1862. February 28. Judgment. puted, it involved also a question of agreement, and the Court has held that in such cases the proper tribunal is this Court rather than the local authorities; Fenix (a). The Queen's Advocate (Pritchard with him), contra.-The salvage services were of the most ordinary kind; the witnesses all Hull men, on the spot; the alleged agreement involved no question of law, but one of fact only, and the plaintiff's claim was most exorbitant. DR. LUSHINGTON:-The Court cannot certify for costs unless conscientiously convinced that the case is a fit one to be tried in a superior Court, and was such in its circumstances that the local magistrates ought not to have been called upon to decide it. One thing only is put forward here as a reason for not taking the case to the magistrates,-the agreement; the agreement alleged to have been made by one of the salvors after the services were performed. Now it is true that I have said, that where the case is mixed up with an agreement,—and I had in my mind informal agreements made at sea and disputed,—difficult questions may arise, which would induce the Court to certify; but I have not said that in every case of an agreement I should on that account certify. I do not think the agreement in this case a sufficient reason for bringing the matter into this Certificate for Court, and in all other particulars, this is a simple, a very simple case. I decline to certify. costs refused. Upon this judgment the defendants paid the plaintiff 100l., and on the 18th of February, the Queen's Advocate (Pritchard with him) applied to the Court to direct that the costs up to the time of the tender should not be allowed the plaintiff.—The tender was made with the offer of costs up to the time of tender, but "costs" are only such costs as are due by law; and the tender having been refused by the plaintiff and overruled by the Court, ceases to have any effect at all. The words of the statute (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 460) are peremptory, "the claimants shall not recover any costs." Deane, Q.C., contra.-The defendants cannot recede from their offer, which was to give costs up to time of tender. In the circumstances of this case, the phrase in the statute "any costs" may be construed to mean any costs after tender." 66 (a) Swabey's Reports, p. 16. On the 28th of February, DR. LUSHINGTON gave judgment. 1862. February 28. This was a cause of salvage for services rendered in the United Judgment. Kingdom, entered on behalf of the plaintiff in the sum of 2,000l. On the 6th of November the proctors for the defendants gave Facts of the notice to the plaintiff's solicitors that they had paid into the case. Bank of England 407., which they tendered in satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim for salvage, together with costs to the date of the tender to be taxed as between party and party. This tender was refused by the plaintiff. When the cause came on for hearing, the Court overruled the tender as insufficient, and gave 607. additional, in all 1007., but gave no costs. It gave no costs, in obedience to the 460th section of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, which enacts that in 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 460. any case of salvage in the United Kingdom which is tried in the Admiralty Court, if the claimants do not recover more than 2007., they shall not recover any costs, unless the Court certifies that the case was a fit one to be tried in the superior Court. I was of opinion that the circumstances of the case did not justify me in so certifying, and therefore I gave no costs. On that occasion nothing was said as to the offer included in the tender of costs up to the time of making the tender; but the question now arises whether, as in an ordinary case, the plaintiff is not intitled to such costs-costs up to the time of tender. The words of the statute are that the claimants shall not recover in the Court of Admiralty "any costs, charges or expenses incurred by them in the prosecution of their claim." Now I think Costs up to it clear that the costs up to the time of tender are costs in the time of tender, prosecution of the claim. The Court therefore cannot enforce the payment of such costs. This is, in truth, a penal consequence resulting from the expressed intention of the Legislature, that salvage suits of small importance shall not be brought into the Court of Admiralty, but shall be left to the jurisdiction of the magistrates. Preston, Turner and Garrett, solicitors for the plaintiff. Pritchard and Son for the defendants. refused. Ни 1862. March 4. THE IRONSIDES. Damage to Goods imported Goods transshipped — Statute retrospective-24 Vict. c. 10, ss. 3, 6, 35. The general presumption that a statute is not intended to have a retrospective operation may give way to a contrary inference from the remedial nature of the particular enactment. The immunity of a res from arrest to satisfy a lawful claim on the owner is not a "vested right." The 6th and 35th sections of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, which, taken together, give a remedy in rem to the owner of imported goods for breach of contract by the foreign shipowner, are remedial, and, subject to equitable considerations applying to proceedings in rem, confer jurisdiction over causes of action which accrued in personam before the date of the Act coming into operation. But the remedy conferred is not against any other ship than that in which the goods are carried into England or Wales. Three hundred bales of cotton were shipped on board vessel A., consigned to the plaintiffs in Liverpool, and a large number of bales was also shipped, consigned to other parties. A fire broke out on board the ship; and in result part of the cargo was destroyed, part was sold abroad, and the residue, consisting of 250 bales, was transshipped and carried on to Liverpool by vessel B. The marks on the bales were there found to be obliterated, and the consignees were called on by advertisement to identify their property. The plaintiffs could identify one bale only, which was in a damaged condition. Vessel A. afterwards came on to Liverpool. Held, that the plaintiffs had no right under the statute to arrest vessel A. THIS HIS was a cause instituted against the American ship Ironsides, under the 6th section of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861. The owners appeared under protest to the jurisdiction. The following facts appeared upon the proceedings on protest. The plaintiffs, Messrs. Lucy and Son, of Liverpool, were owners and consignees of 300 bales of cotton, shipped on board the Ironsides at New Orleans. The bills of lading bore date 25th and 26th of March, 1861. On the 4th of April, 1861, the Ironsides left New Orleans, bound for Liverpool, with a cargo of 2,400 bales of cotton, including the 300 bales belonging to the plaintiffs. On the 29th of April, while the ship was crossing the bar of the Mississippi, her cargo took fire. Means were taken to extinguish the fire, and eventually it was put out, but not until the ship had been entirely filled with water. The ship was then taken back to New Orleans, and the cargo was there discharged. Part of the cargo was found to be totally destroyed, and other parts so badly damaged, that the agents of the defendants sold it on or about the 20th of May, as the necessity of the case required, for the benefit of whom it might concern. 250 bales only out of the 2,400 shipped were fit for shipment to Liverpool, and they were accordingly put in order and shipped to Liverpool in a ship called the Valentina. The Valentina arrived in Liverpool on the 26th of June, 1861, and the marks on many bales being obliterated, the usual advertisement was published calling upon the consignees of cargo to come forward and identify their property. The plaintiffs attended, but could identify one bale only as their property, and that bale was in a damaged condition. Seventeen other bales were identified by other consignees, and the remaining 232 were sold for the benefit of whom it might concern. The Ironsides came to England in December, 1861, and was then arrested by the plaintiffs in Liverpool, where she remained under arrest for ten days. The grounds of protest assigned by the petition of the defendants were: 1. That the damage done to the goods of the plaintiffs was done before the time appointed for the coming into operation of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861. 2. That no part of the goods of the plaintiffs was carried into any port in England or Wales, and that the plaintiffs were estopped from alleging the contrary. 3. That no part of the goods of the plaintiffs was carried into any port in England or Wales in the ship Ironsides. The plaintiffs alleged non-delivery of the goods, and damage to the goods by the negligence of the defendants. The 24 Vict. c. 10 (Admiralty Court Act, 1861), enacts, s. 3. "This Act shall come into operation on the first day of June, 1861." s. 6. "The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim by the owner or consignee or assignee of any bill of lading of any goods carried into any port in England or Wales in any ship, for damage done to the goods or any part thereof, by the negligence or misconduct of, or for any breach of duty or breach of contract on the part of the owner, master, or crew of the ship, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that at the time of the institution of the cause any owner or part owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales: Provided always, that if in any such cause the plaintiff do not recover twenty pounds he shall not be intitled to any co charges or expenses incurred by him therein, unless the judge shall certify that the cause was a fit one to be tried in the said Court." 1862. March 4. 1862. March 4. February 26. s. 35. "The jurisdiction conferred by this Act on the High Court of Admiralty may be exercised either by proceedings in rem or by proceedings in personam." Milward and Lushington in support of the protest.-First. The case is not within the terms of the 6th section of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, which can alone confer jurisdiction. The section speaks only of damage done to "goods carried into a port in England or Wales." Here no part of the plaintiffs' goods has been "carried into England or Wales," except a single bale, which is immaterial. "Carried" is not to be read as "to be carried;" the remedy is made contingent upon the goods arriving in this country; if actual arrival is not required, why should the jurisdiction be limited to goods to be carried into England or Wales? why should it not extend to breach of any contract to carry over seas? Secondly. The case is not within the section, because no part of the cargo has been carried into this country by the Ironsides. The section speaks of a breach of contract by the master "of the ship," that is to say the ship previously mentioned, the ship in which the goods have been carried into England. Thirdly. The Act does not apply, because the transaction happened before the 1st of June, 1861, the date of the Act coming into operation. The bill of lading, the fire, the sale, were all before that date, nor does it appear that the reasonable time for delivery of the cargo expired after that date. Not only the contract therefore, but the breach of the contract, dates before the time of the Act coming into operation. The Court of Admiralty is careful to follow the decisions of the Courts of Common Law on statutes, Earl of Auckland (a); and the rule of interpretation is well settled at common law, that no statute is to be construed so as to have retrospective operation, except the particular language of the statute immediately requires it. No such language is to be found here. The terms of the section. will be satisfied by giving it application to future transactions only. In Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 33, the rule is given and illustrated under the maxim "Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non præteritis," quoted from the 2nd Inst. 292. In Moon v. Durden (b), the leading decision, previous authorities are reviewed; the Court of Exchequer there held that the 18th section of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, enacting that "all contracts or agreements by way of gaming or wagering shall be null and void," did not defeat an action for a wager commenced before the statute passed. The same rule was applied |