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4. STATUTORY GROUNDS.—Where a patent for a process was adjudged invalid for lack of patentable invention in that the process was not new, but the claim was merely for the function of a machine to do what had previously been done by hand, the case was not one of insufficiency, overstating, inadvertence, accident, or mistake, which would entitle the patentee, under the provisions of section 4916, Revised Statutes, to a reissue, with a claim to the machine. (d) Penn Electrical & Mfg. Co. v. Conroy, 492.

5. QUESTION OF INTERVENING RIGHTS NOT CONSIDERED.-Held that in an interference involving a reissue application the question whether such intervening rights exist as will constitute a ground for refusing the reissue will not be considered, (citing Norling v. Hayes, ante, 347; 166 O. G., 1282). (*) Frost v. Chase, 409.

6. VALIDITY.-Authority to grant reissue patents is derived exclusively from Revised Statutes, section 4916, (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 3393,) and the Commissioner goes beyond his jurisdiction if he grants a reissue for an invention other than the one disclosed and described in the original patent, which by reason of inadvertence, accident, or mistake is inoperative to secure the monopoly it shows on its face was intended to be secured. (4) Moneyweight Scale Co. v. Toledo Computing Scale Co., 504.

7. INADVERTENCE.-The inadvertence of the solicitors of an applicant for a patent is his inadvertence, and, on the other hand, their erroneous judgment in submitting to the rejection of claims is his erroneous judgment, and he is estopped from presenting any of such rejected claims in an application for a reissue. (d) Id.

8. SAME. Where none of the original claims presented by an applicant for a patent was adequate to cover the invention disclosed by the specification and drawings, acquiescence in the rejection of such claims is not an abandonment of the invention as an entirety, and the failure of his solicitors to submit adequate claims is an inadvertence which may entitle the applicant to a reissue. (d) Id.

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9. AUTHORITY TO GRANT-" SPECIFICATION DEFINED.-In Revised Statutes, section 4916, (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 3393,) authorizing the issuance of a reissue patent where the original is inoperative or invalid "by reason of a defective or insufficient specification," the word "specification," by settled construction, may include the claims as well as the technical specifications preceding them. (d) McDowell v. Ideal Concrete Mach. Co., 514.

10. SAME. The Commissioner of Patents is without jurisdiction to grant a reissue in lieu of an original patent unaltered save by the addition of enlarging claims and where the original described and illustrated by its drawings an operative machine which was fully covered and protected by its claims. (d) Id.

REJECTION OF CLAIMS. See Abandonment of Applications, 2; Construction of Claims, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14; Construction of Specifications and Patents, 1; Examination of Applications, 1, 2; Mandamus, 3; Patentability, 3, 6; Prosecution of Applications, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 23; Reissue, 7, 8; Reopening of Rejected Applications.

PROSECUTION-FOREIGN REFERENCE-NOT WITHDRAWN UPON MERE SUGGESTION THAT IT IS APPLICANT'S Patent.-Where an application was rejected on a foreign patent, Held that the Examiner properly refused to withdraw the patent as a reference in the absence of an affidavit by the applicant fully identifying it as his own or filed on his behalf with his knowledge and consent.-Ex parte Wlost, 57.

RENEWAL OF FORFEITED APPLICATIONS.

RENEWAL PERIOD CANNOT BE EXTENDED BY COMMISSIONER.-A forfeited application may, under the provisions of section 4897, be renewed at any time within two years from the date of the notice of allowance; but the Commissioner has no authority to extend that period. Ex parte Myers, 61. REOPENING OF DECIDED CASES. See Abandonment of Applications, 3; Interference, 4; Prosecution of Applications, 5; Trade-Marks, 70. REOPENING CASE AFTER APPEAL.-A case will not be reopened for amendment after a decision by the Examiners-in-Chief except for the consideration of matter not previously adjudicated, sufficient cause being shown. Rule 142. Ex parte Atwood, 18. REOPENING OF INTERFERENCE. REOPENING OF REJECTED APPLICATIONS. See Abandoned Applications,

See Interference, 3, 22.

5; Trade-Marks, 1.

RECOMMENDATION OF EXAMINERS-IN-CHIEF

ACTION BY PRIMARY EXAMINER.Where the Examiners-in-Chief recommended that certain claims be rejected upon new grounds stated by them, Held that the action of the Examiner in rejecting the claims upon the return of the case to him for the reasons stated in the decision of the Examiners-in-Chief was clearly a proper one, and since it was a new ground of rejection it reopened the case for further prosecution as to the subject-matter of rejected claims. Ex parte Luten, 101.

RES ADJUDICATA. See Applications, 3; Fraud, 1; Trade-Marks, 6, 7, 22.
RESPONSIVE ACTION BY APPLICANT. See Abandonment of Applications;
Division of Applications, 3; Examination of Applications, 1, 2: Prosecu-
tion of Applications, 1, 2, 3, 4, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23.
REVIEW OF EXAMINER'S ACTION. See Labels.
RIGHT OF APPEAL. See Interference, 22.
RIGHT TO MAKE CLAIMS.

See Amendments; Fees; Interference, 2, 6, 8, 15; Motion to Dissolve Interference, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8; Priority of Invention, 5, 7, 10; Public Use and Sale.

RULES OF PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE. HAVE FORCE OF LAW.-All rules of the Patent Office which are authorized by law have the force of law and control procedure in that Office. (*) Broadwell v. Long, 300.

SCOPE OF CLAIM. See Interference, 21; Prosecution of Applications, 9. SECOND APPLICATION. See Prosecution of Applications, 18, 24; Refundment of Fees.

See Amendments, 2, 3, 4.

SECOND INTERFERENCE.
SIMILARITY OF MARKS. See Trade-Marks, 1, 4, 11, 12, 20, 23, 24, 25, 28,
31, 36, 43, 49, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 78, 79, 83, 84, 92.
SPECIFIC CLAIMS. See Interference, 16.

SPECIFICATIONS. See Abandonment of Applications, 1; Applications, 3;
Construction of Claims, 7, 8, 16; Construction of Specifications and
Patents, 1; Examination of Applications, 2; Interference, 15, 17, 18;
Invention; Particular Patents, 1, 6, 9, 12; Patentability, 3, 4, 5, 7;
Prosecution of Applications, 7, 13; Reissue, 8, 9.

STATE OF THE ART.

See Construction of Claims, 3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20; Construction of Specifications and Patents, 1; Particular Patents, 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12; Patentability, 3, 4, 5, 7. STATUTORY BAR. See Interference, 11; Reissue, 4. STATUTORY IMMUNITY. See Construction of Statutes, 5. STRIKING TESTIMONY FROM THE RECORD. See Testimony, 5.

SUBSTITUTION OF MATERIAL.

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM. See Construction of Statutes, 3, 4, 5.
See Construction of Claims, 5, 6.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. See Testimony, 1, 2, 3.
SUITS FOR INFRINGEMENT OF TRADE-MARKS. See Trade-Marks, 22,
37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42.

SUITS IN FORMA PAUPERIS.

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS.-The act of Congress of June 25, 1910, allowing the prosecution or defense of suits or actions in the courts of the United States and appeals to the circuit court of appeals and to the Supreme Court of the United States in forma pauperis upon certain conditions therein prescribed is not applicable to appeals from the decisions of the Commissioner of Patents to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, since such an appeal is not in a suit or action and the Patent Office is not a court of the United States. (*) In re Meta Mattulath, administratrix of Hugo Mattulath, deceased, 450.

SUITS UNDER SECTION 4915, REVISED STATUTES.

1. SUIT TO OBTAIN PATENT-LACHES.-The remedy by bill in equity to obtain a patent which has been refused by the Patent Office given by Revised Statutes, section 4915, (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 3392,) is a part of the application for the patent and is governed by the rule as to laches declared by Revised Statutes, section 4894, (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 3384,) which provides that the failure of an applicant to prosecute his application within one year after any action therein shall be regarded as an abandonment, unless it be shown that the delay was unavoidable. (c) Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. et al. v. Ohio Brass Co., 259.

2. SAME-SAME-UNAVOIDABLE DELAY.-An allegation in a bill to obtain the issuance of a patent under Revised Statutes, section 4915, (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 3392,) filed more than a year after the application was refused by the decision of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in interference proceedings, that complainants brought suit within the year against the successful applicant, to whom the patent was granted, and learned for the first time after such suit had been pending for several months that the defendant had assigned the patent, whereupon that suit was dismissed and the present one was brought against the assignee, does not show that the delay was unavoidable within the meaning of Revised Statutes, section 4894, (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 3384,) there being no allegation that the assignment was not recorded nor that complainants had no means of ascertaining the fact of the assignment.. (c) Id.

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3. INTERFERENCE-DECISION ON PRIORITY-GRANT OF PATENT TO OPPOSING PARTY NOT SUSPENDED.-Where after a decision on priority by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia the defeated party files a bill in equity under the provisions of section 4915, Revised Statutes, Held that the issuance of a patent to the successful party to the interference cannot be suspended pending the final determination of the suit. McIntyre v. Perry, 92.

SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS. See Jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Patents; Motion to Dissolve Interference, 9; Reissue, 10.

SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. See Certiorari, 3, 4;

Mandamus, 1.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

See Construction of Specifi

cations and Patents, 1; Suits in Forma Pauperis; Trade-Marks, 22. SURNAME. See Trade-Marks, 72, 73.

See Interference, 11; Trade-Marks, 10.

SUSPENSION OF HEARING. See Interference, 4. SUSPENSION OF INTERFERENCE. TECHNICAL MARKS. See Trade-Marks, 6, 7, 21. TEN-YEARS CLAUSE. See Trade-Marks, 3, 6, 7, 48. TERMINOLOGY. See Construction of Claims, 1, 2, 8, 9, 16; Employer and Employee, 3; Priority of Invention, 5; Reissue, 9; Trade-Marks, 15, 16, 18, 38, 40, 41.

TESTS. See Reduction to Practice; Testimony, 2, 3; Trade-Marks, 92. TESTIMONY. See Construction of Statutes, 5; Drawings, 2; Interference, 8, 11. 26, 21; Motion to Amend Preliminary Statement; Motion to Dissolve Interference, 7; Priority of Invention, 6, 18; Reduction to Practice, 1, 8; Reissue, 2; Trade-Marks, 51.

1. INTERFERENCE-PROOF OF INVENTORSHIP.-When D. testified that he conceived the invention in issue and disclosed it to others and that a gun embodying the issue was built under his direction by the company with which he was connected, Held that testimony corroborating him as to the building of the gun is sufficient to establish that the invention originated with him in the absence of testimony that he derived knowledge thereof from the opposing party. (Herman v. Fullman, C. D., 1903, 452; 107 O. G., 1094.) Driggs v. Schneider, 1.

2. SAME. DATE OF TEST.-The inventor's uncorroborated testimony that a competitive test was held by the Government on a certain date is sufficient to establish that fact in the absence of any testimony to the contrary. Id.

3. SAME-REDUCTION TO PRACTICE.—Testimony that a gun embodying the invention was built under D.'s directions, was shipped to the Government proving-grounds and tested, and that after the test it was adopted by the Government and other guns were made exactly like it for the Government Held sufficient to establish reduction to practice by D. Id. 4. LEADING QUESTIONS.-The record reviewed and certain questions to which objection had been taken Held not objectionable as leading. Ward v. Midgley, 229.

5. SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE FOR TAKING.-A notice given in New York city on June 22 that testimony would be taken in Troy, N. Y., on June 24, Held insufficient, and testimony taken in accordance with this notice stricken from the record. Randerson v. Hanna & Hanna, 234.

TITLE OF INVENTION.

1. NAMING BY APPLICANT.-Under the ruling in ex parte Becker (C. D., 1893, 95; 64 O. G., 559) an applicant should be allowed within reasonable limits to name the title of the invention. Ex parte Mackintosh, 13.

2. SAME. Where the claims were directed to the bearings and mode of connecting the driving device of a centrifugal machine, Held that the title "Centrifugal machines" did not correctly indicate the nature and design of the invention, as required by section 4884, Revised Statutes. Id.

TITLE TO TRADE-MARK. See Trade-Marks, 45.
TRADE-MARKS. See Labels, 1.

1. INTERFERENCE-"ARKOMA "—"ARMONA."-Held that an interference in fact exists between the words "Arkoma and "Armona used as trademarks for goods of the same descriptive properties. California Fruit Canners Association v. Foster, Caldarera & Company, 11.

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2. SAME-MOTION TO DISSOLVE-PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF GOODS.-The fact that in C.'s application for registration of a trade-mark the particular description of the goods is given as canned fruits and canned vegetables" Held to constitute no ground for dissolving an interference between this application and an application for the registration of a trade-mark for flavoring extracts and canned tomatoes," especially as the labels filed by C. show that the mark was used on "canned tomatoes." Id.

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3. SAME-SAME-QUESTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTER OF MARK IMMATERIAL WHERE REGISTRATION IS SOUGHT UNDER "TEN-YEARS CLAUSE.— Where one of the applications involved in an interference is presented under the "ten-years" clause of the Trade-Mark Act, the question of whether it is geographical in significance is immaterial to the proper determination of a motion to dissolve the interference. Id.

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4. PRIOR REGISTRATION-VALIDITY THEREOF CANNOT BE QUESTIONED IN AN EX PARTE PROCEEDING.-Where the registration of the word "Autola as a trade-mark for cigars was refused in view of the prior registration of the word "Au-to-do" for the same goods, Held that on an appeal from such refusal applicant cannot question the validity of such prior registration. (*) In re J. Fred Wilcox & Co., 264.

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MEASURING-TAPES-DESCRIPTIVE.-The

5. "INSTANTANEOUS FOR word "Instantaneous" used in a trade-mark for measuring-tapes Held properly refused registration, since it is descriptive of a character or quality of the goods to which it is applied. Ex parte The Lufkin Rule Co., 16. 6. PUBLICATION-APPLICATION PLACED UNDER "TEN-YEARS CLAUSE "-REPUBLICATION.-Where after a mark for the registration of which application has been made is published registration of such mark as a technical trade-mark is refused and the applicant amends his application by averring exclusive use of the mark for ten years next preceding the passage of the Trade-Mark Act, Held that "the Commissioner of Patents was entirely justified in ordering a second publication." (*) Carter Medicine Company v. Barclay & Barclay, 268.

7. OPPOSITION-RES ADJUDICATA.-A decision in an opposition filed against the registration of a mark presented as a technical trade-mark Held not res adjudicata in a second opposition filed by the same party against the registration of the same mark when presented under the "ten-years" proviso of section 5 of the Trade-Mark Act. Id.

8. MARK SHOWN IN TWO FORMS-REQUIREMENT THAT ONE BE CANCELED PROPER. The trade-mark sought to be registered, which consists of the word "Acme," was shown in the drawing in two different forms. Held that the requirement that one of these forms be canceled was proper. Ex parte Atsatt Bros., 20.

9. "CHOC HOME-SPUN," FOR CANDY-DESCRIPTIVE.-The words "Choc Home-Spun Held properly refused registration as a trade-mark for candy, since such mark is descriptive of the goods to which it is applied. Ex parte Croft & Allen Company, 23.

10. OPPOSITION AND INTERFERENCE-INTERFERENCE NOT SUSPENDED.-Where after the filing of a notice of opposition to the registration of a trademark by the owner of a registered trade-mark an interference is declared between the registration of the opposer and the application, Held that the interference should not be suspended pending the final determination of the opposition except by consent of the parties. Wm. A. Coombs Milling Company v. Barber Milling Company, 27.

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