Ewart v. Village of Western Springs comply with this specification if it did not cause a loss of over 5 per cent. We forbear to discuss the objections thus made to the descriptions of the wires, poles, and insulators any further. We are of the opinion that the descriptions were not defective as not being sufficiently specific. 3. It is further contended by the appellants that, when the county court annulled the first assessment on account of the disqualification of one of the commissioners, it put an end to the entire proceeding, and that, when the new commissioners presented the new assessment roll, it was necessary for the village to file a AssessmentsDisqualification of Commissioner -Petitions. new petition, and give new notices, as was done when the original assessment roll was reported. In making this objection, counsel applies section 46 of article 9 of the city and village act to the present case. Section 46 provides that, "if any assessment shall be annulled by the city council or board of trustees, or set aside by any court, a new assessment may be made and returned, and like notice given and proceedings had, as herein required in relation to the first; and all parties in interest shall have the like rights, and the city council, or board of trustees, and court, shall perform like duties, and have like power in relation to any subsequent assessment, as are hereby given in relation to the first assessment." 1 Starr & C. Ann. St. (2d Ed.) p. 775. Section 46 has reference to such assessments as have been set aside by the legislative authority of the city. of the city or village, or by some court, after they have once become in fact assess ments by the order of the county court. The setting aside mentioned in section 46 is one which takes place subsequently to the confirmation of the assessment. Here, however, the action of the court was taken under and in pursuance of section 33 of said article 9. 1 Starr & C. Ann. St. (2d Ed.) p. 768. Section 33 provides that "the court, before which any such proceeding may be pending, shall have authority, at any time before final judgment, to modify, alter, change, annul or confirm any assessment returned, as afore Ewart v. Village of Western Springs said, or cause any such assessment to be re-cast by the same commissioners whenever it shall be necessary for the attainment of justice, or may appoint other commissioners in the place of all or any of the commissioners first appointed, for the purpose of making such assessment, or modifying, altering, changing or re-casting the same, and may take all such proceedings and make all such orders as may be necessary to make a true and just assessment of the cost of such improvement according to the principles of this act, and may from time to time, as may be necessary, continue the application for that purpose as to the whole or any part of the premises." Section 33 authorizes the court to annul an assessment which is returned. The court here annulled the assessment then before it on account of the disqualification of one of the commissioners, and ordered new commissioners to be appointed to prepare an assessment, which should be made in the manner prescribed by law. Although the assessment was changed, yet the proceeding was the same. The proceeding does not consist merely of the assessment roll itself, but the assessment roll is merely a part of the suit, begun by the petition, which is filed to secure from the county court an assessment in the manner prescribed by law. Although section 33 authorizes the court to modify, alter, change, or annul the assessment, or cause it to be recast by the same commissioners, or to appoint other commissioners for the purpose of making a new assessment, yet the proceeding, begun by the filing of the petition, is not thereby ended. The assessment roll is merely changed under the order of the court, and, when it is again reported, the court acts upon the new assessment without the necessity of causing a new petition to be filed and a new proceeding to be instituted. Where an assessment is set aside, as was done here, not on account of a defective ordinance, but on account of a disqualified commissioner, it is not necessary to file a new petition. The ordinance remains unrepealed and unchanged, and the difficulty lies only in the fact that one of the commissioners is. MC CAS-40 Ewart v. Village of Western Springs technically disqualified to act. Section 33 expressly provides that the application may be continued from time to time, as may be necessary. The case here was still continued in court after the order for the appointment of the new commissioners. Therefore the law as it stood when the petition was filed in June, 1897, and not the law of 1897, which went into effect on July 1, 1897, was applicable to the proceedings subsequently taken. Same-Report of Statutory 4. It is further claimed by the appellants that the board of trustees of the village of Western Springs did not approve the report of the commissioners appointed to estimate the cost of the improvement. We do not think that there Commissioners is any force in this objection. Counsel for the Requirement. village introduced a certified copy of a part of the minutes of a meeting of the board of trustees of the village, held on June 18, 1897; and these minutes show that the report of the commissioners, appointed on June 8, 1897, to make an estimate of the cost of constructing an electric light system in the village, was read and accepted, and that the village attorney was, on motion of the trustees, instructed to take the ordinance into court as soon as possible. The word "accepted" must here be regarded as equivalent to the word "approved," because the board ordered court proceedings to be instituted, and this would not have been done, unless the report of the commissioners was approved. Section 21 of article 9 provides that, "on such report being made, and approved by the council or board of trustees, as the case may be, it may order a petition to be filed by such officer as it shall direct in the county court of its county for proceedings to assess the cost of such improvement in the manner provided in this act." 1 Starr & C. Ann. St. (2d Ed.) p. 757. It will be presumed that the board of trustees did their duty, in accordance with the law, until the contrary is shown; and, having ordered that court proceedings be instituted, it will be presumed that the report of the commissioners was approved. Ewart v. Village of Western Springs Objections to It is said, however, that the certificate of the village clerk to the extract from the minutes, as well as the certificate attached to the ordinance introduced in evidence, was defect ive. The village clerk certifies, in his certificate, "that the foregoing is a true and correct extract of a part of the minutes of a meeting of the board of trustees of the village of Western Springs, Ill., held June 18, 1897." To this certificate is attached the corporate seal of the village. Section 10 of article 6 of the city and village act provides that "the clerk shall keep the corporate seal, to be provided under the direction of the city. council or board of trustees, and all papers belonging to the city or village; he shall attend all meetings of the city council or board of trustees, and keep a full record of its proceed ings in the journal; and copies of all papers duly filed in his office, and transcripts from the journals and other records and files in his office, certified by him under the corporate seal, shall be evidence in all courts in like manner as if the originals were produced." 1 Starr & C. Ann. St. (2d Ed.) p. 724. The certificate of the village clerk in the case at bar conforms to the requirements of section 10. Counsel for appellants, however, refer to sections 14 and 16 of chapter 51 of the Revised Statutes, entitled "Evidence." Said section 16 provides that "the certificate of any such clerk of a court, city, village, town, county, or secretary, clerk, cashier, or other keeper of any such papers, entries, records or ordinances, shall contain a statement that such person is the keeper of the same, and if there is no seal, shall so state." 2 Starr & C. Ann. St. (2d Ed.) p. 1846. The objection made to the present certificate is that it does not state that the clerk is the keeper of the records of the village, as seems to be required by said section 16. We do not wish to be understood as passing any opinion upon the question whether or not the certificate in the present case is defective in the respect thus indicated. It is sufficient to say that when, upon the trial below, the certified copy of the Note extract from the minutes of the board of trustees and the certified copy of the ordinance were introduced, the objection made thereto by counsel for appellants was general in its character. Such objection did not state in what respect the certificate was regarded as defective. If the objection had specified the absence of a statement in the certificate that the clerk was the keeper of the records of the village, the defect might have been remedied by the obtaining of a new certifi cate from the clerk. An objection of this character to the introduction of the certified copy of a document is too general, as it fails to point out the specific defect insisted upon. Payne v. Village of South Springfield, 161 Ill. 285, 44 N. E. 105. For this reason the court below committed no error in admitting the certified copies against the objection made by counsel for appellants. Some other objections are urged upon our attention by appellants, but they are of a mere technical character, and we do not deem it necessary to discuss them. After a careful examination of the record, we are of the opinion that the court below committed no error in overruling the objections. Accordingly the judgment of the county court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. PHILLIPS, J., dissents. NOTE. Lighting Streets-Local Assessments.-Though it is not usual to assess the property benefited with the cost of lighting the streets, it seems that it may be done. Jonas v. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio 318. |