is immaterial; they are not even admissible evidence in this cause. But if they were, they can have no influence on those of the drawer -into whose expectations only is the enquiry to be made. The facts in the cases of Legge v. Thorpe, 12 East, 170, and Claridge v. Dalton, 4 Maule & Selw. 226, afford much stronger evidence of a reasonable expectation in the drawers that their bills would be honoured, than those in the present case; yet there they were adjudged insufficient. The "reasonable grounds" required by law are not such as would excite an idle hope, a wild expectation, or a remote probability, that the bill might be honoured, but such as create a full expectation, a strong probability of its payment; such indeed as would induce a merchant of common prudence and ordinary regard for his commercial credit, to draw a like bill. The facts in this case constitute no such reasonable grounds. We therefore think that the county court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and consequently reverse their judgment.

Judgment reversed, and procedendo awarded.

SEC. VI.-OF NEGOTIATION IN GENERAL.

INDORSEMENT AND DELIVERY.

§ 32.

Geary v. Physic (1826), 5 B. & C. 234; 11 E. C. L. 442.

Assumpsit by the plaintiff as indorsee against the defendant. as maker of a promissory note for the sum of 30l. payable two months after date to the order of one Folder, and indorsed by him, Folder, to one Kemp, who subsequently indorsed the note to the plaintiff. At the trial before Abbott, C. J., at the London sittings, after Hilary term, 1825, it appeared that the indorsement by Kemp, to the plaintiff was in pencil, and it was thereupon objected that the plaintiff could not recover; an indorsement in pencil not being such an indorsement as the law and custom of merchants recognizes to be sufficient to pass the interest in a bill of exchange, and promissory notes being by the statute 3 & 4 Ann. c. 9, s. I, assignable or indorsable in the same manner as unpaid bills of exchange are according to the custom of merchants. The Lord Chief Justice, thought it sufficient, and directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff, reserving liberty to the defendant's coun

sel to move to enter a non-suit, if the court should be of opinion that the indorsement of the promissory note in pencil, was not a good and valid indorsement. F. Pollock, in last Easter term, obtained a rule nisi to enter a nonsuit.

Thesiger, now showed cause.

ABBOTT, C. J. There is no authority for saying that where the law requires a contract to be in writing, that writing must be in ink. The passage cited from Lord Coke, shows that a deed must be written on paper or parchment, but it does not show that it must be written in ink. That being so, I am of opinion that an indorsement on a bill of exchange may be by writing in pencil. There is not any great danger that our decision will induce individuals to adopt such a mode of writing in preference to that in general use. The imperfection of this mode of writing, its being so subject to obliteration, and the impossibility of proving it when it is obliterated, will prevent its being generally adopted. There being no authority to show that a contract which the law requires to be in writing should be written in any particular mode, or with any specific material, and the law of merchants requiring only that an indorsement of bills of exchange should be in writing (see the custom stated in Lutwidge, 878), without specifying the manner with which the writing is to be made, I am of opinion that the indorsement in this case was a sufficient indorsement in writing within the meaning of the law of merchants, and that the property in the bill passed by it to the plaintiff.

BAYLEY, J. I think that a writing in pencil is a writing within the meaning of that term at common law, and that it is a writing within the custom of merchants. I cannot see any reason why, when the law requires a contract to be in writing, that contract shall be void if it be written in pencil. If the character of the handwriting were thereby wholly destroyed, so as to be incapable of proof, there might be something in the objection; but it is not thereby destroyed, for, when the writing is in pencil, proof of the character of the handwriting may still be given. I think, therefore, that this is a valid writing at common law, and also that it is an indorsement according to the usage and custom of merchants; for that usage only requires that the indorsement should be in writing, and not that that writing should be made with any specific materials.

HOLROYD, J., Concurred.

Rule discharged.

Brown v. The Butchers' & Drovers' Bank (1844), 6 Hill (N. Y.) 443.

On error from the superior court of the city of New York, where the Butchers & Drovers' Bank sued Brown as the endorser of a bill of exchange, and recovered judgment. The endorsement was made with a lead pencil, and in figures, thus, "1. 2. 8.," no name being written. Evidence was given strongly tending to show that the figures were in Brown's handwriting, and that he meant they should bind him as endorser; though it also appeared he could write. The court below charged the jury that, if they believed the figures upon the bill were made by Brown, as a substitute for his proper name, intending thereby to bind himself as endorser, he was liable. Exception. The jury found a verdict. for the plaintiffs below, on which judgment was rendered, and Brown thereupon brought error.

C. De Witt, for the plaintiff in error.

A. Schell, for the defendants in error.

By the court, NELSON, Ch. J. It has been expressly decided that an endorsement written in pencil is sufficient; (Geary v. Physic, 5 Barn. & Cress. 234;) and also that it may be made by a mark. (George v. Surrey, 1 Mood. & Malk. 516). In a recent case in the K. B. it was held that a mark was a good signing within the statute of frauds; and the court refused to allow an cnquiry into the fact whether the party could write, saying that would make no difference. (Baker v. Dening, 8 Adol. & Ellis, 94; and see Harrison v. Harrison, 8 Ves. 186; Addy v. Grix, id. 504).

These cases fully sustain the ruling of the court below. They show, I think, that a person may become bound by any mark or designation he thinks proper to adopt, provided it be used as a substitute for his name, and he intend to bind himself.

Judgment affirmed.

Day v. Longhurst (1893), Ch. Div. 41 W. R. 283.
Motion.

This was a motion to commit the defendant Longhurst and his solicitor, Young, for contempt of court.

On the 1st of July, 1892, an order was made in this action restraining the defendant over the 8th of July from "negotiating,

pledging, or disposing of" certain bills of exchange. This interim order was from time to time continued down to the 22nd of November, 1892. Previously to the commencement of the action. the bills in question (which were payable to the defendant's order) had been deposited by him with Young by way of security for a debt, but had not been indorsed, and they had since continued in Young's possession. On the 5th of October, 1892, while the interim order was in force, the defendant, at the request of Young, indorsed one of them; and the mution to commit the defendant and his solicitor for contempt of court was thereupon made.

The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, provides, as follows:Section 2.-"Bearer" means the person in possession of a bill or note which is payable to bearer. "Holder" means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.

Section 31 (1).-A bill is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder of the bill. Sub-section (3).-A bill payable to order is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery. Sub-section (4).-Where the holder of a bill payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing it, the transfer gives the transferee such title as the transferor had in the bill, and the transferee, in addition, acquires the right to have the indorsement of the transferor.

Hastings, Q.C., and Swinfen Eady, for the plaintiff.

Buckley, Q.C., and Lewis Edmunds, for the respondents.

STIRLING, J., after referring to the definition of "bearer" and "holder" in the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 2, continued:Previously to the 5th of October, 1892, Young was neither "bearer" nor "holder" of the bills in question. The former term applies only to the person in possession of a bill or note payable to bearer, which this was not, and the latter to a payee or indorsee of a bill or note, which Young was not. [His lordship then read section 31, sub-sections 1 and 3, and said:-] Previously to the 5th of October, 1892, the bill had not been transferred to Young so as to constitute him the holder of the bill, for he was not "payee" or "indorsee," therefore the bill was not up to that date negotiated. On the 5th of October, 1892, the bill, being in the possession of Young, was for the first time indorsed by the defendant. Young, who up to that time had been merely the transferee of the bill, now for the first time became the "holder" of it within

the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Act, and the bill was for the first time "negotiated" within the meaning of sub-section I of section 31; consequently the defendant by his act on the 5th of October, 1892, converted Young from a mere transferee into a holder of the bill, and, in my opinion, negotiated the bill, contrary to the interim order which had been made.

On behalf of the respondents reliance was placed on subsection 4 of section 31. No doubt that sub-section shows that Young had, prior to the 5th of October, 1892, the right to have the indorsement of the defendant, and, consequently, to sue the defendant if he refused to indorse the bill. That, however, did not justify the defendant in violating the order of the court. If proceedings were taken or threatened by Young, the defendant ought to have applied either that the injunction might be. removed, so as to enable him to give effect to Young's rights, or else to have Young made a party to the action. The latter alternative, however, the defendant actually declined, in the course of the hearing of the motion. In my opinion the defendant has violated the order of the court. I do not, however, regard the case as one of serious contempt, and as regards costs I think justice will be met if I order the defendant to pay those of the applicant and leave Young to pay his own.

Motion dismissed.

IRREGULAR FORMS OF INDORSEMENT.

$33.

Markey v. Corey (1895), 108 Mich. 184, 36 L. R. A. 117, 62 Am. St. Rep. 698.

Error to Wayne; Lillibridge, J.

Assumpsit by Matthew M. Markey and Catherine Sundars against Lorenzo Corey, impleaded with George H. Waldo and Alden M. Varney, on a promissory note. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Edgar Weeks (Moore & Moore, of counsel), for appellant.
Ervin Palmer, for appellees.

LONG, J. Defendant Corey entered into a written contract with Waldo and Varney for the sale of certain personal property at the sum of $2,500, payable $200 the first year, $500 the second, and $500 each year thereafter, until the whole amount should be