For the errors indicated, the decree of the circuit court and the judgment of the Appellate Court are reversed, and the cause will be remanded to the circuit court of Sangamon county for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed. Reversed and remanded. JAMES C. SWAIN, Appellee, vs. L. J. STEWART et al. Appellants. Opinion filed February 17, 1915. This case is controlled by the decision in Cook v. Board of Directors of School District No: 80, 266 Ill. 164. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Morgan county; the Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Judge, presiding. KIRBY, WILSON & BROCKHOUSE, for appellants. WORTHINGTON, Reeve & GrEEN, for appellee. Per CURIAM: This was a petition for a writ of mandamus against appellants, the board of directors of school district No. 40, in Morgan county, Illinois, filed in the circuit court of that county, to compel said board to comply with the provisions of an act of the General Assembly of 1913 in regard to high school privileges for graduates of the eighth grade, approved June 26, 1913. (Laws of 1913, p. 584.) The circuit court ordered the writ to issue. From that order this appeal is prosecuted. The sole question urged here is the unconstitutionality of said statute. That question has been considered and passed upon by this court in Cook v. Board of Directors of School District No. 80, 266 Ill. 164, where the statute was held constitutional. That decision controls here. The judgment of the circuit court must therefore be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. THE PEOPLE ex rel. Ona L. Cline, County Collector, Appellee, vs. THE WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant. Opinion filed February 17, 1915. I. TAXES-County may levy tax for State aid roads-purpose of section 22 of Roads and Bridges act of 1913. A county may, under its general power to levy taxes for county purposes, levy a tax for State aid roads, as section 22 of the Roads and Bridges law of 1913 relates to the appropriation of funds for the share of the county in the construction of a State aid road along a designated route which has been determined upon. 2. SAME what is properly included in a tax for ditching to drain roads. In levying a tax, under section 58 of the Roads and Bridges law of 1913, for ditching to drain roads it is proper for the highway commissioners to include an amount sufficient to pay an assessment against the township under the Drainage law. (People v. Wabash Railroad Co. 256 Ill. 394, followed.) 3. SAME when description of railroad property in delinquent list and judgment is sufficient. If the description of railroad property in the delinquent list and judgment would be sufficient to enable a competent surveyor to find and identify the property the description complies with the law, as a railroad is a fixed and continuous monument in the description of lands. APPEAL from the County Court of Piatt county; the Hon. ELIM J. HAWBAKER, Judge, presiding. CHARLES F. MANSFIELD, (JOHN G. DRENNAN, of counsel,) for appellant. P. J. LUCEY, Attorney General, THOMAS KASTEL, State's Attorney, and GEORGE P. RAMSEY, for appellee. Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Piatt county against the property of the appellant, the Wabash Railroad Company, for delinquent taxes of the year 1913. The county board included in the levy for county taxes $7500 for State aid roads, and the appellant objected to that portion of the county tax on the ground that the methods provided for aiding in the construction of State aid roads are by appropriating funds from the county treasury or submitting to the legal voters of the county the question of issuing bonds for that purpose. The court overruled the objection. In the case of People v. Kankakee and Seneca Railroad Co. 265 Ill. 497, and other cases, it was decided that the county board may levy a tax to provide an amount equal to the allotment to the county by the State highway commission, and that section 22 of the Road law relates to the appropriation of funds for the share of the county in the construction of a State aid road along a designated route which has been determined upon. The court did not err in overruling the objection. The commissioners of highways of Cerro Gordo township levied a tax of $1250 for ditching to drain roads, to which the appellant objected. Section 58 of the Road law authorizes a tax for ditching to drain roads, and there had been an assessment against the township in October, 1912, under the Drainage law. An installment of the assessment amounting to $184.07 would be due on December 1, 1913, and the tax was levied and certified on September 2, 1913. The court gave judgment for appellant's portion of that assessment and refused judgment for the remainder. It was the duty of the commissioners of highways, at the time of certifying the general tax levy, to include a sufficient amount to pay the assessment coming due, and the tax to that extent was properly levied under the authority of People v. Wabash Railroad Co. 256 Ill. 394. The appellant contends that the judgment was void because the description of its property was not sufficient to locate and identify it. The description was as follows: "Wabash Railroad Co. (main line,) Bement and Cerro Gordo townships, comprising all the right of way of the above named company in the towns of Bement and Cerro Gordo, county of Piatt and State of Illinois. "Wabash Railroad Co. (Chicago and Paducah division,) Blue Ridge, Sangamon, Monticello, Bement and Unity townships, comprising all the right of way of the above named company in the town of Blue Ridge, Sangamon, Monticello, Bement and Unity, in the county of Piatt and State of Illinois." A railroad is a fixed and continuing monument in the description of lands. (Miller v. Beeler, 25 Ill. 163.) The same description given in the delinquent list and judgment would be sufficient in a conveyance, and as the property could be found and identified by a competent surveyor the description complied with the law. Koelling v. People, 196 Ill. 353. The judgment is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. J. E. WAGGONER, Plaintiff in Error, vs. ANNA M. Opinion filed February 17, 1915. 1. PRACTICE-motions and orders in a chancery proceeding are part of the record proper. The motions and orders made in the course of a chancery proceeding are a part of the record proper, and are as much out of place in the certificate of evidence as the pleadings and rulings thereon would be in a bill of exceptions in an action at law. 2. SAME-function of a certificate of evidence. The function of a certificate of evidence is to preserve and set forth the evidence offered, received and considered or rejected by the chancellor on the hearing, and its only object is to preserve matters which are not a part of the record proper. 3. SAME-oral announcements or remarks by the chancellor do not constitute the decree. Oral announcements or remarks by the chancellor expressing his opinion on the question at issue do not constitute the decree, and they are of no binding force or effect unless they are embodied in the decree and filed with the clerk, to be entered of record. 4. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE—when court may order conveyance from holder of legal title to equitable owner's assignee. One who has a valid, existing contract with the owners of the legal title to convey lands to him is the equitable owner and may assign his contract or execute a new contract for the sale of the land to a third party, and if the latter performs her part of the contract, a court of equity, upon a bill by her for specific performance, to which the holders of the legal title are made parties and under which they are brought into court, may decree a conveyance from the holders of the legal title directly to the complainant. A con 5. CONTRACTS-when contract is for the sale of land. tract made between the equitable owner of land and a third party, by which the former agrees to sell and the latter agrees to buy certain described real estate for a specified consideration and upon specified terms, is a contract for the sale of land which may be specifically enforced, notwithstanding a provision for the furnishing of articles of agreement for a warranty deed in the event the proposed purchaser elects to pay the balance of the purchase price in deferred payments of monthly installments of $25 or more, as the purchaser may waive such provision and elect to pay the balance in full and demand a deed. 6. APPEALS AND ERRORS—when question is not open to review. A question raised in the argument is not open to review in the Supreme Court where there is no assignment of error which presents such question. WRIT OF ERROR to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. J. M. O'CONNOR, Judge, presiding. Plaintiff in error, J. E. Waggoner, filed his bill of complaint in the superior court of Cook county against Anna M. Saether (who will be referred to in the opinion as defendant in error) and E. A. Sporron, asking the court to construe two contracts between plaintiff in error and defendant in error and declare the same null and void and order them surrendered up and canceled as clouds on the title of the property of plaintiff in error, copies of the contracts being attached to the bill. Defendant in error and Sporron answered the original bill. Defendant in error also filed a cross-bill asking for specific performance of the contracts, in which she alleged plaintiff in error had purchased one of the tracts under a contract of sale from Clif |