had not their cassock and their mule, and theologians their square cap and flowing garments, they would never have duped the world, which cannot withstand this imposing show. Soldiers are the only men who are not in some measure disguised; and that is because their own share in the matter, is the most essential part of it. They gain their point by actual force, others by grimace.

On this account our kings have not had recourse to such disguises. They have not masked themselves in extraordinary habits, in order to appear impressive; but they have surrounded themselves with guards, and lancers and whiskered faces, men who have hands and energies only for their service. The drums and trumpets which go before them, and the legions that surround them, make even brave men tremble. They not only wear a dress, but they are clothed with might. A man must have sound reason to consider merely as another man, the Grand Seignior surrounded, in his magnificent seraglio, by forty thousand Janissaries.

If magistrates were possessed of real justice, if physicians knew the true art of healing, there would be no need of square caps. The majesty of science would be sufficiently venerable of itself. But possessed as they mostly are with only imaginary science, they must assume these vain ornaments which impress the imagination of those among whom they labor, and, by that means, they obtain respect. We cannot look at an advocate in his gown and wig, without a favorable impression of his abilities.

The Swiss are offended at being called gentlemen, and have to prove their low origin, in order to qualify them for stations of importance.

X.

No one chooses for a pilot, the highest born passenger on board.

All the world sees that we labor with uncertainty before us, by sea, in battle, etc., but all do not see the law of the chances, which shows that we do rightly. Montaigne saw that a narrow mind is an offence, and that custom rules everything, but he did not see the reason of this. Those who see only effects, and not their causes, are, in relation to those who discover the causes, as those who have eyes only, compared with those who have mind. For the effects are perceptible to the senses, but the reasons only to the understanding. And though these effects are perceived by the mind, yet this mind, compared with that which discovers the causes, is as the bodily senses to the intellectual powers.

XI.

Why is it that a lame man does not irritate us, and that a lame mind does? It is, that the cripple admits that we walk straight, while a crippled mind accuses us of limping; but for this, we should feel more of pity than of anger.

Epictetus asks also, Why we are not offended if any one tells us that we have the head-ache, and yet are angry if they tell us that we reason falsely or choose unwisely? The reason is, that we know certainly that nothing ails our heads and that we are not crippled in body. But we are not as certain that we have chosen correctly. So that, having assurance only because we perceive the matter distinctly, while another sees it as clearly the contrary, we are brought into doubt and suspense, and still more so, when a thousand others laugh at our decision; for we must pre

fer our own convictions to those of so many others, and that is a bold and difficult course. Now we never feel this contradiction of our senses, in a case of actual lameness.

XII.

Respect for others requires you to incommode yourself. This seems foolish, yet it is very proper; for it says: I would willingly incommode myself, if it would serve you, since I do so when it will not. Besides, the object of this respect is to distinguish the great. Now, if simply lolling in an elbow-chair, commanded respect, we should respect all the world, and then we should not distinguish the great; but by being put to inconvenience, we distinguish them very plainly.

XIII

A superior style of dress is not altogether vain. It shows how many persons labor for us. A man shows by his hair, that he has a valet, a perfumer, etc.; and by his band, his linen, lace, etc. It is not then, a superficial matter, a mere harness, to have many hands employed in our service.

XIV.

Strange indeed! they would not have me pay respect to that man dressed in embroidery, and followed by seven or eight lacqueys! Why! he would horse-whip me if I did not. This dress has great power; it is not so with two horses, when one is better caparisoned than the other.

It is surprising that Montaigne does not see the difference between admiring what we see, and asking the reason of it.

XV.

The people have some wise notions; for example, choos

ing amusements and hunting, in preference to poetry. The half-learned gentry laugh at them, and delight in pointing out their folly in this; but, for reasons which they cannot perceive, the people are right. It is well also to distinguish men by externals, as by birth or property. The world strives to show how unreasonable this is; but it is perfectly reasonable.

XVI.

Rank is a great advantage, as it gives a man of eighteen or twenty years of age, a degree of acceptance, publicity and respect, which another can scarcely obtain by merit at fifty; thus thirty years are gained without labor.

XVII.

There are men, who, to show that we are wrong, in not esteeming them more highly, never fail to bring forward the names of those persons of quality who think well of them. I would answer them: Show us the merit by which you have gained their esteem, and we will esteem you as they do.

XVIII.

If a man stands at a window to see those who pass, and I happen to pass by, can I say that he placed himself there to see me? No; for he did not think of me particularly. But if a man loves a woman for her beauty, does he love her? No; for the small-pox, which destroys her beauty without killing her, causes his love to cease. And if any one loves me for my judgment or my memory, does he really love me? No; for I can lose these qualities without ceasing to be. Where then is this me, if it is neither in the

body nor the soul? And how are we to love the body or the soul, except for those qualities which do not make up this me, because they are perishable? For can we love the soul of a person abstractly, and only some qualities that belong to it? That cannot be, and it would be unjust. Therefore we never love the person, but only the qualities; or, if we love the person, we must say that the combination of qualities, constitutes the person.

XIX.

Those things about which we are most anxious, are very often a mere nothing; as, for instance, the concealment of our narrow circumstances. This is a mere nothing, which our imagination magnifies to a mountain. Another turn of thought would induce us to tell it without mortification.

XX.

Those who have the power of invention are few; those who have not are many, and, consequently, the strongest party. And, generally, we see that they refuse to inventors the praise which they deserve, and which they seek by their inventions. If they persist in seeking it, and treat contemptuously those who have not this talent, they will gain nothing but a few hard names, and will be treated as visionaries. A man should take care, therefore, not to plume himself upon this advantage, great as it is; and he should be content to be esteemed by the few who can appreciate his merits.