Opinion of the Court "approved" form is meant a form prescribed by the Comptroller of the Treasury with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury under authority of the Dockery Act. See 28 Stat. 206, sec. 5. This form required the stating of the claims in separate columns under the following headings: "Date," "No. of transportation request," "From," "To," "Total distance," "Miles of land-grant road," "No. of men," 46 Rate per man," "Gross amount," "Amount to be deducted on account of land grant," and "Amount claimed." A certificate followed stating among other things that "the above account is correct and just," to be signed by the transportation company by some proper representative, and upon the form was the following instruction: "Certification and bill to be completely filled in by payee or before signature by payee, without alteration or erasure thereafter." See 14 Comp. Dec. 977. The use of this and other forms relating to Government transportation was specifically prescribed by Department Circular No. 62, dated October 29, 1907, issued by the Comptroller of the Treasury with the approval of the Secretary. 14 Comp. Dec. 967. This form was slightly changed, principally in its "makeup," on two occasions subsequent to the promulgation of the form set out in 14 Comp., but the essential requirements above stated were all retained and appeared in all landgrant voucher forms prescribed for use from 14 Comp. to and throughout the period here involved. At the same time that this voucher form for transportation of passengers subject to land-grant deduction was prescribed appropriate forms were also prescribed for vouchering transportation not subject to land grant. From them the columns headed "Miles of land-grant road," "Gross amount," and "Amount to be deducted on account of land grant" were omitted. (See circular above referred to and Form No. 8 on page 980, same volume.) These and other prescribed voucher forms were available to the railroad. companies in such quantities as they might desire, and it was therefore the option of a railroad company, in the first instance, to state its claim on such form as it might deem appropriate thereto. Opinion of the Court For the first of these periods beginning March 1, 1912, all bills involving land grant to the amount of $39,253.54 were thus presented and paid as presented and there was no other action with reference thereto except that upon one bill for transportation in September, 1913, involving land grant to the amount of $294.06, there was stamped what is now called the short form of protest, viz, "Amounts claimed in this bill accepted under protest." Throughout this period, therefore, with the single exception stated, the effect of which, if any, we will hereafter consider, there was manifest no intention otherwise than to acquiesce in the then prevailing rule as to the status of these travelers and to claim for their transportation land-grant rates only, and we may reasonably presume that this had been the attitude of plaintiff for some time preceding this period, for the rulings as to the status of these persons had considerably antedated it except as to discharged soldiers, who were not furnished Government transportation until after the passage of the act of August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 576, but had theretofore received travel pay, and there is no indication that the fixing of March 1, 1912, as the beginning of this period indicated any change of policy or anything other than that it was the utmost limit to which the period of six years before the commencement of this suit on March 1, 1918, would reach. As to this period, it is sufficient to say that recovery is precluded under the authority of Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. United States, 52 C. Cls. 468, and Oregon-Washington R. R. & Nav. Co. v. United States, 54 C. Cls. 131; affirmed 255 U. S. 339. With the second period here involved, commencing January 1, 1914, began a practice of typing, or for the most part stamping on the vouchers, rendered and certified as heretofore stated, a form of "protest," although all vouchers were not so "protested." And it is the alleged practice of the plaintiff with reference to the protesting of vouchers which divides the case into the three periods, a different practice prevailing in each period to such an extent as to justify the separation, although there was not complete uniformity. The first period is therefore treated as a period of no protest, which is true as to all of that period with the single ex Opinion of the Court ception noted; the second period is the period during which the prevailing practice was to stamp on the vouchers the short-form" protest; and the third period is one during which, upon most vouchers, the "long form " of protest was used. The use of the word " protest " is for convenience and in line with plaintiff's presentment of its case without intention thereby to commit ourselves as to the legal effect of the words used under the circumstances. During the second period, from January 1, 1914, to October 1, 1914, there were 508 bills involving a total land grant of $71,560.92, of which 201 involving $24,176.62 of land grant bore the short form of protest, 4 involving $843.96 of land grant bore the long form of protest, and 303 involving $46,540.34 of land grant bore no protest. Thus of 508 bills involving $71,560.92 of land grant, 201 thereof involving $24,176.62 of land grant had stamped on them before presentment the words, "Amounts claimed in this bill accepted under protest," and, eliminating from the discussion for the present the few cases in which another form was used and which must be the subject of discussion as to the third period, we must consider the legal effect of this procedure. It is contended that when plaintiff began in January, 1914, the practice "of noting on its bills its formal protest against a settlement at land-grant fares" and continued the practice with some degree of regularity, although it appears that it "protested" less than half its bills, it put the accounting officers on notice that it was claiming full tariff fares for all such transportation and was rendering its bills and accepting payment at land-grant fares under protest and as part payment only. If its practice determines its policy it is for consideration that in a majority of cases its bills bore no protest. The striking feature of this situation is that the plaintiff puts itself in the position of rendering a bill for a stated amount, found under the heading "Amount claimed," arrived at by the application of correct mathematics to previously stated amounts, certifying that the amount is correct and just, and then stamping on the voucher before presentment a statement that the "amount claimed," necessarily Opinion of the Court by it, and shown by its certification to be correct, is accepted under protest. We are conversant with the argument that disbursing officers, under rulings of the comptroller, could pay no more, and that it was useless to present to them a claim for more, but we have fully pointed out in the Baltimore & Ohio and Oregon-Washington cases, supra, the methods of procedure open to claimants if they desired in fact to present their claims upon a different basis. And it may be said that railroad companies and their officers and attorneys were very familiar with all these methods. Such a conclusion must follow from the extent and frequency of their claims, necessitating resort to established settlement methods, and, indeed, familiarity with the accounting system appears from the testimony of plaintiff's attorney in this case. Any other conclusion would no doubt be regarded as a reflection on his long experience and competent service in the interest of railroad claimants. But, notwithstanding the availability of this other and better procedure, if a claimant desired in fact to assert a right to something more than it could obtain at the hands of a disbursing officer, we need not now determine whether it could not preserve a right by a proper protest, since that question will naturally be for later consideration in its application to any form of protest. As to the procedure now under consideration, we do hold that such a socalled protest was not in fact an effective protest, if there could be one, and under the circumstances could avail the plaintiff nothing. We frequently encounter the apparent belief that a "protest" is "something to conjure with" under almost any circumstances; that it wipes out the disastrous results of any course of conduct; and that it creates as well as preserves rights. Equally is it sometimes the view that whatever its form or applicability it is only necessary to label it a "protest" and it is a protest. And these observations are not at all antagonistic to the idea that there may in fact be protests, rightly so called, and that they may at times be very efficacious in the accomplishment of their intended purpose, but suggest rather the necessity of determining whether a so-called "protest" is in fact and in legal effect a protest, Opinion of the Court and whether, under the circumstances, it accomplishes anything as affecting the rights of the protestor. In one of our early cases, Hildeburn v. United States, 13 C. Cls., 62, 70, a protest was characterized as "so much waste paper," and in numerous cases they have been held ineffective for any purpose. } We find no established rule with reference to any particular form of protest in general, and this quite naturally so since the circumstances of each case must largely determine the applicable form, although in some cases in which protests are provided for by statute particularity is required as, for example, in the matter of protests as to customs duties when the requirement is that it shall set forth "distinctly and specifically and in respect to each entry or payment the reasons for his objections thereto," while in other cases wherein the action taken is of such specific character that there is but one possible subject matter for protest the requirement only is that there shall be protest, which by necessary implication addresses itself to but the one matter, and that the action of a party other than the protestor. To us it seems but reasonable to hold that if the transaction itself does not so define the situation that a protest in general terms can have but one application, and that an application entirely consistent with the relations of both parties to the transaction, then a protest must so specifically state its subject matter and the respect in which action had is objected to that its purpose may clearly appear on its face. We know now, in our consideration of this case, that plaintiff's contention is that the transportation in question was not subject to land-grant deduction, but the short form of protest used presented no question of land grant to the disbursing officer any more than it presented any one of the several other questions which might be involved in data stated in the voucher. So far as appears it might have been a question as to the number of men, the mileage traveled, the correct land-grant mileage, or the gross rate as well as the applicability of land-grant rates. It is true that we were requested to find as a fact that the plaintiff's procedure after January 1, 1914, put the account |