being members of the union, and be in restraint that he looks upon it in somewhat the same business by his workpeople were not suffiof the public freedom of commerce. next year. This definition of the two dissenting Judges is extremely clear, and to our mind conclusive, and it is to be regretted that it did not prevail. But it will be very valuable for guidance in the framing of the new law, which must be passed It is, however, an error to assert that the decision deprives the unions of protection. They have still the criminal law in common with all other subjects, and Mr. Russell Gurney's Act of last session effectually removed from them all disabilities. The judgment deprives them of the remedies given to friendly sccieties, but of nothing more, and these are not so desirable that there need be regret for the loss of them. A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. MR. GLADSTONE has given excellent reasons for the determination of the Government not to impose upon the poor taxpayers the costs of a prosecution undertaken on his own account by a gentleman who had invested largely in OVEREND and GURNEY shares and found them to be a bad, instead of a good, speculation. Had the company prospered, Dr. THOM would assuredly not merely have acquiesced in, but he would positively have approved, the acts of the directors, for which, as they did not produce the expected results of gain to the shareholders, he has thought fit to indict them. If the facts which they are prosecuted by Dr. THOм for concealing had been published, and, as the necessary consequence, the company had collapsed immediately, who can doubt that the indignant shareholders, Dr. Tпoм included, would have unanimously denounced the directors for the untimely revelations that had reduced the value of their shares to nil. Or if it had been left to the shareholders themselves to say if the facts should be made public that would ruin their speculation at its very birth, who can doubt that they would have voted unanimously for their suppression. Mr. GLADSTONE therefore, rightly asserts that they are entitled to no special sympathy or aid from the public purse. They are a very wealthy body and well able to defray the cost of avenging their own wrongs, if wrongs they have, without asking contribution from the poor taxpayers, who took no part in their speculation and would have shared none of their profits had it been successful. Mr. GLADSTONE suggested, also, that it may be fairly questioned if it is desirable to encourage speculations of this kind by help from the public purse when they fail. People ought to know, or, if they are ignorant, it is well they should be taught by painful experience, that endeavours to obtain the profits of industry without the toil, to trade without the mental labour and responsibility of commercial enterprise, to expect great gain without incurring the risk of great loss, which is the true design and desire of shareholders, is gambling, and as such should receive no encouragement from the State. We repeat our entire approval alike of the decision of the Government, and of the reasons assigned for it both by the PRIME MINISTER and the HOME SECRETARY. As to the larger question of a Public Prosecutor, there is so much to be said on both sides that it is difficult to arrive at any clear and decided opinion. Upon the whole, our impression is rather in its favour; but certainly it is a subject not to be hastily determined. England is the only country where that officer or his equivalent does not exist, and yet the administration of criminal justice in England will, as a whole, bear comparison with that in any other country. There are faults, it is true; but they would admit of amendment, without the entire revolution involved in the transfer of power to put the criminal law in force from the subject who is wronged to an official, who if he is less likely to be influenced by motives of revenge, will also be less open to the kindly feelings that so often lead to the practical charity of mercy and forgiveness to the sinner in the hope of repentance and amendment. We do not say that this practical mitigation of the necessary severity of the letter of the law may not be attended with counterbalancing evils, or that the advantages of a Public Prosecutor may not outweigh all that can be advanced in favour of the existing system; but it is a question to be carefully considered alike by the statesman and the lawyer before action is taken upon it, and we were pleased to gather from the silence of Mr. BRUCE manner. THE TRADES UNIONS BILL. ciently tyrannical, there comes the sweeping provision at its close that legalises combination for "any terms or conditions whatsoever, under which any work or employment shall or shall THIS Bill, the product of the dissenting mi- not be done or carried on." The 3rd section nority of the Trades Union Commission, is to secures members of associations for any of be pressed upon Parliament during the present those purposes against criminal prosecutions for the Government that so great and grave a objects. A subsequent section (the 5th) consession, in opposition to the declared desire of any combination to carry out any of these question should not be undertaken by private tains a proviso excepting an association formed members, and a promise that they would themor maintained with intent to procure the comselves deal with it next year. mission of an offence which shall subject the Therefore, as the subject is to be formally dis-offender to prosecution. But this is quite a cussed and a division is to be taken on the merits needless provision, for no union is formed exof this particular measure, no apology is neces-pressly for the purpose of committing indictable sary for directing to its details the careful offences. The complaint is, that they too often attention of the lawyers in and out of the House. resort to illegal means to carry out and enforce Some of the newspaper writers, ignorant proa legal object. The Sheffield sawgrinders were bably of the text of the Bill, and misled by the not associated for the purpose of murdering and studied temperance of the language of its ad- rattening, but they encouraged murder and the vocates, have praised its moderation and recom- destruction of property as the illegal means by mended it as a fair compromise. Can it be so which they sought to enforce their legal objects. accepted? The next ten sections are devoted to the enrolment of trade societies under the Friendly Societies Acts, and are in themselves unobjec tionable, save that they make no sufficient provision for separating the funds of the benefit society from the funds applicable to trade purposes, an omission which should be supplied in committee. It commences with a repeal of the existing Combination Acts, and then proceeds to legalise, in express terms, the combination, either of workmen or of employers, for mutual agreement with respect to 1. Wages to be paid. 2. Hours to be worked. 3. The persons by whom any work is to be, or is not to be, done. 4. The mode in which any work is to be, or is not to be, done. 5. Any terms or conditions whatsoever under which any work or employment shall or shall not be done or carried on. This is in effect to abolish the existing law that makes illegal acts that are in restraint of trade, that is to say, the acts as above defined, Nos. 3, 4, and 5. The first question that presents itself for anxious consideration is, whether combinations for all or any of these objects can be legalised with safety to the community, with justice to individuals, and without violating personal liberty. First, for the purpose of regulating wages. As this is a matter that affects none but the contracting parties, it is undoubtedly permissible. The like may be said of the second proposition, relating to the regulation of working hours. This also is a question solely between the employers and the employed. Not so is it with the third and fourth proposals, which relate to combination for the purpose of regulating the persons by whom, and the mode in which, any work is to be or is not to be done. There must be no mistake as to the meaning of this. Its manifest purpose is to legalise that which now is illegal (because it is deemed to be injurious to the community and unjust to individuals), the dictation to the master by the workman, not merely of something which concerns himself, but of that which directly affects other people, and therefore is not merely in restraint of trade but is also in restraint of freedom of labour and of personal liberty. Its meaning, in plain terms, is that it shall be lawful to form combinations to compel the employer not to employ an apprentice, or a workman who is not a member of the union, or one who is, for any cause, obnoxious to the union, or for any other reason that caprice, or malice may prescribe. What an intolerable tyranny would thus be created will be apparent on a moment's reflection-a despotism that would crush, not the masters only, but still more the working men who are not unionists. Indeed, the plain purpose of it is to force all the working people into the unions. But, having given much consideration to this subject, we have no hesitation in preferring the plan we proposed here to that proposed by the Bill before us. It will be remembered, perhaps, that we suggested the extension to trade societies of the scheme of the Companies Act; that is to say, we would incorporate them, with the same powers and the same responsibilities as a company-with a common seal, articles of associa tion, annual balance-sheets, power to sue and be sued, responsible directors, and liability civilly for contracts and torts. This would give to them great power, it is true, but it would also impose proportionate responsibility in the exercise of licity as to the objects and acts of the society, that power, and especially it would secure pubby virtue of its registered articles of association and published accounts, as well as by the necessity for the keeping of minutes of the proceedings of the governing body. We must confess to entire inability to understand the purpose of an extraordinary provision in clause 12, which expressly prohibits a registered society from enforcing at law or in equity against any of its members "payment of any contribution, fine, or other due whatsoever, whether owing by such member under any rules or not, or of obtaining as against any member the benefit of any agreement made with such member." Does this singular prohibition contemplate merely that all payments by and agreements with members shall be enforced only under the provisions of the Friendly Societies Acts, or is it deliberately designed to prevent enforcement in any manner by process of law? This should be made clear. Clause 14, however, fetters the members, as the 12th clause limits the powers of the corporate body. It declares that no such society shall be sued as a corporate body, in its own name or in that of its trustees or officers, and further that it "shall not be liable at law or in equity to any of its members for or in respect of any agreement or assurance made between such society and its members." The meaning of this is obvious. It is designed to relieve the society from all responsibility, not merely to the public, but even to its own members. If, for instance, the society, in the carrying out of some resolution as to work, were to cause its members to do an injury to an Not less noxious to the community would be employer, by this clause he would be prevented the legalising of combinations to prescribe to from suing the society for damages, but would employers the mode in which any work is to be be left to his remedy against the individual or is not to be done. The purpose of the pro- workman only-who would be practically free vision is to prevent the introduction of ma- from liability, inasmuch as he would not be chinery, to forbid contrivances to save labour, worth the suing. The same objection applies and to compel arrangements that increase labour, to the prohibition of members of the society such as the working of marble at the quarry, enforcing agreements made with the society. forbidding a bricklayer to use both his hands, As the Bill stands now, the society might enter and a mason to carry more than a certain into an agreement with a member, but the memquantity of mortar at one mount. Had this Billber would be forbidden by the Act to enforce been law forty years ago we should still have such agreement. been in a state of comparative barbarism—all The 16th section abolishes, alike in criminal improvement stayed and all invention para- and civil proceedings, the plea that the allysed, and its enactment now would be scarcely leged act or offence is in restraint of trade. less mischievous. And as if these specific Thus is directly raised the very important quesclaims to the regulation of the employer's tion, whether freedom of trade shall continue to be the subject of legal recognition and protection. The acts of the trades unions to which exception has been usually made are those directed to the limitation of the right of employers and individual workmen to make such bargains as they please. This clause reverses the tendency of modern legislation, which is to remove obstacles to free bargains between individuals, by legalising acts which are in restraint of freedom of trade and freedom of contract. But a proviso in this clause excepts from the operation of it the power of the courts to enforce the performance, or penalty for non-performance, of an agreement considered by such court to be contrary to public policy as being in restraint of trade, due regard being had by such court to the amount of the restriction thereby imposed on the party restrained, together with the adequacy of the consideration to the party restraining," a provision which savours more of a treatise than of positive law. Its meaning is certainly not very clear. The Bill contains no penal clauses. It deals with this important matter by the simple process of repealing the existing Combination Acts, as they are wrongfully called, for they are not laws to prohibit combinations, but on the contrary they repeal previous prohibitory statutes, legalise associations, and merely impose penalties on certain acts which experience had shown that the associations and their members had been accustomed to do for the purpose of compelling fellow-workmen to join them, or masters to come in to the terms they dictated. The argument is that these societies should be left to the criminal law and not be the subjects of special legislation. But the question is, whether the general criminal law sufficiently meets the specific offence which members of these societies have committed at various times. The criminal law certainly extends to such grave crimes as are recorded of the Sheffield sawgrinders. It punishes murder, blowing up houses, malicious injuries to property, such as are known by the name of "rattening," and all acts of violence to persons. But it does not reach picketing, and such like contrivances for personal annoyance, not amounting to positive assault, but even more vexatious. The law, which exists for the protection of individual liberty, is bound to punish every form of invasion of that liberty. There are acts which, not in themselves sufficiently vexatious to call for punishment when done by a single person, are a grievous injury and annoyance when done by many acting in concert, and there is nothing unjust or invidious in making such cumulative acts the subject of special prohibition and penalty. This is what the existing law does—and it is this law which the Bill before us repeals. Is not the liberty of the subject entitled to the protection it enjoys, and would its removal be right or safe? That is the question which Parliament must ask and answer. THE DIVISION AND DEBATE AS TO THE SALARIES OF COUNTY COURT JUDGES. We expressed in our last number the great regret which we felt at the result of Mr. HIBBERT'S motion for the increase of the salaries of County Court Judges, and our strong reprehension of the tone adopted by Mr. AYRTON and the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER on the occasion, especially as the lateness of the hour rendered a reply to them impossible. We think the subject of so much importance to the Profession and the public, that we offer to our readers the following additional observations and considerations on the division and on the debate. The division we do not look upon as a defeat. Fifty-eight independent members of the House, including the tellers, registered their votes in favour of the reasonable claims of the Judges, and against the unreasoning refusal of the Government to comply with them. The division included the mover and seconder of the resolution, Mr. HIBBERT, and Mr. ASSHETON CROSS (Lancashire was well represented), Mr. BERESFORD HOPE, Mr. AMPHLETT, Q. C., and Mr. HINDE PALMER, Q. C., Mr. BONHAM CARTER (Chairman of the Committee of Selection), and several other distinguished names. The quarter sessions and other accidental circumstances deprived the Judges of many of their best friends, and amongst others, of Lord STANLEY and Sir JOHN PAKINGTON. for Queen's County, appeared in the minority. Where alone the division disappointed the supporters of the resolution, was in the default of certain members, who were pledged to support it, and of whom no less than eight actually attended the previous deputation, and stated to the CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER their own conviction and that of their constituents in favour of it, and their determination to vote for it. (a) Amongst them we cannot help mentioning Mr. HEADLAM, Q.C., who was entrusted with a memorial from the Chamber of Commerce of Newcastle in favour of the resolution, and Mr. NORWOOD, who attended the discussions on the Bankruptcy Bill throughout, and who were both in the House, but failed to vote. However, the Government majority of 102 votes threw out the resolution, without a pretence of argument or reason against it. Such a defeat so caused, is not a defeat at all, but only the shadow of a certain victory hereafter. With regard to the debate there was in reality, only one speech made, and that was the very able, unanswered, and unanswerable speech of Mr. HIBBERT, who moved the resolution at nearly one o'clock in the morning. Mr. ASSHETON CROSS's few observations were, however, to the point. Mr. AYRTON stated that there was a large deficit between the income and expenses of the County Courts, but he overlooked alike that it was fast decreasing in consequence of the extended jurisdiction and augmented business of the County Courts, and that if the Judges had continued to receive the fees originally designed for them by Parliament, their salaries would have been much higher, and the deficit would be much larger. He then proceeded to state that the present salary of 15007. per annum was given to the Judges in 1865 on the understanding that bankruptcy business would be added to their duties, although the contrary was the fact, as indeed clearly appears by a question put by Mr. AYRTON himself in that year to Mr. GLADSTONE, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the reply of the latter. Then Mr. AYRTON asked whether the salary of 1500l. was to be considered a final settlement, or that any further claims were to be made in respect of any further duties. Mr. GLADSTONE replied in a manner, giving the honourable gentleman no answer, assurance, or satisfaction whatsoever. Mr. AYRTON concluded by stating that the Judges' allowance was probably double what they earned at the bar. How contrary this statement is to the fact is well known to most of our readers. Take any dozen of the Judges from the earliest to the latest appointed; take Mr. BILLINGSLEY PARRY, Q.C., Mr. BAGSHAWE, Q.C., Sir WALTER RIDDELL, Mr. GALE, Mr. Serjt. PETERS DORFF, Mr. Serjt. WHEELER, Mr. ELLIS, Mr. WELFORD, Mr. STONOR (who, besides his practice, had an appointment of 1000% a year as the head of the West Indian Commission), Mr. TURNER, Mr. LAKE RUSSELL, Mr. RUSSELL, Q.C. As to all these gentlemen, and most of the other Judges, it may well be said, that not only is Mr. AYRTON'S statement untrue, but that the logical contrary of it is, generally speaking, the truth. But what has the question so improperly raised by Mr. AYRTON to do with the matter? If the present Judges are gentlemen whose capacities and abilities of mind or body proved inadequate for the arduous contest which ends in the highest judicial honours of the Equity and Common Law Bench, and who wisely accepted the less onerous duties of their present offices, is that any reason why the duties of the Judges of Superior Courts of Common Law, Admiralty, and Bankruptcy (we omit Equity, for remuneration was granted for that, and establishes the principle we contend for), should now be from time to time thrown on them as by the Amendment and Admiralty Acts of 1867 and 1868, and the Bankruptcy Bill 1869, without additional remuneration? Both Mr. Lowe and Mr. AYRTON carefully avoided any reference to the cases now referred to the County Courts by the Superior Courts under the Amendment Act 1867, or the cases in which the title to real estate is involved, and in which jurisdiction was also conferred on them by that Act. With regard to the Admiralty jurisdiction, the Act of course will operate on the 1st Jan. 1869, and the rules regulating it have only just been published by the LORD CHANCELLOR and his committee of County The Scotch and Irish members present generally responded to the Treasury whip, but the distinguished name of Mr. KENELM DIGBY, M.P. June 12. (a) See notice of this deputation in our number for Court Judges, and yet in one court to our knowledge there have been forty cases, some of great importance, and we believe there have been an equal number in other courts. With regard to the equity cases, and also the referred cases and those in which title is to come in question, which Mr. LOWE and Mr. AYRTON no doubt purposely ignored, we would refer the CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER to the County Courts Chronicle, much known and largely circulated in the Profession, but with which he is perhaps unacquainted. If he will refer to the judgments there reported of the learned Judges of County Courts, and especially of Mr. ELLIS, Mr. FALCONER, Mr. HERBERT, Mr. SHAW, and Mr. WELFORD, and Serjt. WHEELER, we think that he will not venture to repeat his assertions. The gentlemen we have mentioned are only some of whose judgments we have here had opportunities to obtain full and accurate reports, and we have every reason to believe that most of the Judges have discharged their large and multifarious duties as ably as those we have mentioned. With regard to the quantity of work performed by the County Court Judges, we have no hesitation in saying that whenever it is inquired into it will be found that they are occupied more hours in the public service than the Common Law Judges, and it is to be remembered that they have no secretary, clerk, or attendant, to assist them in their courts. The friends and supporters of the Judges of the County Courts, the Profession and the public, regard the decision of the House of Commons as an injustice, and the language of the Government as an insult. The House of Lords will soon have to deal with this measure, and we hope that the clause conferring the whole duties of the present Metropolitan Court and the Court of Appeal on Mr. Commissioner BACON, and the duties of the district commissioners on the County Court Judges, will be struck out until the Bill is accompanied with another increasing the salaries of both. That assembly has lately been charged with “unwisdom," and the country has resented the insult; we hope that in this case it will show its regard for that great maxim of absolute wisdom that "the labourer is worty of his hire." DEFENDANTS IN SCOTLAND. A VERY singular anomaly exists in our procedure as regards jurisdiction over defendants resident in Scotland. This will be illustrated by the following case which has come to our knowledge A., B., and C., are co-partners, carrying on business in a northern county in England. B. and C. are men of straw, and the partnership property at the place of business consists only of landlord's fixtures. A. resides in Scotland, and is the monied member of the firm. A bill of exchange having been accepted by the firm is dishonoured at maturity. It is useless to proceed against B. and C., and A. cannot be reached by any proceedings taken in this country. The anomaly is this. As our readers know, the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852, by sects. 18 and 19, provides for suing persons out of the jurisdiction, and the former section commences thus: "In case any defendant, being a British subject, is resident out of the jurisdiction of the said Superior Court in any place except in Scotland or Ireland, &c.” This anomalous provision is noticed by Mr. Day in his edition of the Common Law Procedure Acts. In a note to the section he says, "It is to be observed that a writ cannot be issued under this section against a defendant residing in Scotland or Ireland. The words creating the exception were introduced into the Act at the last moment. A Scottish plaintiff may sue an English defendant in the Courts of Scotland if he have any property which can be attached jurisdictionis fundandæ causa, and the latter may never hear of the action till he finds his property seized by a judgment-creditor. An English creditor has no such remedy against a debtor in Scotland or Ireland. He must go to the Scottish or Irish courts, as the case may be; and this, even if the debtor have all his property in this." In connection with this subject the action of the Legislature has been remarkable, for by the Act of 31 & 32 Vict., c. 54, a judgment obtained in England is, by registration, made effectual in Scotland, and vice versa. To our mind this is beginning at the wrong end of the procedure. A judgment cannot be obtained in this country against a debtor in Scotland, because a writ will not run into Scotland. The only conceivable use of the Judgments Extension Act is to attach in Scotland the property of debtors against whom judgment may have been obtained in England whilst within the jurisdiction. An early opportunity should be taken of placing this branch of our procedure on a sensible footing. case within the statute, the court, without giving The position of this question is, therefore, AGREEMENTS FOR LEASES, AND Is it PROSTITUTES IN PUBLIC HOUSES. WE have before us an Irish decision which is on all fours with the Haymarket case which recently came before the Middlesex sessions. According to the case stated by the Dublin magistrate, the complainant, an inspector of police deposed that on the night of the 19th Dec. LANDOWNERS and tenant farmers, house owners 1868, at about ten minutes past eight o'clock, and house occupiers, are continually asking he entered the public-house of the defendant and themselves these questions:-" Is the printed or written paper, under which I hold, or have went into a tap-room, and saw there thirty or forty soldiers and ten women, three or four of granted to hold, my premises, sufficient? whom he knew to be prostitutes, and the rest he a lease or only an agreement for one? suspected and believed to be prostitutes; they full and circumstantial that I do not see how a were sitting at table in company with soldiers; further document would make things plainer, or the defendant himself was not in the house, as my position safer; and yet my solicitor tells me he was ill; but the witness was accompanied by I ought to execute one! What is the practical the defendant's wife, who managed the business difference between an agreement and a lease; of the house, to whom he complained that the and how am I to know whether this is the one women were prostitutes, to which she replied or the other?" These questions, so natural and that they came in with soldiers and that she did easy to be put, are not so easy to answer. the object of this paper, however, to attempt to not know who or what they were; there were no other women but the ten that witness could see at do so; and to help the landed interest, if not to the time. On cross-examination the witness said dispense with lawyers in the matter, which would that the women were sitting at different tables, be in the last degree dangerous, at least to mixed up with soldiers; there were drinking understand something of the law, which reguvessels on the table; the women were not taik- lates transactions of everyday occurrence to ing to each other, but were talking to soldiers, of whom there were about thirty or forty in the rooms, and there was no appearance of improper and disorderly conduct in the room. For the defendant it was deposed by his shop assistant that none of the women in the room on the occasion of the visit of the police came in alone. That they all came in accompanied by men, and all got refreshments in the ordinary way. They and the men accompanying them came in in different numbers. Witness also themselves. It is It is necessary then, in the first place, to impress on them this fact, that an instrument, although it styles itself an "agreement," or a agreement," may, nevertheless, be a lease. And "memorandum of agreement," or "articles of that, on the other hand, one which on the face of it appears to be a lease, may, all the while, be an agreement only. the instrument belongs? The real test seems to As to the statutory formalities to be observed, the subject may be treated under two heads: 1. As regards interests in lands and houses which do not, and 2. As regards such as do, exceed three years from the making thereof. First, as to interests not exceeding three years. These, if leases, and reserving rent to the amount of two-thirds of the full improved value of the thing demised, were not required by the (old) law to be in writing (29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 2), and therefore need not be by deed (8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3), nor even in writing, row. But such a lease by a corporation must be by deed. If, however, these interests are, as they may be, created by deed or writing, an ad valorem stamp on the amount of rent is necessary: (13 & 14 Vict. be of a furnished house for less than a year, and c. 97; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 83, s. 24.) If the lease the rent exceed 251., a 2s. 6d. stamp is necessary, which may be adhesive, and across which every party, if not more than two, must write his name: (24 & 25 Vict. c. 21, sched. B.) If the instrument be an agreement only, it must be in writing, in order to be valid at law (though if made by an agent he need not be authorised in writing), or at least, and this virtually amounts to the same thing, no action can Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4.) be brought upon it unless it be in writing: (29 In equity, however, an agreement not in writing will be enforced, if it has been partly performed. What amounts to a part performance is in itself a long chapter in law, and need not here be gone into. If the agreement be by a corporation it seems it must be by deed: (Carter v. Dean of Ely, L. & T. 155), and payment of rent a tenancy 7 Sim. 211, 227.) Entry under a mere agreement constitutes a tenancy at will (Woodfall's or, at least, evidence from which a jury may find a tenancy-from year to year: (Ibid. P. 153.) The stamp on such an agreement is the same as on a lease for the same rent, term, &c.: furnished house for less than a year, the stamp is added that he received orders from his master, with the statutory formalities as to its being in (23 Vict. c. 15.) If it be an agreement for a without a man, and that those orders were also writing, or under seal, and as to its stamp (of the same as on a lease thereof for such a term: the defendant, never to allow prostitutes in strictly observed and enforced. And on the defendant's behalf it was contended that the presence in his house of ten prostitutes, who came in as described, and only for the purpose of getting refreshments, did not constitute a meeting within the provisions of the statute 5 Vict, c. 24, s. 17, under which the complaint was brought, and that the magistrate which presently)-was the intention of the parties (24 & 25 Vict. c. 21.) Secondly, as to interests in lands or houses exceeding three years, or-if the reserved rent be not two-thirds of the improved annual value, or the lease is to begin from a day subsequent to the making (a) thereof-not exceeding three years. These, if leases, must be by deed (8 & 9 Vict. should not convict the defendant without some rather a vague and unsatisfactory way of stating c. 106, s. 3); but if not by deed, and therefore for the purpose of prostitution. The magistrate, however, considered that the prostitutes, or the majority of them, had been permitted to continue in the defendant's publichouse for a longer period than was reasonable or necessary for the purpose of refreshment; and held that such an assembly of soldiers and prostitutes as described was in violation of the Act of Parliament, as being likely to result in breaches of morality and decency. He accordingly convicted the defendant of knowingly permitting prostitutes to meet together and remain in his house contrary to the statute. This is exactly similar to the decision of Mr. KNOX. It was appealed from to the Court of Common Pleas, which court quashed the conviction after the manner of the Middlesex terms of each agreement-which are indefinite in their variety-for the discovery of that intention. And yet it seems all that can be said, in a general way. It may be made clearer, however, by a few illustrations. Thus, it may be considered that the words "A. agrees to let, and B. to take;" "A. does this day agree to let;" "You shall have a lease," followed by immediate occupation (a) by the tenant, constitute a lease, even although the instrument contains words pointing to a subsequent lease; for these words may be satisfied by referring them to the execution of a second lease by way, as the lawyers call it, of "further assurance," setting out more fully the terms of the holding, and so assuring" to each party more completely their respective rights. So, the stipulation that "until a lease is executed the parties shall stand in the same relation as if it had been" is a strong indication of its being a lease; and so, if the instrument contains provisions usually found in actual that the magistrate should arrive at the con- leases. Again, certainty as to the amount of clusion that the women came to the house for rent and time of its payment, and as to the the purpose of prostitution or other disorderly commencement and duration of the term, or an conduct; that on the case there was no finding expenditure by the tenant on the premises in by the magistrate that, as a fact on the evidence, compliance with the instrument, point to a he arrived at the conclusion that the ten women, similar construction. or any of them, had gone into the appellant's house either in furtherance of prostitution or in the capacity of prostitutes; that he did find that they remained longer than was necessary for refreshment; but the conclusion he arrived at from that fact was not a fact, viz., that they came into the appellant's house, or were there magistrates. The court were of opinion that to justify a conviction it was not sufficient that prostitutes were in the house together; that it was necessary in their vocation, or in furtherance of it; but only a probability that such assembly was likely to result in breaches of morality. And as the magistrate did not appear himself to have come to the conclusion essential in order to bring the On the other hand, if the lessor had not at the time the power to grant a lease, it is not one, though in terms it would appear to be so; nor does the absence in it of words pointing to a future more formal instrument show it to be a lease. So a stipulation that the tenant shall hold on "all usual covenants where the premises are situate," is strong to show it an agreement only. not still be good as agreements, and enforceable as such in a court of equity, or by action for breach of them at law, if founded on what is called in law a "good or valuable consideration." That is, the party making the promise must have obtained some advantage, and the party with whom such pro mise was made must have suffered some loss, or sustained some injury or inconvenience, in consequence of the making or accepting the promise. And this "consideration" must be mutual, i. log there must be one moving from the landlord to the tenant, and also from the tenant to the landlord; otherwise it is one-sided, and incapable of being enforced. Thus a tenant, who has stipu lated to repair (in an instrument void at law for not being by deed), and has entered and paid rent, cannot allege want of consideration on his own part as a ground for relieving himself from his stipulation. His entry and payment has raised such an equitable obligation in the landlord to fulfil his part of the contract (ie, to do everything that is properly incidental to a tenancy) as will support the stipulation. And such a stipulation to repair is not inconsistent with a tenancy from year to year: (Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. Merral, L. Rep. 4 Ex. 162.) These interests must, moreover, to be good as agreements, be in writing, for the same reason as agreements for interests under three years: (29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4.) If leases, the proper stamp on them is an ad valorem one on the rent: (13 & 14 Vict. c. 97.) If agreements for a term not exceeding seven years, they must be stamped as leases for the If agreements for terms exceeding seven years, same term, rent, &c.: (23 Vict. c. 15, sched.) then they seem to require a sixpenny stamp (a) It is true Mr. Platt (Leases, vol. 1, p. 611) says only, as agreements "not otherwise charged," if the subject-matter of them be over 5l.: (Ibid.) The chief practical difference between an agreement for a lease, and a lease, now that the stamps on them are generally the same, is, that in the former the tenant, not possessing, at least until he has paid rent, the legal estate, the landlord may bring an action of ejectment against him at any time without notice, should he enter and occupy; and his only redress, if any, is to obtain an injunction in equity to restrain him. Whilst, on the other hand, and for the same reason, the landlord cannot, at least until payment of rent by the tenant, have the summary remedy of a distress, for rent in arrear, but will be driven to his action in damages for use and occupation: (5 Davidson's Convey. p. 17.) Not that even a lease passes the legal estate to the tenant by force of, and instantly upon, its execution, unless and until the lessee, as he generally does, or has previously done, "enters:" (Co. Litt. 270, a.) This entry must be an actual one on a part of the premises in the name of the whole, by himself or his agent. The following advice then, upon the whole, is offered : Find, first, from the instrument itself, whether it is an agreement or a lease, and then apply the above-mentioned statutes, and see how far it has complied with their requirements, as to its being in writing, or by deed, or being duly stamped. And if it be still in course of preparation, and unexecuted, and the intention be that it should operate only as an agreement, insert in it a clause to that effect, to obviate all future questions about it. MISSTATEMENT OR FRAUD? THE careers of limited liability companies have done a great deal to illustrate the distinction between misstatement and fraud. This distinction we have seen cropping up again in the case of Jacomb v. Watkin, which has occupied so much of the London sittings in the Court of Queen's Bench, and therefore it may not be labour lost if we look at the judicial decisions respecting fraud and misrepresentation, to use the legal expression, in order to see the reasons which underlie the distinction. We may notice, in the first place, that strong objection has been more than once expressed to the use of the word fraudulent, and conspicuously so in the case of Turquand v. Marshall, the hearing of which before the Lord Chancellor we report this week (see also L. Rep. 4 Ch. App. 376.) This case was originally before the Master of the Rolls; and his Lordship, upon counsel using the word "fraudulent," interposed by saying, "I do not like the word 'fraudulent,' the expression is 'false.' That is the proper statement. I do not like to have the word *fraudulent' used unless there is strong proof of it. It means not merely falsehood, but falsehood for the benefit of the persons who utter the falsehood. As the case is put to me, no case of that sort is opened. The case put by Sir R. Palmer has been, negligence and improper conduct, for which they are liable, but from which they did not get the slightest benefit themselves." cases of misrepresentation, as, for instance, of Therefore, we see that, as a matter of induce- found in the disinclination which was felt against interfering with that description of betting which had so long existed at TATTERSALL'S and elsewhere in connection with the great national sport of horse-racing. This he did say beyond a doubt, and the only question is whether his Bill spoke as clearly as himself, and overcame the difficulty by steering clear of the favoured betting places. The writer of the pamphlet very ingeniously takes sects. 1 and 2 of the Act, together with the speech of the now Chief Justice, and out of the most comprehensive view extracts the conclusion that what Sir ALEXANDER said he intended he has actually effected. Now for the purpose of seeing whether this is so we must look carefully at the Act. The preamble undoubtedly refers to a new kind of betting-house, the proprietors of which gambled with their customers, a system which the Act designed to suppress. The first section says, "No house, office, room, or other place shall be opened, kept, or used for the purpose of the owner, occupier, or keeper thereof, or any person procured or employed by or on behalf of such owner, occupier, or keeper, or person using the same, or of any person having the care or management, or in any manner conducting the business thereof betting with persons resorting thereto; or for the purpose of any money or valuable thing being received by or on behalf of such owner, occupier, keeper, or person as aforesaid, as or for the consideration for any assurance, undertaking, promise or agreement, express or implied, to pay or give thereafter any money or valuable thing on any event or contingency of or relating to any horse race, fight, game, sport, or exercise; or as or for the consideration for securing the paying or giving by some other person of any money or valuable thing on any event or contingency as aforesaid; and every house, office, room, or other place opened, kept, or used for the purpose aforesaid, or any of them, is hereby declared to be a common nuisance and contrary to law." Now taking the great case of Pasley v. Freeman, and the numerous decisions of which that is the chief, we find the principle to be that a mere falsehood is not enough to give a right of action; but if it be a falsehood told with the Taken apart from the speech which introintention that it should be acted upon by the party duced the Bill, this section can have but one injured, that party would have his remedy. meaning, namely, that all places inducing to the This principle was affirmed in the Exchequer congregation of persons for the purpose of Chamber in Langridge v. Levy, on the ground betting should be a nuisance and contrary to that there had been fraud and damage resulting law. It satisfies the statute if a person profrom it. Thus we find a false statement regarded cures another to come and bet with the persons as a fraud and punished accordingly. The result who resort to his place. This person need not at which we must arrive is that there is very be employed, that is to say, made use of for the little distinction between a false statement and a fraudulent statement, where the knowledge of cured. This distinction is material. A person express purpose, but it is sufficient if he be prothe person making it is equal in each case. learned author, dealing with fraud in the sale of certain thing or whether he be attracted to do it. A is equally procured, whether he be paid to do a personalty, says, "Although fraud has been If by the attractions provided by facility of said to be every kind of artifice employed by one meeting with men of his class, a man goes to a person for the purpose of deceiving another,' place prepared to bet with persons resorting to courts and lawgivers have alike wisely refrained it, is not a temptation thus held out to the from any attempt to define with exactness what general public to go there and make their bets? constitutes a fraud, it being so subtle in its And was not the greediness of the public for the nature, and so Protean in its disguises, as to excitement of betting exactly what the Legislarender it almost impossible to give a definition ture meant to check when they passed the Bill which fraud would not find means to evade :" brought in by Sir A. COCKBURN? (Benjamin's Sale of Personal Property, p. 314.) That is to say that whilst in every knowingly false statement, fraud primâ facie exists, it is so difficult to satisfy the law's conception of fraud that its actual presence can rarely be proved. Therefore if the word fraudulent were erased rather an advantage than otherwise. from our legal vocabulary the loss would be THE LAWS AGAINST BETTING AND Having these observations of the Master of as may be, the policy of the Legislature in pass- The principal point made by the writer is, that TATTERSALL'S is more within the Act than are We are disposed to think, indeed, that the offices of the betting commission agents which have been attacked by the police, and Mr. POLAND's plea that TATTERSALL'S is a club is about the most untenable that could have been set up. Any body of men may form a club by subscribing one penny apiece, and we suppose no one would venture to say that the rate of subscription has anything to do with the question. The word used in the section is "re sorting," which, if anything, admits rather than negatives the presumption of an application for admission, and whether a person so applying pays, or whether he does not, is a matter of no moment. We have taken a view opposed to "LEX," who writes the pamphlet which suggested this article, and we do so because we do not travel out of the Act to look at what Sir A. COCKBURN's intention was. Had the Legislature intended to spare TATTERSALL's and the commission offices they should have done so expressly. As it is, the "club" theory being exploded, we do not see how the ancient institution is to be protected whilst less noxious modern ones are prosecuted. What if an opposition TATTERSALL'S started tomorrow-would it be liable and the old one exempt? Clearly a custom in favour of that which is contrary to law is a bad custom, and could not be supported. If the pending prosecutions succeed, à fortiori should a similar prosecution succeed against TATTERSALL'S. THE POWERS OF VOLUNTARY Ar a time when there is before us a near pros- law. From one or two recent decisions we are led to infer that the courts are disposed to uphold the independence of voluntary bodies, to allow them to be judges of their own concerns, and to interfere as little as possible with the administration of their affairs. One of the most important duties of a voluntary religious body is, obviously, the appointment of its minister, and the power of such a body in dealing with its minister is illustrated by the case of Cooper v. Gordon, before Vice-Chancellor Stuart, 20 L. T Rep. N. S. 732. There, it is true, there were endowments to be administered by trustees in paying the minister. But the same principle arising in all these cases arose there, namely, the principle affecting the power to dismiss on mere caprice and upon grounds not tenable in the case of master and servant. The facts in that case are edifying in many respects. Had the minister, who was there the defendant, been guilty of immorality or heterodoxy, the congregation would, of course, have had a right at once to eject him from his office. But Mr. Gordon was not charged with anything of this kind, and there was nothing in the rules of the society with reference to the removal of the pastors. Was, then, the majority to govern the minority? and was a minister to be dismissed upon grounds affecting merely the composition of his sermons? Of course, it will at once occur to the legal mind that the question is one of contract between the parties, and where the contract is not in writing usage must govern. It appeared in the case of Cooper v. Gordon that the objections to Mr. Gordon were not of such a nature as would have justified his dismissal without notice, but were simply as follows:1. That his sermons were too argumentative, containing trains of reasoning which the people could not carry away with them. 2. The sermons were above the level of the great mass of people, not being sufficiently simple. 3. They were too Arminian in doctrine. 4. They set up too high a standard of Christian life, not taking sufficient account of the influence of trials, &c. 5. There was a deficiency of unction, of Gospel power, and Christian experience. 6. The motives from which Christians were exhorted to act were not those of Christian love, but of dry, rigid duty. 7. The work of the Spirit was not sufficiently dwelt upon. 8. In some of the sermons there was nothing said to unconverted sinners. And we may briefly say that it was in the power of the majority of the congregation on such grounds as these to dismiss their minister against the wish of the minority. This doctrine is carried to its full extent in a case more to the point as regards voluntary bodies bound by no trust but governed only by ordinances-the case of Perry v. Shipway, 1 Giff. 1. There it was recognised that a dissenting minister is merely tenant, at will of the trustees, and if a majority of the trustees choose to prevent him from preaching they can do so. That was established at law by two cases which it may be wise to notice. They are both reported in 10 B. & C., the first, Jones v. Jones, at p. 718. That case decided that where a dissenting minister was, after his election, placed in possession of a chapel and dwelling house, by certain persons in whom the legal fee was vested in trust, to permit and suffer the chapel to be used for the purpose of religious worship, he was a mere tenant at will to those persons, and that his interest was determinable by a demand of possession, without any previous notice to quit. The other case which follows this is Nicholl v. McKaeg, at p. 721. That case is strictly in accordance with Jones v. Jones, but goes further, and says that the minister is not entitled to reasonable time to remove his goods. Lord Tenterden, in his judgment, said, "It was contended that a mere demand of possession was not in this case sufficient to determine the tenancy, but that a reasonable time ought to have been allowed the defendant for the purpose had been obtained calling on the respondents to enforce payment from the Dock Company of Southampton of such a sum as would make up the income of the commissioners from dues on goods equal to 1000l. per annum. The corporation of Southampton were the promoters, and their direct interest in the money to be recovered from the Dock Company was supposed to be that they were entitled to one-fifth of that sum, when it should have been recovered from the Dock Company. The money was sought to be recovered from the Dock Company under 6 Will. 4, c. 29, s. 124, and the right of the corporation to have one fifth of the sum recovered from that company was al leged to have been created by 43 Geo. 3, c. 21, s. 19, which established the commissioners. The Court of Exchequer Chamber, being of opinion that the corporation had no right to the fifth part of the money sought to be recovered from the Dock Company, reversed the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench, which had turned upon another point. At the conclusion of the arguments the Lord Chancellor put the following questions to the learned judges, who requested time to consider their opinions :-First, whether the writ of mandamus in this case was good and satisfactory; and secondly, whether, according to the construction of the Acts of Parliament relating to the docks and port of Southampton respectively, the income of the commissioners arising from rates, duties, and payments in respect of goods, wares, or mer chandise referred to in the 124th section of 6 Will. 4, c. 29, was to be taken as inclusive or exclusive of the one-fifth share payable to the corporation of Southampton out of the said rates and duties. The further consideration was adjourned sine die. There remains the question of the rights of Vice-Chancellor Stuart thinks it a wise law "You have now been heard between six and seve hours. We realise the importance of the issues to yourself and daughter, and we have been most anxious to give you every possible indulgence. But the issues have been nearly smothered by the mass of irrelevant matter introduced. You have added no new arguments to those of your SAYINGS AND DOINGS OF THE daughter, and we are of opinion that your case 13 COURTS. [CONTRIBUTED BY THE REPORTERS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS. The arguments in The Queen on the Prosecution closed. The questions are these: Ought the court below to have called a jury? Were the inferences drawn from the evidence by the court below right or wrong? Was evidence improperly admitted or rejected by the court below? Does the new evi dence, discovered since the trial in the court below, affect the accuracy of the decision then arrived at? We will take time to consider whether we need call upon the counsel on the other side." The further consideration of this case was then adjourned sine die. It may be interesting to note the time occupied in the addresses of the appel lants. Miss Shedden applied for a further postponement on April 26, but the application was refused by the House, and it was ordered that the case should be proceeded with peremptorily on the following day. On April 27 accordingly Miss Shedden commenced her address, and continued it on twenty-one days between that date an June 22. She occupied eighteen days in her |