save under special circumstances, to be stated in the order. This new economy of the Treasury will result, like all former attempts unduly to curtail the expenses of prosecutions, in the further paralysis of the criminal law. The reduction of the allowance to prosecutors and witnesses has already operated to deter the one from prosecuting crime, and the other from detecting it. The limitation of counsel's fee to a guinea will prevent practised men from appearing in prosecutions, because thereby they will deprive themselves of the chances of a better fee for the defence. Something will depend, of course, upon what the Clerk of Assize may hold to be special circumstances. He may, we think, fairly deem any number of witnesses above three, or the fact that the prisoner was defended, to be such "specialties" as would justify a larger fee. If he should so determine, this cheeseparing order will be more in show than substance. But if it is to be strictly enforced, either the Bar will be treated in a manner that will amount almost to an insult, or prosecutors will be subjected to an additional punishment in the discharge of a public duty. IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT. A GREAT improvement has been introduced into this Bill. The most effective power possessed by the County Courts, that, indeed, by which only they are enabled to compel payment of debts, is the power to imprison for disobedience to an limited to the counties of Northumberland, Cum- The real grievance of the Unions, though was not the ostensible one, is that they have not the help of the Friendly Societies Acts for the recovery of the subscriptions from their own members, nor powers wherewith to compel observance of their rules. It is to obtain this, and not for protection against embezzlement, that the privilege of enrolment under the Friendly Societies Acts is so eagerly sought, and it would have been more candid in Mr. HUGHES so to have told the House and the public. 66 On all sides doubts were expressed whether it THE TRADES UNION BILL. 3. That associations for such a purpose were the right of the poorest labourer because they are inflicted by persons of his own class. This wrong it is that the general criminal law fails to meet, and it will be absolutely necessary to order to pay, unless the defendant satisfies the entitled to the same protection from the law for the security of the workman from oppression court that he does not pay because he cannot pay. This power, which it was impossible to take from the County Courts without paralysing them, was objected to as drawing an invidious distinction between small debtors and great debtors, when the latter are relieved from liability to imprisonment for debt, and there was great danger lest the popular tribunal should be practically destroyed for the sake of avoiding a seeming inequality. The difficulty has been removed by a process of "levelling up." The Bill that abolishes imprisonment for debt extends to the Superior Courts the same power to imprison for contempt in non-obedience to an order as is possessed by the County Courts. Where after judgment a debt is not paid at a time ordered by a court or a Judge, the defendant may be summoned to show cause why he should not be imprisoned for such contempt. If he satisfies the Judge that he had not ability to obey the order, he will be discharged, of course; but otherwise he may be imprisoned for a limited time. A very foolish argument against imprisonment for debt has been founded on the small number of such imprisonments. But the effect of fear of it is forgotten. It is the knowledge that he might be sent to gaol if he do not pay that keeps many a man honest who would readily escape the obligation if he knew he could do so with impunity. The efficacy of punishment cannot be measured by the number of those who suffer it. The question is, how many does the dread of it deter from crime? The relaxation of severity in the law of debtor and creditor has been undoubtedly attended with an enormous increase of fraudulent debtors, and the pending Bill will doubtless largely increase their number. CLERKS OF ASSIZE. THE report of a committee, consisting of Mr. Justice BRETT, Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, and Mr. M. LAW, appointed by the Treasury to inquire into the duties and salaries of clerks of assize has been made. The committee come to the conclusion that it will be desirable to retain the office of clerk of assize, but that it would be expedient to prescribe that persons appointed to these offices should have had some degree of legal training, i.e., that he should be a barrister or certificated attorney of three years' standing, or should have served for a similar period in a subordinate office on circuit. The committee consider that a salary of 1000l. per annum is more than sufficient to secure the services of officers properly qualified to fill those posts, and they recommend that the salaries of the clerk of assize on the Home, Western, Oxford, Midland, and Norfolk circuits, should, as vacancies occur, be reduced to a sum not exceeding 8001. per annum. As regards the Northern Circuit, they state that if the duties of the clerk of assize remain, as at present, their persons and their property as is given to all other lawful associations. 4. That there should be some recognition by law of such associations, so as to enable them to act in a corporate capacity. But there was and is much diversity of opinion what should be the form of such incorporations. The Bill simply proposes the extension to them of the Friendly Societies Acts; but many friends of the Trades Unions, and notably the Economist, object to this, as being to some extent a misrepresentation of their character. The Acts in question are constructed purposely to promote certain objects of charity; but the main purpose of the Trades Unions is not charity, and there is no reason why they should have the benefit of Acts designed with a different object than a joint-stock company, or a cricket club, or any other association. Thus all the main principles for which the LAW TIMES has contended on behalf of the Trades Unions are conceded; and in framing the measure which Mr. BRUCE again promised on behalf of the Government, they must form its foundation. It will then, we doubt not, be seen that the plan here proposed for the incorporation of Trades Societies, very much upon the model of the Companies Act 1862, is the most feasible and the best calculated to give permanent satisfaction. A good deal was said about the absence of legal protection for their property, and so little is this point understood, that the HOME SECRETARY has brought in a short Bill to give such protection pending the production of the general cheme. But there is no need for it. The trades unions possess precisely the same protection, neither less nor more, as all other associations not enrolled under the Friendly Societies Acts. Certain summary jurisdiction is given to magistrates by those Acts for the protection of the funds of enrolled societies; but this is not a substitute for the general protection provided by the criminal law. A trades union can punish a defaulting treasurer or secretary by indictment, and Mr. RUSSELL GURNEY'S Act of last session removes the only obstacle that practically impeded such a prosecution. At this moment every trades union possesses the identical protection against embezzlement by its servants which is possessed by every other employer. To say, then, as Mr. HUGHES and other speakers ventured to say, that their funds are unprotected, was to mislead the House and the country, for Mr. HUGHES, who is a lawyer, cannot but know that the law gives to them precisely the same protection as it gives to him. It was surprising that of the many lawyers in the House not one rose to correct this mis-statement, and it is still more strange that it was not noticed by Mr. BRUCE, who also must have been better informed. by his fellows that sufficient provision should be made for it simultaneously with the repeal of the Combination Act. SPECIAL BAILS BILL. WE have received the following letter: TO THE EDITOR OF THE LAW TIMES. Sir,-As a specimen of the esteem in which the Profession is held, I beg to call your attention to what is reported to have been uttered by the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain on the occasion of moving the second reading of this Bill. His Lordship is reported to have said that by an old Act of Parliament (alluding, no doubt, to the 4 Will. & M. c. 4) no person was allowed to take special bail in the country who was an attorney or solicitor, but that now it was not worth any per son's while to take the office who was not an attorney or solicitor, and the object was to enable attorneys and solicitors to take special bail. In other words, now that the office and duties of commissioners for taking special bail was utterly worthless in a pecuniary sense, it is discovered that they are eligible to fill the office. Is any comment necessary? I abstain from making any. I leave you to deal with the subject as you may deem right. S. J. H. WHAT WE SHALL HAVE TO PAY. THE British taxpayer is in for it. When the Budget was propounded, there was so much dexterous dealing with the various duties henceforth to be levied, and especially with the periods for future payments, that very few in or out of Parliament had formed any definite notion when they would be called upon to put their hands into their pockets to meet the demands of the State. Tables were authorotatively published purporting to show when the taxes of the next twelvemonth were to be paid. But strings of figures are read by few, and understood by fewer, and at this moment probably not one taxpayer in a hundred has any definite conception in his mind of what the law has imposed upon him. It is the law now, and the statute is before us, and a summary of its provisions will doubtless astonish many of our readers. The Act that is to wring so vast a sum from the taxpayers in so short a time is c. 14 of 32 & 33 Vict., Part 1 of which relates to the Customs, and does not concern the present inquiry. We turn to Part 2 which relates to the income-tax, land-tax, and inhabited house duty. The sums assessed to the income-tax for the last year are to be taken as the annual value for assessment during the present year, but subject to increase or diminution in the same manner as the original assessment. The 8th section then proceeds to repeal the provisions for collecting the house duty, landtax, and income-tax quarterly, and enacts that the duties for the year ending April 5, 1870, one week of a month, I cannot sign it until four shall be payable on the 1st Jan. next. Observe the effect of this. In practice, the taxes for the year ending April 5 next would be collected, one half in November and the other half in May; that is to say, half the incometax for the current year would not be payable until the 6th April next, and would not be in fact collected until May or June. But, according to the text of Mr. Lowe's new law, it must be paid in full in January next, thus anticipating the period of payment by four or five months, and compelling that payment at the period of the year when most persons have more demands upon them and less receipts to meet them than at any other season. But this is not the only hardship inflicted by the new law. Another screw is to be applied to the unhappy taxpayer in this same black month of January. The assessed taxes, as well as the income tax and land tax, are to be paid in January in full. This is effected by a process even more stringent. The assessed taxes are converted by sect. 16 into excise duties, for which licences are to be taken out on the 1st Jan. for the ensuing year, so that we shall be called upon in September to pay the half year's assessed taxes for this year; in January the whole year's assessed taxes for next year, and in April the remaining half year's assessed taxes for the present year-practically two years' payments will be demanded in one year, and the greater portion of them in the most inconvenient month of the whole year in which to provide the money to meet them. We shall make this complicated arrangement more intelligible by an instance. B. is assessed, say, at 204 for assessed taxes, at 50% for income-tax, at 10% for land tax. As it would have been but for Mr. Lowe's scheme, he would have paid this 807. thus:1869. In September 1870. In May £40 sent year £10 80 10 The Budget offers many and considerable improvements in taxation, but they will be dearly purchased at the price of so terrible a screw in the collection as is described above, and the working of which is as yet but imperfectly understood by those who are to be subjected to it. In January there will be such an outcry from the taxpayers as England has not heard for many a year. A general election would then assuredly leave the Government in a minority. It is fortunate that they are not likely to be compelled to appeal to the country at a time when it will be smarting under the infliction of two years taxes levied in three months. COUNTY COURT APPEALS. Ir is not often that we find a County Court Judge reviewing a decision of a court of appeal which has reversed his own judgment. As a general rule of course there can be no practical utility in this, and the Judge who would make it a practice would simply waste the public time. There should be good grounds for making any comment upon the judgment of a court of appeal, and the question is, what we are to consider good grounds. Mr. FALCONER, of the Welsh Circuit, has afforded us some material upon which we may arrive at a reasonable conclusion. He gave judgment in a case which was pretty much one for a jury, involving as it did a claim for demurrage, and the question being whether certain delay in unloading was excusable or not. In the first place his Honour pointed out that it is a very easy matter for a case stated for appeal to go to the court above in a defective condition. He takes occasion to say, "At first I thought the case was too hastily prepared. This arose from a rule of the courts, that the appeal case shall be drawn up by the parties and settled, in case of dispute, by the Judge; and also to an absurd provision which interferes with a prudent delay, namely, that the case shall be signed in open court. So that if I do not sign the case in weeks afterwards." This being so, we think that wherever the case is one principally of fact, and where there can be any doubt as to the construction to be put upon the facts, it should be open to a County Court Judge further to inform the court of appeal. There are obvious objections to such a proposal, the main one being that it might be abused; but we think that a restatement of the case might be permitted in certain cases, and the first thing to be done is to abolish the provisions now existing as to stating and signing cases for appeal. PASTURAGE ON HIGHWAYS. The question is one of fact for the magistrates to determine. It would be hard not to allow the proprietors of these roads to depasture their cattle on the sides, but they must place them under sufficient charge to prevent their straying." This makes the matter sufficiently clear, and disposes of the doubts entertained by the writer of the letter which we have quoted above. LAND. THE INCLOSURE OF COMMON A CORRESPONDENT Writes as follows to the task. The commons throughout England are The writer of the above was evidently un- The committee conclude their report by ex pressing the opinion that the annual Inclosure Bill requires the constant attention of Parliament. In this we heartily concur. We would further recommend that the condemnation of common lands to inclosure should in each instance be made the subject of a proper inquiry, the assistant commissioner being empowered to hold a court, and persons compelled by subpoena to give evidence before him. CONTRACTS TO LOAD AND UNLOAD. A CASE of Nelson v. Richards, recently before the Queen's Bench, but not reported, raises a question upon the construction of a contract to deliver to consignees within a reasonable time, and it was there decided that unless there is an express clause providing for contingencies, the delivery must be made subject to contingencies. There the facts were these: A ship, the Rivulet, arrived at Swansea, on Friday morning, the 2nd Oct., at eight o'clock, laden with calamine or oxide of zinc. She was not discharged until Saturday, the 17th Oct. She might have been discharged in six days if her discharge had commenced on her arrival, but seven other vessels, laden with zinc ore for the same consignee as the consignee of the Rivulet, had arrived in port before the Rivulet and four of the seven arrived the same day. The "unloading" in the terms of the charter-party was to be "through the charterer's agency at Swansea as expeditiously as the custom of the port would allow, for which special arrangements were made." The ore was unloaded into barges, and the distance they had to traverse was about three miles, and through locks. The unloading was accomplished expeditiously and with as much despatch as this mode of discharge permitted, and so far, "unloaded" with all reasonable despatch. But this despatch related only to the unloading, that is the taking of the ore out of the vessel and the claim for demurrage, for which the action was brought, depended on the delay preceding the unloading. The consignees took the vessels in turn, and employed as many barges as they could get. Looking at this case in connection with previous decisions, we see that a nice distinction may exist where states of facts are somewhat different. In the above case the court said that the charterer could not be taken to have contracted that the port should be free, and that if the shipowner had desired to protect himself against possible delay by the happening of any contingencies he should have had a clause inserted in the charter-party. The previous decisions are not numerous. The earliest that we know of-Rodgers v. Forresters, 2 Camp. 483-decided that if the freighter of a ship employed to bring a cargo of wine into the port of London, covenant to unload in the usual and customary manner at her port of discharge, he is not liable for detention of the ship in the London Docks, if she is unloaded in her turn into the bonded warehouses. There, however, there was a particular custom, that ships should unload in rotation. "The wines," said Lord Ellenborough, "might have been landed sooner, by an immediate payment of the duties; but since the bonding system was introduced, this has ceased to be the usual and customary mode of unloading a cargo." Another case in the same volume, at p. 488, is that of Burmester v. Hodgson, and comes near the principal case which we have already mentioned. The facts were very similar to those in Rodgers v. Forresters, Chief Justice Mansfield holding, indeed, that the two cases were not distinguishable. It was therefore held that the consignee was not liable to make compensation to the owner of the ship in the nature of demurrage for any delay occasioned by the crowded state of the London Docks, although the cargo might have been landed sooner if the duties had been immediately paid. This case, however, is apparently in conflict with a third case on the point, occurring in the same volume-Randall v. Lynch, p. 352. It was laid down there that if by a charter-party leave is given to detain the ship a certain number of days for the purpose of discharging her cargo, this amounts to a covenant on the part of the freighter, that he will not detain her longer; and further that the vicissitude of the crowding of the London docks was one for which the freighter was liable to the shipowner in respect of the delay in unloading. Lord Ellenborough said, "The question is whether the detention of the ship arising from the inability of the London The reader will, of course. perceive that in In other cases the question what is a vicissitude which may reasonably cause delay, for which neither party can be made responsible to the other, has been somewhat arbitrarily decided. In Adams v. The Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, 28 L. J. 33, C. P. which was an action for not loading in the customary manner, the Judge was held rightly to have directed the jury not to take into consideration a delay occasioned by a strike among the colliers, and a dispute with a railway company, along whose line the coal had to be brought to the port for shipment, these not being matters contemplated by either party when the charter party was made. Chief Justice Cockburn said, "It happened that extraordinary circumstances arose which prevented the defendants getting their coals down to the vessel. That cannot now avail them. They ought to have protected themselves by a clause to that effect in the charter-party." Mr. Justice Lush is said to have held that this case and another, to which we shall refer, were not applicable to the case of Nelson V. Richards, but in our opinion, there is very little in the distinction drawn between contracting to supply a cargo and contracting to unload, that the one is absolute, the other contingent. Could it be said that a contract to supply a cargo is invariably absolute? The question, however, is now concluded by authority, and must be considered as no longer open for discussion, for Kearon v. Pearson, 31 L. J. 1, Ex., established that a contract to load with usual despatch means "usual despatch of persons who have a cargo in readiness for the purpose of loading," and that if the party contracting to supply the cargo is prevented from obtaining it within a reasonable time, the loss must be his. This being so, we will only say that there are some cargoes which could not be kept in readiness. In Kearon v. Pearson, the cargo was coal. But what if it had been perishable? The distinction, however, must be held sound on authority, and the deduction must be, first, that there can be no excuse for not loading at the time agreed upon, and secondly, that whilst delay may be excusable in unloading, the question of what contingencies will excuse delay is a question for the jury. If a time of hiring be agreed upon, all detention after that time must be paid for as demurrage, the fact of there being no berth available offering no excuse: (Randall v. Lynch, sup.) But where no time of hiring is agreed upon, the case of Nelson v. Richards recognises that contingencies must be considered, and that the crowded state of the docks is a contingency which will be taken into calculation. COUNTY COURT ADVOCACY. County Court advocacy is at present very it can be said there will always be some barrier to the solicitors attaining the object of the ambition of so many of them. But we cannot say that this result is wholly owing to the solicitors. We have one instance before us which shows that a Judge may, in a great degree, govern the behaviour of those who practise before him. That it is hard to leave untouched an obstreperous advocate, we allow, but the temptation to meet such an one with his own weapons can rarely be submitted to without loss of dignity. the following information: "It is a well known From a western court a local reporter sends us fact," he says "that Judge SAUNDERS and Mr. Attorney JOLLIFFE seldom meet without having a mutual go-in.' This may be all very well as a vent-peg for a lawyer who has a losing cause, or as a safety-valve for the wrought-up feelings of a Judge, whose ears are bored day after day with long and tedious cases, and some excuse may even be found in the fact that these passing flings between the Bench and the Bar afford them with a great deal of gusto, but surely the amusement to the public, who generally swallow unfortunate client who is in waiting is a subject for commiseration. If his case is to be left to the consideration of a jury, ten to one but they are listening to the legal retort courteous, instead of reviewing the arguments. Again, a Judge would be more than human, and Judges are but human, if he failed to give a combaopportunity presented itself, even if it were tive lawyer a slap in the face when the would possess a more peaceable disposition at the expense of a client; and an attorney than is usually exhibited if he did not at once destroy any favourable consideration that may have existed for his client, by returning an answer that must have the effect of raising the judicial ire. To his Honour it must be particu larly trying, after sitting hour after hour, in a crowded room with the thermometer at 90, to have inflicted upon him a long-winded statement of the case of an hour's duration, that might have been laid before him with equal force and clearness in ten minutes; but at the same time it must be particularly mortifying to Mr. JOLLIFFE be an elegant peroration, suddenly pulled up to be, in the middle of what appears to him to with a remark from his Honour that raises a laugh at his expense in court among those who better men than themselves; or to be told in the are only too pleased to see the humiliation of midst of what he considers an acute examination of a witness, that in the judicial opinion, the question he has just put is an absurdity. if Mr. JOLLIFFE would consider that time is made, not only for slaves, but for men of business, and, accordingly, cut it short, all this would cease." According to this local observer the fault is on the side of the attorney, but it is somewhat difficult to come to that conclusion on looking through the report of a case occurring at the court. We shall quote, however, not for the purpose of founding on the quotations any and amusement of our readers. The amusement judgment of our own, but for the edification will, no doubt, be as much caused by the kind of thing which law reporting is in the provinces, as by the eccentricities of the persons engaged in the scene. Mr. JOLLIFFE called the attention of the jury to the Six Carpenters' case. We here quote: His Honour.-Tell the jury what year that case was decided in. Mr. Jolliffe.-That can't affect the decision. His Honour.-Well, tell them. Tell them that it was some centuries ago (derisive laughter in court). Mr. Jolliffe. That does not, for one single moment, alter the case. (To the jury): It is right and proper for me to tell you, and I hope and trust that I shall be allowed to make any observations annoyance-that in quoting this case I am quoting without the slightest unnecessary interruption or one of the leading cases of the land as bearing upon this point. Juryman (of an inquiring turn of mind): We should like to know what year t'was decided in. His Honour.-Oh, never mind, that makes no difference; it is a very old case, but it is established law. Our readers will judge whether there was any necessity for this piece of banter. But better follows. His HONOUR asks where the Six Carpenters' case is to be found, and we think there is some cause for being ashamed of the following discussion, the peculiarities of the report notwithstanding: His Honour.-Where is the case to be found? His Honour.-No, it is not. (Mr. Joliffe begins to search a large volume of law.) Here, let me have the book; perhaps you haven't looked into it before, and I'll tell you. Mr. Jolliffe (not quite certain, but near the mark). -In Coke's Reports. His Honour.-No, it isn't; it's Cooke's. (Audience, whose sympathies lie with the defendant, go into ecstacies at Mr. Jolliffe's discomfiture.) Mr. Jolliffe (who doesn't relish matters).-Well, wherever it's reported, it can make no difference; it is the highest authority in the case. His Honour.-Well, you have not told us yet what you want it for; go on! Upon this again we will say nothing, but proceed to a point in the proceedings where the Judge and a boy in the audience have it all to themselves. The reporter tells us : A small model, made from a cigar box, was put in to show the alterations done to the premises. His Honour (viewing it humorously).-That is the house that Sharp boy in the audience (promptly).-Jack built! His Honour (facetiously).-No; the six carpenters. (Roars of laughter from appreciative listeners.) The most marvellous part of the whole business, however, seems to have been the effect of the verdict of the jury for the defendant, the simple question involved relating to a breach of an agreement to repair. We are told that "on the announcement of the verdict there was loud and long-continued cheering, which the officers of the court found it impossible to check for some time, and immediately afterwards a peal of the church bells rang out, notwithstanding the late hour of the night." And finally, to point the moral of this singular history, the reporter says, "This trumpery case was begun at twelve o'clock and finished at 4. That such fines constitute a fund for the benefit of the army generally. 5. That the punishment of non-commissioned officers the ranks. need not necessarily be accompanied by reduction to 6. That greater facility be afforded for the discharge of men of bad character. 7. That the practice of "marking" be abolished when altered circumstances referred to in the report will admit of it.-Pall Mall Gazette. under its jurisdiction, as far as may be practicable, Whenever it is practicable, cases of embezzlement of more than common importance should be submitted to an ordinary criminal court, as having more experience in dealing with such charges, and greater facilities for thoroughly investigating them. [CONTRIBUTED by the ReportERS OF THE SEVERAL COURTS.] HOUSE OF LORDS. Judgment in three cases, two of much general interest, was given on Tuesday last. 66 The circum twenty minutes to ten. Mr. JOLLIFFE exhausted whom in the course of the proceedings it may be There was no proof that defendants were ever in an hour and five minutes in opening it and fifty minutes in reply, thus occupying nearly two hours, or 20 per cent. of the time spent on the whole case." COURTS-MARTIAL. THERE are several points of interest and importance in the second report of the Courts-Martial Commission. The commissioners express their conviction, founded on the evidence of soldiers of all ranks, that, though there may be defects requiring correction, these courts have the confidence of the army, and are satisfactorily spoken of even by those who have suffered from their jurisdiction. The evidence laid before the commissioners has convinced them that military law as laid down in the Acts of Parliament and the Articles of War is in a complicated state, and that not only in the courts themselves, but even in the highest military departments, there is often much difficulty in arriving at a just conclusion, owing to the different sources to which reference has to be made. His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief has expressed an opinion that the frequent reassembling of courts-martial for the purpose of revising their proceedings is attributable mainly to the difficulty which the courts often experience in ascertaining the meaning of the Mutiny Act and Articles of War, and his Royal Highness strongly recommends that both should be revised, with a view to their being rendered more clear and simple. Other authorities cited agree in this opinion. The task of conolidating military law should be undertaken, the commissioners think, on the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government. When a prisoner is found not guilty, the finding should be announced in open court, and the prisoner immediately discharged. In the case of a verdict of "guilty," the verdict should also be announced in open court, and the sentence declared. The prisoner should be detained in custody, but the sentence should not be further carried out until the legality and propriety of the verdict and sentence have been examined by the proper authority. In the Great Western Railway Company v. Sutton, in error from the Exchequer Chamber, the question raised, as to the legality of charging to carriers an exceptional rate for the conveyance It is recommended that the present rule of of "packed parcels," was one that has been for examining witnesses in general courts-martial, nearly thirty years past constantly before the which requires that questions shall be submitted courts. The respondent sued the appellants to in writing to the president of the court, previous recover over-charges made by them. The declato being put to the witness, shall be relaxed. It ration contained counts for money had and is clearly the duty (the commissioners say) of the received, and on account stated. president and Judge-Advocate to protect the pri- stances were these:-Sutton was a carrier, and soner from any improper question, and they rehis chief business was to collect parcels at a central office in London. These he packed together commend that wherever the services of a sworn shorthand writer can be conveniently obtained, according to the places of their consignment, and and a full and accurate record of the proceedings forwarded them by railway to his country agents thereby secured, the examination be conducted for delivery to the various consignees. Such viva voce as in our ordinary courts. By the pre-packages, on being declared "packed," were sent Articles of War a prisoner under trial before charged by the railway company at the highest a general court-martial is not entitled as of right rate named in their tariff, and 50 per cent. in to a list of the witnesses to be brought against addition. At the trial, before Baron Martin, him. The commissioners think that this right evidence was given for the plaintiff to the effect should be conceded to him, and a list of the wit- that various wholesale houses (not carriers) for nesses, together with the charges, should be the accommodation of tradesmen and customers, were in the constant habit of sending "packed furnished to him as a matter of right a reasonable time previous to the trial, and that he should also parcels" by defendants' railway, and that these have reasonable notice of any additional witnesses were not charged as packed," but at a less rate. found desirable to adduce. formed that the parcels were packed, but no questions were asked. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. On a bill of exceptions, to the admission of evidence and the summing up by the learned judge, it was held by the Exchequer Chamber (Chief Justice Erle dissenting) that the evidence above mentioned was properly admitted; that the judge was right in directing that there was evidence that defendants had knowingly carried parcels for other persons, "containing goods of a like description and under like circumstances," at a less rate than for the plaintiff; and that in the absence of any evidence that the difference of charge was on account of a difference of the contents of the parcels or of the circumstances under which they were carried, the jury were justified in concluding that the extra charge was within the meaning of and against 7 & 8 Vict. c. iii., s. 50, providing that "no reduction or advance in any charge shall be made partially . . . in favour of or against any particular company or person." A full report of the case will be found in 13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 221. Lord Chelmsford delivered judgment, in which Lords Colonsay and Cairns concurred, to the following effect :-There were three questions-(1) Whether there was evidence to go to the jury that the appellants knowingly charged the respondent at a higher rate than the wholesale houses for packed parcels ? (2) Whether the evidence stated above was properly admitted? (3) Whether an action for money had and received would lie to recover the overcharge? Now, there was the direct evidence of several persons that hundreds of packed parcels were carried day after day by the appel lants for wholesale houses, and this without objection or extra charge. No specific instance in which the appellants were informed that these parcels were packed" had been proved; but that was not necessary. The appellants could have given notice that packages, unless otherwise declared, would be assumed to be "packed parcels," and Information of the fact charged accordingly. might therefore have been obtained. It was essential that the equality clauses of the Act (7 & 8 Vict. c, iii., s. 50; 10 & 11 Vict. c. ccxxvi., 8. 53) should particular parties and a monopoly by the railway be strictly observed, to prevent the favouring of companies. Charges had not been made "equally The following is a summary of the chief altera- be carefully redrawn. 2. That a text-book on military law be prepared for 3. That a stricter examination of officers in military 4. That the convening officer of a district court- 7. That whenever the services of a shorthand writer can be obtained the examination of witnesses before a 9. That in general courts-martial the lists of witnesses, together with the charges, be furnished to a prisoner as a matter of right previous to trial, and that he should also have reasonable notice of any additional witnesses whom in the course of the proceedings it may be thought desirable to adduce. 10. That the practice of reassembling a court for the purpose of revising their proceedings be discontinued, power being given to the confirming authority in certain cases to commute the sentence. 11. That a regimental court should only be had recourse to when a district court cannot conveniently be assembled, and that it be composed of officers of not less than three years' standing. be forwarded to the general officer commanding the 12. That the proceedings of all regimental courts district. The commissioners advert to the opinion so With regard to military punishment, the commissioners recommend: 2. That the term habitual drunkenness as applied to the fourth offence be abolished. 3. That a scale of fines be substituted for the present system of imprisonment for this offence. to all persons" for the conveyance of goods "of a like description and quantity . . . . and under the like circustances." The packed parcels, whether of Sutton or the wholesale houses, did not differ in themselves; the only difference was that the persons sending. And it could not be said that Sutton's packed parcels were not carried" under the like circumstances," because he was an intercepting carrier. There was, therefore, a violation of the Acts. The evidence was admissible. It was but general proof, but it was the only means available to prove that for which it was offered. The form of action was right. The case fell within the principle that, under this count, money may be recovered that has been paid unlawfully under compulsion. The judgment on this point in Baxendale v. Great Western Railway Company (9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 814) was conclusive that the action will lie. In the present case, the respondent did not complain merely that other customers "have the same benefit for less money" (as it was put by Chief Justice Erle, in Baxendale v. Great Western Rail way Company, 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 838), but that other persons having been charged less, he was entitled to pay only the same charge as they. The judgment of the Exchequer Chamber would therefore be affirmed. In the case of the Hammersmith and City Railway Company v. Brand and wife, an action was brought by the respondents to recover a sum, which a sheriff's jury, on an inquisition held under the provisions of the Lands Clauses Act, had assessed as compensation for the depreciation in value of a house belonging to the female respondent through vibration caused by passing trains in the ordinary traffic of the line. The fact was admitted by the appellants, but they denied that the claim to compensation could be supported. The railway crossed a road on a viaduct, near the respondents' house, and the company paid compensation to them for obstruction of light, air, and way, and for damage to their garden by lime-dust during the construction of the railway. The vibration caused no structural injury. No land of the respondents had been taken by the company. The railway was constructed by the appellants, but used exclusively by the Great Western. The court of Queen's Bench, justices Mellor and Lush, held that compensation could not be recovered, claims to compensation under the Lands and Railways Clauses Acts being limited to damage resulting from the execution of the works, and not extending to damage resulting from the carrying on, without negligence, the ordinary business of the company. And the court further expressed an opinion that no action would lie, the act complained of being one authorised by the law: (13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 501; L. Rep. Q. B. 130.) In the Exchequer Chamber (16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 101; L. Rep. 2 Q. B. 230) the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench was reversed by Baron Bramwell and Justices Keating and M. Smith, Baron Channell dissenting. The grounds of that judgment, as stated by Baron Bramwell, were these: A nuisance had here been created to the Occupiers of these premises, which would be actionable at common law. There must be a remedy either by action or under the compensation clauses of the Lands and Railways Clauses Act. The case of Vaughan v. Taff Railway Company, 2 L. T. Rep. N. S. 394; 5 H. & N. 679, decided that no action would lie in such a case as the present. The remedy must, therefore, be under the Acts referred to. (The case was apparently tried in the courts below as if the damage had been caused by "vibration, noise, and smoke," but on the case before the House of Lords it appeared that the jury had assessed the sum claimed as compensation for damage by vibration " only.) Lords Chelmsford and Colonsay now gave judgment to the following effect: There had been a difference of opinion among the learned judges who had advised the House. The present case was within the principle of the Caledonian Railway Company v. Ogilvy, 2 Macq. H. of L. Cas. 229, and R. v. Pease, 4 B. & Ad. 30, and since the damage complained of was inevitable in the ordinary working of the line, it must be taken to have been sanctioned and contemplated by the Legislature in authorising the construction and use of the line. Baron Bramwell, in his opinion to the House, thought that the case of Vaughan v. Toff Railway Company (ubi sup.) was wrongly decided, but in the judgment of their Lordships there was no remedy by action. The remedy, if any, must then be under sect. 6 or 16 of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act (8 Vict. c. 20). Now sect. 6 must be construed to limit compensation to cases where damage was caused by "the construction of the railway and the works connected therewith." And sect. 16 is limited to damage sustained by the exercise of the powers therein conferred. The present case was within neither of these sections. No compensation was given by the Acts, where damage arose from the proper use of the railway. Their Lordships must therefore hold reluctantly, that the respondents were without remedy, and the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber would be reversed. Lord Cairns dissented on these grounds: An action would not lie. The headings to the groups of sections in the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act were fallacious as to their scope. Sect. 16 was not to be limited to compensation for damage by the exercise of the powers immediately before enumerated only. The Legislature must be taken to have considered the railway as a working concern, and to have intended compensation in all cases where damage arose through the working. There might be a difficulty, as suggested by the judges, in assessing the damage done in the present case, but the jury had found a certain sum due, and this the respondents were entitled to recover. Judgment in the Exchequer Chamber was reversed. The hearing of the case of Foreman v. the Company of Free Fishers and Dredgers of Whitstable was noted in "Sayings and Doings" for July 3. It was a claim by the respondents to anchorage tolls. In Gann v. the Free Fishers, &c., of Whitstable, it had been held in the House of Lords (12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 150) that the company were not entitled to the tolls claimed, because they had failed to prove some corresponding advantage to the public, which would support, as consideration, this limitation of the public right of free navigation on the seas. In the present case, accordingly, the claim was supported by evidence that the company keep, and have long kept, buoys, beacons, and lights, to mark the bounds between the oyster-beds and the anchorage ground, and further that before and since the time of legal memory Whitstable had been a port. The judgments of the Common Pleas and Exchequer Chamber were that the above constituted a sufficient consideration to support the claim to toll (16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 747; 18 Ibid 735). There was then an appeal to the House of Lords, on a special case. The Lord Chancellor and Lord Chelmsford (Lord Colonsay concurring) now gave judgment, in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the judges, affirming the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber, and dismissing the appeal with costs. Their Lordships considered that the existence of a port was proved, and that this, in connection with the company's ownership of the soil and the immemorial payments, supported the claim to toll. In the Wicklow Peerage case, a Committee for Privileges met on Monday last. Mr. Serjt. Ballantine (with whom was Mr. Charles Clark) appeared on behalf of Mrs. Howard, the mother of the infant claimant. He said that Mrs. Howard having presented a petition in formâ pauperis for the purpose, had had counsel assigned to her on the previous Wednesday. He now asked for an adjournment, in order to give time for the preparation of a case. The House, after consideration, ordered that a printed copy of Mrs. Howard's case should be delivered to the agent for the other claimant on Monday the 19th inst., and the hearing was then adjourned to Thursday the 22nd inst. The arguments in the case of the Duke of Buccleuch v. Wakefield and another, with a cross appeal, were completed on Tuesday last. These were appeals from a decision of the Court of Chancery, reported in 15 L. T. Rep. N. S. 462, and in L. Rep. 4 Eq. 613. The Duke of Buccleuch was represented by Sir R. Palmer and Mr. Freeling; and Mr. Wakefield by Mr. Mellish and Mr. Everitt. Mr. Wakefield is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land situated in the manor of Plain Furness, in the county of Lancaster, and the appellant,' as the lord of that manor, claims the right to work the mines and minerals under the land. Mr. Wakefield claims to be the owner, not only of the surface of the land, but also of the minerals under it. The land in question was part of certain lands inclosed under a private Act, and formed part of those which were sold to pay the expenses of the inclosure. Mr. Wakefield does not dispute the right of the duke to work the minerals under the lands allotted to the customary tenants of the manor, but contends that he has no right to work the minerals under the lands sold for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the inclosure. Owing to the peculiar nature of the minerals and of the surface of the soil, it is alleged that it is impossible to work the minerals without entirely destroying the surface of the land belonging to Mr. Wakefield. Mr. Wakefield complains of the decree of the court below on the ground that it declared the duke entitled to the minerals beneath his land, and the duke complains of it on the ground that it declared that he was not entitled to work the minerals so as to cause a subsidence of the surface of the land belonging to Mr. Wakefield. At the conclusion of the arguments, their Lordships took time to consider. Further consideration postponed sine die accordingly. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL. THE following are the only cases of interest that have occurred since those reported in last week's "Sayings and Doings' Ryland v. Delisle was heard on Tuesday, July 6. This was an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada, reversing on appeal a judgment of the Superior Court of the District of Montreal. The respondent was a shareholder in the Montreal and Bytown Railway Company, and was also the president of the company. In the company's books he was credited with the sum of 10007., which had been voted to him for his services as president. One Doutre recovered judgment in an action against the company, and took out execution against the property of the company. Doutre transferred his interest in the judgment and execution to the respondent, who thereupon brought an action to recover the sum so due, amounting to 6381., against the appellant, as a shareholder. The action was founded on sect. 80 of the Consolidated Statutes of Canada, c. 56, which enacts that each shareholder shall be liable to the creditors of the company to an amount equal to the amount unpaid on the stock held by him, until the whole amount of his stock shall be paid up. Now at the time of the action 9001. remained unpaid on stock held by him, but he put in a plea of compensation, alleging that the sum owing on the stock was extinguished by the 1000l. credited to him in the books of the company. The judgment of the Court of Montreal, in favour of Ryland, was reversed in the Queen's Bench of Lower Canada, the latter court considering that the plea of compensation was good under art. 1188 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, which is as follows: "Compensation takes place by the sole operation of law between debts which are equally liquidated and demandable, and have each for object a sum of money or a certain quantity of indiscriminate things of the same kind or quality; so soon as the debts exist simultaneously they are mutually extinguished in so far as their respective amounts correspond." Mr. A. H. Thesiger and Mr. H. W. Austin, for the appellant, contended that the statute did more than transfer to the creditors of the company the rights of the company against its shareholders, for it gave a personal and original right to the creditor, which might be exercised even though no right to sue belonged to the company. And no compensation could have accrued, for the compan: had not called up the amount unpaid on the respondent's shares, and so there was no "debt" from the respondent to the company within the meaning of the code. Mr. Mellish, Q. C. and Mr. W. W. Kerr, contra, for the respondent. Their Lordships now reversed the judgment of the court below, with costs. On Wednesday, July 7, a question of fraudulent preference was raised in the case of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, v. Evans and another, then heard. This was an appeal from a judgment in the Supreme Court for China and Japan, reversing that of the Court of Hankow. The respondent, the creditors' assig nees of M'Kellar and Co., the appellants, were a banking firm, of which M'Kellar and Co. were customers. The appellants were in the habit of discounting bills for M'Kellar and Co. On 25th June 1867, the appellants, there being then several bills running, applied to M'Kellar and Co. for an additional margin of 15 per cent. upon them. On 27th June M Kellar and Co. paid 10,000 taels as such margin, and on the following day stopped payment. The respondents brought an action to recover a sum of 12,000 taels, alleged to have belonged to M'Kellar and Co., and to have been in the appellant's hands at the date of the adjudication of bankruptcy of the above firm. In their answer, the appellants alleged that the sum of 10,000 taels was in pursuance of a special agree ment with M'Kellar and Co., carried to a special account, called the "Margin Bills Account." The court of Hankow gave judgment for the defen dants (the bank), on the ground that the transaction was a perfectly justifiable mercantile one; that the bank did not know that M'Kellar and Co. were about to fail on the 27th June, and that there was no fraudulent transfer by M'Kellar and Co. to the bank. The Supreme Court reversed this judgment, considering that, on the evidence, the payment was a fraudulent preference, made voluntarily and in immediate contemplation of bankruptcy. Their Lordships, without calling on Sir Roundell Palmer to reply, reversed the judg ment of the court below. Anderson and others v. The Pacific Fire and Marine Insurance Company, on appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria, was also heard on Wednesday, July 7. The appellants were the chairman and directors of the Australian Alliance Assurance company, and the original action was brought against them by the respondents to recover the amount of a re-insurance on a ship destroyed by fire. The appellants pleaded that there was a misrepresentation as to a fact material to the risk of the re-insurance. The application for re-assurance was made on a printed form, furnished by the appellants, specifying heads of particulars, the details of which were filled in by the respondents in writing, In this form there was an entry "Valued at 60001.; insured only for 40001." There was also a list of other offices which the ship was insured, with amounts. But there was no mention of an insurance for 1500, which, it appeared, had been effected by a mortgage of the ship, without the knowledge of the respondents. This was the misrepresentation relied on in the plea. A verdict having been found for the appellants on this plea, the respondents subsequently obtained a rule nisi to enter the verdict, on the ground that the representation that the ship was insured only for 4000l. did not include insurances made by other persons than the respondents, and the rule was made absolute by the Supreme Court of Victoria. This judgment was now affirmed by their Lordships, without calling on Mr. Mellish, Q. C. for the respondents. |