liable that were then current not having been paid, they were, according to the course of banking, charged to the debit of the the customer, and the question before the court was whether the lien of the bank extended to those endorsements of the customer as well as to the amount drawn out on the overdrafts of the customer.

The learned Judge held, that the unpaid endorsements of the bankrupt should be treated as overdrafts, and that the lien on the deed lodged extended to the entire sum due by the bankrupt upon the whole of his account. This probably is as great an extension of the doctrine of lien respecting bankers as it will ever receive.

Now as to advances made by bankers upon security given to them. The great danger in these transactions is, that which was just avoided in Martin v. Willyams, namely, allowing the advances to exceed the value of the security, and to cause them, therefore, to stand in the relation of a pre-existing debt to any security subsequently given. But it is clear that there may be an element in dealings with bankers, which in all probability would not exist in the majority of cases of disputed conveyance by a bankrupt; namely, that the conveyance attacked may be, as in Martin v Willyams, one of a series of bona fide transactions. As remarked by the Vice-Chancellor, it was a most important circumstance that the challenged security was not the first security granted by the bankrupt to the defendant bankers. The previous transactions resulted in the danger we have namedthe security given had not covered all the moneys advanced; and it was attempted to put a construction on the deed which was impeached, showing that on the face of it it was a security for the pre-existing debt. But this was denounced by the Vice-Chancellor as an unfair view. The prior securities existed in full force when the last deed was executed, a circumstance which his Honour regarded as material, and which, he added, had not occurred in any of the cases cited.

And at this point in the case we come upon an exposition of the peculiarities attaching to the business of a banker. "It is also," said the Vice-Chancellor, "an important feature in this case that the defendants, who took the securities, are bankers. From the nature of transactions with bankers, and the securities taken by them, it is obvious that a trader, by obtaining from them advances upon a security, is enabled to go on with the management of his business for the benefit of himself and his

creditors. That is perfectly plain. Cases where an individual creditor is dealt with (I mean a creditor from whom advances in the nature of transactions with bankers are not contemplated), stand, to my mind on a very different footing altogether." To this view of the question universal assent must be given. The accommodation allowed by bankers to their customers is a most important element of mercantile credit, and if it is to be restricted in the manner in which the plaintiff in Martin v. Willyams wished to restrict it, namely, by rendering bankers timid of advancing any new loan where a shilling of old debt remained, the effect would

be most undesirable.

"I take it to be perfectly well settled that where a trader makes an assignment of all his effects, or of all except a very small portion, it is necessarily an act of bankruptcy without any actual fraud."

MR. OSGOOD'S PETITION TO PARLIAMENT.

WE regret that we are unable to print in extenso the petition which Mr. LOCKE, Q.C., M.P., has presented to Parliament on behalf of Mr. OSGOOD, who is known to the legal world as the plaintiff in Osgood v. Nelson. And we regret it for this reason,-that the petition reveals an act of arbitrary injustice on the part of the corporation towards a faithful officer of twelve years' standing, and who moreover was an officer of the public, which, as far as we are aware, has no parallel in modern times.

Those who have read the special case submitted to the Court of Queen's Bench will be aware of the acts, which, however, may be shortly recapitulated. Mr. OSGOOD was in practice as an attorney from 1842 to 1856, when he was elected by the Common Council to the office of chief clerk of the Sheriffs' Court, at a salary of 4001, which in two years was increased to 500%. Ample evidence is stated in the petition to show that Mr. OSGOOD, as registrar of the court, which he was when he was suspended, possessed the good opinion of a very large section of the legal profession, and more particularly of those who had business in his court. In the year 1866, in the words of the petition, "the high bailiff of the said court suddenly objected to hand up to the Judge certain notices which theretofore he had been accustomed to hand up with the plaints, and in consequence of his making such objection the Judge of the said court made an order dispensing with his attendance in court, and ordering an inferior bailiff to attend and perform the said duty." The high bailiff appealed to the LORD MAYOR, and the matter was referred by the Common Council to the Officers' and Clerks' Committee. Mr. OSGOOD frequently attended before this committee to make explanations, and was as frequently told there were no charges against him. The committee, however, took evidence not upon oath and when Mr. OSGOOD was not present, and consequently had not the privilege of crossexamining the witnesses. When he applied to know the specific charges made against him, he was referred to this evidence. In May 1867, he was heard by counsel, and a resolution was passed removing him from his office. He then obtained a quo warranto information in the Queen's Bench, but the points were ultimately submitted to the court in the form of a special case.

Now we arrive at the astounding consummation. The court were with Mr. OSGOOD on the merits, and they decided that the office was a freehold office; but felt themselves bound to give judgment against him, because the Corporation of London obtained a private Act in the fifteenth of the present reign, giving them power to remove the petitioner, amongst other officers, for inability, misbehaviour, or any other cause which may appear reasonable to the But it is still to be remembered that without mayor, aldermen, and commons." In delivering absolute bona fides, bankers will not be entitled judgment the LORD CHIEF JUSTICE said that to any more consideration than ordinary persons. he believed the decision of the Court of ComThe recent case of Er parte Foxley, re Nurse, mon Council to have been a most mistaken one; 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 862, was an instance of that if it had been the verdict of a jury it could advance by a bank upon the security of the not have stood; that if he had tried the case at bankrupt's solicitor, to whom the bankrupt gave Nisi Prius and a verdict had been found against a bill of sale. The question there did not arise the plaintiff, so far as his (the LORD CHIEF with the bank, but from the tenor of the decision JUSTICE'S) influence could avail, that verdict there is no reason to suppose it would have been should not have stood; that he regretted exaltered had this been otherwise. The great ceedingly that as jurisdiction had been given to question there was whether a reservation of the the Court of Common Council, they could not bankrupt's furniture and book debts was a sub-interfere upon the merits; he wished that they stantial reservation so as to make the deed good. "In judging of the effect of these reservations," said Sir W. P. Wood, "it is convenient to consider, in the first place, how the case would have been as to the validity of the instrument if it had stood alone, before considering the effect of the antecedent circumstances." This is equivalent to saying that the reservations are of little avail if the deed standing alone is calculated to defraud creditors. The Lord Justice cited with approval Baron Parke in Smith v. Cannan, 2 E. & B. 35, where he says, "The test is not whether its necessary effect is to stop the trade, but whether its necessary effect is to delay the creditors of the trader." The same learned Baron said in Siebert v. Spooner, 1 M. & W. 708,

could, because certainly he should say that the result of the inquiry had not been, as regarded the justice of the case, satisfactory, that the judgment of the Court of Common Council was not one which they the Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench should have pronounced, and certainly was not one which they could then approve, and that neither that court nor any other judicial tribunal would have so dealt with one of its own judicial officers.

Upon this state of things Mr. OsGooD very justly asks Parliament to take away the arbitrary power given by the private Act of 16 Vict. "It is manifestly for the public advantage," he says, " and for the proper and impartial administration of justice that the

registrar of the said City of London Court as a public legal officer, should be rendered independent of all private or party influ ences, prejudices, intrigues, and cabals, which alternately govern the movements of a body constituted like the said Common Council of London, consisting of 232 members (of whom 40 form a quorum), and your petititioner conceives that no good or sufficient reason exists

why the powers of appointment and removal given by the said private statute should not be London, and be vested in the said Lord High taken away from the said Common Council of Chancellor, and exercised as in the case of all said City of London Court placed now and from the other County Courts, and the registrar of the time to time in all other respects upon the same footing as the registrars of the other Metropolitan County Courts." He points out that, as the law stands he is absolutely without remedy, having addressed a letter to the corporation, of the Court of Queen's Bench, which letter has bringing before them the terms of the decision been directed simply to lie upon the table. And Mr. OSGOOD prays that so much of the private Act may be repealed as relates to the salary of and to the powers of appointing and removing the registrar of the said City of London Court, and that Parliament will enact "that the powers of appointment and removal of the registrar of the said City of London Court shall be and be vested in the Lord High Chancellor, and exercised by him as in the case of the metropolitan County Courts, and that the registrar of the said City of London Court shall be placed now and from time to time in all other respects upon the same County Courts; and that your Honourable footing as the registrars of the metropolitan House will pass such measures to restore your petitioner to his said office, or to grant such other relief to your petitioner as your Honourable House may deem expedient."

As a matter of justice to Mr. OSGOOD, and as a matter of expediency as affecting the public, it is to be sincerely desired that Mr. LOCKE may bring the petition to a successful issue. The corporation of the City of London, in its legal aspect, stands self-condemned. Supposing the authority of the aldermen on criminal trials to be that contended for by Mr. MELLISH in Leverson v. The Queen, it is quite clear that the aldermen themselves knew nothing about it, and regarded their functions as purely decorative. This is a glaring instance of corporate absurdity. But there a scandal on the administration of the

law is the sole result, which may be remedied without injury to individuals, and assuredly will be remedied if found necessary. In Mr. OSGOOD's case, however, the incapacity of weighing evidence impartially manifested by the shifting quorum of the corporation, inflicts a mortal wound on the prosperity of an exemplary officer. This condemns them as unworthy to exercise the power which Parliament injudiciously conferred. The registrar of the city court should be placed on the same footing with registrars of county courts; and by doing this, and by reinstating Mr. OSGOOD, Parliament will confer a benefit or a public court, and repair the effects of a crying injustice.

HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA.

A QUESTION affecting the liberty of the subject in America is causing not only considerable discussion, but a conflict of jurisdiction between a Federal court and the States Courts, which illustrates the inconvenience arising from the numerous jurisdictions. The actions giving rise to these proceedings were brought upon certain railway coupons given by the officers of the county of Lee. These actions were begun in the United States Circuit Court of Iowa, but were transferred to the Circuit Court of Illinois. Certain tax payers of the Lee county obtained an injunction from the Supreme Court of the State to restrain perpetually the collection of any taxes for the purpose of satisfying the judgments against the officers of Lee county. peremptory writ of mandamus was obtained upon the judgments, obedience to which was refused, reliance being placed on the protection afforded by the Supreme Court of Iowa. Thereupon the Circuit Court of the United States issued a writ of attachment, directed to the United States' marshal of Iowa, commanding him to seize the officers and bring them before the court to answer their contempt. They were accordingly arrested, but immediately had recourse to a writ of habeas corpus. The marshal, to whom it

A

was addressed, refused to surrender his prisoners Government to discharge fully all powers conto the jurisdiction of the Judge issuing the writ,ferred upon it by the constitution. The arguor to the jurisdiction of the State courts. A ment therefore based upon the implied limitation motion for an attachment was then made, and of State power ex necessitate fails." the question of jurisdiction arose-should the writ of a State Judge be obeyed by a Federal officer. Judge BECK said, "I have examined all the cases accessible, and I have not found one in which the exercise of power, called for by the writ of habeas corpus, by a State court or Judge, has been resisted by a Federal officer, or where they refused, save in one instance, to produce the body of plaintiff, and in that instance the jurisdiction was not questioned." Whilst noticing the conflict of jurisdiction, it is satisfactory to know that it is not likely to prove of very great importance, Judge BECK being of opinion "that whatever conflict there may be, apparent or real, between the courts of the United States and of the State, it can, and will be peaceably, speedily, and finally settled by the adjudication of the courts, in a manner not to provoke violence and in accordance with the law."

As to the writ itself it appears that the existence of this remedy as a right of the people is

recognised by the constitution of the United

States, and provision is made that the writ shall never be suspended, except in cases of rebellion or invasion: (Art. 1, sect. 9.) The ordinance of 1787, for the government of the territory northwest of the Ohio river, Art. 2, provides that "the inhabitants of said territory shall always be entitled to the benefis of the writ of habeas corpus," and by the Act of Congress of Jan. 11, 1805, sect. 2, the provisions of this Act were extended to the territory of Michigan. By the Act of Congress of April 20, 1836, sect. 12, the provisions of the ordinance of 1787, and all the rights, privileges, and immunities granted to the territory of Michigan, were conferred upon the territory of Wisconsin, of which the territory now constituting the State of Iowa formed a part. By sect. 12 of the Act of June 12, 1838, organising the territory of Iowa, all the rights, privileges, and immunities granted to the inhabitants of Wisconsin, were extended to the territory of Iowa. The constitution of Iowa of 1846, sect. 13, of Bill of Rights, under which the State was admitted into the Union, secures to the people the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus and a like provision is embodied in the

constitution of 1857.

But Judge BECK is of opinion that while the State cannot abridge or deny the right, she may regulate it; and that she has jurisdiction to regulate it notwithstanding a decision of a Federal court. His views upon the constitution of the Federal Government and the States are interesting. He says: "The Federal Government is one of limited and express powers. The State possesses all attributes of sovereignty, except those conferred upon the Federal Government. If this limitation upon State authority be necessary in order to enable the Federal Government to discharge fully its constitutional powers, I concede that it must be held to exist. But I conclude it is not necessary, and that there are express provisions of the constitution of the Union conferring power upon the Federal Supreme Court which secures the due administration of the laws of the United States quite effectually, though no such limitation exists. It is not contemplated by the constitution that the Federal Government may attempt to discharge its powers by the illegal imprisonment of the citizens of a State, but it is presumed that all of its authority will be exercised in a legal manner. It has the power, in the proper cases, to imprison the citizen. Now, the power to discharge from imprisonment can only be exercised by the State courts when the citizen is illegally imprisoned. If he be legally imprisoned, under Federal authority, the State court cannot discharge, and it is not to be presumed that a State court will attempt to discharge, one so rightfully deprived of his liberty. The presumption must be exercised that both Federal and State courts, in such cases, will honestly, faithfully, and truly administer the law. But should the State court fail so to do, the Federal Supreme Court can exercise corrective jurisdiction over it. This corrective jurisdiction is conferred upon the United States Supreme Court by express constitutional provision and Congressional enactment. I am justified, therefore, in holding that the limitation upon the power of the State court under this writ, as claimed, is not necessary in order to enable the United States

This opinion is, however, in direct conflict with a decision in Ableman v. Booth, 2 Howard 516, where the CHIEF JUSTICE said, "The powers of the general government and of the States, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and disdistinct sovereignties acting separately and independently of each other, within their respectives spheres. And the sphere of action appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State Judge or a State court, as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye." But whether Judge BECK be right or whether the decision in Ableman v. Booth be right, it would appear that every American citizen is liable at times to have his right to his writ of habeas corpus rendered doubtful by a conflict of jurisdiction, unless Congress alters matters by legislation. The mode of so doing is pointed out by the Judge in the case under notice, for he says, "Admitting that Congress may assume exclusive jurisdiction in cases under this writ arising out of the exercise of authority of the Federal Government, it has in no manner attempted to do so."

We may congratulate ourselves that we have not within us the elements of conflict in the jurisdictions of our courts.

MARRIAGE WITH A DECEASED WIFE'S SISTER.

A MAJORITY of ninety-nine has expressed unmistakeably the opinion of the new House of Commons on this question, and it will, we hope, suffice to carry the Bill through the Lords. Many years ago the LAW TIMES expressed a very decided opinion in favour of the repeal of an unjust and unnatural restriction, and all the arguments to which the question has been subjected since have served only to strengthen the conviction then formed. Setting aside the ecclesiastical view of it, which cannot, or ought not, in any manner to influence action as legislators, the reasons in favour of it are overwhelming. The Times contends, indeed, that the burden of proof is upon those who would change the existing law; but this maxim, true enough in certain cases, is fallacious in others, as in the instance of a law that restricts natural liberty. It cannot be denied that Lord LYNDHURST'S Act (for it is not older than the existing generation) is an interference with liberty, and, as such, they who maintain must justify it. If two persons agree to marry, they have clearly a natural right to do so, and although society may interfere to prohibit certain marriages, as being injurious to itself, society is bound to show sufficient reasons for the restraint. Now what are the reasons put forward in this case? That the marriage of a deceased wife's sister might (for no proof is adduced) operate to restrain the freedom of family intercourse with the unmarried sisters of a wife, and cause jealousies and dissensions. Against this bare imagination of a possible evil we must set the certain fact that such an alliance is deemed, not merely innocent, but positively advantageous by great numbers, of persons; that it is contracted in defiance of the law and in spite of the formidable consequences to the offspring; that dying mothers prefer to confide their children to the care of a sister, and that widowers, especially among the poor, choose the dead wife's sister because they believe that the relationship will make them fonder and more considerate stepmothers. The decisive proof that it is an arrangement much desired by those whom alone it concerns is found in the fact, that it is so largely adopted in face of the formidable consequences attending it.

But there is one sufficient answer to all the sentimental and prophetic arguments urged on the other side. It has been actually tried and no such consequences as are anticipated were found to arise from it. For many years the law practically permitted such a marriage; for it was voidable only, and not void. It was a good legal marriage unless set aside during the lives of the parties. In practice this was never done, and therefore, as a matter of fact, such marriages were for all purposes lawful marriages, and were contracted very extensively. Inasmuch as they have existed among us for so long a time, what need is there of conjecture and prophecy of possible ills to arise from them? If they are

dangerous to domestic peace, that danger would have been discovered when they were lawfully contracted. But no such objection was then made to them. The law was not changed at the request of jealous wives, or ill-treated nephews and nieces, or upon petitions of philanthropists witnessing human crime or sorrow as the consequences of such an alliance. The change was made with the basest motives, to prevent a solitary marriage, by which an influential family would be deprived of an anticipated fortune. The law that has brought so much misery to thousands of homes, bastardised so many innocent children, and caused enormous prostitution among the poor, who could not afford to go to a foreign country to be wedded in the sight of Heaven, though not according to English law, can boast of no better origin than a gross job for private advantage; and we trust that one of the first acts of the Reformed Parliament will be to sweep it from the statute book.

CRIME IN IRELAND.

TIE condition of Ireland is not a new question; it has been the subject of endless debate; it has troubled statesmen and perplexed Parliaments for more years than the oldest living man can remember; numberless remedies have been proposed, many have been tried, and more are But all have failed to cure, or even promised.

to relieve, the malady that has afflicted her. The rational conclusion is, either that the source of suffering has not been discovered, or that the disease is incurable.

Crime in Ireland, with the exception of one class of crimes, is far below the average of English criminality. That exception is important, for it indicates the direction in which the causes of the disorder are to be sought. These two exceptional classes of Irish crime are agricultural and political; the assassination of landlords and faction fights. What are the motives that stimulate these offences, and invest them with a halo that changes their character in the eyes of the Irish people?

Until we obtain a clear notion of the causes, it will be impossible to deal practically with the problem that presents itself for solution to the

British Government and Parliament.

It is strange that the truth should not be more readily recognised, that Irish discontent has not its origin in hostility with any existing law, or objection to a Protestant Church, but has its source in a sentiment that lies beyond-the passion for a national existence. This is the key to Irish discontent.

England conquered Ireland. The land of Ireland was in great part taken from its owners and parcelled out among Protestant Englishmen and Scotchmen.

Centuries have elapsed, but this conquest and confiscation have not been forgotten. The Irish still look upon the British as their conquerors; still refuse to acknowledge their title; still remain firm in the conviction that time can give no title to the proceeds of a robbery. Therefore it is that in their consciences they believe it to be their right, and even their duty, to vex their conquerors on every possible opportunity; to oust them when they can, and regain the land of which their ancestors were, as they assert, dispossessed by force or fraud. They desire to be a nation. They have heard other peoples, such as the Italians, the Poles, and the Hungarians, lauded by the English papers for striving to recover their nationalities, and the Irish have concluded, not unnaturally, that what was virtue in those other peoples would be virtue also in them.

This is the true cause of Irish discontent and of the outrages that have alarmed the whole country, and therefore it is that the proposed abolition of the Protestant Church, the promises of compensation to tenants for improvements, and the general declaration of good feeling to Ireland and the Irish in Parliament and in the Press, have failed, and will fail, to bring about that union in fact which now exists in name only. The Irish mind is bent upon national independence, and nothing less will content it.

But England cannot sanction an independent Ireland. At any price Ireland must be possessed by England, if not as an ally, as a subject, held by force, if necessary. Does any person doubt that the time will come, and probably soon, when England will be obliged to employ that force, or that when the hour arrives the British garrison that has grown up in Ireland will be the mainstay of our power there, and that our safety will depend upon its fidelity?

THE LEGAL QUARTERLY. WE regard a quarterly publication as of value, because it gives more mature views than can be looked for in weekly publications, and upon subjects in which maturity of thought is so desirable. It is not possible to say, however, that the three months' interval between the periods of publication are used by writers in the legal quarterly to the best advantage. More than one of the articles in this number may be regarded either as purposeless or insufficient. To take an example, we turned with considerable interest to the title "The Election Inquiries," hoping to find what we contemplate supplying, namely, a digest of the decisions, with a display of the discrepancies and inconsistencies, as contrasted with the principles agreed upon and adopted. Instead of this we find that the "Election Inquiries" are not dealt with at all, except to ventilate the discontent of Baron MARTIN with his present position, and the grumblings of the Press. The shortcomings of the new tribunal have been obvious to everyone, and it was a work of supererogation to elaborate the proof. However, the learned author has a suggestion, and that is, that all questions affecting the validity of an election should be disposed of before the return is made, by means of an investigation, supervision, or scrutiny by the returning officer, with the aid of competent With all deference, we venture to think that this plan could not work. Conceive the immense amount of labour which would be expended to no purpose. Frequently questions do not arise until after the return, and to secure thorough justice, all elections would have to be investigated to discover the two or three score cases of corruption. We do not see why the present tribunal should not be rendered efficient by the time the next batch of petitions presents

assessors.

itself.

Another article which might have been dispensed with is the first, on the well-worn subject of a Law Digest, and the operations of the Law Digest Commissioners. Considering that the matter is now as it were sub judice, and considering moreover that the selected men are now engaged in the labour of digesting, the publication of such a paper is quite purposeless. It is remarkable, however, for one feature. The writer was a competitor for a portion of the Digest, and he modestly refrains from criticising as we did very freely the three specimens which were published. But the publication of those specimens suggests to him "that in all cases of competitive examination it would be exceedingly desirable that the examiners would (sic) issue after each examination a book, at cost price, containing all the answers, as well of the rejected as of the successful candidates." This appears to us to be about the most unreasonable proposition, to use the mildest term, ever made in a legal publication. The object which the writer wishes to secure is, that the general public shall have the opportunity of doing that which they certainly never would do, namely, of going over the work of the defeated candidates to ascertnin whether they ought not to have been successful. This remarkable suggestion is clinched by a very striking passage which will we anticipate be as new to our readers as it was edifying to ourselves -"though it is the province of a court to deem everyone innocent prior to his conviction, it is on the other hand a postulate of law and legislation that even the highest star may fall." Because the highest star may fall, therefore examiners should publish all answers at cost price. And the writer takes the trouble to expound this theory, although he admits that it can have nothing to do with the Law Digest Commissioners.

There is a quaint article on LORD WENSLEYDALE, which appears to have been written by some one well acquainted with him. We have called it quaint, because no other word could properly describe the style. We are told that Mr. PARKE never "rose to be a leader, or obtained the distinction of a silk gown." What is the difference? We are further told (p. 17) that "his narrative became both perspicuous and easy to follow; and his exposition of the law applicable to the case was both lucid and logical." Yet, on page 18, it is written, "he was, perhaps, Occasionally unsuccessful in making himself quite intelligible to a common jury. . . . We know that he has expressed regret at the number of cases tried before him where the verdict was wrong, which was, we suppose, mainly owing to this circumstance." On the next page, we

are told that, although not partial to poachers he tried them fairly. We notice these features in the article because it deals solely and very superficially with Lord WENSLEYDALE's personal character. Much more might have been done for so sound a lawyer.

not present; it had not my concurrence nor sanction; for thus, as our correspondent truly stated, by the process of exhaustion the real offenders may be discovered. "TAUNTONIENSIS wrongly used the term "compelled," when he intended only to say that The fourth article in this number of the maga- he had caused " Mr. Cook to speak out. We zine is a pleasant reference to "an old circuit are perfectly satisfied that Mr. Cook needed no leader," to wit, JOHN JOHNES, of the "Old Car-" compulsion;" that, on the contrary, he was marthen," who, although famous little more anxious and eager to clear himself. It had been than a quarter of a century ago, is now forgotten. asserted again and again that the petition was His life is taken as illustrating the text "It is entirely that of the local people, and that no difficult to believe how short lived is the fame of other person or persons were concerned in it. The assertion was believed, and until Mr. Cook de-a favourite barrister on circuit." "Such a man,' the writer observes, "within the limits of his cir- clared that he, as the local solicitor, had nothing cuit, is as famous as a man well can be. But to do with the transaction in question, he might should it happen that he never attained a judge- not unreasonably be supposed to have had some ship or other signal official dignity, but 'died a knowledge of it. Nisi Prius leader,' it is marvellous how rapidly and completely the recollection of him fades from the memory of the public, and how soon his name is utterly forgotten, even in the fields of his former glory."

Act 1867.

About the best article in the volume is that on Coroners' Election Law, which fully summarises the statutable provisions, and concludes with the recommendation that a Bill should be introduced to assimilate the right of voting at elections of county coroners to the right now exercised under the Representation of the People "After reciting the inconvenience to which the present law respecting the qualification of voters at elections for county coroners has given rise, it should provide that the qualification of such voters should be in future the same as that of freeholders at Parliamentary elections, and disqualify all other persons. It should confine its operation to election for county coroners under the writ de coronatore eligendo, and save from its purview coroners virtute officii, as also all appointed by charter, commission, or privilege, or in accordance with enact the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 92, except as to the any prescription or custom. It should also resingle point of electoral qualification, and the Bill should be exclusively confined to England. Its set effect would be to limit the coroner's

franchise to those freeholders whose names are the coroner's franchise to any one not at present on the Parliamentary register, but not to extend entitled to vote at such elections."

bell's lives of Lord Lyndhurst and Lord Articles on "indexing and digesting," "CampBrougham," and on the Site of the new Law ment), complete a number of the Law Magazine, Courts (written before Mr. Lowe's announcewhich if not extremely useful, is entertaining.

ELECTION LAW.

AN EXPLANATION. MR. COOK, of Bridgwater, the local solicitor for the petition against Mr. Serjeant Cox, has again written to complain of an expression in the letter of "TAUNTONIENSIS," in the correspondence of last week, that he had "compelled" Mr. Cook to speak out. The term was not well chosen, certainly, but its meaning manifestly was not that which Mr. Cook supposes. Mr. Cook reads it as implying that pressure had been put upon something like reluctance on his part to speak out; whereas, in truth, he was most anxious to have it known to all the world that he was in no way concerned in the unprecedented breach of good faith that had been practised in the case of which, though he had the local management, he had not the controlling conduct. We said before, and we repeat, that it redounds greatly to the honour of Mr. Cook that he should be thus eager to relieve himself even from the suspicion of complicity in such a transaction. As a solicitor, and as a gentleman, he is anxious to repudiate all knowledge of or connection with so discreditable an affair and we are glad that he has given us the opportunity thus to exonerate him with the Profession. Our correspondent has really done him the most important service by enabling him to contradict publicly what might otherwise have been the natural conclusion of those who have read the story of the petitions. Mr. Cook must remember that where a dishonourable act has been done, and the parties by whom alone it could have been done were few in number, it is of the greatest interest and importance if one or more of those parties should press forward anxiously, to say in effect, "It was none of my doing; I had neither art nor part in it; I was

Thus, then, it stands now. By an unprecedented breach of professional faith, or of personal honour, or of both, the petitioners against Mr. BARCLAY were tricked out of their petition, and Mr. Serjeant Cox was unseated. Mr. Cook, the country solicitor on the other side, has eagerly vindicated himself by declaring that he was not a party to that breach of faith, and the Profession is looking for other disclaimers.

We hasten to express our regret that a word should have been admitted here calculated to

convey a wrong impression of the character of Mr. Cook's denial. It was certainly not "compelled;" it was not even reluctantly offered; it was immediate and unequivocal, as became a gentleman anxious to relieve himself from all connection with a transaction which he cannot justify. "TAUNTONIENSIS" could have meant only that he had "caused" Mr. Cook so to write, and for whatever annoyance the use of the term "compelled" instead of the word "caused" may have given him, we repeat our regret.

THE THIRD TAUNTON PETITION. the petition against the return of Mr. JAMES would THE Court of Common Pleas has decided, not that not lie, and must be taken off the file, but that the proceedings thereon must be stayed, inasmuch as the charges contained in it had been adjudithe matter of that petition, the question whereturn of Mr. Serjeant Cox. In the course of cated on the trial of the petition against the ther Mr. JAMES was duly qualified was indirectly recriminatory charges and by the cross-examiraised by the notice given by the respondent of nation of the witnesses for the petitioners with respondent did not call witnesses to support his a view to such recrimination, and although the charges still, as he might have done so, the Judge, in fact, decided upon them by deciding that Mr. JAMES ought to have been returned. In this point of view, which is a new one not suggested until the hearing, no fault can be found with the decision. The points put forward by the newspapers as invalidating the petition, were scarcely touched upon in the arguments, and did not enter into the judgment.

The

ELECTION PETITIONS. HORSHAM.-At the Judges' Chambers of the Common Pleas on Monday, Mr. Lumley Smith and Mr. Goldney attended Mr. Justice Willes in reference to the double return in the Horsham election. There had been two petitions. Mr. first petition, Dickins and another v. Hurst, had Hurst and Major Aldridge claimed the seat. been withdrawn, and in the other petition, Hurst v. Aldridge, the respondent had given notice that he did not claim the seat, and the usual notice had been given, and Mr. Hurst could now take his seat as a member for Horsham. Mr. Lumley Smith asked for costs against Major Aldridge. Goldney, for Major Aldridge, said it was a case of double return, and the Major was obliged to go on until he was satisfied that he should fail on a scru

Mr.

tiny, and he then withdrew from claiming the seat. Mr. Buck (Baxter and Co.) said Major Aldridge Mr. Hurst, asked for the costs, as bribery had been was in attendance. Mr. Durrant Cooper, for imputed. Mr. Justice Willes, as the point was of some importance, said he would consult the other judges as to the question of costs. He had nothing to ask Major Aldridge on the case.

NORTH NORFOLK.-On Wednesday at the Judges' Chambers, an application was made in the North Norfolk election petition, Colman v. Sir E. H. K. Lacon and F. Walpole, on the part of the sitting members, for "particulars as to the charges alleged by the petition. An order was given by consent. The case is to be heard on Tuesday when Mr. Serjeant Ballantine will appear for the next, the 11th instant, at the Castle, Norwich, petitioner, and Mr. Rodwell, Q.C., Mr. O'Malley. Q.C., and Mr. Bloomfield, for the sitting members,