part of an outstanding crop of corn, the property of W. D.," charges with sufficient certainty that the stolen ears were, at the time of the larceny, part of an outstanding crop.' The word "part" is interchangeable with "portion," in such an indictment. But an indictment which charges that defendant "feloniously took and carried away one peck of corn, a part of an outstanding crop of corn, of the value of twenty-five cents, the personal property of A." is bad, as it does not show whether the offense was grand larceny under Code 1876, § 4358, or petit larceny. In North Carolina, under Code, § 1069, making it larceny to steal any vegetable or other product “cultivated for food or market," an indictment charging the larceny of watermelons not alleged to be thus cultivated will not support a conviction. But the indictment need not allege that the crops were cultivated for food or market, unless the larceny charged was that of some fruit or vegetable cultivated for food or market not specifically mentioned in the statute.* On trial of an indictment charging defendant with stealing "seed cotton and lint cotton," evidence that he took the gleanings of the cotton from the field is not admissible. To render such evidence competent, the indictment should be framed under the statute, and describe the crop as "growing, standing, or ungathered" in the field, and cultivated for food or market.' In Pennsylvania, an indictment for stealing a certain amount of "corn in the ear" is sufficiently specific in 5 1 State v. Donovan, 1 Del. Cr. 43. * Schamberger v. State, 68 Ala. 543. 8 Holly v. State, 54 Ala. 238. * Smitherman v. State, 63 Ala. 24. State v. Thompson, 93 N. C. 537; State v. Liles, 78 N. C. 496. description if supported by proof that the grain stolen was Indian corn or maize.' In South Carolina, under the statutes making the stealing of corn "from the field" a felony, an indictment charging the stealing of corn "in the field" is fatally defective; but such indictment will support a conviction of simple larceny, under a general verdict of guilty.' In Texas, the rule that an information or indictment is not vitiated by inaccurate orthography, is applicable to a charge that the accused stole "seventy years of corn." $86. Ores and minerals.-In California, where the defendant was charged with stealing gold-bearing quartz rock, and it did not appear from the indictment that the rock had been severed from the ledge and thus become personal property, before the alleged taking by the defendant, it was held ground for arrest of judgment. But judgment will not be arrested where the objection is not to the whole of the indictment, but only to the allegations concerning a part of the property which is alleged in it to have been stolen. In Idaho, an indictment charging the property stolen as "a quantity of specimens of gold and silver ores of one hundred and fifty pounds in weight," is sufficient. Specimens of gold and silver ores,' in common and ordinary acceptation, means pieces and samples of such ores severed from the ledge.' "in 66 6 § 87. Inconsistent descriptions; amendment; aider by verdict. An indictment which in one count described the thing stolen as "a certain writ of fieri facias belonging to the superior court," in another count as "a certain process of and belonging to the superior court," and in a third count as "a certain record of and belonging to the superior court," is bad for uncertainty. So an indictment which charges that 1 Com. v. Pine, 2 Pa. L. J. Rep. 154. 2 State v. Shuler, 19 S. C. 140. State v. Nelson, 28 S. C. 16. + Stinson v. State, 5 Tex. App. 31. 5 People v. Williams, 35 Cal. 671. Com. v. Eastman, 2 Gray 76. See Com. v. Hathaway, 14 Id. 392. People v. Freeman, 1 Idaho T. 322. State v. McLeod, 5 Jones 318. 2 the defendant" feloniously took and carried away one peck of corn, a part of an outstanding crop of corn, of the value of twenty-five cents, the personal property of H.," is self-contradictory, and fatally defective; and neither of the descriptive averments can be struck out as surplusage.' An indictment containing a single count charging that defendant feloniously took and carried away three dollar bills, and also two five-dollar bills, may be amended, with defendant's consent, to conform to proof showing that he took two five-dollar and three ten-dollar, but no one-dollar bills. So an indictment charging the larceny of "one lot of clothing, valued at one dollar and fifty cents," may be amended so as to read, “one lot of clothing, consisting of one pair of woolen pantaloons and one plaited bosom shirt." And on the trial of an information for stealing "one yoke of cattle" it is not error to permit the information to be amended by inserting after the description a separate description of each steer, where the evidence only tends to connect the defendant with the larceny of one of the steers, and the court instructs the jury that if they were not satisfied that there was a larceny of both oxen, but were satisfied that the defendant took one, they might find him guilty of the larceny of the one. In Georgia, an indictment charging the defendant with stealing "twelve five-dollar and one ten-dollar notes, to-wit: United States promissory or bank notes of the value of seventy dollars," is not, after verdict, objectionable on the ground that the description was uncertain and in the alternative. In Virginia, where an indictment charged the stealing from C. of three swarms of bees and forty pounds of honey, it was held that it must be intended after verdict, that the bees were reclaimed and the honey the property of C. In Washington, an information for grand larceny, which merely describes the property taken as "a quantity of money of the value of $77, the property of 'Smitherman v. State, 63 Ala. 24. 'Reynolds v. State, (Ala.) 9 So. Rep. 398. 'Bell v. State, 41 Ga 589. one E.," though insufficient under the common law, is, after verdict, sufficient under Code, § 1023, making it sufficient in charging the larceny and embezzlement of money to describe the property taken by giving it its general name of "money." § 88. Miscellaneous cases.- An indictment alleging larceny of "twenty-five cords of wood" is valid without alleging that the wood was "goods and chattels." An indictment for larceny from the person, which charges that the defendant did take from the person of one C. "one watch and chain of the valaue of $75, and the property of the said C.," is sufficiently specific in the description of the property stolen.3 A description in an indictment charging larceny of certain county orders, which states the amount and value of each order, and that it was drawn by the county auditor on the county treasurer, is sufficient. An indictment charging that defendant, on, etc., at, etc., did "unlawfully and feloniously steal, take and carry away, of the personal goods and chattels of one" A. "then and there being of the value of four dollars, one pair of boots, contrary to the form of the statute," while somewhat transposed and out of the usual form, substantially and sufficiently charges a larceny of the personal goods of the party named." An information that defendant did embezzle a warranty deed, the property of C., made by C. as grantor to defendant as grantee, and duly acknowledged, which conveyed certain land, is good upon motion in arrest of judgment, under 66 1 State v. Hanshew, 27 Pac. Rep. 1029. An indictment for grand larceny charged defendant with stealing one jewelry-box containing two gold watches and chains, of the value of $300; all of said property, viz., the jewelry-box and its contents, was of the value of $450, of the goods and chattels of one J." Held, (1.) That an objection that the charge of stealing the box containing watches and chains was not a charge of stealing the watches, except by way of inference, was correct; but that the objection went to the form, and not to the substance, of the allegation, and was waived by a failure to demur. (2.) That it could be implied by fair and reasonable intendment, from the allegations of the indictment, that the defendant was charged with stealing the watches and chains.-State v. Derst, 10 Nev. 443. 2 State v. Parker, 34 Ark. 158; 36 Am. Rep. 5. |