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EX PARTE LAGAN.

Decided December 10, 1910.

162 O. G., 538.

1. CLAIMS-PROLIXITY.

A claim may be so prolix as not to comply with the requirements of the statute that an applicant "shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the particular improvement or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery."

2. SAME-SAME.

Claims should not be allowed merely because they represent a multitude of elements all of which do not appear in one or two or even more refer

ences.

ON PETITION.

HOSE-WRENCH.

Messrs. Woodward & Chandlee for the applicant.

TENNANT, Assistant Commissioner:

This is a petition that the action of the Examiner finally rejecting the claim presented in this application be set aside as being premature.

I have carefully considered the record of the case and find no error in the action of the Examiner. The finally-rejected claim is twentythree typewritten lines in length and appears to be a complete inventory of all the elements contained in applicant's device. The applicant's device is simple in character, and it does not appear that there was any necessity for applying the references more specifically than was done in the Office letters of February 12 and April 5, 1910.

Objection is made by the Examiner to the prolixity of the claim. Claims of the character presented herein do not comply with the provisions of section 4888, Revised Statutes, which requires that an applicant

shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the particular improvement or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.

If an applicant has made an invention, the claim for such invention should comply with the requirements of the statutes and should not be encumbered by unessential elements.

Claims should not be allowed merely because they represent a multitude of elements all of which do not appear in one or two or even more references. A claim similar to that under consideration, which was presented in the early history of the Patent Office, was criticised by Commissioner Fisher in the following term:

This is a remarkable claim. It is for a combination consisting of no less than fifteen essential elements, the absence of any one of which would destroy

it, and any fourteen of which might be used with impunity. It contains an inventory of every minute detail of the apparatus. It is difficult to see how it could have been made more specific, unless it had included, as an additional element, the solder by which the parts are put together.

It is scarcely necessary to say that no combination precisely similar is to be found in the Office. The fifteen elements here united were never united before, and probably never will be again. The applicant himself, in the next machine which he constructs, will doubtless omit one or more of them, and so destroy his combination and avoid his own patent. (Ex parte Lawrence, C. D., 1869, 83.) The petition is denied.

CALIFORNIA FRUIT CANNERS ASSOCIATION v. FOSTER, CALDARERA & COMPANY.

Decided December 29, 1910.

162 O. G., 539.

1. TRADE-MARKS-INTERFERENCE-"ARKOMA "-"ARMONA."

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Held that an interference in fact exists between the words "Arkoma and "Armona used as trade-marks for goods of the same descriptive properties.

2. SAME-SAME-MOTION TO DISSOLVE-PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF Goods. The fact that in C.'s application for registration of a trade-mark the particular description of the goods is given as "canned fruits and canned vegetables." Held to constitute no ground for dissolving an interference between this application and an application for the registration of a trademark for " flavoring extracts and canned tomatoes," especially as the labels filed by C. show that the mark was used on "canned tomatoes." 3. SAME-SAME-SAME-QUESTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTER OF MARK IMREGISTRATION IS SOUGHT UNDER "TEN-YEARS

MATERIAL
CLAUSE.

WHERE

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Where one of the applications involved in an interference is presented under the " ten-years" clause of the Trade-Mark Act, the question of whether it is geographical in significance is immaterial to the proper determination of a motion to dissolve the interference.

ON APPEAL.

TRADE-MARK FOR CANNED FRUITS AND VEGETABLES.

Mr. W. R. Stone for California Fruit Canners Association.
Mr. F. W. Ritter, Jr., for Foster, Caldarera & Company.

TENNANT, Assistant Commissioner:

This is an appeal by Foster, Caldarera & Company from the decision of the Examiner of Trade-Marks denying a motion by them for the dissolution of the above-entitled interference.

The trade-marks involved in this interference include the application of the California Fruit Canners Association for registration of the word "Armona " as a trade-mark for canned fruits and canned 2097-12- -3

vegetables, the trade-mark of Foster, Caldarera & Company, registered July 27, 1909, No. 74,609, consisting of the word “Arkoma,” for flavoring extracts and canned tomatoes, and an application of Foster, Caldarera & Company for the registration of the same word for canned pork and beans, salmon, corn, hominy, and peaches.

The assignments of error upon this appeal are briefly that the Examiner erred in holding that the words "Arkoma" and "Armona " are so nearly identical as to be likely to cause confusion in the mind of the public; that the Examiner erred in holding that the statement of the particular description of goods of the California Fruit Canners Association-namely, "canned fruits and canned vegetables is such a particular description of goods as is required by section 1 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905; that the Examiner erred in holding that registration of the word "Armona " is not prohibited by section 5 of the act of 1905, it being the name of a post-office and town in Kings county, Cal.

As to the first allegation of error, I am of the opinion that no sufficient ground exists for reversing the Examiner's decision. The words "Arkoma " and "Armona" are quite similar in appearance and sound, and in the absence of any other evidence than the marks themselves it is believed that the interference should not be dissolved. The contention that the terms "canned fruits" and "canned vegetables" do not sufficiently define the particular description of goods within the meaning of section 1 of the Trade-Mark Act of February, 1905, is immaterial to the controversy, since it appears that the specimens filed by the California Fruit Canners Association as illustrating the manner in which the mark is used upon the merchandise, and which form part of the application for registration, bear inscriptions indicating that these labels are used upon tomatoes and peaches, which are among the goods to which the trade-mark "Arkoma " claimed in the Foster, Caldarera & Company registration and application, respectively, is said to be applied.

Finally, the holding of the Examiner that the question whether "Armona" is merely geographical in significance is not material to the determination of this interference is clearly right. The application of the California Fruit Canners Association is presented under the ten-year proviso of the Trade-Mark Act of February 20, 1905, and the question whether this mark is barred by reason of its use by others in that period is one which may be determined in this interference proceeding.

I find no error in the decision of the Examiner of Trade-Marks, and it is accordingly affirmed.

1. TITLE OF INVENTION.

EX PARTE MACKINTOSH.

Decided January 7, 1911.

162 O. G., 783.

Under the ruling in ex parte Becker (C. D., 1893, 95; 64 O. G., 559) an applicant should be allowed within reasonable limits to name the title of the invention.

2. SAME.

Where the claims were directed to the bearings and mode of connecting the driving device of a centrifugal machine, Held that the title "Centrifugal machines" did not correctly indicate the nature and design of the invention, as required by section 4884, Revised Statutes.

ON PETITION.

CENTRIFUGAL MACHINE.

Mr. Edward D. Mackintosh pro se.

MOORE, Commissioner:

This is a petition from the requirement of the Examiner that the title of the invention be changed from "Centrifugal machines" to "Bearings for centrifugal machines" or like expression.

As pointed out by the Examiner, where the claims relate to the construction of the basket of the centrifugal machines or the methods and devices for feeding liquid thereto the case is classified under "Centrifugal Machines" in Division VI. Where, however, the claims are directed to the bearings and mode of connecting the driving device and the basket is only included generally, the case is classified in "Journal-Boxes," Division XII. This application was originally examined in Division VI, where a requirement for division and restriction of the claims was made. As a result of applicant's compliance with this requirement, the case was transferred to Division XII.

The object of the invention, as stated in the specification, isthe supporting and driving of single-shaft centrifugal machines— and the claims allowed in the case are directed to this structure. The criticism of the Examiner that the present title does not correctly indicate the nature and design of the invention, as required by section 4884, Revised statutes, is well taken. Under the ruling in ex parte Becker (C. D., 1893, 95; 64 O. G., 559) the applicant should be allowed within reasonable limits to name the title of the invention. In the present case it is noted that the Examiner has not attempted to arbitrarily fix the title, but requires that it be changed to "Bearings for centrifugal machines" or a like expression. If applicant has any well-grounded objection to the title "Bearings for centrifugal machines," he may suggest such a variation thereof as will come within the requirement of the Examiner.

The petition is denied.

EX PARTE GILMAN.

Decided January 6, 1911.

162 O. G., 783.

1. PROSECUTION OF APPLICATION-RESPONSIVE AMENDMENT.

Where in response to an action rejecting two claims on a patent to L. and other claims as stating aggregations of features shown in certain prior patents, one of which was the patent to L., the applicant within the year filed a slight amendment and a more or less extended argument discussing the pertinency of the patent to L. and contrasting what was shown therein with what was shown in the application, but not specifically referring to the two claims rejected on the patent to L., Held that the amendment was responsive.

2. SAME-SAME.

"The fact that an argument is not a convincing one should never be urged in support of an objection that the action containing that argument was not responsive, except possibly in some extreme case where the argument on its face is directed to a discussion of subject-matter which is entirely beside the case."

ON PETITION.

LUBRICATING DEVICE FOR PNEUMATIC TOOLS.

Messrs. Emery & Booth for the applicant.

BILLINGS, First Assistant Commissioner:

This is a petition from the action of the Examiner holding the above-entitled application to be abandoned for lack of proper prosecution.

It appears that the Examiner on November 4, 1909, rejected all the claims on certain references specifically cited and also rejected some of the claims on the ground that they covered mere aggregations. In this letter of rejection claims 9 and 10 were rejected on the patent to Lunken alone, which patent had been cited in connection with other patents as anticipating all the other claims in the case.

On October 3, 1910, the applicant responded by filing a slight amendment and a more or less extended argument. At the beginning of the argument it was stated:

In accordance with oral interview recently had with the Principal Examiner in charge, reconsideration is requested for the rejection upon the ground of aggregation which ground of rejection as we understand it, applies to all claims excepting the 9th and 10th.

On November 14, 1910, the Examiner stated that

applicant's argument appears to be directed to claims 1 to 8, inclusive, and to claim 9. No action is made as to claims 9 and 10,

and held that the application was therefore abandoned for failure to make responsive action. It is to be noted, however, that in the

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