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To the same effect see Evatt v. Hudson, |viding that a person may carry any weapon 97 Ark. 265, 133 S. W. 1023, and Bennett v. upon his premises, guards employed by a railFarabough, 154 Ark. 193, 241 S. W. 895. In road company to protect its employés are liable the latter case the court recognized that a for carrying concealed pistols, although on false representation in a drainage district property belonging to the company. would be a ground for the rescission of the Smith and Hart, JJ., dissenting. contract for the sale of the land, but denied the purchaser relief on the ground that the testimony did not warrant it.

[2] In the case at bar it is not denied that Brennan was the duly authorized agent for the sale of the land, and had the authority to make the representation that the land was not in a drainage district, if in fact he did make such representation. Appellants contend, however, that Brennan made no such representation, and this presented a question of fact for the chancery court. The burden was upon the appellees to show that they were induced to purchase the land by false and fraudulent representations of appellants or their agent. Gravling Lumber Co. v. Ebbitt, 134 Ark. 175, 203 S. W. 686, and English v. North, 112 Ark. 489, 166 S. W. 577.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pulaski County; John W. Wade, Judge.

J. L. Brown and another were convicted of carrying concealed weapons, and they ap peal. Affirmed.

E. B. Kinsworthy and R. E. Wiley, both of Little Rock, for appellants.

J. S. Utley, Atty. Gen., and Jno. L. Carter and W. T. Hammock, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

agreed statement of facts and convicted of SMITH, J. Appellants were tried on an carrying concealed weapons. of the agreed statement of facts is as folThe substance [3] To sustain the burden, Mr. Carey and tol as a weapon in the railroad yards belows. Each of the defendants carried a pisDr. Utley both testified in positive terms longing to the Missouri Pacific Railroad that they did not wish to purchase any land Company in the city of North Little Rock. in a drainage district, and expressly told They were each then and there engaged in Brennan that their experience was such that the performance of their duties as special they would not under any consideration purchase land in a drainage district. Bren

nan assured them that he had examined the abstract, and knew that the land was not

in a drainage district. It turned out that the land was in a drainage district, and that the assessment of benefits amounted to over $4,000, and it was estimated that it would take about one-half of this to construct the drainage ditch. This was a material matter to be considered in the purchase price of a tract of land sold for $8,000. It was the assertion of a positive fact by Brennan, and appellees were justified in relying upon it. It is true that Brennan denied having made

the representation, and that he is corroborated to some extent by Grismore and by the cashier, who both testified that Carey and Utley had come to them separately and asked for an extension of the time of payment of the first land note on account of the financial depression which had spread over the country since the contract for the purchase of the land.

The chancellor believed the testimony of appellees on this point, and his finding is warranted by their testimony. Therefore the decree will be affirmed.

guard in the service of the railroad company

for which they had been employed.

The railroad company is a corporation authorized to do business in Arkansas, and was then and there, through its omcers and agents, in possession of the premises in question. Said premises consisted of a large parcel of land on which the railroad company was then maintaining yards, consisting of railroad tracks, machine shops, coal houses, storage houses, water tanks, tool houses, and other buildings and structures in large numbers, for use as railroad termials for the cities of Little Rock and North Little Rock, for the purpose of carrying on its business as a common carrier.

It was further agreed that prior to July 1, 1922, said railroad company employed several hundred mechanics, carpenters, machinists, and skilled laborers of various kinds, who worked on said premises in the construction and repair of cars, locomotives, and other structures belonging to the said railroad company, to keep and maintain the property of said railroad company for the purpose of carrying out its duties as a common carrier. On July 1, 1922, practically all of said workmen quit their work and went out on a strike, in compliance with the orders of the governing bodies of the several BROWN et al. v. STATE. unions or crafts of which said workmen. (Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 18, 1923.) were members, and that said strike was in Weapons (1⁄2)-Railroad guards crim- full force from that date until and after the Inally liable for carrying pistols on property said July 5, 1922. In the progress of said of railroad company. strike, said strikers and their sympathizers Under C. & M. Dig. § 2804, making it un-picketed the said premises of said railroad lawful to carry a pistol as a weapon, but pro- company, and congregated in large numbers

(No. 53.)

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(252 S.W.)

near all regular points of ingress or egress | In volume 2 of McClain on Criminal Law, to said premises, and undertook to persuade § 1035, it is said: and prevent any persons from working in their places as mechanics and craftsmen as aforesaid, and thus to interfere with the conduct by said company of its business as a common carrier. There were threats of violence against those who undertook to remain in the service of said railroad company or to enter said service to take the place of the strikers, and there were acts of violence against such persons.

"Some statutes permit one to carry a concealed weapon on his own premises. A laborer on the land of another is not within such exception; nor is one upon his own premises when in fact he has leased the premises to another without reservation of authority to enter thereon. The common stairway or halls of a building, occupied by offices of different persons, are not within the description of one's 'own property.' So one engaged in supervising the erection of a building for another is not on his own premises. Under a statute not making such an exception, it is no defense that the weapon was carried within the curtilage of defendant's abode."

It was in

"The said railroad company undertook to hire other persons to take the place of said strikers, and did hire and have such persons, and put them to work on the premises aforesaid. The officers and managers of said In Kinkead v. State, 45 Ark. 536, the derailroad company considered it necessary to station special guards upon said premises fendant was a contractor engaged in the for the purpose of protecting the property erection of a certain building for another located on said premises and the persons en-person, and he was arrested in the building gaged in the work formerly done by the while in the supervision of the work, and a strikers on said premises, from depredation pistol was found on his person. and injury by the unlawful acts of other sisted that he came within the exception of persons. For that purpose said railroad the statute allowing one to carry weapons company had employed as its servants and upon his own premises; but the court said: agents the defendants, had stationed them on said property, and held them responsible for safeguarding the said property to the extent of their ability to guard and protect it. They were engaged in the performance of their duties as such special guards when they carried the pistols as weapons as hereinbefore stated.

"The pistols carried by the defendants were not such pistols as are used in the army or navy of the United States."

By section 2804 C. & M. Digest, it is made unlawful for any purpose to carry a pistol as a weapon, but there is a proviso that

"Nothing in this act shall be so construed as to prohibit any person from carrying any weapon when upon a journey or upon his premises."

It is the insistence of counsel for the appellants that under the facts recited above appellants are entitled to the benefit of the exception permitting one to carry a weapon upon his premises. But the majority of the judges do not think so.

No one of these guards had the exclusive possession of the premises, or any part of them, nor did the guards, all together, have the exclusive possession of the premises, or any part of them. The premises were primarily and principally used and occupied by the employees of the company who were engaged in the performance of the labor for which the various buildings of the company were intended.

In 8 R. C. L. p. 293, it is said:

"An exception in a statute which permits a person to carry a weapon on his own premises will not be a defense to a prosecution of a servant who at the time is on his master's premises."

"The exception only protects such as have an estate or interest in the real property which constitutes the premises. Obviously a builder, having merely a lien for his work and materials, has no such interest."

The language quoted was somewhat qualified in the case of Clark v. State, 49 Ark. 174, 4 S. W. 658, where the court said that doubtless a tenant in possession of leased premises has such an interest in the premises as to be entitled to the benefit of the exception.

In the opinion of the majority, appellants had no interest or estate in the premises as tenants or otherwise. They were there as employees only. There was no part of the premises, the possession of which they did not share with other guards and employees, and they were not, therefore, upon their premises within the meaning of the proviso contained in the statute.

It is true the appellants were upon the premises to exclude certain other persons from the premises; and this is a right which the railroad company had as the owner of the premises; but, in the opinion of the majority, the exercise of this right did not operate to bring them within the exception contained in the statute.

It is unlawful to carry weapons, and only those persons may do so who come within the excepted class, and as, in the opinion of the majority, the appellants were not on their own premises, the court below properly adjudged them guilty, and that judgment is affirmed.

HART, J., and the writer are of opinion that appellants are within the exception contained in the statute.

RAMEY-MILBURN CO. v. SEVICK et al. (No. 34.)

(Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 11, 1923.) 1. Fraudulent conveyances 74(2)-Inadequacy of price not itself sufficient to establish fraud..

of the sum of $1, "and other good and valuable considerations, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged." On the date of these conveyances appellee Riner executed a mortgage to the Nebraska National Bank of Omaha to secure a debt of $24,500. Appellants were creditors of Sevick, and soon after the filing of the bills of sale they commenced this action in the chancery court of White county to cancel the conveyances to Riner as

Mere inadequacy of price is not of itself sufficient to establish fraud in a conveyance. 2. Fraudulent conveyances 47-Sale of saw-in fraud of the rights of Sevick's creditors. mills together with logs and lumber held not in violation of Bulk Sales Law.

A conveyance of certain sawmill plants and the property on which they were located, together with a comparatively small amount of logs and lumber, held not a violation of the Bulk Sales Law.

Sevick and Riner were both made defendants, and later the Nebraska National Bank filed an intervention asking that its mortgage executed by Riner be foreclosed, the interplea containing an allegation that no part of the debt had been paid.

The answer in the case contained appro

3. Costs 192-Costs of receivership in ac-priate denials of the allegations of fraud in tion to set aside alleged fraudulent conveyances held properly charged to plaintiffs after judgment for defendants.

In a proceeding to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance of a sawmill, together with certain logs and lumber, where a receiver has been appointed over objection of defendants, held that, after a determination of the suit in favor of defendants, it was not error to tax plaintiffs with the costs of the receivership. 4. Appeal and error 984(1)

Costs 192-Assessing costs of receivership largely within discretion of court.

Assessing costs of a receivership is to some extent within the discretion of the courts, and, where that discretion has not been abused, the court's decision will not be disturbed.

the sale from Sevick to Riner, and also contained allegations that the real consideration for the purchase was the sum of $24,500, and the assumption by Riner of certain debts of Sevick to third parties in the sum of approximately $4,000, making a total consideration of about $28,000.

It appears from the allegations of the answer, and also from the proof adduced by the appellees, that prior to the execution of these conveyances Sevick was indebted to the Nebraska National Bank in the sum of $24,500, which had been carried by the bank for anxious to dispose of the property in order some time, and was past due. Sevick was to raise funds to pay the debt of the bank, was seeking a purchaser to raise funds for

Appeal from White Chancery Court; John that purpose, and was being assisted by the

E. Martineau, Chancellor.

Suit by the Ramey-Milburn Company against Chas. H. Sevick and others. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

J. A. Comer, of Little Rock, and Avery M. Blount and Brundidge & Neelly, all of Searcy, for appellant.

Bogle & Sharp, of Brinkley, and Cockrill & Armistead, of Little Rock, for appellees.

MCCULLOCH, C. J. Charles H. Sevick, one of the appellees, was the owner of several small manufacturing plants in White county, one a veneer mill at Higginson, and four sawmill plants, one at Walker, one at Higginson, one at Crosby, and another at West Point. Sevick owned the real estate on which some of the plants were situated, and was also the owner of certain other real estate used in connection with the plants.

bank to find a purchaser. Riner was employed by one of the officers of the bank in service not connected with the bank, but Riner's employers suggested to him the purchase of this property and the operation of it. After thorough examination, Riner decided to purchase the property, and entered into negotiations with Sevick, and the purchase was consummated by the two conveyances mentioned above. The payment of the purchase price was made, according to the testimony, by the extinguishment of the debt of Sevick to the bank and by the execution by Riner of a note and mortgage to the bank for the amount of the original indebtedness of Sevick.

There was a receiver appointed by the court on the application of appellants and over the protest and objection of appellee Riner.

On the final hearing of the cause upon oral and documentary evidence, the court rendered a decree dismissing the complaint for want of equity, and adjudging the costs, including the expenses of receivership, against appellants, who have prosecuted an appeal to

In January, 1922, Sevick executed two separate bills of sale conveying all of the property mentioned above to W. T. Riner, his coappellee. The two bills of sale were execut-this court. ed contemporaneously, and were properly [1] There was a conflict in the testimony. placed of record in White county. Each of At least the state of the testimony is such the conveyances mentioned a consideration that different inferences might have been

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(252 S.W.)

identical statutes. Balter v. Crum, 199 Mo.
App. 380, 203 S. W. 507; Cooney, Eckstein &
Co. v. Sweat, 133 Ga. 511, 66 S. E. 257, 25
L. R. A. (N. S.) 758; Wright v. Hart. 182 N.
Y. 330, 75 N. E. 404, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 838,
3 Ann. Cas. 263;; Everett Produce Co. v.
Smith Bros., 40 Wash. 566, 82 Pac. 905, 2 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 331, 111 Am. St. Rep: 979, 5
Ann. Cas. 798.

In the present case the merchantable property consisted of logs and lumber of small value compared to the aggregate value of all of property conveyed, and it is quite clear, we think, that the Bulk Sales Law has no application to it.

drawn from it as to the good faith of the Other courts have so interpreted similar or transaction; but we have reached the conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to support the finding of the chancellor and to justify the decree which was rendered. In the first place, it is not satisfactorily shown that Sevick was insolvent at the time of these conveyances. The finding of the chancellor in this issue is not against the preponderance of the evidence. Nor does the evidence preponderate to the effect that the transaction was not made in good faith, nor that the consideration was inadequate. There is a wide conflict in the testimony as to the value of the property at the time of the conveyance. The testimony adduced by appellants tends to show that the aggregate value [3,4] Finally, it is contended that the of the property may have been as high as chancery court erred in decreeing the costs, $37,000, whereas much testimony was intro- including the expenses of the receivership, duced on this subject by appellees, and in against appellants. The receiver was apthat testimony the lowest value was fixed at pointed over the protest of appellees, and about $22,000. There is abundant testimony the appointment turned out to be unwarrantwhich justifies a finding that the value of ed, for the reason that the appellants failed the property was not appreciably more than to make out their case by sufficient testi$28,000, the price paid by Riner to Sevick for mony. It is not a case where the title to the it. Certainly the preponderance of the evi- property itself was in controversy, and the dence does not justify the finding that the appointment of the receiver was for the purvalue was sufficiently in excess of the purpose of its preservation and protection chase price as to manifest bad faith. The against damage, but the receivership was to principle is elemental that mere inadequacy sequester the property so as to subject it to of price is not of itself sufficient to establish the payment of appellants' claims. We are fraud. While it cannot be said that the tes- already committed to the rule that the questimony in the case fixes a definite value be- tion of imposing the burden of the costs of a yond question, it is sufficient to show that receivership is to some extent one of discrethe price was not grossly inadequate. We tion of the courts, and that that discretion therefore agree with the chancellor in his will not be disturbed unless there has been a finding that there was not sufficient testi- clear abuse. Myers v. Hines, 122 Ark. 320, mony to establish fraud in the transaction. 182 S. W. 542. While there is some contrariety in the authorities on this subject, our decisions seem to be in entire accord with the weight of authority. High on Receivers, § 809A; 1 Clark on Receivers, § 850. Finding no error in the decree, it is in all things affirmed.

CHILDS v. LINTON et al. (No. 58.) (Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 18, 1923.) 1. Judgment 461(5)—Evidence held not to show agreement of parties not to take judgment on bond.

[2] It is also contended that the sale is void because it falls within our statute commonly known as the "Bulk Sales Law." Crawford & Moses' Digest, § 4870 et seq. The statute in question is entitled, "An act to prevent the fraudulent sales of stocks of merchandise," and the first section provides that sales or transfers "in bulk, of any part of or the whole of a stock of merchandise or merchandise and the fixtures pertaining to the conduct of any such business, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the regular prosecution of the business of the seller," shall be void unless a notice to the creditors be given and the sale otherwise be made in accordance with the terms of the statute. It is clear from the language used that the purpose was to regulate bulk sales of merchandise as a part of the stock of a mercantile establishment. It has no application to a manufacturing plant which sells its Under Crawford & Moses' Dig. 88 4844, product merely, as an incident to the business. That was evidently the thought in the 4854, a judgment on an unlawful detainer bond, conditioned for the payment of all sums reminds of the court in the cases of Fiske Rub- covered by defendant in the action for any ber Co. v. Hayes, 131 Ark. 248, 199 S. W. 96, cause whatsoever, was not void because renderand Robbins v. Fuller, 148 Ark. 173, 229 S. ed without notice, for a surety becomes party W. 8, though the precise question now under to the suit by signing the bond and subject to consideration was not involved in that case. a summary judgment without additional notice. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

In suit to enjoin enforcement of judgment on bond, evidence held not to show alleged agreement by defendants not to take judgment. 2. Landlord and tenant 291(15)—Notice not necessary to judgment on unlawful detainer bond.

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court. The cause proceeded to a hearing up→ on issues joined between I. N. Linton and the Erie Ozark Mining Company, which resulted in a rendition of a decree in favor of the Erie Ozark Mining Company against W. A. Childs and I. N. Linton. I. N. Linton then asked and obtained a judgment against W.

Where parties to a cause transferred to the chancery court objected to the rendition of judgment against them therein and prayed an appeal to the Supreme Court, their appearance in the chancery court waived all irregularities A. Childs and his bondsman, W. E. Layton, in making the transfer of the cause, such as that the circuit court clerk failed to make and transmit a certified copy of the proceedings in the cause to the chancery court.

4. Judgment 521-Suit to enjoin enforce ment of judgment is collateral attack.

Suit to enjoin enforcement of a judgment is a collateral attack, and does not draw into question mere errors in the judgment, such as that when all equitable issues in the case were decided in the chancery court the suit should have been retransferred to the law court for trial.

Appeal from Marion Chancery Court; Ben F. McMahan, Chancellor.

Suit by W. A. Childs against I. N. Linton and another. From decree for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

J. C. Floyd, of Yellville, for appellant.
Sam Williams, of Harrison, for appellees.

HUMPHREYS, J. A suit in unlawful detainer was brought by W. A. Childs against I. N. Linton in the circuit court of Marion county. W. E. Layton was bondsman for W. A. Childs in said action. On motion of I. N. Linton, who had set up certain grounds of equitable relief against Childs and the Erie Ozark Mining Company, the circuit court made an order transferring the cause to the chancery court of said county, where the Erie Ozark Mining Company was made a party. The Erie Ozark Mining Company entered its appearance and filed an answer to the cross-complaint and also a cross-complaint of its own, asking a cancellation of the original lease given to W. A. Childs, and subleases from him to I. N. Linton and 'others, upon the ground of forfeiture.

W.

A. Childs was represented by E. O. Owens and S. W. Woods, regular practicing attorneys at the bar. S. W. Woods testified that he did not appear in the chancery court after the transfer of the case because he understood from Owens that I. N. Linton would look alone for relief to the Erie Ozark Mining Company. E. O. Owens continued in the case after the transfer of the cause and advised Childs, who had moved away, that it was necessary to take depositions to get ready for trial. Childs did not reply to his letters, and thereby put him in position to proceed with the case, so he made a statement to that effect to the court, and was permitted to withdraw from the case. No pleadings were filed for Childs in the chancery

for $1,000 in the unlawful detainer suit. An entry appears on the court's docket to the effect that objections were made and exception's saved to the entry of the judgment, and that an appeal was prayed therefrom to the Supreme Court. Before the judgment was entered, and during the progress of the case, J. C. Floyd, attorney for the Erie Ozark Mining Company, and Sam Williams, attorney for I. N. Linton, advised Layton that Linton was insisting on a judgment against him and that he had better give the matter some attention.

This suit for a permanent injunction against the enforcement of said $1,000 judgment was brought by W. E. Layton to a subsequent term of said court against I. N. Linton, execution creditor, and C. A. Willingham, sheriff of Marion county, upon the four following alleged grounds: First, that I. N. Linton agreed with W. E. Layton, or with W. A. Childs or his attorney, E. O. Owens, that no judgment would be taken against them, but that he would look alone to the Erie Ozark Mining Company for redress; second, that the judgment rendered against W. E. Layton was without notice and void; third, that the chancery court had no jurisdiction of the cause in which said $1,000 judgment was rendered; fourth, that the chancery court was without jurisdiction after the equitable issues were eliminated to render a judgment in a suit for unlawful detainer, which was purely legal in nature.

[1] 1. E. 0. Owens, attorney for Childs, testified that I. N. Linton stated to him in front of the bank in Yellville that he was not particularly after Mr. Layton; that he was after the Erie Ozark Mining Company. He admitted, however, that this statement did not influence him to withdraw from the case, and explained that he withdrew from the case because Childs would not write to him concerning it, so that he could prepare for the trial.

Mr. Layton testified that during the pendency of the suit I. N. Linton came to the bank and told him that he had matters so arranged as to give him no trouble on the bond; that in reliance upon the statement he made no preparation for a defense, and took no further interest in the case. I. N. Linton testified that he did not make the statement attributed to him by W. E. Layton.

Mr. J. C. Floyd and Sam Williams both testified that they called Mr. Layton's attention to the fact that I. N. Linton was in

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