Art. 1. Civil Rights.

Certain rights of person and property are protected by both the Federal and State Constitutions. The amendments to the Federal Constitution, known as the Bill of Rights, follow article VII of the Constitution as originally adopted, and provide, among other things, that no law shall be passed interfering with religious liberty or abridging the freedom of speech or press; the right of the people to assemble and petition; protecting the people against unreasonable searches and seizures; prohibiting excess of bail, etc. Article I of the State Constitution prohibits disfranchising of any citizen unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers; prescribes that trial by jury shall remain inviolate forever; provides for the free exercise and enjoyment of religious liberty, and prohibits the suspension of habeas corpus and infliction of excessive fines; also protects the freedom of the press, right to assemble and petition, etc., and provides that private property shall not be taken without due process of law.

There are certain natural rights enforced in the Constitution by prohibitions against interference with them; such as the right to one's own religious opinions and to a public expression of them, or, as sometimes said, to worship God according to the dictates of one's own conscience; right to personal liberty and individual property; to freedom of speech and of the press; to free access to courts of justice; to due process of law, and to an equal protection of the law; to immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as cruel and unusual punishments; and to such other immunities as are indispensable to a free government. Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (282).

The following propositions are firmly established and recognized: A person living under our Constitution has the right to adopt and follow such lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he may see fit. The term "liberty," as used in the Constitution, is not dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen as by incarceration, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. Liberty, in its broad sense, as understood in this country, means not only the right of freedom from servitude, imprisonment, or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his liveli

Art. 2. Privileges and Immunities of Citizens.

hood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation. People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389 (398), citing Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (106); Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377.

While the police power of the State is so broad that no court has sought to define accurately its extent, still it is subject to recognized limitations. In the interest of public health, of public morals, and of public order, a State may restrain and forbid what would otherwise be the right of a private citizen. It may enact laws to regulate the extent of the labor which women and children, or persons of immature years shall be allowed to perform and prohibit altogether their employment in dangerous occupations. It may limit the hours of employment of adults in unhealthy work, but while it is generally for the legislature to determine what laws and regulations are needed to protect the public health and serve the public comfort and safety, such measures must have some relation to these ends. People v. Orange County Road Construction Co., 175 N. Y. 84.

A consideration of the authorities interpreting and construing these provisions of the Constitution belongs to the domain of constitutional law. Attention is called to the subject here for the reason that any interference with the rights guaranteed by the Federal or State Constitution is a wrongful act, which may, in a proper case, be prevented by a court of equity, or for which damages as for a wrong may be recovered in a court of law. Some of the more important authorities relating to interference with civil. and political rights are cited rather by way of illustration, and as indicating a remedy to be pursued, than with a view to any exhaustive treatment of the subject.

ARTICLE II.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS.

It is provided by section 2, article 4 of the Federal Constitution, that "citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."

In Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (75), Miller, J., cites with approval from Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, which he characterizes as the leading case on the subject, as fol

Art. 2. Privileges and Immunities of Citizens.

lows: "The inquiry is, 'What are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States?' We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may all, however, be comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may prescribe for the general good of the whole."

Justice Miller further cites Ward v. State of Maryland, 12 Wall. 430, and Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 180.

In McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, Chief Justice Waite again cites Corfield v. Coryell, together with Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 580, in which the privileges and immunities of the citizen, as referred to in the Constitution, are described to be such " as belonged to general citizenship;" but adds that usually the courts have manifested the disposition which the Supreme Court did, in Connor v. Elliott, 18 How. 593, not to attempt to define the words, but rather to leave their meaning to be determined in each case upon a view of the particular rights asserted, reviewed, or denied therein.

This is followed by a holding that this provision of the Constitution does not vest the citizens of one State with any interest in the common property of the citizens of another State. And in Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, it is held that this clause of the Constitution does not give nonresident citizens of a State any greater privileges and immunities in that State than her own citizens enjoy.

In Warner v. Jaffray, 30 Hun, 326 (330), it is said that a holding which will secure to the judicial proceedings of one State in all the others the same uniform validity and authority which they may have acquired under the laws of the State in which they are pending, will be in accordance with the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article 4 of the Federal Constitution.

The distinction made between residents and nonresidents by

Art. 3. Due Process of Law.

section 1780 of the Code is not repugnant to this provision of the Federal Constitution. Robinson v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 112 N. Y. 315. But corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the clause in the Constitution declaring that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of several States. Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181.

ARTICLE III.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

It is provided by article 5, amendments to the Federal Constitution, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Article 1, section 1 of the State Constitution provides that no member of the State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers."

It is said in People ex rel. Witherbee v. Supervisors, 70 N. Y. 228 (234), opinion Folger, J., that the meaning of the words "the law of the land" is not materially different in meaning from the phrase "due process of law." In the same opinion it is said that "due process of law requires that a party shall be properly brought into court, and that he shall have an opportunity when there to prove any fact which, according to the Constitution and the usages of the common law, would be a protection to him or his property."

In Happy v. Mosher, 48 N. Y. 313, it is held that this provision does not require a legal proceeding according to the course of the common law, nor must there be personal notice to the party whose property is in question. It is sufficient if a kind of notice is provided by which it is reasonably probable that the party proceeded against will be apprised of what is going on and an opportunity offered to him to defend. The opportunity to defend must not be colorable and illusory, but it matters not, though it may be difficult, so long as it is not impracticable.

In Ward v. Boyce, 152 N. Y. 191 (195), the court holds, per O'Brien, J., "A party cannot be deprived of property without due process of law, and that term, in its application to judicial proceedings, means a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established by our jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. If the

Art. 4. Political Rights.

proceedings involve the determination of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within the jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or voluntary appearance. If it be a proceeding in rem the res must have been seized or attached, or at least must be within the jurisdiction." Citing numerous authorities from this State and in the Federal courts.

means a course

"of legal pro

The words "due of law process ceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its Constitutionthat is, by the law of its creation to pass upon the subjectmatter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (733), cited and followed in Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34 (46).

Legislation is not open to the charge of depriving one of his rights without due process of law, if it be general in its operation upon the subjects to which it relates, and is enforceable in the usual modes established in the administration of government with respect to kindred matters; that is, by process or proceedings adapted to the nature of the case. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, distinguishing Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333.

A very complete monograph on this point will be found in address by Chief Judge Parker before the Georgia Bar Association, July, 1903, on "Due Process of Law."

ARTICLE IV.

POLITICAL RIGHTS.

"Political rights" Judge Cooley defines as "the privilege of participation in the government which is conferred as an act of sovereignty on those whose "articipation is supposed to be most beneficial to the State."

Political rights are said to be distinguished from civil rights. It is said that the right of suffrage was not necessarily one of the privileges or immunities of citizenship before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that amendment does not add to these privileges and immunities.