$ 20. ture of a drawer or acceptor, Russell v. Langstaffe, 2 Douglas, 514. (e.) This provision applies not merely to the case of an incomplete bill, written on stamped paper, but also to the case of a bill drawn or accepted in a foreign country, and sent to this country, which does not require to be stamped till it is negotiated here. The want of any of the requisites prescribed in § 3 or § 83, excepting the signature of the drawer or maker, may be supplied by the person in possession of it; but his prima facie authority to fill up the omission in any way he thinks fit may be limited by notes on the bill, not properly forming part of the bill. Thus, in Cameron v. Morrison, 20th January, 1869, 7 M. 383, a stamped paper was delivered to the respondent, upon which, in addition to the signatures of two persons to whom an address was given, there were the words, "four months after date," and in the left-hand corner the figures "£30 stg. £15 stg. £45 stg." The respondent, on receiving the stamped paper, wrote above the signature, and after the words "four months after date," Pay to me or my order, within the office of the Royal Bank of Scotland, the sum of £45 sterling for value received," dated the bill so filled up, and signed his own name as drawer. In sustaining the validity of the bill so filled up, it was pointed out that the figures in the corner had the effect of limiting the amount which the person to whom the blank acceptance was sent was entitled to fill in, and that the prima facie authority to the holder to fill in any sum which the stamp would cover was limited by this note, though not part of the bill. The want of a material particular cannot always be supplied. Thus, in Macdonald v. Shand, 9th July, 1872, 10 M. 984, a document bearing"I promise to pay, on demand, £100, value received," signed A. B., was held not to be a note, and not to be capable of being made one by the addition of a payee's name. The document was complete in itself, and contained no blank in To which the name of a payee could properly be inserted. (f) The person in possession of a skeleton bill need not be the person to whom it was delivered. Thus, in Ogilvie v. Moss, 28th June, 1866, Mor. App. Bill, No. 17, the trustee in bankruptcy of a creditor, who had received an acceptance blank in name of the drawer, was held entitled to fill in his own name as drawer. An executor may be the person in possession of a bill so delivered, I. Bell's Com. 416; and so also may be a creditor of the original holder, to whom a bill blank in the payee's name has been delivered, Thomson, Still & Co. v. Gall, 6th June, 1805, Hume's Dec. 1853, and who may fill in his own name as payee under this section. But see Hogarth v. Latham & Co., 3 Q. B., Div. 643. "Person in possession" is less restricted in its meaning than either "holder" or bearer," as defined in § 2, and includes a transferee without indorsement of a bill payable to order, vide § 31 (4). A skeleton bill also may be completed by a finder or a thief; but in such a case the bill is only enforceable by a holder in due course. The authority to fill up a blank stamp may be revoked, and is impliedly revoked by the sequestration of the signer, but not so as to affect a holder in due course, M'Meekin v. Russell and Tudhope, 9th March, 1881, 8 R. 587. (g.) Reasonable time will be reckoned from the date of delivery by the signer of the blank stamped paper or incomplete bill. The time will vary according to the circumstances of each case. A bill, for example, made payable on demand must probably be completed within a shorter period than one which is payable at nine or twelve months after date. In the former case the form will probably be held to imply that it was intended to serve an immediate purpose. But see note (e) on § 86. (h.) Vide § 29. To deprive a holder in due course of his rights on the bill, he must know at the time of his taking it, that it had been delivered in an incomplete state, and that it was not intended that it should be filled up for the amount it bears, Lyon v. Butter, 7th Dec. 1841, 4 D. 178; and if he $20. § 20. Delivery. negotiate the bill to one who knows that it was filled up in contravention of the authority given, that transferee, if not himself a party to any fraud in regard to the filling up of the bill, is entitled to all the rights of the holder in due course from whom he took it, vide § 29 (3). A holder in due course is not deprived of his rights where the blank stamp is only filled up by a person in possession of it after the expiry of the years of prescription, with a date subsequent thereto, Montague v. Perkins, 22 L. J., C. P. 187. In like manner, where A. delivered his blank acceptance to B., who retained it till A. became bankrupt and was discharged, and then filled it up, dating it subsequent to his discharge, a holder in due course was held entitled to enforce it against A., notwithstanding his discharge, Temple v. Pullen, 22 L. J., Ex. 151. 21. (1.) Every contract on a bill (a), whether it be the drawer's, the acceptor's, or an indorser's, is incomplete and revocable, until delivery (b) of the instrument in order to give effect thereto (c). Provided that where an acceptance is written on a bill, and the drawee gives notice to or according to the directions of the person entitled to the bill that he has accepted it, the acceptance then becomes complete and irrevocable (d). (2.) As between immediate parties (e), and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course (f), the delivery (a.) in order to be effectual must be made either by But if the bills be in the hands of a holder in due course (ƒ) a valid delivery of the bill by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed (h). (3.) Where a bill is no longer in the possession of a party who has signed it as drawer, acceptor, or indorser, a valid and unconditional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved (h). (a.) There may be a valid contract to draw, accept, or indorse a bill, but till the drawing or indorsing has been followed by delivery, or, in the case of acceptance by delivery or notification, there is no contract on the bill, and a drawee may cancel his signature and return the bill unaccepted, even though he is bound to accept. In such a case he will be liable to the person to whom he had undertaken to accept for any damage occasioned by his refusal to accept, but he will not be liable in an action on the bill, Prehan v. Royal Bank of Liverpool, L. R. 5, Ex. 92. See also Introduction, pp. 11, 12. Till delivery of the acceptance the drawee is under no liability on the bill to the holder, but in Scotland presentation for acceptance or payment operates as an assignation of the sum in the bill in favour of the holder, if the drawee have assets of the drawer in his hands, vide § 53 (2), but the drawee's liability is not on the bill, but depends on his indebtedness to the drawer, the right to enforce which is assigned by the bill. (b.) Delivery means the transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another, vide § 2. There is no delivery where a bill is given into the keeping of a third party, who acquires no right to deal with it, and whose duty consists in preserving the actual instrument from loss, and in returning it to its owner when desired. A., a foreign correspondent of B., sent him a bill drawn upon B. by A., and indorsed to C., with instructions to accept it and give it to C. in exchange for free bills maturing in C.'s hands. B. handed the bill to C. with a written memorandum of the condition, $ 21. § 21. The but without accepting. C. did not comply with the conditions, but indorsed the bill to D., with notice thereof. D. sent the bill to B. for acceptance, which was refused by B., who retained the bill. Held, in an action for delivery by D., that B. was entitled to retain, as there had been no delivery to give effect to bill, Martini & Co. v. Steel & Craig, 18th Dec. 1878, 6 R. 342. Delivery must be made by or under the authority of the party drawing, accepting, or indorsing. authority to deliver a bill may be verbal, Bell's Prin. 216. A bill may be delivered either to a transferee, or to some third party on his behalf. Delivery is inferred from the bill being found in the possession of the transferee, or of an agent for him, but if the transferor hand the bill to his own agent, delivery is not held to have taken place. If the transferor and the transferee's agent is the same there is a presumption, which, however, may be reargued, that the bill was delivered to him as agent for the transferee, while if it is in the possession of a neutral third person, the presumption is for delivery, if the bill be for value, but not if it is gratuitous, Bell's Prin. 23. Constructive delivery-i.e., where the bill, though in the actual possession of the granter, or of some person selected by him, Anderson v. Robertson, 21st Feb. 1867, 5 M. 507, requires proof of intention of the granter, Miller v. Miller, 27th June, 1874, 1 R. 1107. (c.) The effect of delivery is (1) to transfer the existing contracts on the bill, if any, to the transferee; and (2) to complete a new contract between the drawer, acceptor or indorser, and the holder. Delivery by an indorser thus transfers the engagements of the acceptor, vide § 54; of the drawer, vide § 55 (1); and of all prior indorsers, vide § 55 (2) ; and in addition to transferring the right to these contracts completes the new engagement which is implied in indorsation, vide § 55 (2). The effect of delivery may, however, be limited by the terms of the indorsation. Delivery, for example, of a bill indorsed without recourse, transfers the already existing contracts on the bill, but does not complete any new contract on the bill. Delivery, in this case, is the fulfilment of the prior contract to make or indorse and deliver a bill or note; where a bill is indorsed "for my use," or "for |