Where, pending an appeal from a judgment for plaintiff in an action
for mandamus to compel the defendants, Board of County Com-
missioners, to build a bridge, the Statute requiring the bridge
to be built was repealed; Held, that such repeal abated the ac-
tion. Wikel v. Commissioners, 451.
1. A public office being private property, so long as the office is in
existence the term for which the holder has been elected or
appointed cannot be lessened to the prejudice of the incumbent,
unless he has committed some act which works a forfeiture.
Wood v. Bellamy, 212.
2. An office created by the Legislature may be abolished at its discre-
tion, in which event the officer loses his office and his property in
it, he having taken it with the implied understanding that the
continuance of the office is a matter of legislative. discretion.
Wood v. Bellamy, 212.
Where plaintiff, at the express request and for the benefit of defend-
ants, endorsed a note executed by a third person for the benefit
of, but not payable to, defendants, and, upon the insolvency of
the makers, plaintiff was compelled to pay the note under a judg-
ment thereon against him, the law will imply a promise by de-
fendants to repay him. Springs v. McCoy, 417.
Chapter 293, Acts of 1893, validating probates of deeds by husband
and wife, where the wife's privy examination was taken prior
to the husband's " acknowledgment," embraces cases where the
execution of the deed by the husband was proved by a sub-
scribing witness and not by the technical "acknowledgment',
of the husband. Barrett v. Barrett, 127.
Against County for Costs by Superior Court Clerk, 23.
For Contribution Among Sureties—
1. An action at law by a surety for contribution lies only against
the co-sureties, severally, for the aliquot part due from each.
Adams v. Hayes, 383.
2. Where a complaint in an action by a surety for contribution joined
the principals as parties, and alleged the contract of suretyship,
payment by the plaintiff and demand of the co-sureties "for
their contributive shares," and asked judgment against all, but
did not allege insolvency of the principals except by the aver-
ment that plaintiff was compelled to pay the debt; Held, that
though the proper relief was not asked, and the insolvency of
the principals was imperfectly alleged, the cause of action will
be construed, on demurrer, as equitable rather than legal, in
order to confer jurisdiction below. Ibid.
For Damages, 14, 134, 288, 320, 443, 461, 489, 492, 495, 498, 508, 514,
517, 525, 534, 544, 551, 555, 557.
For False Arrest, 56, 292.
Where plaintiff, at the express request and for the benefit of defend-
ants, endorsed a note executed by a third person for the benefit
of, but not payable to, defendants, and, upon the insolvency
of the makers, plaintiff was compelled to pay the note under a
judgment thereon against him, the law will imply a promise by
defendants to repay him. Springs v. McCoy, 417.
For Money Received as Agent, 69.
Of Claim and Delivery, 264.
On Administrator's Bond, 446.
On Fire Insurance Policy, 302.
On Life Insurance Policy, 141.
To Foreclose Mortgage, 312, 325.
To Recover for Usurious Interest Paid, 286.
To Recover Personal Property, 402.
To Recover Land, 90, 96, 163, 177, 225, 253, 318, 328, 331, 344, 376,
391, 394.
Where, in the trial of an action of ejectment, the plaintiff estab-
lished title in himself by a succession of deeds through a sale
under power in a mortgage given by the ancestors of defend-
ants, it was error to adjudge that plaintiff was entitled only to an
order of sale of the land. Rumley v. Puryear, 291.
To Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyance, 14, 355.
To Set Aside Sale of Land by Administrator, 123.
The running of street cars by an incorporated street railway com-
pany over a bridge already constructed by a railroad company
within the city limits and sufficient for the ordinary uses of
the public, imposes an additional servitude upon the bridge,
for which the street railway company must render compensa-
tion by contributing to the expense of maintenance and by
providing necessary conveniences at the intersection, as re-
quired by Section 1957 (6) of The Code. Railroad Company v.
Street Railway Company, 520.
1. In the trial of an indictment for bigamy, the admission by de-
fendant of his former marriage is competent evidence against
him, though such statement may have referred to the relations
which he and his former wife sustained to each other, as man
and wife, in slavery times. State v. Melton, 591.
2. Where a defendant charged with bigamy, upon the preliminary
examination before a justice of the peace, and after being cau-
tioned that his statements could be used against him, stated that
he had been married to his former wife while a slave in South
Carolina, had children by her and was subsequently married in
North Carolina to his present wife, such admissions were com-
petent to go to the jury, on his trial in the Superior Court, as to
his guilt. Ibid.
3. Where, on the trial of a defendant for bigamy, one witness tes-
tified that defendant had been married to his first wife thirty-
nine years and had admitted two years before the trial that he
had another wife living, and it appeared that the defendant had
testified on the preliminary examination before a justice of the
peace to such first marriage while he and she were slaves, it was
proper to refuse an instruction that, on the evidence, the jury
could not convict. Ibid.
1. In a proceeding to sell lands for assets, the heirs may plead the
statute of limitations to any of the debts set up, and may also
plead fraud and collusion between the administrator and credi-
tor where the claims have been reduced to judgment. Person v.
Montgomery, 111.
2. While it is now left, by the Statute, to the discretion of an admin-
istrator whether or not he will plead the statute of limitations
against a debt preferred against the estate, it is nevertheless his
duty to act in good faith in that respect, and, if he fail to do so,
he may be held responsible for his failure. Ibid.
3. The purchase of land of an intestate by his administrator at a
sale legally conducted, confirmed and price paid, passes the legal
title and can only be set aside at the suit of some one having an
equitable interest therein and upon a repayment of the purchase
money. Highsmith v. Whitehurst, 123.
4. Where land was sold by an administrator to pay debts of his in-
testate and was bought for his benefit, at its full value, and the
sale was confirmed, the price paid, and the creditors ratified it by
receiving the proceeds, which together with the other assets were
not sufficient to pay the debts of the estate in full, the widow and
heirs of the decedent have neither any legal right to the land nor
any equitable ground upon which to have the sale set aside or
to have the purchaser declared a trustee for them. Ibid.
ADMINISTRATOR CUM TESTAMENTO ANNEXO:
1. Where an executor named in a will is thereby also appointed a trustee
and renounces or dies, the administrator cum testamento annexo
appointed in his stead succeeds to the trusteeship, and hence an
appointment by the clerk of the Court of a trustee in place of
the executor is void and clothes the appointee with no power.
Clark v. Peebles, 31.
2. In such case payments of the body of the trust fund made by the
administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. to the cestui que trust (who was to re-
ceive the income only) and to the alleged trustee acting under the
clerk's appointment were not valid payments, and the adminis-
trator c. t. a. is not entitled to credit therefor.
An allegation in an affidavit for a warrant of attachment that de-
fendants are about to assign or dispose of their property with
"intent to defraud plaintiffs," is an assertion not of a fact, but
of a belief merely and, hence, the grounds upon which such
belief is found must be set out in order that the court may
adjudge upon their sufficiency. Judd v. Mining Co., 397.
1. Where an agency is limited it is the duty of the person dealing
with the agent to ascertain its value and extent of his authority
and to deal with him accordingly. Willis v. Railroad, 508.
2. A section master of a railroad has such general authority only as
is incidental to the duty assigned to him, and no power what-
ever as to the transportation of passengers, and notice of this
limited authority will be implied from the natural and apparent
divisions of the business of a railroad company among its various
departments. Ibid.
|