These two deeds under consideration are shown by the record to have a common history, and to have been relied on as links in the same chain of title. Testimony, therefore, which is directly applicable to one only tends to support the other. The facts, therefore, which we have just stated in reference to the deed from Bryan to Sackett tend to show also the genuineness of the deed from Fleming and the Bernards to Bryan. We are therefore of opinion that the genuineness of both deeds was proven, and that the court erred in excluding them from the jury. The offer in evidence of the original deed from Charles Fleming to John and William, Bryan, dated August 8, 1794, stands upon substantially the same ground as the two deeds already considered. The bill of exceptions states that the plaintiffs offered in support of the competency of this deed the same evidence as was offered in support of the two last-mentioned deeds; that it was found at the same time and place, and produced from the same custody. In further support thereof the plaintiffs produced the clerk of the Mason county court, having with him Deed Book B, containing deeds recorded in the clerk's office of that court, beginning February 22, 1794, and the two or three years next ensuing, and offered to show that there was recorded in that book a deed identical in terms with the aforesaid original deed. They also offered and read in evidence a copy of the deed, duly certified from the clerk's office of the Mason county circuit court, with a copy of the certificate thereto appended showing that the original deed was recorded in the year 1794. It follows, from what we have said in relation to the admissibility of the other original deeds, that this one, also, should have been received in evidence, and that the circuit court erred in excluding it. * It results from the views we have expressed that the judgment of the circuit court of Kentucky must be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to grant a new trial. (B) Document Under Which Adverse Party Claims an Interest JACKSON ex dem. STEWART v. KINGSLEY. (Supreme Court of New York, 1819. 17 Johns. 158.) This was an action of ejectment, to recover lot No. 4 in McKey's patent, in the town of Worcester, in Otsego county, tried before Mr. Justice Platt, at the Otsego circuit, in 1818. At the trial, the plaintiff proved, that a notice had been duly served on the defendant's attorney, to produce, at the trial, a lease, in perpetuity, from James V. Romayne to the lessor of the plaintiff, or that parol evidence would be given of its contents. The defendant ac cordingly, produced a lease of the premises in question, dated the 15th of January, 1801, executed by Romayne and the lessor of the plaintiff, to the lessor of the plaintiff, his heirs and assigns for ever, paying an annual rent of $15. The defendant's counsel objected to the lease being read in evidence, without first proving the execution thereof by the subscribing witnesses, or in some other legal mode. It appeared, that the names of the subscribing witnesses had been torn off. The judge decided, that the deed coming out of the hands of the defendant, under these circumstances, no further evidence concerning it was necessary. The lease was, thereupon, read in evidence, and the lessor of the plaintiff proved, that some time after its execution, he went into possession of the premises, on which he lived several years, and that at the commencement of this suit, the defendant lived on the premises. The defendant after proving the handwriting of the lessor of the plaintiff, whose name was endorsed on the lease, offered to prove that, about ten years ago, Thomas Benton agreed to purchase of the lessor of the plaintiff, the premises in question for $750, and that Benton was to pay Romayne the rent then in arrear, and which should become due thereafter, and that, in pursuance of this contract, B. paid the lessor of the plaintiff the sum of $750, who, thereupon, endorsed his name on the lease, and delivered it to Benton, who immediately went into possession of the premises, and continued in possession until his death, leaving a wife and children; and the defendant, afterwards, married the widow, and lived with her on the premises, until the commencement of this suit. The evidence was objected to by the plaintiff's counsel, who stated that no rent had ever been paid by Kingsley or Benton, that K. was insolvent, and that the lessor of the plaintiff, the original lessee, was called upon for the rent. The judge rejected the evidence, and charged the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff; and the jury, accordingly, found a verdict for him. A motion was made to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial, which was submitted to the court without argument, on the above case, and the points and authorities stated thereon. SPENCER, C. J. In Betts v. Badger, 12 Johns. 223, 7 Am. Dec. 309, we laid down this rule, that if the party producing an instrument, on notice, is one of the parties to the instrument, the custody of the paper affords high presumptive evidence that he holds it as a muniment, and, prima facie, it is sufficient proof of the execution. The same rule was adopted by the Court of Common Pleas in England, in Pearce v. Hooper, 3 Taunt. 60. In that case the Chief Justice observed, "The mere possession of an instrument does not dispense with the necessity which lies on the party calling for it of producing the attesting witness." He puts the case of an heir at law being in possession of a will, and the devisee being an ejectment, and calls on the heir to produce the will; then the heir claiming against the will, it would be hard that it should be taken to be proved against him be cause he produced it. Phillips (346) says, the result appears to be, in-hour. The objection, that notice to quit ought to have been given, is untenable. The relation of landlord and tenant never existed between parties. Benton purchased the interest of the lessor of the plaintiff, as a lessee in the lease from Romayne. He was not to pay him any rent but was subject to pay the rent to Romayne. The lease was never assigned in such manner, as to vest Benton with the title, and consequently, the lessor of the plaintiff had the legal estate under the lease. As between them, it was an agreement to sell, and in such case notice to quit is unnecessary. Jackson ex dem. Whitbeck v. Deyo, 3 Johns. 422; Jackson ex dem. Phillips v. Aldrich, 13 Johns. 106. A new trial must be granted, with costs to abide the event, on the first point. New trial granted. Judgment, you все VII. Proof of Handwriting 14 1. IN GENERAL PEOPLE v. MOLINEUX. (Court of Appeals of New York, 1901. 168 N. Y. 261, 61 N. E. 286, See ante, p. 290, for a report of the case. KEITH v. LOTHROP. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1852. 10 Cush. 453.) Assumpsit upon a promissory note alleged to have been given by the defendant to the female plaintiff, while sole, then Lydia Shaw, dated June, 1846. The defendant filed the general issue, and for a specification of defence denied the signature. The trial was before Shaw, C. J., who reported the case for the consideration of the whole court, as follows: "There was evidence to show that the female plaintiff, then Lydia Shaw, resided in the family of the defendant about ten years, from 1835 to 1845, in the earlier part of the time, keeping a public summer school; that she sometimes did writing for him; that in 1845. or early in 1846, she went home to her father's. This note was dated in June following. "The case, as opened on the part of the plaintiff, was this: That when this girl was fifteen or sixteen years old, Lothrop requested of her parents that she might be permitted to reside in his family; that she did go, and was employed as a teacher of his children, and in doing writing; that she stayed till about 1845; that after her return, some attempt was made to settle for her services, but no settlement was made; that afterwards a letter was received by her from Mr. Lothrop, inclosing this note for $2,500; and that after her marriage, which was in 1849, this action was brought. The plaintiffs then gave. in evidence, both the note and the alleged letter, and called witnesses to establish their genuineness, by proof of the handwriting; this evidence was general as to the handwriting both of the signature and body of the note. There was evidence tending to show that the body of the note and the signature were in the same hand. I considered it competent for the plaintiffs to give evidence of the genuineness both of the body and of the signature of the note, especially as no exception 14 For a discussion of principles, see McKelvey on Evidence (3d Ed.) §§ 296297, 301. was made, because, if the body of the note was in the true handwriting of the defendant it was competent evidence tending to show that the signature was also genuine. Afterwards, when the defendant offered evidence to prove that the body of the note was not in the handwriting of the defendant the question was asked by the plaintiffs' counsel, whether the inquiry should not be confined to the question of the genuineness of the signature. I remarked that as the plaintiff had opened the inquiry as to the question whether the body of the not, as well as the signature, was the genuine handwriting of the defendant, I supposed the defendant had a right to extend the inquiry to the same question. I however, instructed the jury, that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs, in order to recover, to prove that the body of the note was in the genuine handwriting of the defendant; it would be quite sufficient to prove the genuineness of the signature and the other question was only of importance as it bore on this. "Another exception, taken by the plaintiffs, was as follows: The defendant offered George G. Smith as a witness, in the character of an expert who had no personal knowledge of the defendant's handwriting, and who gave his opinion, derived from a comparison with acknowledged or proved specimens of his genuine hand, and also from internal evidence, that it was not the genuine handwriting of the defendant; that it was a simulated, stiff, and imitative hand, and not a free and natural one. Being asked the grounds and reasons of his opinion, it was objected to by the plaintiffs, on the ground that the opinion, itself, and not the reasons and ground of it, was the only competent evidence on the direct examination; but as the evidence went beyond an opinion formed upon comparison, it was ruled that the witness might be examined, and point out to the jury, those facts and appearances upon the note, which tended to show that it was a simulated and artificial hand, and not the genuine hand of the defend ant. "The defendant called James D. Albro as a witness, who stated that he had had business with the defendant and seen him write, and could form an opinion of his handwriting. The evidence of opinion was objected to, because it appeared from the witness that his knowledge of the defendant's handwriting was acquired after the time that the note in question purported to be given. It was ruled, that this objection went to the weight and effect of the testimony and not to its competency, and it was admitted. "Another exception was taken by the plaintiffs which requires a preliminary statement. The relations and conduct of the female plaintiff, whilst she resided in the family of the defendant, and after she left it, previously to her marriage, was a subject of inquiry before the jury; evidence was offered tending to show that she had declared, whilst in the family of the defendant, that she could imitate his handwriting so that he would not know it himself; also, that she had kept this note almost secret and did not show it to her father |