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in the Crown Court. There was rather a larger number of cases than usual, seventeen being entered, five of which were marked to be tried by special juries. Several of these were, however, withdrawn, or referred during the day. The gaol calendar only contained the names of eleven prisoners, and all the cases were of an ordinary character.

The Deputy Judge Advocate-Generalship has been given to Mr. O'Dowd, barrister-at-law, in succession to Mr. Lushington.

MAGISTRATE AND PARISH
LAWYER.

READINGS OF NEW STATUTES. THE WINE AND BEERHOUSE ACT 1869. (a). The provisions of this statute are of the utmost importance to brewers and the owners and keepers of beer and refreshment houses, and as the Act is now in operation, it is desirable that the attention of our readers should be immediately called to the great changes it introduces.

It is necessary to classify the statutes recited in the Act which are as follows: (1.) The Beerhouse Acts (11 Geo. 4 and 1 Will. 4 c. 64; 4 & 5 Will 4 c. 85; and 3 & Vict. c. 61). (2.) The 24 & 25 Vict. c. 21, s. 3; and the 26 & 27 Vict. c. 33, s. 1, relating to licences to sell beer not to be drunk on the premises. (3.) The Wine and Refreshment Houses Act (23 Vict. c. 27.)

The term "beer" is to include ale and porter, and the term "cider" is to comprise perry. The house Act 1869," and is to be in force for two short title of the Act is "The Wine and Beeryears (sect. 22).

From and after the 15th July 1869, no licence for the sale of beer, &c. (except licenses for wine and refreshment houses, and licences to sell beer not to be drunk on the premises) is to be granted, except upon the production and in pursuance of the authority of a certificate to be granted by justices at the annual licensing meetings held in pursuance of the Alehouse Act (9 Geo. 4 c. 61) or at an adjournment thereof (sects. 4 & 5.)

From the 5th section it is clear that certificates, upon which alone the excise authorities can grant the ordinary retail beer licences, are only to be granted once a year, namely, at the annual licensing meetings. Justices at the special sessions for transferring licences may, however, by the same section, grant certificates for wine and refreshment licences, and licences to sell beer not to be drunk on the premises.

With reference to the formalities necessary to obtain a certificate authorising the excise to grant a retail beer licence, it will be desirable to see what is required. First, to obtain a certificate in respect to a house holding a licence granted prior to the 15th July 1869; secondly, to obtain a certificate in respect to a house not holding a licence granted prior to such date.

First, a person applying for a certificate in respect of a house already licensed by the excise must twenty-one days at least before he applies, give notice of his intention to one of the overseers of the parish, township, or place in which the house is situated, and to some constable or peace officer acting within such parish, township, or place. The notice must set forth the name and address of the applicant, and a description of the licence or licences for which he intends to apply, and the situation of the house: (sect. 7.)

Secondly, a person applying for a certificate in respect of a house not already licensed by the excise, must also within twenty-eight days before such application is made cause a like notice to be affixed and maintained between ten in the morning and five in the afternoon of two consecutive Sundays on the door of such house or shop, and on the principal door or on one of the doors of the church or chapel of the parish or place in which such house or shop is situate, or if there be no such church or chapel, on some other public and conspicuous place within such parish or place: (sect. 7.)

It is proposed to offer some practical comments on each of the above heads.

1. As to obtaining a certificate in respect of a house already licensed by the excise.

A mere hasty perusal of the Act may perhaps leave a doubt whether the twenty-one days' notice to the overseer and constable is required in case of a house already licensed, for at the

(a) By T. COUSINS, Solicitor, Portsea.

end of the 7th section is the following proviso: "Where application is made to the justices for the grant of a certificate under this Act by way of renewal only, notice in pursuance of this section shall not be requisite."

On careful perusal of the wording of the 7th section, and the proviso, it is tolerably clear that the twenty-one days' notice to the constable and overseer must precede the first application for a certificate which is to be made by beerhouses already licensed. Under the alehouse Act (9 Geo. 4, c. 61), the justices are to grant licences to inns, alehouses, and victuallinghouses. But no such power is conferred upon them by the statute under consideration, which merely empowers them to grant certificates upon production, and pursuant to the authority of which, the excise are to grant beer, cider, and wine licences. Now, the proviso to the 7th section applies only to the renewal of such certificates, and consequently the first applications under the Act for certificates will not be by way of renewal, there being no certificates in existence to renew.

Another argument in favour of the necessity of giving the twenty-one days' notice in case of houses already licensed is, that where applications are to be made in respect of houses not already licensed, the notices on the house and church are also prescribed by the latter part of the 7th section. If, therefore, the twenty-one days' notice was not intended to be given respecting houses already licensed, there are no cases under the Act to which such notice only can apply.

the applicant must go through the formalities required in the case of a new application for a retail beer licence under the latter part of the 7th section.

2. We pass on to consider the requirements necessary to obtain a licence in respect of a house not holding a retail licence prior to the 15th July 1869.

As we have already seen, the applicant in this case, in addition to the twenty-one days' notice to the overseer and constable, is to cause a like notice to be affixed and maintained between ten in the morning and five in the afternoon of two consecutive Sundays on the door of such house or shop, and on the principal door, or on one of the doors of the church or chapel of the parish or place in which such house or shop is situate, or if there shall be no such church or chapel on some other public and conspicuous place within such parish or place. This provision is somewhat similar to that contained in the Alehouse Act (9 Geo. 4, c. 61), excepting that in the lastmentioned Act the hours are ten and four, whereas in the present Act the hours are ten and five, and in the Alehouse Act the notices are not required to be "maintained" as they are in the present statute. The introduction of the word "maintained" will probably lead to some differences of opinion and practice. It may be contended that it must be proved that the notices were upon the house and churchdoor during the whole time between the hours of ten and five, and doubtless this is the literal meaning of the satisfied with proof that such notices were clause. Probably, however, justice will be posted shortly before ten, and were seen in refuse new applications for beer licences, it the same place shortly after four. As to the grounds upon which justices may would seem that their powers are discretionary, and similar to those they possess under the Alehouse Act as to granting or refusing alehouse licences.

biguous. It provides that the provisions of the Alehouse Act (9 Geo. 4, c. 61), as to the terms upon which, and the manner in which, and the persons by whom, grants of licences are to be made; and as to appeal shall, so far as may be, have effect with regard to the grants of certificates under the present Act, subject to this qualification that no application for a certificate for a retail licence not to be consumed on

The 8th section of the Act is somewhat am

A still stronger argument may be based upon almost universally agreed that the Beershop Acts the probable intention of the Legislature. It is have failed, and that many of the beer shops are an intolerable nuisance, not being sufficiently under proper control, and being conducted by persons of bad repute and in a disorderly manner. The object of the twenty one days' notice is, therefore, to enable the police to make proper inquiries as to the character of the applicant, and the manner in which the house is conducted, and also to enable the overseer to ascertain that the house is duly rated, and report to the justices the 19th section, which provides that where, on if necessary. This reading is in accordance with the 1st May 1869, a retail licence is in force, it shall not be lawful for the justices to refuse an application for a certificate, except upon one or more of the grounds set forth in the 8th section, the premises shall be refused except upon one or which applies to licences to sell beer not to more of the four grounds above specified. This be consumed on the premises. These grounds section, however, cannot be intended to extend are four in number, and are as follows: 1. That the provisions as to the notices and other forthe applicant has failed to produce satisfactory malities, which are now required to obtain new evidence of good character. 2. That the house alehouse licences, to applications for certificates or shop in respect of which a licence is sought, under the present Act, for the various notices is of a disorderly character, or frequented by required by the present Act are particularly thieves, prostitutes, or persons of bad character. mentioned. The 8th section probably refers to 3. That the applicant, having previously held a the provisions in the Alehouse Act relating to licence for the sale of wine, spirits, beer, or the time, place, and manner of holding, adjour cider, the same has been forfeited for his mis-ing, and conducting the licensing meetings, the conduct, or that he has through misconduct disqualification of certain justices, &c. been at any time previously adjudged disqualified from receiving any such licence, or from selling any of the said articles. 4. That he applies, is not duly qualified as by law is the applicant, or the house in respect of which required.

This provision clearly gives the justices the power to refuse to grant certificates to houses already licensed on any of the above grounds, and the twenty-one days' notice is therefore required in order that the justices may be properly informed as to the character of the applicants for such certificates, and the conduct and rating of their houses.

mediate and careful consideration. These provisions require the practitioner's im

By the 5th section certificates for retail beer licences can only be granted at the annual licensing meetings which are held between the 20th Aug. and the 14th Sept., except in Middlesex and Surrey, which are held within the 1st ten days in March. It therefore follows that in all cases where persons already holding retail beer licences require certificates under the Act, they will have to give the twenty-one days' notice to the overseer and constable prior to the

day fixed for the next annual licensing meeting. The results of neglecting to do so will be: First. That the excise will have no power to renew retail beer licences without a justices' certificate, and therefore the trade of the house will be necessarily suspended for a year. Secondly. That if a certificate be applied for next year,

The form of the certificate is by sect. 6 to specify certain particulars. It is to be in force for one year, and is to be in the form given in the first schedule to the Act, as follows:

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We, the justices assembled [or being the ma jority of the justices assembled at the general annual licensing meeting [or an adjournment of the general annual licensing meeting, or at a the peace acting for the division [or liberty, &c., special petty session] of Her Majesty's justices of as the case may be] of in the county of holden on the 186 day of hereby authorise the grant to A. B., of the county of of a licence or licences, if more than one be authorised, to sell by retail [beer, cider, or wine, to be consumed on or off the premises] at a house [or shop], situate [describe situation and the particular Act or Acts under which the licence is to be taken out]. day of

Witness our hands this

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counsel for the prisoner did not put the prosecutor to his election upon which act of receiving he would proceed, but after a conviction moved in arrest of judgment:

Held, that the objection was too late.

The prisoner was indicted for receiving certain property, well knowing it to have been stolen. The indictment contained two counts; one for receiving on the 25th June, the other for another act of receiving on the 26th June. The prisoner was tried upon this indictment, and evidence given of both acts of receiving alleged in the indict

ment.

J. W. Cooper, for the prosecutor.
Naylor, for the prisoner.

The prisoner was convicted; and Naylor moved in arrest of judgment upon the ground that the prosecutor was bound to elect upon which act of receiving he would proceed.

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far when the prisoner said he was anxious to marry the prosecutrix, and she observed that she would have married him had he behaved properly to her. The Chief Justice (to the prisoner).-"Are you ready to marry her?" Prisoner. nity." (Loud laughter, in which the judge heartily "Yes, my Lord; I'll marry her the first opportujoined.) The Chief Justice. But what does Mary say to that? Prosecutrix.-I am quite willing. The Chief Justice.-I think there must be a conviction, and, perhaps, the best plan will be to respite the sentence till next assizes, and if in the mean time they settle the matter by marriage that will be the best way to settle it. The conduct of the prisoner has been most gross and wicked, but, as he is now sorry, this will be the best way to settle the case. The jury found a verdict of guilty, and the Chief Justice said:-Prisoner, you must be bound over to come up for judgment at SUFFOLK QUARTER SESSIONS.-BURY ST. the next assizes, but I hope you will not be called upon. Prisoner. Oh, I'll marry Mary before then, my lord. (Laughter.)

The RECORDER ruled that the objection was too late; no doubt the prosecutor could have been put to his election upon which count he would proceed (Reg. v. Dunn, 1 Mood. C. C. 146), but the objection not being then taken it was too late to move in arrest of judgment: (3 T. R. 98; Reg. v. Hinley, 2 M. & R., N. S. 24; O'Connell v. The Queen, A. & Fin. 155.)

Sentence, three months' imprisonment.

EDMUND'S.

Tuesday, July 6.

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Held, that it was a question for the jury under these circumstances whether the prisoner had a felonious intention.

This was an indictment for larceny; the prisoner, William Taylor, being the foreman of a gang of lighters, the property of the prosecutor, and it being his duty, as foreman, to pay the tolls, provide provisions for the men working the lighters. On the 15th May the prosecutor gave the prisoner the sum of £2 for the express purpose of purchasing some bread and paying some tolls; instead of doing this, the prisoner absconded, and when apprehended, said he had fallen asleep and lost the money. The tolls were not paid, and the barges were detained until security was given in the shape of a chain being left in pledge, and no bread was ever obtained.

COUNTY FINANCIAL BOARDS.-A return has been prepared for the House of Commons, showing county by county, the total number of members of each class, honorary and elective, who will constitute the boards for financial purposes under the County Administration Bill. In some counties the elected members will be a very small minority compared with the number of magistrates on the roll, but in the following ten cases the elected members of the financial boards will probably exceed one-fourth of the number of magistrates on the roll. In Durham the elected members will probably be 47 to 159 magistrates on the roll; in Huntingdonshire, 12 to 43 magistrates: in Leicestershire, 28 to 106; in Lincoln, 17 to 53 in the Kesteven division, 34 to 112 in Lindsey, and 12 to 22 in Holland; in Middlesex, 122 to 390; in

Northamptonshire, 32 to 124; in the Liberty of Ely, 17 to 53; in the Fast Riding of Yorkshire 34 to 107, and in the West Riding, 103 to 395.

CRIME AND VAGRANCY.-MEASURES TAKEN IN LANCASHIRE AND CHESHIRE. This important question, which has of late occupied so much public attention, was alluded to by Mr. R. A. Cross, M.P., in his charge to the grand jury at the opening of the Kirkdale Sessions. He stated that in consequence of the prompt action taken by the magistrates of Cumberland and Westmoreland in the apprehension of vagrants, people of this nomadic and half-criminal class had flocked in great numbers into Lancashire, but the magistrates there, and also those in Cheshire, were now adopting measures of arrest which it was hoped would soon teach this army of robbers (for Mr. Cross could call them nothing else) that there was no resting place for them unless they adopted some honest means of livelihood. Mr. Cross next referred to the lamentable amount of ignorance which prevailed amongst the lower classes. We boasted that we were the foremost people in the world, but we were the last people in Europe in reThe CHAIRMAN left it to the jury to say whether gard to education. He urged upon the jury the or no the prisoner had a felonious intent in appro-importance of recognising the fact that the boys priating the money to his own use, or whether he and girls now in our streets would be the men and took it with the intention of paying himself the women of the next generation. wages due to him.

J. W. Cooper, for the prosection, submitted that under these facts the prisoner' was guilty of larceny. He cited R. v. Lavender, 2 Russ. 160; R. v. Beaman, C. & M. 595.

The prisoner, who was undefended by counsel, elicited in cross-examination that on the 15th May his master owed him the sum of 14s. for wages, and he deducted that amount from the money he had received.

J. W. Cooper demurred to this direction. Where money was given for a specific purpose it was the duty of the servant to apply it to that purpose; and if, instead of so applying it, he converted it to his own use, then it was larceny. The CHAIRMAN thought it was right to leave the question to the jury.

J. W. Cooper drew attention to the prisoner's statement that he had lost the money. The claim of wages had not been set up at all before the magistrates, and it was much less than the sum

entrusted to him.

The CHAIRMAN charged the jury to the effect that it was for them to say, under all the circumstances, whether the prisoner brought himself within the decision in Reg. v. Lavender.

Verdict, Not guilty.

A MARRIAGE ARRANGED BY A JUDGE.-At the Worcestershire Assizes a farm servant named William Shields, twenty-three years of age, was charged with perjury, the case arising out of an affiliation case, the prisoner denying the authorship of several letters written by him to the complainant, Mary Burt. The case had not proceeded

FALSE WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.-A Parliamentary return recently issued, and which seems intended to be annual, showing the number of persons convicted in Great Britain in a quarter of the year (the second quarter) of having false weights and measures, belonging to a class of returns which give an imperfect representation of facts. It states that there were 447 convictions in the metropolitan police district, 165 of them in Newington, Surrey. In Lancashire there were 203. In Staffordshire, 208. In Sussex, Wilts, Westmorland, Northumberland, and Monmouthshire there were none at all. In all Berkshire there were only two convictions; in less populous Buckinghamshire there were 18, in Bedfordshire 17, in Cambridgeshire 49, in Cornwall there were only two, in Devon 48. In Hampshire there were only seven, and all in Portsmouth. In Nottinghamshire there were 11, all but one in Nottingham town. In Warwickshire 59, the majority in Birmingham. In the East Riding of Yorkshire there were five, in the West Riding 117. In all Wales there were 55, above a fourth of them in the borough of Welshpool. It is plain enough from the return that there is a vast number of unjust weights and measures in use; but where there is no efficient inspection there are few exposures. It has been urged that weights and measures cannot be absolutely perfect, but pieces of lead attached

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What notice of appeal to be given.

10 days 8 days 10 days

10 days Statutory.. 10 days

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to a scale or to the weighing end of a beam are not accidents, nor will wear and tear for a reasonable account for large defects, such as 21b. in 25lb., or lb. in 4lb. The return, extending to 207 folio pages, presents a long and discreditable list of shopsmaller quantities than they pay for. The Bath keepers, using weights which give the customers rule seems a fair one; all persons using weights

and measures are required to have them examined twice a year at the office of the inspector, and those who comply with this rule are not summoned if, at any intermediate visit of that officer, their weights and measures merely indicate defects consequent upon the usual wear and tear.

IMPORTANT CASE AS TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF STREETS.-A decision of some importance to municipal authorities and owners of property in the county of Lancashire was given at the quarter sessions held at Preston, on Friday week, by the chairman (Thomas Batty Addison, Esq.), in a case in which the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company were the appellants, and the Over Darwen Local Board of Health the respondents. The appeal was brought to try the validity of an order made upon the railway company by the justices of Over Darwen, on the 20th May last, for the payment of a sum of 641. 3s., being their board in the improvement of a street adjoining proportion of the expense incurred by the local the railway company's premises at Sough, near Over Darwen. The ground of appeal was that the street in question was an ancient highway, repairable by the public, being part of the old of Turton, and that the expense of its repair ought, Roman road leading from Darwen in the direction therefore, to have been defrayed by the local board however, denied this, and also insisted that the as representing the public. The respondents, appellants were not now at liberty to raise this objection in consequence of not having given the

local board notice of objection before the works were executed, in accordance with a provision contained in the Public Works (Manufacturing Districts) Act 1863, under which the works were executed. This Act provided that where the local board had served a notice upon the owner of any property adjoining a street in which such improvements were proposed to be executed, informing him of what was proposed to be done, and of the estimated cost, and had also deposited detailed plans and specifications for his inspection, showing the manner in which the expenses were proposed to be apportioned, then unless such owner gave the local board a written notice of objection before the works were carried out, he would not afterwards be allowed to question the validity of the charge, except on the ground that the works had not been executed in conformity with the plans and specifications. Mr. Leresche and Mr. Watson, who appeared for the respondents, argued that the effect of this provision was that where an owner of property lay by in silence, and allowed the local board, after ample notice to him of their intention, to expend the public money in improving his property without giving any notice of objection, he should not be allowed to dispute payment. They stated that when the statute in question was passed more than 1,500,000l. of public money was about to be spent in improvements of this kind by local authorities under its provisions, and the provision in question was intended to give those authorities some security for the repayment of the money thus expended, and to secure them against unforeseen objections which might be raised by owners of property who had remained quiet until the works had been carried out and their property benefited.-Mr. Addison and Mr. Gorst, who appeared for the appellants, contended that the section referred to did not apply to an objection of this kind, and that they were at liberty to raise it any time, as in case the street were shown really to be an ancient highway they were never liable to repair it, and therefore the proceedings of the local board were bad ab initio. After a long argument which lasted the whole of the afternoon, the Chairman gave judgment for the respondents, and confirmed the order made by the justices. On the application of the counsel for the appellants, however, he gave them leave to take a case on the point to the Court of Queen's Bench, the costs to abide the event.-Several other owners of property had also appealed on a similar ground, and their cases were directed to stand over to abide the result of the railway company's appeal.

REAL PROPERTY LAWYER AND effectual releases and discharges for the same,

CONVEYANCER.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WILL-EXECUTION.-At the time of the execution of his will B. was so weak as to be unable to affix his signature, and it was signed for him by the person who drew it. On affidavit that he had aftewards frequently confirmed the will, and that the next of kin did not object, probate was granted: (Re Elcock, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 757. Prob. Ct.)

LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANT NOT TO ASSIGN WITHOUT CONSENT-FORFEITURE.-In

being vested in the trustees, for which permission was given. In November the trustees agreed with D. for sale of their interest in the premises; and on the 16th Dec. an agreement of sale was executed and E. entered into possession. On ejectment brought by B., it was held that on these facts there had been no forfeiture: (West v. Dobb, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 737. Q.B.)

and assure the same or such part or parts as shall
be sold to the purchaser or purchasers thereof,
and to give effectual receipts, releases, and dis.
charges for the purchase-moneys. And for all or
any of the purposes aforesaid one or more, &c.
[Power to appoint substitute or substitutes, and
to revoke appointment, from time to time, and
authority to register documents in local courts as
in precedent 111, supra.] In witness, &c.
112. Power of attorney from inspectors under deed
of inspectorship, to collect portions of their trust
estate.

To all to whom these presents shall come, A. B. Whereas, &c. [recital of deed generally and parti and C. D., of &c. [inspectors] send greeting. cularly clause therein giving power to inspectors to delegate]. And whereas all the conditions required by the Bankruptcy Acts then in force concerning deeds of inspectorship were complied with and the said in part recited indenture a valid deed of fulfilled, and all things done necessary to make inspectorship within the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1861, and the same was duly registered accordingly. Now these presents witness that for better recovering and receiving the goods and

and also to institute such actions, suits, or proceedings in any court or courts of law or equity as shall be deemed necessary or advisable for enforcing the payment or recovery thereof, and to appear to and defend any actions, suits, or other proceedings commenced or to be commenced against us or our said firm, and either to proceed to judgment and execution, or to become nonsuit, or to suffer judgment to go by default in any such actions, suits, or other proceedings as aforesaid, or to compromise the same as shall be most expedient, and to submit to arbitration any disputes or questions which may arise between us or our said firm and any other person or persons, and for that purpose to execute any Sept. 1860 B. leased a tenement to C. for four-bonds or agreements of submission, and to perteen years, with a covenant not to underlet, form the award to be made in pursuance thereof, assign, &c., without his written consent, with a and to take security for any debt or debts due to claim of re-entry on breach. In 1865 the us or to our said firm, or to receive payment or lessees, with B.'s written consent, parted with satisfaction for the same in real or personal prothe possession to D., but without a formal perty, and for that purpose to execute all neassignment of the lease. D. continued in pos- cessary conveyances and assurances thereof, session till Jan. 1867, when, being in difficulties, and afterwards, if deemed expedient, to sell he executed a deed of arrangement, but before and convert into money such property, and doing so he applied to B. for consent to the lease to sign, seal, and deliver all necessary convey moneys hereinafter referred to, and in pursuance of ances, assignments, and assurances to the purchasers of the same or any part thereof; and the above-mentioned power conferred upon and to give and execute valid receipts for the purchase-vested in the said inspectors, and by virtue of all money, and also to compound for any debt or debts other powers us enabling in that behalf. We, due to us or our said firm, if deemed expedient, the said A. B. and C. D., do jointly and each of us, and for all or any of the purposes aforesaid, one or doth separately, by these presents hereby constimore attorney or attorneys, substitute or substitute and appoint Y. Z. a partner in the firm of tutes, with the whole or less power to appoint, Y. Z. and Co., of, &c., the attorney of them the and from time to time, at pleasure, to revoke said debtors and each of them; and of us the said A. B. and C. D. and of each of us for them the said every or any such appointment, and other or entire management and conduct of all matters or name, and for us the said inspectors and each relating to or connected with our business or the of us to claim, demand, sue for, recover, receive, business of our said firm, and to use and pursue effects, accounts, books, moneys, negotiable or and take possession of all goods, chattels, and all such ways and means, and make, do, and exeother instruments or securities, being parts of the cute all such acts, deeds, matters, and things, as said joint and separate estates of the said debtors may be requisite or expedient for that purpose, in as full and absolute a manner as we ourselves owing, belonging, or appertaining to the said or either of them respectively which are now due, could do, perform, and execute the same in our and C. D., hereby ratifying, allowing, and our own proper persons. We, the said A. B. debtors, or to either of them, or to us as aforesaid, or to the said joint and separate estates respec confirming, and promising, and undertaking to tively from M. N., of, &c. [debtor], and from the ratify, allow, and confirm all and whatsoever persons comprising the partnership firm of “P. 0. our said attorney or any such substitute or sub- and Co," of, &c. [other debtors], and from any other liable or stitutes shall lawfully do or cause to be done in firm or firms, person or persons in said A. B. and C. D., hereby authorising our said possession of the said M. N. and "O. P. and Co.," the premises by virtue of these presents. We, the accountable in that behalf, or which are in the attorney to appear before all and every or any the or of any person or persons in and to give court or courts, magistrate or magistrates, officer receipts and acquittances for the same, and to or officers, constituted and appointed for the indorse and transfer all instruments relating to or respecting the ownership of any part of the registration of deeds and documents in said, and to cause these presents and all other said property, and to appoint substitutes for all instruments, and writings connected with the or any of the purposes aforesaid, and to do all or execution and fulfilment hereof to be duly regis. any of the said acts; we, the said A. B. and C. D., tered and recorded according to law. In witness, to ratify and confirm all acts and things to be and each of us respectively, hereby undertaking &c. done under the authority herein contained. In witness, &c. (a)

WILLJOINT TENANCY SEVERANCE.-B. others to appoint, and generally to act, in the debtors and each of them, and in their or his names

gave all his estate, consisting of personalty only, to his wife absolutely, "for the benefit of herself and children," and appointed her executrix. He died, leaving six children; one of the daughters married during the lifetime of the widow and subsequently died. The children were held to take as joint tenants, and the marriage of the daughter was held not to operate as a severance of the joint tenancy: (Armstrong v. Armstrong, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 776. V.C. J.)

ELEMENTARY PRECEDENTS IN CON-
VEYANCING. (a)

A Collection of practical Forms designed for pro-
fessional Use, and suited to the Emergencies of
actual Practice, with Notes.

(Continued from page 187.) PRECEDENTS. POWERS OF ATTORNEY.

111. Power of attorney from partners to manage their business abroad.

Know all men by these presents that we, A. B. and C. D., both of, &c., carrying on business there in copartnership as under the style or firm of "A. B. and Co." for divers good causes and considerations us hereunto moving do by these presents make, constitute, and appoint Y. Z., of, &c., our true and lawful attorney and agent for us, and in our names, or in the name of our said firm, and as our act or that of our said firm, to carry on, conduct, and manage all and every our business and concerns according to the usual and regular course thereof as heretofore carried on at, &c., and for that purpose for us, and in our names, or in the name of our said firm or otherwise as occasion shall require, to draw, subscribe, and indorse any bill or bills of exchange or promissory note or notes in satisfaction of or on account of any debt or claim due or payable from or to us or to our said firm, and also for us and in our names, or on our behalf, or in the name and on the behalf of our said firm to charter or hire any vessel or vessels in or from, &c., to any port or ports in Great Britain or Ireland, or to parts or places beyond the seas or otherwise as occasion shall require, and for that purpose to enter into, make, sign, and execute all necessary agreements and charterparties with the owner or owners of such vessels,

our

and upon such terms and conditions as
said attorney shall think advisable, and also
to examine, adjust, and settle all accounts
and reckonings which shall be subsisting
unsettled between us or our said firm, and any
person or persons whomsoever in aforesaid,
and to pay or receive (as the case may be) the
balance, if any, which shall appear to be due on
the settlement of such accounts and reckonings.
And also for us and in our names, or in the name
of our said firm, or otherwise as occasion shall
require, to ask, demand, and receive of and from
all and every persons or person in aforesaid,
all and every sum and sums of money, goods,
securities and effects due to us, or to our said firm
in their or his custody or possession, or for which
such person or persons is, are, or shall be liable or
accountable to us or to our said firm in anywise.
And upon receipt thereof to give and execute

a.) By THOMAS WILKINSON, Esq., Liverpool.

afore

112. Power of attorney from mortgagee of heredi-
taments abroad to agent to enter and sell.

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Know all men by these presents, that I, A. B., of, &c., hereby constitute and appoint C. D., of, &c., my true and lawful attorney and agent for me, and in my name, and on my behalf, or otherwise, for my use, as and when he shall think proper, to enter upon and take possession of all and singular the house with the garden and appurtenances thereto in And also to enter upon and take possession of all and singular, or any part or parts, of the lands, hereditaments, and premises comprised in and assured to me by way of mortgage by a certain indenture, dated, &c., and made between Y. Z. of, &c. [mortgagor] of the one part, and myself of the other part, and for that purpose or any other purpose connected with the execution and fulfilment hereof, to commence and prosecute or defend such actions, suits, or other proceedings as my said attorney shall deem expedient, And for me and in my name to exercise, perform, and execute all powers of sale and other powers or authorities over or in relation to the said house, lands, and premises, and to execute all deeds and documents necessary for the pur poses aforesaid as fully and effectually as I myself could or might lawfully exercise or execute the same if personally present. And also for me and in my name or otherwise for my use, to ask, demand, and receive of and from all and every person and persons in or elsewhere in liable or accountable in that behalf all and every sum and sums of money, goods, securities, and effects due to me, and in his or their custody or possession, or for which such person or persons is, are, or shall be liable or accountable to me in anywise, and upon the receipt thereof to give and execute effectual releases and discharges for the same. And I empower my said attorney on payment to him by the said Y. Z., his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, of the moneys secured to me by the aforesaid mortgage to re-convey or re-assign the land and premises comprised in the said security to the person or persons entitled thereto. And in default of payment to sell the same lands and premises and every or any part thereof, and convey

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JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES' LAW

JOURNAL.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SALE OF SHARES-USAGE OF STOCK EXCHANGE -NOMINEE OF JOBBER-ULTIMATE PURCHASER. The plaintiff, through his brokers, sold ten Guerend-Gurney shares to the defendant, a jobber, for the account day, and on the same day the defendant gave in the name of G. to the plaintiff's brokers as the ultimate purchaser, G.'s name was given with his authority, and was not objected to at the time by the plaintiff or his brokers, and in due course a transfer to G. was executed by the plaintiff and handed to G., or to F., his broker, for him, and the price of the shares was received by the plaintiff through his own brokers. It afterwards appeared that the shares had been in fact purchased by S., through his broker F., and that upon Overend and Gurney's failure, shortly before the name day, S. had directed his broker not to pass his name as the purchaser, and accordingly F., by direction of S., passed G.'s name to the defendant as that of the purchaser. This was done in pursuance of an arrangement made by S. with G., a person in poor circumstances, and wholly irresponsible, that for the sum of 41. 10s. he should take a transfer of the shares into his

the persons seeking to give such a power are competent (a) It must clearly appear in this and like cases, that to do so, and expressly authorised to delegate wholly or partially their trust by the instrument under which they are acting, otherwise such a substitution would be in contravention of the maxim, delegatus non potest by A. to B. to execute a power himself, or give it to delegare, and void. Where, however, authority is given another; by so giving it he does not delegate it. (And see Doe dem. Duke of Devonshire v. Lord G. Cavendish, 4 T. R. 774n.)

name; but of this arrangement the brokers on both sides and the plaintiff and defendant were entirely ignorant. G. not paying calls subsequently made, and the defendant, though requested by the plaintiff to do so, refusing to pay them, the plaintiff was compelled to pay the amount, and in an action to recover it back from the defendant, it was Held, on the authority of Grissell v. Bristowe, in the Exchequer Chamber, 19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 390; L. Rep. 4 C. P. 36; 38 L. J. 10. C. P., by Kelly C. B., Bramwell, B., and (hesitante) Pigott, B. (dissentiente Cleasby, B.) that the defendant having given in, with the nominee's authority, the name of G. as the ultimate purchaser, and the plaintiff having accepted it without objection, and executed a transfer of the shares to G., the defendant had performed his part of the contract as jobber, and exonerated himself of all liability thereon. Per Kelly, C.B. -Any holder of shares in a joint-stock company may lawfully sell and transfer them, and cease to be the proprietor of them, and vest the property in them in the vendee, with or without consideration, or even paying a sum of money to the vendee to accept them, although the latter be irresponsible or insolvent; and if the name of an insolvent, who has thus become the owner of shares, be given in by the jobber as the ultimate purchaser, the seller by the usage of the Stock Exchange, may object to him, and has ten days from the account-day for that purpose; but if he fail to do so, and accepts the nominee without inquiry, he is bound by the usage to recognise him, and him alone, as the purchaser. Per Bramwell B.-Upon a sale of shares in the Stock Exchange market, where both the buyer and seller are members of the Exchange, the sale must be taken to be according to the rules and practice of the Stock Exchange, and there is no question as to the reasonableness of such rules and practice. Per Cleasby, B.-The usage for the jobber to substitute a name for his own is limited to the legitimate purposes for which it was intended, and does not apply when the name given is not that of an ultimate purchaser, but of a man of straw, selected because he is a man of straw, and bribed to permit his name to be used. The ticket by which the name is passed must, by the usage, be a bona fide document; it passes current among the brokers, and this currency makes it a most important document, and must be upon the faith of its being genuine. Here, it falsely represented G., the pauper substitute, to be a purchaser at 2s. 6d. discount, or 14. 7s. 6d. a share, and so imposed upon the plaintiff's brokers, who made out the transfer upon its basis. I should decline, therefore, to infer that the same usage which made it pass current recognised, as coming within the usage, a document fabricated for the purpose of imposition. The defendant has not satisfied the usage, not having given the name of an ultimate purchaser, in compliance with it, and, therefore, continues responsible to the plaintiff (Maxted v. Paine, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 148. Ex.)

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

ANSWERS TO THE FINAL EXAMINATION QUESTIONS. TRINITY TERM 1869.-SECOND DAY. VI. BANKRUPTCY AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS.

56. Verdict when provable.-A verdict is only prima facie evidence of a debt, which the assignees are at liberty to impeach; and if there be legal or equitable grounds upon which the verdict cannot stand, it is the duty of the commissioner to inquire into them, and admit or reject proof accordingly : (Doria & Mac. Bank. 786.) Even when damages in tort have been assessed by a jury, they are not considered as a liquidated debt provable under the bankruptcy till judgment has been actually signed: (Sm. M. L. 598, 5th edit.) 57. Proof of debt.-He may do so by statement and declaration: (See the mode, Doria & Mac. Bank. 756.)

58. Creditor holding security.-The chief rule on this subject is that a creditor holding a security upon the bankrupt's estate shall not be suffered to prove unless he will give it up, or its value has been ascertained by sale. But a creditor holding & security of a third person is not obliged to give it up or sell it before proving. So a joint creditor holding a separate security from one of the codebtors, or separate securities from both of them, may prove against the joint estate without sur

(a) The questions are given ante, p. 168.

render or sale of his security. And the holder of a joint security may prove against the separate estate of one debtor, and recover what he can against the other: (Sm. M. L. 595, 5th edit.) 59. Action-Election.-Yes; he may relinquish his action, and then prove under the adjudication; and such proof will be considered an election to take under the adjudication, and the creditor is thereby freed from the costs of the suit: (12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 182.)

60. Action.-See preceding answer.

61. Proof for costs.-Costs, though untaxed, of obtaining any judgment, decree, or order, which may have been made before bankruptcy, for any debt or demand may be proved. So the payment of costs enforceable by attachment may be proved: (Will. P. P. 138, 5th edit.)

ment-creditor who is entitled to issue a ca. sa. 62. Judgment-debtor summons.· Every judgagainst the debtor in respect of any debt of 501., exclusive of costs, may at the end of one week in the case of a trader, and at the end of one month in the case of a non-trader, issue a judgmentdebtor summons requiring him to appear and be examined respecting his liability to pay the debt under the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 134: (See further Will. P. P. 128, et seq., 5th edit.)

63. Composition-deed-Evidence.-It must be duly registered under the 194th section of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 134.

64. Composition or trust deeds.-(1) A majority in number, representing three-fourths in value of 101. and upwards, after deducting the value of securities held, must assent to the deed and prove their debts by affidavit or declaration; (2) the deed must be executed by the trustees; (3) the execution by the debtor must be attested by a solicitor; (4) within twenty-eight days from its execution, the deed, duly stamped, and a certified times when they were incurred and the consideracopy, and schedule of debts and liabilities, the tion for them, the names and addresses of the creditors, the amounts due to them, the securities held by them, and the value of such securities, &c., verified by affidavit, must be left with the chief registrar of bankrupts; (5) the fact that the required majority of creditors have assented, and the value of the property must be verified. A memorandum of the deed must also be left and advertised in the Gazette within forty-eight hours afterwards: (See Bankruptcy Acts 1861 and 1868, and Orders thereon.)

65. See answer No. 58.

proof, by affidavit or otherwise, of a trading 66. Requisites to adjudication.-There must be within the meaning of the bankrupt laws, a sufficient petitioning creditor's debt, and the debt must have been contracted whilst the debtor was a trader, or must have been subsisting during that period, and due before the bankruptcy; an act of bankruptcy must be committed within twelve months before the filing of the petition, and the creditor must proceed to obtain the adjudication within three days after filing his petition, or within such extended time (not exceeding fourteen days) as shall be allowed by the court: (12 & 13 Vict. c. 106.)

67. Steps after adjudication.—A duplicate of the adjudication is served on the bankrupt, who is allowed seven days, or such extended time as the court thinks fit, to show cause against the adjudication, and if this be not done, it is forthwith to be advertised in the Gazette: (See the further proceedings, Will. P. P. 135, et seq., 5th edit.) 68. Act of bankruptcy by trader-debtor-Summons.-Under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, which provides that a creditor may deliver in writing the particulars of his demand, with a notice requiring payment, and file an affidavit of the truth of the debt, that the debtor is a trader, and that he has delivered particulars and notice. The trader is then summoned to appear before the commissioner and swear he has a good defence. If he admits and state whether he admits or denies the demand, it, or any part of it, he must sign and file a demand, the court may require him to sign and file a deposition on oath that he has a good defence on the merits, and enters into a bond with two sureties to pay such sum and costs as may be recovered in an action by the creditor. If he does not do so, or makes default in appearing to the summons (having no lawful impediment), and does not, within seven days after personal service of the compound for the debt, he commits an act of summons or filing the admission, pay, secure, or bankruptcy on the eighth day, provided a petition be filed against him within two months from the filing of creditor's affidavit: (See sects. 78 to 81.)

written admission. If he refuses to admit the

69. See preceding answer. 70. See answer No. 58.

VII. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

JUSTICES.

71. Justices of the peace.-Justices of the peace were formerly called conservators; and of these, several are so by virtue of their office: the first is the King; then comes the Lord Chancellor; the lord treasurer; the lord high steward; the lord

:

marshal; the justices of the Court of Queen's Bench; the Master of the Rolls; the coroner. Justices of the peace are either for the borough or county (See further, 2 Steph. Com.) Will. 4, c. 50, amended by 4 & 5 Vict. cc. 51, 59; 72. Highway. By the Highway Act (5 & 6 8 & 9 Vict. c. 71, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 61), the inhabitants in vestry assembled may direct the surveyor to apply to two justices of the division to examine a highway, with a view of its being diverted or stopped up; and if a certificate of the justices in favour of the proceeding is sent to the quarter sessions, the justices there assembled are to make the order accordingly. But in case of a diversion, the proceedings must be by consent of the owner of the lands through which the new highway is to pass. And a party, thinking himself aggrieved, may appeal from the certificate of the justices to the quarter sessions, before the order of that court is made: (3 St. C. 249, &c., 5th edit.)

73. Landlord and tenant.-Where the ren dose not exceed 201, and the term is ended by notice to quit, &c., the landlord, &c. may give seven days' notice of his intention to apply to justices. On the hearing, on proof of the tenancy, the title and service, the justices may issue a warrant for the delivery up of possession at not less than twentyone or more than thirty days: (See Stone's Justice, 194; Law Examination Reporter, No. 3, p. 49.) 74. Mode of procedure.-The prisoner is taken before a magistrate. The evidence of the witnesses is taken down in writing in his presence, and signed by them and also by the magistrate. The depositions are read over to the prisoner, and any thing he may say after being cautioned is also taken down. If the magistrate is satisfied that there is a prima facie case against the prisoner, he will commit him to prison for trial, or admit ferred at the assizes against him to the grand jury, him to bail. An indictment is subsequently preand if they return a true bill he is tried in due course by the petit jury.

75. Competency of witnesses.-Very little difference now prevails as to the competency or incompetency of witnesses in civil and criminal cases; yet an important exception exists as to husbands and wives who are witnesses for and against each other in ordinary civil actions and suits but not in criminal cases: (Rosc. Cr. Ev. 116, 6th edit.)

76. Rules of evidence.-The general rules of evidence are the same in criminal as civil cases. And the primary division is into primary and be produced, if possible, before any other evisecondary evidence; and the best evidence must dence is admitted: (Rosc. Cr. Ev. 1, 6th edit., et infra.)

77. Irrelevant matter.-Evidence which would otherwise be inadmissible is received because it serves to identify the prisoner with the commission of the crime; or to explain his motives or intention; and in other like cases: (Rosc. Cr. Ev. 86, et seq., 6th edit.)

78. Circumstantial evidence.-Direct evidence is the best or primary mode of proof, as where a prisoner was seen to commit the crime. It is

circumstantial when the fact itself cannot be proved by direct evidence, but by surrounding circumstances, as on proof of a felony having been committed and the property is shortly afterwards found in the possession of the prisoner: (Russ. Crimes, 726 733.)

79. Presumptions.-Presumptions of law are rules of jurisprudence, while presumptions of facts are inferences of facts from the proved existence of other facts-acts of reasoning. In civil cases it is always necessary for a jury to decide the question at issue, and whatever be their decision rights of the parties will be affected; but in criminal cases there is always a result open to a jury which is partly looked upon as merely nega tive, namely, that which declares the accused to be not guilty: (Rosc. Cr. Ev. 14, 15, 6th edit.)

stealing the goods of an unknown person merely 80. Presumptions,-(1). Not to convict one of because he would not give an account how he came

by them unless there was proof of a felony of those goods. (2). Not to convict of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were proved to be done, or the body found dead.

sometimes so strong as to throw the burden of 81. Burden of proof.-Presumptions of law are proof on the prisoner; as when A. kills B. with a deadly weapon, malice prepense is presumed and must be rebutted by the prisoner.

82. Witnesses. In cases of treason and perjury. 83. Dying declarations.-When made in full confidence of approaching death and when the death is the subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death are the subject of the dying declarations.

tary, for if made by threat or inducement of a 84. Confessions.-The confession must be voluntemporal nature having reference to the charge it is not receivable. The inducement must, however, be by a person in authority, as the prosecutor.

85. Privilege of witness.-The grounds are three :-(1) that to answer the question would expose the witness to consequences so injurious

that he should be allowed to decline doing so; (2) that to answer the question would be a breach of confidence which he ought not to be forced to commit; (3) that to compel the witness to answer the question would be against public policy: (Rosc. Cr. Ev- 137, 6th edit.)

MERCANTILE LAW.

WHAT IS 66 MACHINERY."-A point as to the meaning of "machinery' "in the mortgage of a mill, has been decided by Lord Justice Giffard in a case Ex parte Astbury and Ex parte Lloyd's Banking Company, re Richards and Hill. The dispute was between the assignees of Richards and Hill, who were bankrupts, and the banking company, who were mortgagees of the premises and machinery of a rolling-mill. The latter claimed under the mortgage, as against the bankrupts' assignees, certain duplicate sets of iron rolls as part of the machinery, and this claim was ratified by the Lord Justice. His reason was that the duplicate set of rolls were like duplicate latchkeys to a lock-it was unreasonable to argue that under a deed only one set of latch-keys would pass. His Lordship also decided that the "straightening plates" for a weighing machine passed under the mortgage, though the machine

second carriers an allowance for freight on goods which they had not begun to carry. Had the defendants signed the bill of lading for the whole service, the judgment perhaps would have been different, but the evidence was held to prove that the service and freight were to be distributed.Economist.

ECCLESIASTICAL LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. COURT OF ARCHES ARE BOUND TO ACCEPT LETTERS OF REQUEST-CONSTRUCTION OF CHURCH DISCIPLINE ACT.-After a report of a commission of inquiry on a charge of heresy, a bishop of Arches. That court having refused to accept sent the case by letters of request to the Court the letters of request so sent, on appeal to the Judicial Committee, it was held (reversing the judgment below), that on the true construction of the Church Discipline Act, the judge of the Court of Arches could not refuse to deal with the case. The words of sect. 13 of the Act, " to be there heard and determined according to the law and practice of such court," are to be construed according to their ordinary acceptation, as creating the duty as well as the power of so hearing and determining the case sent. Letters

itself being quite detached, and not being part of the fixed machinery of the mill, would not so pass. of request are no more than the process by which ing back to the 2nd section, it will be found that

TELEGRAPH LAW.-The case of Playford v. The Electric Telegraph Company is probably one of the last cases we shall hear of to recover damages from a company for a mistake in a telegram; but the point raised was curious, though. the case cannot be of much importance now as a precedent. The plaintiffs having a cargo of ice at Grimsby, invited an offer from merchants at Hull for it, and the latter telegraphed that they would give 23s. per cwt. This price the telegraph company made 27s., and the plaintiffs at once sent the cargo to Hull to their great loss. In an action against the company, however, to recover that loss, it was decided that the plaintiffs could not maintain it, as the contract to send the message was not with them. Such a decision undoubtedly reveals a great imperfection in the law. Either the receiver of the telegram should be entitled to recover damages for the wrong-doing of the telegraph company in a matter where they certainly had an interest, or the company should be considered the agent of the sender of the message, so that the plaintiffs would have been entitled to hold the sender responsible for the message as delivered, his right of action against the company being undoubted. But the law is ceasing to be of practical interest, when the public are about accepting an agency from which no damages will be recoverable. We may suggest, however, that the telegraph department ex gratia should create an insurance fund for mistakes in messages. The liability to fatal mistake is much greater with telegrams than with letters, and this is a good practical reason for not applying to it the Post Office rule of no damages for mistakes or delay.-Economist.

MARITIME LAW

NOTICE OF ABANDONMENT.—The rule has been laid down by the Queen's Bench, in the case of Strange v. The English and Scottish Marine Insurance Company, arising out of the American war, that notice of abandonment may be given after capture on any material change in the condition of the things insured, and that a forced sale under the orders of the court, the defendants objecting to give bail for the full value of the goods, was such a change. The mere prolongation of the litigation would not have been enough when the assured had elected not to treat the loss as total; but the sale of the cargo "placed the case on quite a different footing," and the assured became entitled to give notice of abandonment.

MARITIME LAW-THROUGH FREIGHTS.-According to Greeves v. The West India and Pacific Steamship Company, the agents for through freights, and the shippers who employ them, would require to be very careful in their arrangements. The plaintiff's in this case had shipped through to San Francisco by arrangement with the defendants, who, however, only signed the bill of lading "for the service from Liverpool to Colon," two other companies signing it for the service from Colon to San Francisco." Notwithstanding this the defendants received the whole freight; and the goods having been lost between Liverpool and Colon, the question was whether they were entitled to retain the whole, and pay the two companies which had never received the goods at all, under the stipulation that freight and primage is to be considered as earned, ship lost or not lost;" or whether they should retain all the freight except what they themselves earned. The latter was the view taken by the court, and the defendants were

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held to have acted wrongfully in paying to the

the cause is to be placed in a condition to be heard and determined by the Superior Court. Comments on the cases of Brookes v. Cresswell, 4 Notes of Cases, 431; and Sanders v. Head, 4 Moo. P. C. 196: (Sheppard v. Phillimore, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 762. Priv. Co.)

COUNTY COURTS.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.

COSTS.-The plaintiff, on the 15th July 1867, and before the passing of the 30 & 31 Vict. C. 142, commenced an action in this court against the defendant for goods sold and delivered, which action by a judge's order was referred for trial to a County Court, but before trial the above statute came into operation. At the trial a verdict was returned for the plaintiff for 131. Held (per Mr. Justice Lush and Mr. Justice Hayes), that by the operation of the above statute the plaintiff was not entitled to his costs; but per Mr. Justice Hannen that the plaintiff was entitled to his costs by virtue of the Statute of Gloucester: (Mirfin v. Atwood, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 779. Q.B.)

LIVERPOOL COUNTY COURT.
(Before Mr. Serjeant WHEELER, Judge.)
MILLIGAN v. MACK.

Admiralty jurisdiction-Wages. In this case, which which was heard a short time since, his HONOUR gave judgment as follows: This was a plaint entered on the common law side of the court, since the time at which the order in council constituting this court an Admidant, the owner of the ship Mary Mack, the sum ralty Court took effect, to recover from the defenof 251. 8s. 1d., claimed to be due to the plaintiff as the plaintiff; Mr. Nordon for the defendant; and master of such ship. Mr. Bremner appeared for when the case came on for trial Mr. Nordon objected that the cause had been wrongly entered on the common law side, and that the court has its Admiralty jurisdiction. This objection-which now no power to entertain the suit except under is a very formidable one, and is supported by the high authority of Messrs. Williams and Bruce in their recent very able work on Admiralty practice -arises under the 5th section of the Act 30 & 31 Vict. c. 71, by which Admiralty jurisdiction is conferred upon County Courts. The 2nd section authorises Her Majesty, by order in council, to appoint that any County Court should have Admiralty jurisdiction, and to assign to it a district for Admiralty purposes. And the section further provides that any such order in council might be from time to time varied as deemed expedient, and that a County Court so appointed to have Admiralty jurisdiction, and no other County Court, should, for the purposes of the Act, be deemed a County Court having Admiralty jurisdiction. Sect. 3 provides that any County Court having Admiralty jurisdiction should have jurisdiction and all powers and authorities relating thereto to try and determine, subject and according to the provisions of that Act, certain enumerated causes, which, says the section, are "in this Act referred to as Admiralty causes.'

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Amongst the enumerated causes is any claim for wages not exceeding 1501. The 5th secvides that, after the time specified in each order tion, upon which the present question hinges, pro

in council under that Act, appointing a county court to have Admiralty jurisdiction within any district, and no County Court other than the County Court so appointed should have jurisdiction within that district in any Admiralty cause, provided that all Admiralty causes at that time pending in any County Court within that district might be continued as if no such order in council had been made. What, then, is the meaning of this section? For the plaintiff it is contended that it leaves the common law powers of all the County Courts untouched; whilst the defendant insists that any causes which by the Act are made Admiralty causes, and which, when the order in council appointing a particular County Court to have Admiralty jurisdiction took if no order in council had been made, but that no effect, were pending under the common law jurisdiction of such court, might be continued as further plaints could be entered on the common law side of the court in respect of causes which by the Act are made Admiralty causes, all such claims being thenceforth cognisable only under the provisions of the Admiralty Act. Now, unless and until a County Court were made an Admiralty Court under that Act, it had not and it could not have any Admiralty causes pending, and therefore it is difficult to understand how this section can be said to apply to the case of a court which has not, and never had, Admiralty jurisdiction. Upon lookit is expressly provided that any order in council appointing a particular court to have Admiralty jurisdiction, and assigning to it a particular district, may be from time to time varied as may seem expedient, so that, in fact, there may be a succession of orders in council, under one of which Admiralty jurisdiction may in the first instance be given to a particular court, and under another of which it may be taken away from that same court. And the introductory words of the 5th section point to a varying state of things, for they speak of the time specified in each order in council," evidently referring to successive orders in council, in which the state of things existing under any previous order in council may be changed. The proviso at the close of the 5th section may, therefore, be interpreted as applicable to the case of a court which has been made an Ad miralty Court under the Act, and in which Admi ralty causes have been pending, but whose powers as an Admiralty Court have ceased by some The effect of this subsequent order in council. the County Courts remain unaffected by the Act. interpretation is that the common law powers of This construction has the advantage of being consistent with what I think may be fairly as sumed to have been the intention of the framers of the Act, namely, to add a jurisdiction, but not to interfere with an existing jurisdiction where the amount claimed is within the ordinary common law powers of the court. And it would really be a great evil if the court were to be compelled to adopt the construction of the Act contended for by the defendant; because the result would be to compel the institution of an Admiralty suit instead of an ordinary plaint in the most trivial cases of, say seaman's wages, and to take away from every County Court in England a jurisdiction which each court (but for the Admiralty Act) possesses in common It is often very difficult to construe the terms of intended to confer a benefit upon the community. an Act of Parliament; but where, in a statute as in this case, by improving the remedies or addrights, the language used is either doubtful in ing a new remedy for the assertion of private import or admits of diverse interpretations, I conceive it to be the duty of the court so to interpret it as to secure to the public the benefit of cases to consist in giving to parties having a intended. That benefit seems to me in this class maritime lien the benefit of that lien by affording facilities for the institution of Admiralty suits in certain County Courts, leaving open the ordinary remedy at common law. The difficulties of the conclusion I have come to upon the words of the statute are enhanced by the fact that my view appears to differ from the opinion expressed by the very learned writers to whom I have referred, who consider that the section takes away, subject the claims mentioned in sect. 3 from all County to the proviso, all common law jurisdiction as to Courts other than the County Courts mentioned in the Order in Council," and that "all such claims seem to be subject to the provisions of the Act." I am glad to add that my opinion is subject to review, and that I shall be happy to give every facility for the purpose.

66

BUYING STOLEN PROPERTY.-On Friday, at the Westminster County Court, an action was brought by Mr. Harold, one of the "Royal Christys," against Mr. Watson, musical instrument dealer, of Holborn, for the recovery of 11., which he had paid to him for the purchase of a valuable flute in May last. The flute in question was of Lloyd's, in Leadenhall-street, in July 1867. stolen from the office of Mr. L. P. Emile Clairat,

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