(260 U. S. 438) (43 Sup.Ct.) (41 Stat. 305), the assignments of error raised HEITLER v. UNITED STATES. PERLMAN many questions as to the admissions of eviV. SAME. GREENBERG v. SAME. Mc-dence and the charge of the court. We held CANN v. SAME. QUINN v. SAME. that, in view of our previous decision affirm (Submitted Dec. 11, 1922. Decided Jan. 2, ing the validity of the National Prohibition 1923.) Nos. 185-189. 4. Courts 5272, New, vol. 17A Key-No. Series-Provision for transfer of causes to proper court should be liberally construed. Act Sept. 14, 1922, providing that, if an appeal or writ of error has been taken to, or issued out of, the Supreme Court; in a case where it should have been taken to, or issued out of, the Circuit Court of Appeals, it shall not be dismissed, but shall be transferred to the proper court, is a remedial statute, which should be construed liberally, and the fact that it gives litigants an opportunity at times to prolong the litigation unduly is no reason for denying the remedy, when the case comes clearly within the language of the statute. 2. Courts 5272, New, vol. 17A Key-No. Series-Writs of error to Supreme Court on unsubstantial constitutional question transferred to Circuit Court of Appeals. Act (National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 40 Sup. Ct. 486, 588, 64 L. Ed. 946), the plaintiffs in error were precluded from raising the question again and basing thereon a claim of jurisdiction for a writ of error under section 238, that the question made was therefore not substantial, but frivolous, and that the writ should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction on the authority of Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182, 184, 39 Sup. Ct. 191, 63 L. Ed. 550, and cases cited. Heitler et al. v. The United States, Per Curiam, 260 U. S. 703, 43 Sup. Ct. 163, 67 L. Ed. —, decided November 27, 1922. This conclusion made it impossible for us to consider the other errors assigned. The plaintiffs in error now invite our attention to an act of Congress approved September 14, 1922, which provides that "If an appeal or writ of error has been or shall be taken to, or issued out of, the Supreme Where writs of error to review convictions Court in a case wherein such appeal or writ under the National Prohibition Act were issued of error should have been taken to, or issued out of the Supreme Court, on the assumption out of, a Circuit Court of Appeals, such appeal the attack on the constitutionality of those or writ of error shall not for such reason be acts presented a substantial question, and nu- dismissed, but shall be transferred to the propmerous errors were assigned besides those bas-er court, which shall thereupon be possessed of ed on constitutional questions, the writs will not the same and shall proceed to the determination be dismissed because the constitutional questions are not substantial since a prior decision sustaining the validity of that act, but will be transferred to the Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the other assignments of error, under Act Sept. 14, 1922. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. *440 thereof, with the same force *and effect as if such appeal or writ of error had been duly taken to, or issued out of, the court to which it is so transferred." [1] This is a remedial statute, and should be construed liberally to carry out the evident purpose of Congress. The fact that the opportunity therein given to litigants in the Circuit Courts of Appeals, where they have mistakenly sought a review in this court, may at times be abused, and unduly prolong the litigation, and delay the successful party be Michael Heitler, Nathaniel Perlman, Mandel Greenberg, Frank McCann, and George F. Quinn were separately convicted of violating the National Prohibition Act (274 Fed. 401), and they bring error. Cases trans-low, is no reason why when the case comes ferred to the Circuit Court of Appeals. clearly within the language of the statute the transfer should not be made. The successful party below may avoid undue delay by a prompt motion to dismiss in this court in such cases. [2] The cases before us are clearly within the remedy of the statute. Based on the assumption of the presence of a real consti Mr. Chief Justice TAFT delivered the tutional question in the case, plaintiffs in opinion of the Court. error sought review here, not only of These were writs of error issued directly that question, but of the numerous other to the District Court under section 238 of errors assigned in the record. Williamson the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1215) to re- v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 432, 434, 28 view sentences of fine and imprisonment on Sup. Ct. 163, 52 L. Ed. 278; Goldman v. the ground that they were cases in which United States, 245 U. S. 474, 476, 38 Sup. Ct. the constitutionality of the National Prohibi- 166, 62 L. Ed. 410. We find that there is no tion Act, under which the convictions were constitutional question of sufficient substance had, was drawn in question. In addition to to give us jurisdiction to consider these other the constitutionality of the Prohibition Act errors. In other words, we find that, to have For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 4. Public lands 98-Receipt issued in excess of receiver's authority starts running of limitations. such alleged errors considered and reviewed, after the issuance of such receipt, if no contest the writ of error herein should have issued or protest is then pending. out of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the proper circuit. Accordingly we hold that these several cases should be transferred to the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit at the costs of the respective plaintiffs in error, that that court be thereupon possessed of the jurisdiction of the same and proceed to the determination of said writs of error as if such writs had issued out of such court. And it is so ordered. (260 U. S. 532) STOCKLEY et al. v. UNITED STATES. Even if a receiver of the land office had no authority under the instructions of the land department to issue receiver's receipt to a homestead entryman at the time he did, the issuance of such receipt starts the running of the two-year period of limitation prescribed by Act March 3, 1891, § 7 (Comp. St. § 5113). 5. Public lands 98-Limitation of two years after issuance of receipt forecloses inquiry into mineral character of land. The expiration of the two-year period of limitations after the issuance of the receiver's receipt upon final entry which, under Act March 3, 1891, § 7 (Comp. St. § 5113), en (Argued Nov. 20, 1922. Decided Jan. 2, 1923.) titles the entryman to a patent if no contest No. 74. 1. Public lands 98-After issuance of receiver's receipt, issuance of register's certificate not required before limitations begin to run. or protest is then pending, precludes a subsequent inquiry as to whether the entryman knew or should have known that the land was chiefly valuable for its minerals at the time he made his entry and final proof. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Act March 3, 1891, § 7 (Comp. St. § 5113), providing that, after the lapse of two years from the issuance of the receiver's receipt on Suit in equity by the United States against the final entry, when there shall be no pend- Thomas J. Stockley and others to have plaining contest or protest against such entry, a tiff adjudged to be the owner of a tract of final entryman shall be entitled to a patent, land, to enjoin all interference therewith, and does not require the issuance of a register's certificate approving the final proof before to require defendants to account for the the period of limitation stated therein be- value of oil and gas abstracted by them gins to run, since it must be assumed Con- therefrom. Decree for plaintiff was afgress was familiar with the operations and practice of the Land Department and knew the difference between a receiver's receipt and a register's certificate. 2. Public lands 98-Change in department's practice does not change effect of statute of limitations, after receiver's receipt is issued. firmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (271 Fed. 632), and defendants appeal. Reversed, and cause remanded to the District Court, with directions to dismiss the bill of complaint. *533 *Mr. S. L. Herold, of Shreveport, La., for appellants. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Riter, for the United States. *536 *Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court. The fact that after the enactment of the statute (Act March 3, 1891, § 7 [Comp. St. § 5113]) entitling an entryman to patent two years after the receiver's receipt is issued, the prior practice of the Land Department not to issue the receiver's receipt until the register's certificate accepting the final proof This is a suit in equity brought by the was also issued, was changed so as to permit United States, as plaintiff, against the apthe issuance of the receiver's receipt when pellants, as defendants, by which a decree final proof was made, without waiting for its was sought adjudging the plaintiff to be the approval, cannot have the effect of changing owner of a tract of land in the parish of the plain limitation prescribed by that statute, Caddo, La., enjoining all interference thereso as to require the issuance of the register's with, and requiring the defendants to accertificate also before the period starts to run. count for the value of oil and gas extracted 3. Public lands 98-Receiver's receipt for by them therefrom. final payment is "receipt upon the final entry." The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, upon the reA receiver's receipt, issued to a homestead port of a master, found for the plaintiff and claimant at the time the claimant made final entered a decree in accordance with the proof showing compliance with all the require- prayer of the bill ordering a restoration of ments to entitle him to a patent under the possession and awarding damages against homestead laws and paid all fees and commissome of the defendants, including Stockley, sions lawfully due, was a "receipt upon the final entry" under the homestead laws, within for about $62,000. Act March 3, 1891, § 7 (Comp. St. § 5113), The case comes to this court by appeal entitling the claimant to patent two years from the decree of the Circuit Court of Ap For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (43 Sup. Ct.) peals affirming the decree of the District | prior thereto full equitable title had vested Court. 271 Fed. 632. The defendants denied plaintiff's title and alleged that the land was the property of the defendant Stockley by virtue of his compliance with the homestead laws of the United States. in Stockley and he had become entitled to a patent by virtue of the provisions of section 7 of the Act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, 26 Stat. 1095, 1099 (Comp. St. § 5113). That section, so far as necessary to be stated, provides: *538 That after the lapse of two years from the date of the issuance of the receiver's receipt upon the final entry of any tract of land under the homestead, timber culture, desert land, or there shall be no pending contest or protest against the validity of such entry, the entryman shall be entitled to a patent conveying the land by him entered, and the same shall be issued to him; but this proviso shall not be construed to require the delay of two years from the date of said entry before the issuing of a patent therefor." The conceded facts are that in 1897 Stockley took possession of the land and on November 13, 1905, made a preliminary entry thereof as a homestead. He complied with the provisions of the homestead laws, submit-pre-emption laws, or under this act, and when ted final proof, including the required nonmineral affidavit, paid the commissions and fees then due, and on January 16, 1909, obtained the receiver's receipt therefor. Prior to that time, viz. on December 15, 1908, a large body of public lands, embracing within its boundaries the land in question, was withdrawn by an order of the President of the United States from all forms of appropriation. The withdrawal order was expressly made "subject to existing valid claims." The receiver's receipt, omitting unnecessary matter, is in the following words: *537 "Received of Thomas J. Stockley the sum of three dollars and one cent in connection with Hd. Final, Serial 0188 for [lands described] 71.25 acres. On March 17, 1910, Stockley leased the property in question to the defendant the Gulf Refining Company, which company subsequently drilled wells and developed oil. The rights of the other defendants are wholly dependent upon the title asserted on behalf of Stockley. The court below rejected defendants' contention, holding that the receipt issued to Stockley was not a "receiver's receipt upon the final entry" for the reason that, in the view of that court, a final entry could not become effective until the issuance of the certificate of the register. In other words, it was the opinion of the lower court that in order to constitute a final entry within the meaning of the statute above quoted, there must be an adjudication upon the proofs and the issuance of a final certificate, evidencing an approval thereof. shall be entitled to a patent. [1] We think the language of the statute does not justify this conclusion. It must be assumed that Congress was familiar with the operations and practice of the Land Department and knew the difference between a receiver's receipt and a register's certificate. On July 16, 1910, after the report of a spe- These papers serve different purposes. One, cial agent confirming Stockley's claim of resi- as its name imports, acknowledges the redence upon and cultivation and improvement ceipt of the money paid. The other certifies of the lands, the Commissioner of the Gen- to the payment and declares that the claimeral Land Office ordered the case "clear-list- ant on presentation of the certificate to the ed and closed as to the Field Service Divi-Commissioner of the General Land Office sion." Subsequently, and more than three years after the issuance of the receiver's receipt, viz. on February 27, 1912, a contest was ordered by the Commissioner of the General Land Office before the local register and receiver upon the charge that the land was mineral in character, being chiefly valuable for oil and gas, and that when Stockley made his final proof he knew or, as an ordinarily prudent man, should have known this fact. After a hearing, the register and receiver decided in favor of Stockley, but the Commissioner of the General Land Office reversed the decision and ordered the entry canceled. The Secretary of the Interior affirmed the Commissioner, with a modification allowing Stockley to obtain a patent for the surface only, under the provisions of the Act of July 17, 1914, c. 142, 38 Stat. 509 (Comp. St. §§ 4640a-4640c). The defendants contended that the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of the Interior were without authority to entertain this contest because 539 In The evidence shows that prior to the passage of the statute, and thereafter until 1908, the practice was to issue receipt and certificate simultaneously upon the submission and acceptance of the final proof and payment of the fees and commissions. 1908 this practice was changed, so that the receipt was issued upon the submis*sion of the final proof and making of payment, while the certificate was issued upon approval of the proof and this might be at any time after the issuance of the receipt. The receiver and register act independently, the former alone being authorized to issue the receipt and the latter to sign the certificate. The receipt issued to Stockley was after submission of his proof and payment of all that he was required to pay under the law. No certificate was ever issued by the register. [2] It is contended by the government that the receiver's receipt named in the statute should be restricted to a receipt issued simultaneously with the register's certificate after approval of final proofs, and that, after the change of 1908 in the practice of the department, a receipt issued before such ap proval does not come within the meaning of the statute. Such a receipt, it is contended, obtains no validity as a "receiver's receipt upon the final entry" until after the proof has in fact been examined and approved. [3] We cannot accept this conception of the law. A change in the practice of the Land Department manifestly could not have the effect of altering the meaning of an act of Congress. What the act meant upon its passage, it continued to mean thereafter. The plain provision is that the period of limitation shall begin to run from the date of the “issuance of the receiver's receipt upon the final entry." There is no ambiguity in this language and, therefore, no room for construction. There is nothing to construe. The sole inquiry is whether the receipt issued to Stockley falls within the words of the statute. In Chotard v. Pope, 12 Wheat. 586, 588 (6 L. Ed. 737), this court defined the term entry as meaning: "That act by which an individual acquires an inceptive right to a portion of the unappropriated soil of the country, by filing his claim in the office of an officer known in the legislation of several states by the epithet of an *540 entrytaker, and corresponding very much in his functions with the registers of land offices, under the acts of the United States." It was in this sense that the term "final entry" was used in this statute. Having submitted to the proper officials proof showing full compliance with the law, and having paid all the fees and commissions lawfully due, Stockley had done everything which the law required on his part and became entitled to the immediate issuance of the receiver's receipt, and this receipt was issued and delivered to him. No subsequent receipt was contemplated or required. From the date of the receipt the entry may be held open for the period of two years, during which time its validity may be contested. Thereafter the entryman is entitled to a patent and the express command of the statute is that "the same shall be issued to him." Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U. S. 174, 37 Sup. Ct. 558, 61 L. Ed. 1066; Payne v. United States ex rel. Newton, 255 U. S. 438, 41 Sup. Ct. 368, 65 L. Ed. 720. That Stockley's acts constituted final entry is borne out by rulings of the Land Department. Thus in Gilbert v. Spearing, 4 Land Dec. 463, 466, Secretary Lamar said: "When the homestead application, affidavit and legal fees are properly placed in the hands of the local land officers, and the land applied for is properly subject to entry, from that moment the right of entry is complete and in contemplation of law the land is entered." See, also, Iddings v. Burns, 8 Land Dec. 224, 226. We are not at liberty to add to or take from the language of the statute. When Congress has plainly described the instrument from whose date the statute begins to run as the "receipt upon the final entry," there is no warrant for construing it to mean only a receipt issued simultaneously with the certificate or one issued after the adjudication on the final proof, which might be-and in this instance was postponed indefinitely. It was to avoid just such delays for an unreasonable length of time-that is, for more than two years-that the statute was enacted. Lane v. Hoglund, supra, and Land Depart*ment decisions cited. The purpose and effect of the statute are clearly and accurate ly stated by the Commissioner of the General Land Office in Instructions of June 4, 1914, 43 Land Dec. 322, 323, in the course of which it is said: *541 "There is no doubt that Congress chose the date of the receiver's receipt rather than of the certificate of the register as controlling, for the reason that payment by the claimant marks the end of compliance by him with the requirements of law. It would be manifestly unjust to make the right to a patent dependent upon the administrative action of the register, subjecting it to such delays as are incident to the conduct of public business and over which the claimant has no control. Payment, of which the receiver's receipt is but evidence, is, therefore, the material circumstance that starts the running of the statute, inasmuch as a claimant is and always has been entitled to a receipt when payment is made." [4] It is urged, however, that in any event the receiver exceeded his authority in issuing the receipt, since the Commissioner of the General Land Office, on December 15, 1908, had instructed the register and receiver, among other things, as follows: "Applications, selections, entries, and proofs initiated prior to the date of withdrawal may based upon selections, settlements, or rights be received by you and allowed to proceed under the rules up to and including the submission of final proofs. You must not, however, in such cases receive the purchase money or issue final certificate of entry, but must suspend the entries and proofs pending investigation as to the validity of the claims with regard to the character of the land and compliance with the law in other respects." *542 These instructions were issued, as shown upon their face, in view of the presidential withdrawal order of the same date. We suggest, without deciding, that, inasmuch as the withdrawal order was expressly made subject to existing valid claims, and Stockley's claim was obviously existing and valid, this instruction of the Commissioner was itself without authority, since, as applied to Stockley, it was in conflict with the withdrawal order. This has nothing to do with the question as to whether the lands were, in fact, mineral in character, which is another and different matter dealt with later. (43 Sup.Ct.) However, Stockley, as already shown, did, in act, make final entry and the receiver did, in fact, issue and deliver his receipt thereon. The case, therefore, falls within the terms of the statute and must be governed by it, unless the receipt be held for naught on the ground that it was issued contrary to the Commissioner's instructions. But the very object of the statute was to preclude inquiry upon that or any other matter, except as provided by the statute, after the expiration of two years from the date of the receiver's receipt. In United States v. Winona & St. Peter Railroad Co., 165 U. S. 463, 476, 17 Sup. Ct. 368, 371 (41 L. Ed. 789) this court had under consideration section 8 of the same act (26 Stat. 1099 [Comp. St. § 5114]), limiting the time within which suits by the United States might be brought to annul patents. That section, it was said, recognizes: 611, 614 (quoted with approval in Lane v. Hoglund, supra), it had been held that the statute did not affect the conduct or action of the Land Department in taking up and disposing of final proof of entrymen after the lapse of the two-year period (Mertie C. Traganza, 40 Land. Dec. 300), but this view was sharply challenged and overruled in the Harris Case, where it was said: "Passed, primarily, to rectify a past and to prevent future abuses of the departmental power to suspend entries, the proviso is robbed of its essential purpose and practically repealed by the decision in the Traganza Case." [5] The effective character of the receiver's receipt being established, the question, after the lapse of the two-year period, as to whether the land was mineral bearing, was no longer open. Inquiry upon that ground was then foreclosed, along with all others. Payne v. United States ex. rel. Newton, supra. "That when its proper officers, acting in the ordinary course of their duties, have conveyed away lands which belonged to the government, The bar of the statute likewise prevails, such conveyances should, after the lapse of a prescribed time, be conclusive against the gov-notwithstanding the executive withdrawal of ernment, and this notwithstanding any errors, December 15, 1908. The validity of that orirregularities or improper action of its officers der is, of course, settled by the decision *in therein." It was said further: "Under the benign influence of this statute it would matter not what the mistake or error of the Land Department was, what the frauds and misrepresentations of the patentee were, the patent would become conclusive as a transfer of the title, providing only that the land was public land of the United States and open to sale and conveyance through the Land Department." In United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U. S. 447, 450, 28 Sup. Ct. 579, 580 (52 L. Ed. 881), this section of the *543 act was again under *consideration. A patent was attacked as void for the alleged reason that the land which it purported to convey had been reserved for public purposes, and upon that ground the application of the statute was denied, but this court said: ⚫544 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 35 Sup. Ct. 309, 59 L. Ed. 673, but, as already stated, there is excepted from the operation of the order "existing valid claims." Obviously this means something less than a vested right, such as would follow from a completed final entry, since such a right would require no exception to insure its preservation. The purpose of the exception evidently was to save from the operation of the order claims which had been lawfully initiated and which, upon full compliance with the land laws, would ripen into a title. The effect of a preliminary homestead entry is to confer upon the entryman an exclusive right of possession, which continues so long as the entryman complies in good faith with the requirements of the homestead law. Stearns v. United States, 152 Fed. 900, 906, 82 C. C. A. 48; Peyton v. Desmond, 129 Fed. 1, 12, 63 C. C. A. 651. Since it is conceded that Stockley made such an entry in 1905 and his compliance with the requirements of the homestead law prior to the withdrawal order is not questioned, it follows that he "It is said that the instrument was void and hence was no patent. But the statute presup poses an instrument that might be declared void. When it refers to any patent heretofore issued,' it describes the purport and source had, when that order was issued, an existing of the document, not its legal effect. If the valid claim, within the meaning of the exact were confined to valid patents it would ception. The action of the Commissioner of be almost or quite without use." To hold that the receipt here under consideration falls outside the terms of the statute would be to defeat the purpose of the statute and perpetuate the mischief which it sought to destroy. Prior to the decision in the case of Jacob A. Harris, 42 Land Dec. the General Land Office, therefore, in directing a contest against Stockley's entry three years after the issuance to him of the receiv er's receipt was unauthorized and void. The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause remanded to the District Court, with directions to dismiss the bill of complaint. |