INSURANCE.

suicide, and prevent the avoidance of a life insurance policy. Hathaway's
Adm'r v. National Life Ins. Co., 684.

23. A policy of life insurance which stipulates for the payment of an annual
premium is not an insurance from year to year, but the premiums constitute
an annuity, the whole of which is the consideration for the entire assurance
for life. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 724.

24. But the time of payment in such policies is material, and of the essence
of the contract; and failure to pay involves an absolute forfeiture, which
cannot be relieved against in equity. Id.

25. If failure to pay the annual premium be caused by the intervention of
war between the territories in which the insurance company and the assured
respectively reside, which makes it unlawful for them to hold intercourse, the
policy is nevertheless forfeited if the company insist on the condition; but in
such case the assured is entitled to the equitable value of the policy arising
from the premiums actually paid. Id.

26. This equitable value is the difference between the cost of a new policy
and the present value of the premiums yet to be paid on the forfeited policy
when the forfeiture occurred, and may be recovered in an action at law or
suit in equity. Id.

27. The doctrine of revival of contract, suspended during the war, is one
based on considerations of equity and justice, and cannot be invoked to revive
a contract which it would be unjust or inequitable to revive-as where time
is of the essence of the contract, or the parties cannot be made equal. Id.

28. The average rate of mortality is the fundamental basis of life assurance,
and as this is subverted by giving to the assured the option to revive their
policies or not after they have been suspended by war (since none but the sick
and the dying would apply), it would be unjust to compel a revival against
the company. Id.

1. Under the Ohio statute, parties may stipulate in a note for any rate of
interest not exceeding 8 per cent. per annum, and such note, after maturity,
without an express agreement to that effect, will continue to bear the stipu-
lated rate until payment. Marietta Iron Works v. Lottimer, 192.

2. A judgment taken on such a note for the amount due, including unpaid
interest, will bear the stipulated rate of interest only, without rests, until pay-
ment. Id.

3. A special rate of interest continues under the Ohio statute after the time
agreed upon has expired. Monnott v. Sturges, 124.

4. Where a party agrees, by note, to pay a certain sum at the expiration
of a year, with interest on it at a rate named, and does not pay, it bears
interest not at the specified rate but at the customary or statute rate. Burn-
hisel v. Firman, 124.

5. If, however, the parties calculate interest and make a settlement upon
the basis of the old rate, and the debtor gives new notes and a mortgage
for the whole on that basis, the notes and mortgage are, independently of
the Bankrupt Act, and of any statute making such securities void in toto
as usurious, valid securities for the amount which would be due on a calcula-
tion properly made. They are bad only for the excess. Id.

INTERNATIONAL LAW. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 38; GOVERNMENT;
INSURANCE, 25-28; WAR, 1, 4.

INTERPLEADER.

Where a bill of interpleader is filed, the holder of the money cannot claim
part of it.
Cogswell v. Armstrong, 444.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14, 15; CON-
TRACT, 3.

1. When the charter of a municipal corporation gives the common council
power to license inns and taverns, and also power to license wholesale liquor

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

dealers, liquor cannot be sold by the quart without license, in violation of a
city ordinance. Roberson v. Lambertville, 124.

2. A complaint which charges that the complainant had just cause to sus-
pect, and does suspect, that the defendant is guilty of violating the city ordi-
nance, without averring that he is guilty, is not made with such reasonable
certainty as to be the ground of a judicial determination, conviction and sen-
tence. Id.

3. Upon indictment for selling intoxicating liquor to a minor, it does not
matter that the defendant did not know that such person was a minor. Far-
mer v. The People, 501.

4. Roethke was sued for beer furnished by defendant in error, a corporation
located in Milwaukee.. The beer was sold after verbal negotiations with an
agent, carried on at Roethke's store in Saginaw City. The jury found the
transactions were sales and not agency. Part of the beer was sent under the
Saginaw City negotiations, and the sale was held by the court below to have
been void under the Michigan liquor law. The remainder was sent from
Milwaukee on separate orders, held to be valid foreign contracts: Held, that
as the verbal agreement made in this state was not sufficient under the Statute
of Frauds to cover future orders, and as those therefore stood on their own
merits, and the sales and shipments were in Milwaukee, the rulings on these
were correct-as there was a contract made there which would have been
valid at common law, and which must be presumed to be valid, under which
these latter sales were made. Roethke v. Brewing Co., 444.

5. The court below refused to allow the money paid for the unlawful pur-
chases to be set off against the demand in suit for the rest: Held, that this
was error. Id.

INTOXICATION.

JOINT DEBTORS.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 9.

See ACTION, 3, 4; EQUITY, 14; LIMITATIONS, 2.

JOINT TENANT. See VENDOR, 9.

When one of four joint tenants makes a mortgage of land conveyed to the
four, on a bill filed to foreclose the mortgage, it is not necessary to make the
three who do not join in the mortgage, parties defendant to the bill.
v. Beal et ux., 251.

Stephen

1. As a genernl rule, none but parties to a judgment can have it set aside.
Etna Ins. Co. v. Aldrich, 251.

2. But where the nominal party to an action is not the real party in interest,
the latter is treated as having a standing in court, and may have control of
the action. Id.

3. A party is not chargeable with laches for failing to give a supersedeas
bond on suing out a writ of error.
Id.

4. If a judgment is rendered against a corporation, the proceeding, if regu-
lar in other respects, will not be vitiated by a mere mis-recitation of the name
of the corporation. Wilton Co. v. Humphrey, 319.

JUDICIAL SALE. See SHERIFF'S SALE.

JUROR. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 2.

STICE OF THE PEACE.

Great allowance must be made in the proceedings of justices of the peace
for their ignorance of legal phraseology. Wilton Co. v. Humphrey, 319.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See AGENT, 4.

1. A seizure of property as abandoned by the United States military au-
thorities, exempts a lessee from paying rent to the landlord during the time
of such seizure. Harrison v. Myer, 685.

2. Under the Landlord and Tenant Act of Illinois, a landlord has no lien
upon the personal property of his tenant prior to an actual levy of distress.
Morgi v. Campbell, 253,

VOL. XXIV.-98

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

3. If proceedings of bankruptcy are begun by other persons against his
tenant before such warrant of distress be actually levied, the subsequent
assignment in bankruptcy will vest the personal property of the tenant in the
assignee, to the exclusion of the landlord's right to levy on it. Morgan v.
Campbell, 253.

4. A covenant by a lessor for quiet enjoyment is a covenant that the lessee
shall not be rightfully disturbed in his possession and enjoyment during the
term, not that he shall not be disturbed at all. Underwood v. Birchard, 58.

5. In an action on a lease it is a good defence where the lessor was to
remain on the land with the lessee, that the lessee was "infected with a loath-
some, contagious and infectious disease." Douglas v. McFadin, 310.
As a pre-

6. N. leased to G. certain property to be used as a distillery.
liminary to its use it was necessary for the lessee to file with the United States
collector the written consent of the lessor as the owner in fee of the property,
in accordance with sect. 3262 of title xxxv of the Revised Statutes. The
lessor having refused to give such written consent, it was held, 1st. That the
lessee was discharged from all obligation to pay the rent-the default of the
lessor amounting to "constructive eviction." 2d. That the obligation of the
lessor to give his consent was to be implied as a necessary incident to the
lease. Grabenhorst v. Nicodemus, 381.

7. A claim for rent is not assignable as between mere joint occupiers.
Carver v. Palmer, 382.

8. A purchaser of grain from a tenant, with knowledge of the landlord's
lien on it for rent, will be liable to the landlord for the rent due, to the extent
of the value of the grain purchased by him. Prettyman v. Unland, 556.

LANGUAGE.

Where a statute of the state requires publication in a "newspaper," in the
absence of any provision to the contrary, a paper published in the English
language is understood as intended. Cincinnati v. Bickett, 501.

LEASE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

LEGAL TENDER NOTES. See EQUITY, 18.

United States treasury notes are a legal tender upon contracts stipulating
for the payment of money generally. Longworth v. Mitcheli, 688.

LIBEL. See EVIDENCE, 11.

Whether an alleged libel is a privileged communication, is a question for
the jury. Carpenter v. Bailey, 621.

LICENSE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 15; HAWKERS ANd Pedlers.
LIGHT. See EASEMENT, 1-7.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2, 3; Vendor, 13.

1. An ordinance provided that the owners of lots on which assessments
were made should pay within twenty days from the date of the ordinance, or
be subject to the interest and penalty allowed thereon by law. Held, that an
action to enforce the lien of such assessment within six years after the expi-
ration of said twenty days, is not barred. Reynolds v. Green, 743.

2. A partial payment on a joint and several promissory note, by one of
several makers, will not prevent the running of the Statute of Limitations
as to the other maker. Ilance v. Hair, 189.

3. The mere payment of interest on a single bill barred by the statute, will
raise no such promise as will support assumpsit for the amount due on the
single bill. Nothing less than an express promise will be sufficient. Leonard
v. Hughlett, 59.

4. In assumpsit on an express promise, the single bill may be given in
evidence as inducement to the express promise. Id.

5. A married woman who executes a mortgage of her land with her hus-
band, is not saved by her coverture from the running of the Statute of Lim-
itations against her title in favor of the mortgagee. Hanford v. Fitch, 85.

6. Where the plaintiff was induced not to commence a suit to recover his
claim by the defendant's agreement to refer to arbitration, the defendants

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

were estopped from setting up the Statute of Limitations.

499.

Davis v. Dyer,

7. As to sect. 18 of Code of Kansas, see Young v. Whattenhall, 314.

LOCAL OPTION LAWS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. See SET-OFF, 1.

1. The true inquiry in an action for malicious prosecution is what the de-
fendant had reason to believe and did believe were the facts. Gallaway v.
Burr, 190.

2. The institution of a criminal prosecution for the recovery of a private
claim is strong, if not conclusive evidence of malice; if this is the motive,
the advice of counsel is no protection. Id.

3. To recover special damages the declaration should set out with particu-
larity the causes which produced them. Stanfield v. Phillips, 314.

4. Evidence of special damages can only be given where they have been
properly averred in the declaration. Id.

5. In such an action, punitive damages can be recovered.

Hoban, 315.

McWilliams v.

6. The police annals of the city on which the plaintiff's name was entered
are not admissible evidence against the defendant, unless there was some law
requiring such a record to be kept, or unless the plaintiff was prepared to
show by proof that the defendant knew that the name of the plaintiff would
be so entered as the consequence of the charge of theft brought against him.
Garvey v. Wayson, 382.

7. Where the court has rejected a prayer defining malice because it was
incorrect, it is not bound ex mero motu to give any definition of it. Id.

8. Probable cause does not depend on the actual state of the case in point
of fact, but upon the honest and reasonable belief of the party commencing
the prosecution. Harpham v. Whitney, 445.

9. Malice does not mean spite or hatred, but malus animus, as denoting that
the party is actuated by improper and indirect motives. Id.

10. It is error, in an action for malicious prosecution, to permit witnesses
to rehearse the testimony given before the magistrate by witnesses other than
the defendants. John v. Bridgman, 556.

11. A witness, however, who was present can prove that no evidence in
support of the criminal charge was given by the defendant. Id.

MALPRACTICE. See ACTION, 2.

MANDAMUS. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 18.

MARITIME LIEN. See ADMIRALTY, III.

MARITIME USAGE. See ADMIRALTY, 12.
MARRIAGE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.

MASTER AND SERVANT. See COUNTY.

1. A malicious assault by an employee of a railroad company, authorized
or approved by them, constitutes a case for exemplary damages. Hinckley v.
The C., M. & St. P. Railway Co., 249.

2. While it is true that a common employer is not responsible to a servant
for an injury caused by the negligence of his fellow-servant engaged in the
same line of employment, yet it is the duty of a railway company as employer
to provide safe structures, &c., and to adopt such regulations as will insure
safety. C. & N. W Railway Co. v. Taylor, 253.

3. An employee on a railroad train continuing for eight months with the
same equipment estops his representatives in an action for damages after his
death from alleging the equipment to be defective. B, & O. Railroad Co. v.
State, 60.

4. It is the duty of every employer to exercise reasonable car in providing
his laborers with safe machinery, suitable tools and appliances, adapted to the
uses for which they are designed. Mullan v. Steamship Co., 315.

5. Where a master places the entire charge of his business, or a distinct

MASTER AND SERVANT.

branch of it, in the hands of an agent, exercising no discretion and no over-
sight, the neglect by the agent of ordinary care in supplying and maintaining
suitable instrumentalities, is a breach of duty for which the master is liable.
Mullan v. Steamship Co., 315.

6. The risk which a laborer assumes of injury from the neglect of his fel-
low, is when they are co-operating in the same business, so that he knows that
the employment is one of the incidents of their common service. ld.

7. Where a servant of a mining company was killed by the falling of a
rock from the roof of a common gangway, notice to the superintendent of the
dangerous situation of the roof was notice to the company; and if this was
long enough before the accident to have given time to repair, the same was
sufficient to fix negligence upon the company. Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood, 445.
8 Where a brakeman of a railway company is injured in consequence of
the giving way of a defective ladder, the company will not be liable, unless
it had notice of the defect, either actual or constructive. Toledo Railway Co.
v. Ingraham, 557.

MERGER. See CORPORATION, 18.

MILL-DAM.

As to Mill Act of 1868 of New Hampshire, see Town v. Faulkner, 685.
MISNOMER. See JUDGMENT, 4.

A party served with process under a wrong name can only take advantage
of it by plea in abatement, and this is so, though he be an infant.
Pond v.
Ennis, 315.

MORTGAGE.

See BANKRUPTCY, 1, 6; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 24, 25; IN-
FANT, 1,2; JOINT TENANTS; LIMITATIONS, 5; NATIONAL BANK, 1; PAR-
TITION; RECORDING ACTS; USURY, 1.

1. The generality of its language forms no objection to the validity of a
mortgage. A mortgage of "the road and property" of a railroad company
is sufficient. Wilson v. Boyce, 743.

2. A railroad company can mortgage its lands not used for its track or ap-
purtenances. Id.

3. An unrestricted reference by rule of court of a suit pending upon a
mortgage gives authority to the referee, if he finds the plaintiff entitled to
recover, to determine the amount of the conditional judgment. Fales v.
Hemenway, 150.

4. Where the mortgage is conditioned to be void upon the fulfilment by the
mortgagors of their obligation to the mortgagee for a life maintenance and
other things, the referee should make up the conditional judgment in such
sum as a present equivalent for full performance, including prospective as
well as past damages. Id.

5. A mortgagee of chattels who has expressly fixed a certain time and
place for the payment of the mortgage, makes himself a wrongdoer by seiz
ing the chattels on the day before the day he has fixed for payment. Baxter
v. Spencer, 377.

6 Where a mortgage was given to a guardian to secure a debt due his
wards, and subsequently a new guardian was appointed in his place, who, in
ignorance of the existence of subsequent encumbrances upon the property,
agreed that the time of payment of the mortgage-debt should be extended,
and took a new mortgage on the same property to secure its payment, but
without releasing the first mortgage, it was held, that the debt secured by the
two mortgages was the same and should have the benefit of the lien of the
first mortgage. Drury v. Briscoe, 383.

MORTMAIN See TRUST, 4.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See ATTORNEY, 1; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
23; CORPORATION, 6; COUNTY; DAMAGES, 1; INTOXICATING LIQUORS,
1; WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 3

1. Is liable for injury arising from defective highway, although a railroad
company using the street is bound by its charter to keep it in repair.

The