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́eldest male lineal descendant" of the youngest son Charles.

In the suit"The Hon. Arthur Thellusson v. Lord Rendlesham and others," the question was, who was the "eldest male lineal descendant" of Peter Isaac. The plaintiff, who was born in 1801, and was the only surviving son of Peter Isaac, the first Lord Rendlesham, the eldest son of the testator, claimed to have one of the lots conveyed to him as the eldest male lineal descendant; the defendant, Lord Rendlesham, who was born in 1840, and was the only son of Frederick, third Lord Rendlesham, an elder son of Peter Isaac, contended that, though he was younger than the plaintiff in age, he was the eldest male lineal descendant according to the true construction of the will, as being the son of the plaintiff's elder brother, and therefore older in blood.

The cause was first heard before the Master of the Rolls, who decided in favour of Lord Rendlesham, the defendant. The cause was brought on appeal before the House of Lords, happily for the litigants the court of supreme and final jurisdiction. So great a cause, distinguished by such remarkable peculiarities, received all honours at their Lordships' hands. It was twice argued before their Lordships, sitting with the Judges as assessors, by the ablest counsel that wealth could command; and their Lordships, by the advice of the Lord Chancellor, put the following questions to the learned Judges:

"First. Whether the devise by the testator of his lands, tenements, and hereditaments after the decease of the several person VOL. CI.

during whose lives the rents and profits of the same were directed to be accumulated (if it had been a devise of legal estates) to the eldest male lineal descendant then living of Peter Isaac Thellusson, George Woodford Thellusson, and Charles Thellusson respectively in tail male, is capable of an intelligible construction, or is void for uncertainty.

"Second. If at the time directed by the testator for the division of the estates into three lots, and for the conveyance to be made thereof, Peter Isaac Thellusson had had three sons, all of whom were dead, and the eldest of the three sons had left a son under age, and the second son had left a son of 21 years of age, and the third son had left a son of 30 years of age, and supposing it had been a devise of legal estates, which of the sons of the three sons would have been entitled to take under the devise?"

The learned Lords, having taken time to consider, delivered their several opinions. In answer to the first question, they were unanimous that the devise was capable of an intelligible construction. With regard to the second question, there was a diversity of opinion; but the majority concurred in holding that the word "eldest" used in the will as descriptive of the person who is to take a lot as a purchaser, when the time of accumulation ceased, does not mean the oldest man among his male lineal descendants, but that the testator meant and intended that the person who would be heir-at-law of Peter Isaac in tail male should take one of the lots as purchaser, by the designation of his eldest male lineal descendant.

On the 9th June, 1859, just sixty-two years after the cruel and insane old man had bequeathed his legacy of dispute and litigation to his children and his children's children, the House of Lords put an end to his power of inflicting further mischief by pronouncing their final judgment.

Lord Cranworth, after stating the will, and the questions that had arisen upon it, said that it was plainly the testator's object, by an unprecedented accumulation, to create enormous wealth for the purpose of founding three families. but beyond that there was nothing to be discovered in the will indicating any capricious intention as to who should take the property. On the contrary, everything showed that the testator had the ordinary rules of succession in his mind. The gift was confined to males-the persons benefited were to take in tail male only. The first choice of the estate, after the trustees should have made the division, was given to the representative of the eldest son, and to him, too, was given the first preference in presenting to the living. And the succession of the sons after the deaths was to follow the same rule. The construction contended for by the appellant would contradict the whole of this arrangement, and would postpone the estate of the present Lord Rendlesham to that of his uncle, they being the only male lineal descendants of Peter Isaac, to whom estates by purchase were limited by the will. Had there been more than two persons to take, the anomalous nature of the way in which they were to take (could the appellant's construction have been adopted) would have been

more apparent. It was impossible to suppose that the testator could have intended that there should be such a shifting of the possessors of the estates as must follow the adoption of the appellant's construction. It was no answer to this objection to say, that every devisee in succession would be tenant in tail male, and so might acquire the fee, for there might happen many circumstances which would prevent him doing so, and, at all events, it was not to be supposed that the testator had created capricious limitations in the belief that their capriciousness would be rendered inoperative by the act of the first taker. On the other hand, as the testator must of course have wished that the limitations he had created should be observed, there could be little doubt that the tendency to alter limitations that were of the ordinary kind and not capricious, being less than the tendency to alter those that were capricious, would of itself suggest to him a preference for limitations of the former kind. Reading the will, therefore, with every inclination to follow the rule that words must have their ordinary meaning assigned to them, he felt no doubt that the meaning to be given to these words must be that which was the ordinary construction of such a devise, and the estate must be held to go to the person who at the specified time was heir male of the body of Peter Isaac. The words were technical, they were used technically, and they must have their ordinary technical meaning assigned to them, and taken to mean descent in the male line according to the ordinary course of law. The decision of Lord Eldon on the

advowson clause was exactly in point with the construction to be put on the clause now under discussion. The word "eldest" did not mean oldest in point of age, but must be taken to mean "first," namely, the person first entitled to succeed according to the ordinary rules of descent. The decree of the Court below must therefore be affirmed.

Lord St. Leonards concurred, expressing a strong opinion that the question as to the alleged uncertainty of the devise had been concluded by the decision which took place in 1825. As to the other question, what was the meaning of the words? he was of opinion that, as they were the words of a lawyer, they must receive a lawyer's construction. But in truth there was not an educated man in the country who, knowing what the ordinary modes of settlement were, would not put the same meaning upon them. It was true that "eldest," as a mere word, might have two interpretations; it might mean eldest in point of age without reference to primogeniture. But in refer ence to settlements, it never did mean that. This will was a settlement of real estate. And nobody could doubt that here the testator really intended the eldest son of Peter Isaac as the first tenant in tail, and so went on adopting the rule of primogeniture. The decision on the advowson clause was in entire conformity with this construction, and the clause itself showed in a very clear manner the testator's preference for primogeniture over mere age.

Lord Wensleydale was of the same opinion. The word "eldest" must here be construed as having

reference to primogeniture, and he said this with the full intention of adhering to the rule laid ́ down by Mr. Justice Burton in Warburton v. Loveland (1 Hudson & Brook (Jr.) 648 s. c. 2, Dow. & Cl. 480), and adopted in the most recent instance, in Grey v. Pearson. "Eldest" did not necessarily mean oldest in point of age, for even applied to an individual having a particular character, it had a different meaning. The eldest magistrate or officer might not mean him who had lived the greatest number of years, nor even him who had filled the office for the longest time, for it might indicate rank only, and the "eldest earl of England" would not mean him who was most advanced in years, but the eldest in point of family origin-the premier earl. Here, used as it was with other words, it meant, not the eldest in age, but the eldest in heritable blood in the male line. As to the advowson clause, if any semblance of argument of a different sort was to be deduced from that clause, it was explained by this, that the testator was manifestly labouring under the erroneous belief that an infant could not present, and so framed this clause that by the power of presentation being for the time lodged in a person legally able to make it, the presentation should not go out of the family. There was no uncertainty in the will, nor any intestacy as to any part of it.

Lord Brougham would not take part in the decision as he had not heard the whole of the argument. But the decision entirely accorded with the impression existing in his mind, formed upon the hearing of that

portion of the case in the hearing of which he had taken part. Decree of the Court below affirmed.

II. CRIMINAL TRIALS. Murder by poison has formed a very noticeable feature in our recent criminal annals. The trials of Palmer and Dove, in 1856, of Madeleine Smith, in 1857, and those of Smethurst and Royal in the present year, besides their general notoriety, have attracted the attention of the legal profession and of chymists and pathologists in no common degree. The case of Madeleine Smith, notwithstanding the great interest it excited, is in fact of least importance, since there was no question that l'Angelier was killed by a coarse dose of arsenic, and the conviction or acquittal of the accused rested solely on the force of the incriminatory evidence. But in the other three cases, scientific questions of the most difficult character arose, presenting specific differences well worthy of consideration. In Palmer's case, the chief questions belonging to medical jurisprudence were these-one, whether the convulsions of which Cooke died were such that they would have been produced by strychnia, and could not have been produced by any other extrinsic cause, or by natural causes; the other, whether if strychnia had been administered to him, it was a necessary consequence that strychnia should have been detected in his body. In the Leeds case, the death of Mrs. Dove was unquestionably due to strychnia, and strychnia was discovered in considerable quantity. The Rich

Palmer's case, many scientific authorities were of opinion that the symptoms were such as might have originated in natural causes

such as the deceased's subsequently discovered pregnancyand that if arsenic had been administered, traces of it must have been discovered. Royal's case presents entirely novel features in accusations of this kind. It was the unanimous opinion of the medical witnesses produced by the Crown (the accused called none), that death in this case was not due to natural causes, but to the administration of some irritant poison; but the subsequent examination of the body of the deceased did not disclose the administration of any poison whatever, whether mineral or vegetable; but there was discovered a secreted fluid of a highly poisonous nature, and the intestines were in a state of general inflammation, such as has not been found save where some irritant poison has been taken. What this poisonous secretion was, the scientific witnesses were entirely unable to discover; neither could they offer any proof whether it was a cause of the surrounding disease or was a consequent of it. The peculiarities of these cases suggest a wide field for

inquiry in this region of science; and it greatly concerns the security of mankind and the peace of society that a satisfactory solution of the questions involved should be speedily arrived at.

THE RICHMOND POISONING CASE.

CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT, July 7 and 8; August 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19; and November 30. (Before the Lord Chief Baron.)

As the several proceedings against the accused extended over a period little short of five months, and occupied in their actual decision eight days, any attempt to comprise the whole case within the limits which can here be assigned to it would be futile-and the same remarks apply to the following case of Royal-all that can be attempted is to give so much of the arguments of counsel, and the facts proved by the witnesses, as will justify the conclusions at which the juries arrived, and the course taken by the authorities.

By a singular accident, the interest of the public in the Richmond case, already highly excited, was held in suspense and greatly raised, by the abrupt close of the first trial, and by the very unusual circumstance of an alleged murderer being tried twice for the same offence on the same indictment.

The first trial commenced at the Central Criminal Court on the 7th of July, before Chief Baron Pollock.

Thomas Smethurst, 48 years of age, surgeon, was indicted for the wilful murder of Isabella Bankes.

The prisoner was a person of small stature and insignificant appearance, with reddish brown moustaches. Although his age was stated in the calendar to be 48, there is strong reason to suppose that he was several years older. The prisoner, though appearing careworn, maintained great self-possession throughout the proceedings, particularly during the second trial.

Mr. Serjeant Ballantine, after impressing upon the jury the grave responsibility which attached to them in deciding on so important a case, said that the charge he was about to prefer was one of a most serious character; the] allegation of it was, that the prisoner at the bar took away the life of a fellow-creature by poison, and likewise contrived to throw around the means he resorted to to destroy life some more than ordinary difficulties in the detection of the crime, and, in order to effect this purpose, he had availed himself of the knowledge he possessed, and made use of a slow irritant poison, which he administered with his own hands, until, by the accumulation of poison and irri tation, the poor woman sunk and died; and the jury, probably, would be of opinion, when they had heard the evidence, that every means was taken by him from the beginning to the end to shroud the whole affair in the deepest mystery. The prisoner was represented to be a member of the medical profession; he had a considerable knowledge of medicine, and was known as Dr. Smethurst. He was a married man, and had a wife considerably older than himself, who was now living. At the time when he should first