Construction of Statutes in general. 2. The intention of the legislature, when dis- is also true, that where great inconvenience will covered, must prevail; any rule of construction, result from a particular construction, that condeclared by previous acts, to the contrary not-struction is to be avoided, unless the meaning withstanding. Ibid. of the legislature be plain; in which case it must 3. The presumption must always be in favour be obeyed. United States v. Fisher et al., Asof the validity of law, if the contrary is not clearly signees of Blight, 2 Cranch, 358; 1 Cond. Rep. demonstrated. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14; 1421. Cond. Rep. 211. 12. That the consequences are to be considered 4. A legislative act founded on a mistaken in expounding laws, where the intent is doubtopinion of what was law, does not change the ful, is a principle not to be contradicted: but it actual state of the law, as to pre-existing cases. is also true, that it is a principle which must be Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1; 1 Cond. Rep. 229. applied with caution, and which has a degree 5. It is true, that in mere private cases be-of influence dependent on the nature of the case tween individuals, a court will and ought to to which it is applied, when rights are infringed. struggle hard against a construction, which will, Ibid. by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of 13. Where fundamental principles are overparties; but in great national concerns, where thrown, where the general system of the laws individual rights acquired by war are sacrificed is departed from, the legislative intention must for national purposes, the contract making the be expressed with irresistible clearness, to insacrifice ought always to receive a construction duce a court of justice to suppose a design to conforming to its manifest import; and if the effect such objects. But when only a political nation has given up the vested rights of its citi-regulation is made which is inconvenient, if the zens, it is not for the court, but for the govern-intention of the legislature be expressed in terms ment, to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation. United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch, 103; 1 Cond. Rep. 256. 6. If courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; 1 Cond. Rep. 268. 7. In the construction of a statute, positive and explicit provisions, comprehending in terms a whole class of cases, are not to be restrained by applying to those cases an implication drawn from subsequent words, unless that implication be very clear, necessary and irresistible. Faw v. Marsteller, 2 Cranch, 10; 1 Cond. Rep. 337. 8. Where a case is shown to be out of the mischief intended to be guarded against, or out of the spirit of the law, the letter of the statute will not be deemed so unequivocal as absolutely to exclude another construction. Ibid. 9. It is said the case ought to be an extraordinary oue, that the circumstances ought to be uncommon, which would warrant a departure from the general principles established for the government of contracts. This is true, and the supreme court would certainly not feel itself at liberty to exercise, on a common occasion, a discretionary power, limited only by the opinion entertained of the naked justice of the case. Ibid. 10. That a law is the best expositor of itself; that every part of an act is to be taken into view for the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature; and that the details of one part may contain regulations restricting the extent of general expressions used in another part of the same act, are among those plain rules laid down by common sense for the exposition of statutes, which have been uniformly acknowledged. Pennington v. Coxe, 2 Cranch, 33; 1 Cond. Rep. 346. 11. It is undoubtedly a well established principle in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be considered, and the intention of the legislature to be extracted from the whole. It which are sufficiently intelligible to leave no doubt in the mind, when the words are taken in their ordinary sense, it would be going a great way to say that a constrained interpretation must be put upon them, to avoid an inconvenience which ought to have been contemplated in the legislature, when the act was passed, and which, in their opinion, was probably overbalanced by the particular advantages it was calculated to produce. Ibid. 14. In cases depending on the statutes of a state, the settled construction of those statutes, by the state courts, is to be regarded. Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87; 3 Cond. Rep. 286. 15. In the construction of the statutes or local laws of a state, it is frequently necessary to recur to the history and situation of the country, in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of many of them, to enable a court to apply with propriety the different rules for construing statutes. Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. 116; 3 Cond. Rep. 508. 16. The best judges in England have been of opinion, that relaxing the construction of the statute of frauds ought not to be extended further than it has already been carried; and the supreme court entirely concurs in that opinion. Grant v. Naylor, 4 Cranch, 224; 2 Cond. Rep. 95. 17. An act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains; and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations, as understood in this country. Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch, 64; 1 Cond. Rep. 358. 18. When an act of congress is revived by a subsequent act, it is revived precisely in that form, and with that effect, which it had at the moment when it expired. The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. The United States, 7 Cranch, 882; 2 Cond. Rep. 540. 19. It is a general rule, in the construction of public statutes, that the word "may" is to be Construction of Statutes in general. construed "must," in all cases where the legislature mean to impose a positive and absolute duty, and not merely to give a discretionary power. And in all cases, the construction should be such as carries into effect the true intent and meaning of the legislature in the enactment. Minor et al. v. The Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 1 Peters, 64. 20. Where English statutes, such for instance as the statute of frauds, and the statute of limitations, have been adopted into our own legislation, the known and settled construction of those statutes by English courts of law has been considered as silently incorporated into the acts, or has been received with all the weight of authority. Dialogue v. Pennock et al., 2 Peters, 18. 21. Where the question upon the construction of the statute of a state relative to real property has been settled by any judicial decision in the state where the land lies, the supreme court, upon the uniform principles adopted by it, would recognise that decision as a part of the local law. Gardner v. Collins, 2 Peters, 85. 22. A legislative act is to be interpreted according to the intention of the legislature, apparent upon its face. Every technical rule, as to the construction or force of particular terms, must yield to the clear expression of the paramount will of the legislature. Wilkinson v. Leland et al., 2 Peters, 662. 23. In cases not absolutely closed by authority, the supreme court has always expressed a strong inclination not to extend the operation of the -tatute of frauds so as to embrace original and distinct promises, made by different persons at the same time, upon the same general consideration. Townley v. Sumrall, 2 Peters, 182. 24. The supreme court has been often called upon to consider the sixteenth section of the judiciary act of 1789, and as often, either expressly or by the course of its decisions, has held that it is merely declaratory; making no alteration whatever in the rules of equity on the ubject of legal remedy. Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 3 Peters, 210. mon to both countries, we do not hold ourselves bound to fluctuate with them. Ibid. 27. Laws imposing duties on importation of goods, are intended for practical use and application by men engaged in commerce; and hence it has become a settled rule, in the interpretation of statutes of this description, to construe the language adopted by the legislature, and particularly in the denomination of articles, according to the commercial understanding of the terms used. Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Peters, 137. 28. Generally, statutes are to be construed to operate in futuro, unless a retrospective effect be clearly intended. Prince v. The United States, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 204. 29. The word "or" has sometimes been construed to mean "and." Such construction has been clearly necessary to give effect to a clause in a will, or to some legislative provision, but never to change a contract at pleasure. Douglass v. Eyre, Gilpin's D. C. R. 148. 30. Where a British statute is re-enacted in this country, it is reasonable to suppose that the legislature designed to adopt, as well the settled construction which had been given to the act by the British courts, as the act itself. Kirkpatrick et al. v. Gibson's Executors, 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 388. 31. In doubtful cases, a court should compare all the parts of a statute, and different statutes in pari materia, to ascertain the intention of the legislature. The Sloop Elizabeth, Paine's C. C. R. 11. 32. Semble: That in questions of commercial law, the courts of the United States are not concluded by the local construction proceeding from state courts. Donnell v. The American Ins. Co., 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 366. 33. In the construction of statutes, one part must be construed by another. In order to attest the legislative intention, the whole statute must be inspected. Strode v. Stafford Justices, 1 Brockenb. Č. C. R. 162. 34. It is a rule of law that a statute applicable in its terms to particular actions, cannot be applied by construction to other actions standing on the same reason. Jacob v. The United States, 1 Brockenb. C. C. R. 520. 25. The rule which has uniformly been observed by the supreme court in construing statutes, is to adopt the construction made by courts of the country, by whose legislature the statute was enacted. This rule may be susceptible of 35. Penal laws must be construed strictly to some modification, when applied to British sta- bring the case within the definition of the law, tutes which are adopted in any of the states. but not so as to exclude a case within their ordiBy adopting them they become our own, as en-nary acceptation. The United States v. Wilson tirely as if they had been enacted by the legis-and Porter, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 78. lature of the state. Cathcart et al. v. Robinson, 36. Laws are construed strictly to save a Peters, 264. right, or avoid a penalty; and liberally to give a remedy, or effect an object declared in the law. Whitney et al. v. Emmett et al., 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 316. 37. The provisions of a law which are merely directory, are not to be construed into conditions precedent. Ibid. 26. The construction which British statutes had received in England at the time of their adoption in this country, indeed to the time of the separation of this country from the British empire, may very properly be considered as accompanying the statutes themselves, and forming an integral part of them. But however subse- 38. The mercantile terms are to be taken in quent decisions may be respected, and certainly the sense intended, which is to be ascertained they are entitled to great respect, their absolute by the laws in pari materia. The United States authority is not admitted. If the English courts v. Twenty-four Coils of Cordage, 1 Baldwin's C. vary their construction of a statute which is com- | C. R. 505. Construction of Statutes in general. 39. The words of a law imposing a forfeiture | to conform to state laws, in giving to persons or penalty, should not be construed to embrace imprisoned under their execution, the privilege a case not within the parts of the law which pro- of jail limits, embracing executions at the suit hibits the act done, or direct the performance of of the United States. Ibid. an act, by the omission of which the penalty or forfeiture is incurred. Ibid. 508. 40. If a section of an act of congress admits of two interpretations, one of which brings it within, and the other presses it beyond, the constitutional authority of congress; it is the duty of the supreme court to adopt the former construction, because a presumption never ought to be indulged that congress meant to exercise or usurp any unconstitutional authority, unless that conclusion is forced on the court by language altogether unambiguous. The United States v. Coombs, 12 Peters, 72. 41. Upon the general principles of interpreting statutes, where the words are general, the court are not at liberty to insert limitations not called for by the sense, or the objects, or the mischiefs of the enactment. Ibid. 42. Action on a bond to the United States for the liberty of the jail-yard of Portland, in the state of Maine. The condition of the bond was, that J. K. and B. K. should "continue true prisoners in the custody of the jailor, within the limits of the jail-yard." It was agreed by the counsel for the plaintiff and defendants, that J. K. and B. K. had remained within "the limits of the jail-yard," as established under the laws of 1787, of Massachusetts, then prevailing in Maine; the limits of the jail-yard having, in October, 1798, been extended over the whole county; but had not remained within the limits established on the 29th of May, 1787, and existing when the act of congress was passed, 4th January, 1800, authorizing persons under process from the United States to have the "jail limits," as established by the laws of the state. Held, That the act of congress of 19th May, 1828, gives the debtors imprisoned under executions from the courts of the United States, at the suit of the United States, the privilege of the jail limits in the several states, as they were fixed by the laws of the several states at the date of that act. The United States v. Knight, 14 Peters, 302. 43. Whatever might be the liability of the officer who took the bond from the defendants, if the jail limits continued to be such as were established under the law of Massachusetts, of 1787, the bond not having been taken under that law, and the condition being different from the requirements of those regulations; the parties to the bond, the suit being upon the bond, are bound for nothing whatsoever, but what is contained in the condition, whether it be or be not conformable with the law. Ibid. 44. The statute of May 19th, 1828, entitled, "An act further to regulate processes in the courts of the United States," which proposes only to regulate the mode of proceeding in civil suits, does not divest the public of any right; does not violate any principle of public policy; but, on the contrary, makes provision, in accordance with the policy which the government has indicated by many acts of previous legislation, VOL. I.-36 45. The act of congress under which title was claimed, being a private act, and for the benefit of the city of Mobile and certain individuals; it is fair to presume it was passed with reference to the particular claims of individuals, and the situation of the land embraced in the law at the time it was passed. Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 14 Peters, 353. 46. A lot of ground was granted by the Spanish government of Florida, in 1802, to Forbes and Company, in the city of Mobile, which was afterwards confirmed by the commissioners of the United States. The lot granted was eighty feet in front, and three hundred and four feet in depth, bounded on the east by Water street. This, while the Spanish government had possession of the territory, was known as "a water lot." In front of this lot was a lot which, at the time of the grant to Forbes and Company, was covered by the water of the bay and river of Mobile, the high tide flowing over it; and it was separated from Forbes and Company's lot by Water street. It was afterwards, in part, re claimed by Lewis, who had no title to it, and who was afterwards driven off by one of the firm of Forbes and Company. A blacksmith's shop was then put upon the lot by him; and Lewis again, by proceedings at law, obtained possession of the blacksmith's shop, it not being his improvement. The improvement was first made in 1823. The Spanish governor, in 1809 after the Louisiana treaty of 1803, and before the territory west of the Perdido was out of the possession of Spain, granted the lot in front of the lot owned by Forbes and Company, to William Pollard; but the commissioners of the United States, appointed after the territory was in the full possession of the United States, refused to confirm the same, "because of the want of improvement and occupancy." In 1824, congress passed an act, the second section of which gives to those who have improved them, the lots in Mobile, known under the Spanish government as "water lots," except when the lot so improved had been alienated, and except lots of which the Spanish government had made new grants," or orders of survey, during the time the Spanish government had "power" to grant the same; in which case, the lot is to belong to the alienee, or the grantee. In 1836, congress passed an act for the relief of William Pollard's heirs, by which the lot granted by the Spanish government of 1809 was given to the heirs, saving the rights of third persons; and a patent for this lot was issued to the heirs of William Pollard, by the United States, on the 2d of July, 1836. Held, That the lot lying east of the lot granted in 1802, by the Spanish government, to Forbes and Company, did not pass by that grant to Forbes and Company; that the act of Congress of 1824 did not vest the title in the lot east of the lot granted in 1802 in Forbes and Company; and that the heirs of Pollard, under the second section of the act of 1824, which ex Construction of Statutes in general. cepted from the grant to the city of Mobile, &c., | clude some possible ground of misinterpretation lots held under "new grants" from the Spanish of its extending to cases not intended by the government, and under the act of congress of legislature to be brought within its purview. 1836, were entitled to the lot granted in 1809, Minis v. The United States, 15 Peters, 423. by the Spanish governor, to William Pollard. Ibid. 47. The term "new grants," in its ordinary acceptation, when applied to the same subject or object, is the opposite of "old." But such cannot be its meaning in the act of congress of 1824. The term was doubtless used in relation to the existing condition of the territory in which such grants were made. The territory had been ceded to the United States by the Louisiana treaty; but, in consequence of a dispute with Spain about the boundary line, had remained in the possession of Spain. During this time, Spain continued to issue evidences of titles to lands within the territory in dispute. The term "new" was very appropriately used as applicable to grants and orders of survey of this description, as contradistinguished from those issued before the cession. Ibid. 51. The act of congress of the 26th May, 1824, entitled "An act granting certain lots of ground to the corporation of the city of Mobile, and to certain individuals of the said city," relinquished the rights of the United States, whatever they were in the lot in question, to the proprietor of the front lot. Watkins v. Holman, 16 Peters, 25. 52. The act of the legislature of Alabama, which authorized Sarah Holman, resident in Boston, the administratrix of Oliver Holman, to sell the estate of which Holman died seised in the city of Mobile, was a valid act; and the deed made under that statute, according to its provisions, was legal and operative, and was unauthorized by the constitution of Alabama. Ibid. 53. A lot of ground, part of the ground on which Fort Charlotte had been erected, in the city of Mobile, before the territory was acquired from Spain by the United States, had been sold under an act of congress of 1818. The lot had been laid out according to a plan by which a street called Water street was run along the tended over part of the site of Fort Charlotte. The lot was situated west of Water street, but when sold by the United States, its eastern line was below high-water mark of the river. The purchaser of this lot improved the lot lying in front of it, east of Water street, having filled it 48. The time when the Spanish government had the "power" to grant lands in the territory, by every reasonable intendment of the act of congress of 1824, must have been so designated with reference to the existing state of the terri-margin of Mobile river, and the street was extory, as between the United States and Spain; the right to the territory being in the United States, and the possession in Spain. The language, "during the time at which Spain had the power to grant the same," was, under such circumstances, very appropriately applied to the case. It could with no propriety have been ap-up at a heavy expense, thus reclaiming it from plied to the case, if Spain had full dominion over the territory, by the union of the right and the possession; and, in this view, it is no forced interpretation of the word " power," to consider it here used as importing an imperfect right, and distinguished from complete lawful authority. Ibid. the river, which at high-water had covered it. When the lot east of Water street was purchased, the purchaser could not pass along the street, except with the aid of fogs and other timber. Water street was, in 1823, filled up at the cost of the city of Mobile. Taxes and assessments, for making side-walks along Water street, were paid to the city of Mobile by the owner of the lot. The city of Mobile had brought suit for taxes, and had advertised the lot for sale, as the property of a tenant under the purchaser of the lot. On the 26th of May, 1824, congress passed an act which declared, in the first section, that all the right and claim of the United States to the lots known as the Hospital and Bakehouse lots, containing about threefourths of an acre of land in the state of Alabama; and all the right and claim of the United States to all the lots not sold or confirmed to individuals, either by this or any former act, and to which no equitable title exists, in favour of any individual under this or any other act, between high-water mark and the channel of the river, and between Church street and North Boundary street, in front of the city of Mobile, should be vested in the corporation of the city of Mobile, for the use of the city for ever. The second section provides, "that all the right and claim of the United States to so many of the lots east of Water street, and between Church 50. The office of a proviso, generally, is either street and North Boundary street, now known to except something from the enacting clause, as water lots, as are situated between the chanor to qualify or restrain its generality, or to ex-nel of the river and the front of the lots, known 49. The act of congress of 25th March, 1812, appointing commissioners to ascertain the title and claims to lands on the east side of the Mississippi, and west side of the Perdido, and falling within the cession of France, embraced all claims of this description. It extended to all claims by virtue of any grant, order of survey, or other evidence of claim whatsoever, derived from the French, British, or Spanish governments; and the reports of the commissioners show, that evidence of claims of various descriptions, issued by Spanish authority, down to 1810, come under their examination. And the legislation of congress shows many laws passed confirming incomplete titles, originating after the date of the treaty between France and Spain at St. Ildefonso. Such claims are certainly not beyond the reach of congress to confirm, although it may require a special act of congress for that purpose. Such is the act of congress of 2d July, 1836, which confirms the title of William Pollard's heirs to the lot which is the subject of this suit. Ibid. Construction of Statutes in general. under the Spanish government as water lots, in the said city of Mobile, whereon improvements have been made, be, and the same are hereby vested in the several proprietors and occupants of each of the lots heretofore fronting on the river Mobile," &c. The city of Mobile claimed from the defendant in error the lot held by him, under the purchase from the United States, and the improvements before described, asserting that the same was vested in the city by the first section of the art of 1824. Held, that under the provisions of the second section of the act, the defendant in error claiming under the purchase made under the act of 1818, and under the act of 1824, was entitled to the lot. The City of Mobile v. Eslava, 16 Peters, 234. 54. The right relinquished by the United States was to the water fots “lying east of Water street, and between Church street and North Boundary street, now known as water lots, as are situated between the channel of the river and the front of the lots, known under the Spanish government as water lots, in the said city of Mobile, whereon improvements have been made." The improvements refer to the water lots, and not to the front lots. A reasonable construction of the act requires the improvements to have been made or owned by the proprietor of the front lot at the time of the passage of the act. Being proprietor of the front lot, and having improved the water lot opposite and east of Water street, constitute the conditions on which the right under the statute vests. Ibid. 55. A grant by the Spanish government, confirmed by the United States, was made of a lot of ground in the city of Mobile, running from a certain boundary eastwardly to the river Mobile. The land adjacent to this lot, and extending from high-water mark to the channel of the river, in front of the lot, was held by the grantee as appurtenant to the fast land above high-water mark. The city of Mobile instituted an action to recover the same, asserting a title to it under the act of congress of 26th May, 1824, granting certain lots of ground to the corporation of the city of Mobile, and to certain individuals in the said city. Held, that this lot was within the exceptions of the act of 1824; and no right to the same was vested in the city of Mobile by the act. The City of Mobile v. Hallett, 16 Peters, 261. 56. The twenty-fifth clause of the second section of the tariff act of 1832, ch. 244, includes within its terms all bindings, whether worsted or woollen. Whiting v. Bancroft, 1 Story, 560. 57. Although penal statutes are to be construed strictly, yet all the provisions thereof must be taken together, and interpreted according to the import of the words, and not by the mere division into sections, so as to give effect to the objects and intent of the statute. And all statutes relating to the same subject-matter, are to be interpreted together; and such a construction is to be given to them, consistent with the words, as will avoid the mischiefs, and promote the objects and policy contemplated by the statutes. The Schooner Harriet, 1 Story, 251. 58. The tariff being a statute regulating commerce, the terms of it must be construed according to commercial usage and understanding. In this case, it was submitted to the jury to determine whether gunny cloth and cotton bagging were different articles of commerce. Bacon v. Bancroft, 1 Story, 341. Lee v. Lincoln, 1 Story, 610. 59. In expounding a law, the court cannot, in any degree, be influenced by the construction put upon it by individual members of congress, in the debate which took place on its passage, nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law, as it passed, is the will of the majority of both houses; and the only mode in which that will is spoken, is the act itself; and the intention of the law must be gathered from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it passed. Aldridge et al. v. Williams, 3 Howard, 24. 60. It is impossible to suppose that congress, by the act of March 2, 1833, commonly called the compromise act, could have doubted its power to repeal or modify the duties imposed by that act, in such manner as the public exigencies might require, or its power to pass laws to secure the collection of the revenue, and to punish any one who might attempt to evade the duties imposed by an act of congress. Ibid. 61. The act of March 2, 1832, did not repeal all duties imposed by the laws of the United States after the time limited in that act should expire. The duties payable before the act of March 2, 1832, could be legally collected under rules and regulations established under the authority of the president of the United States, by the secretary of the treasury. Ibid. 28. 62. If divers statutes relate to the same thing, they ought to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them; and it is an established rule of law, that all acts in pari materia are to be taken together as if they were one law. The supreme court have repeatedly, in effect, acted upon this rule. The United States v. Freeman, 3 Howard, 565. 63. Brevet officers in the marine corps, in respect to pay and emoluments, were included under the army regulation, No. 1124, sanctioned on the 1st of March, 1825; were included also under the regulations upon the subject of brevet pay, sanctioned by the president December 1st, 1836; and they may claim brevet pay and emoluments under the regulations of 1841, when they exercise a command according to the provisions regulating brevet pay on page 344 of the army regulations of 1841. The act of June 5, 1834, does not repeal the first section of the act of 1818, regulating the pay and emoiuments of brevet officers. Ibid. 566. 64. The fifth section of the act of June 30, 1834, is a repeal of the joint resolution of congress of May 25, 1832, respecting the pay and emoluments of the marine corps. Ibid. 65. Appropriations having been made by congress for double rations, does not determine |