but this is an exceptional privilege, granted in consideration of their charitable objects, a claim to which a trades union has no more title than a co-operative store, or any other society formed for profitable or social purposes. We fear that by putting forth this small and really worthless claim now, they will endanger the much larger | and more useful claim which they will next year prefer to be admitted to corporate privileges. LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE. A FAMILIAR difficulty arising out of the existing legal relations of husband and wife, is illustrated by the case of Fleet v. Perrins, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 814, the difficulty, namely, of determining whether a claim by a wife is a chose in action, and then whether it has or has not been reduced into possession by the husband. In that case the Court of Exchequer Chamber was not unanimous, the Chief Baron coming to the conclusion that, although the Court of Queen's Bench and his brother Judges in the Court of Appeal had taken the correct view as regarded the justice of the case, that view was opposed to first principles. It must always be a matter of regret when justice and first principles conflict, because justice may be very clear as regards a particular case, and yet inapplicable as a principle of law, to all cases. If any system of equitable procedure could be invented by which legal principles could be stretched to meet the requirements of individual cases, the advantage to the community would undoubtedly be great. The nearest approach to such an invention is the resolute action of the courts in favour of the justice of the cases taken individually, notwithstanding they thereby to some extent strain or violate first principles. The case to which we are referring presented these facts. The defendant received money to be applied for the use of a married woman. Part of this money was so applied. Both the woman and her husband being dead, two questions arose: first, whether there was here a chose in action; and, secondly, who should sue, the repre sentatives of the wife or of the husband. The first question may be said to be new. Mr. Justice Blackburn said in the court below (19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 148): "There is no doubt that all personal property of a corporeal nature, such as goods or cash belonging to his wife before marriage, vests in the husband by the marriage, and that all such property given or acquired by the wife after marriage also vests in the husband. But choses in action belonging to the wife before marriage do not vest in the husband unless he does some act to reduce them into possession during her coverture, and even during coverture the husband may prevent the wife from making a contract in an action on which he may join with her during her life, though he may disaffirm her interest, and sue on the contract as made with himself alone. If he does permit the wife to make such a contract, and does not reduce it into possession during the Coverture, it survives to the wife." This he followed up by saying that the court saw no reason why the rule of law should be different in cases of a contract in writing and any other, and therefore it is to be taken as established that a chose in action may exist without a writing, that it being shown that some person was made the depositee of money for the benefit of a feme covert, a chose in action is created. Then comes the question under what circumstances it will remain the sole property of the wife, to be recovered by her personal representative in the event of her death. The case of Bird v. Peagrum, 13 C. B. 63, often cited in Fleet v. Perrins, exemplifies, as Mr. Justice Smith said, the distinction between the case of property actually reduced into possession by the wife and a mere chose in action. There it was held that the husband could bring an action in his own right after the death of his wife to recover the rents of certain leasehold property conveyed by the wife on her marriage to trustees. The wife had actually received the rents, and deposited part of the money with the defendant. In Fleet v. Perrins, on the other hand, the money did not come into the possession of the wife, but remained a mere chose in action at the time of her death. Such was the opinion of all the Judges in the Exchequer Chamber, with the exception of Chief Baron Kelly. The Chief Baron objected to the conclusion of his colleagues that it could In Piddington v. The South-Eastern Railway Company, 5 C. B., N. S., the opinion of ChiefBaron Pollock, that the question was one of fact for a jury, appears to have been approved, and it was held that to charge for packed parcels at a double rate was unreasonable in itself and a violation of the equality clause of the defendants' Act of incorporation. be correct only upon the supposition that per- former; and the jury having found that there sonal property may belong to a wife during was no such difference, it was held generally that coverture, and that husband and wife may sue the increased rate could not legally be charged. jointly for money had and received though the Baron Martin, however, in the same case rested interest of the wife does not appear upon the his judgment on the violation of the equality face of the proceedings, which (as his Lordship | clause that such a charge would be. remarked) is in the teeth of Bidgood v. Way, 2 W. Bl. 1236. Baron Channell, however, who is one of our oldest "pleader Judges," said, "I think that the husband and wife might have sued the defendant in the present case for money deposited with him for his wife." His only doubt was whether the action would have lain in the form which had been adopted. Eventually he agreed with the rest of the court in holding that there was a chose in action which had not been interfered with by the husband. We have noticed this case to show, that if the Bill relating to married women, which has just passed its third reading in the House of Commons, is not one to be desired, the law of husband and wife calls for revision. The question of property as between husband and wife is not one which should be left to the tender mercies of special pleading. PACKED PARCEL S. By the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of the Great Western Railway Company v. Sutton, noticed in last week's "Sayings and Doings," a conclusive decision has been given on the much-vexed question of " packed parcels." Carriers of goods by road or canal because of the expense and slowness of the means of carriage at their command, found competition with railway companies impossible. They then adopted the system of "packed parcels," and many carriers made this their almost exclusive business. Mr. Justice Willes said: "It is clear upon the whole facts of the case that the increased charge is made for the purpose of preventing people, who are likely to send packages of the description in question, viz. carriers, from entering into competition with the company in the conveyance of goods-a thing which it has over and over again been decided that these companies cannot be permitted to do." We may pass over other cases in which no new point on the question has been decided. The judgment of the House of Lords in the present case concludes the question, for it is probable that by no device on the part of the railway companies can the effect of it be evaded. They cannot make in all cases an increased cels, whether belonging to the same or to charge for packages, consisting of several pardifferent persons, because such charge would be held to be unreasonable. They cannot charge carriers at a higher rate than other persons for packed parcels, for that the present case has determined. They cannot in the case of packed parcels insist on delivering the several parcels to the consignees and make an extra charge for such delivery, for this was decided in the case of Baxendale v. The London and South-Western Rail way Company, L. Rep. 1 Ex. 137; 14 L. T. Rep. N. S. 26.) tain a higher charge for the conveyance of packed And were any other mode available to mainparcels, it would fail from the difficulty that the whether a package entrusted to them was a railway company would have in ascertaining According to this system, the carrier collects at a central office the parcels of various consignors, sorts them, packs together the parcels destined for different consignees in the same neighbourhood, and forwards them so packed by rail, the distribution and delivery of the several parcels being entrusted to the carrier's local agents. The carrier thus has these advantages: 1st. He has the trouble of collection and delivery only, the actual carriage being done by the rail-packed parcel or not. The parcel could not be way company. 2nd. He gets for himself the opened (Crouch v. London and North Western difference between the charge for weight, which Railway Company, 2 C. & K. 789), nor could it he pays to the railway company, and that for be insisted that a declaration, specifying the number of parcels, which he receives from the contents, should be signed by the sender prior to the acceptance of the parcel for conveyance various consignors. by the company, (Ib. 14 C. B. 255). The railway companies have tried to check the carriers in this practice, by charging at a much increased rate for "packed parcels," the carriers disputed the legality of such charges, and the question thus raised has repeatedly come before the courts. It is obviously one of much interest to the carriers, to the railway companies, and to the public. It will be convenient to collect here the results of the principal decisions hitherto arrived at. The earliest case on the subject was that of Pickford v. The Grand Junction Railway Company, 10 M. & W. 399, in which, in 1842, it was held that a charge of 1d. per lb. on a packed parcel was not a reasonable one. The gist of the decision is expressed thus by Baron Parke: "The remuneration is excessive and unjustified by the increase of responsibility from the circumstance of the properties being separate. It is impossible to support on this ground a charge for 4/. 1s. 8d. for the first package, for which, if it had consisted of parcels one property, 17. 6s. 6d. would have been the proper charge, and a charge of 31. 1s. 6d. instead of 9s. for the second." In Parker v. The Great Western Railway Company, 11 C. B. 582, the plaintiff, a carrier, was held entitled to recover any additional charges paid for packed parcels, the defendants' Act providing that the charges should be imposed equally on all persons using the railway, and it being admitted that the above charge was imposed upon carriers only. The next decision, that in Crouch v. The Great Northern Railway Company 11 Exch. 742, went further. There Chief Baron Pollock laid it down that the question whether a railway company was entitled to charge extra for packed parcels was one of fact and not of law; that the question ought to be left to a jury to determine whether the difference, in point of risk or trouble or other wise, between a package containing several parcels belonging to different persons (ie. a packed parcel), and a package containing several parcels all belonging to one person, was such as to justify an increased rate of charge for the ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW ON JETTISON AND GENERAL AVERAGE. THE extraordinary state of perplexity in which the judgments in this country and the United States have placed the subject of general average, in respect of the fundamental branch of jettison, will doubtless lead to a considerable amount of future litigation. We therefore once more recur to this subject, for the purpose of concluding our notices of American cases in regard to it with some observations on the most recent leading case by which the present law of the United States in regard to jettison is ruled. It is a case entirely in conflict with English law, namely, Faulkner and Rogers v. The Augusta Insurance Company, determined by the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, Charleston, in Feb. 1842 (2 Macmullan, 161). Insurance to the amount of 6270 dols. was effected on goods per schooner Estell, from Charleston to Mobile. In April 1840 the vessel struck on the Florida Reef, and was taken off and carried into Key West, and labelled for salvage, and part of the goods insured were sold to pay the salvage and expenses on ship and cargo. The ship afterwards proceeded on her voyage, and on arrival at Mobile an average agreement was entered into by the owners of ship and cargo. The assured (the plaintiffs in the suit) were credited in the statement of average with the value of their goods sold as above-mentioned, 1735 dols. 34c., and charged with their contributory share of the general average, 879 dols. 52c.; amount to be made good by other contributors, 855 dols. 82c. The assured took no steps to recover the contribution from the ship and freight, and the residue of the cargo, but sought recovery, on their own policy, of the entire loss of the goods sold, 1735 dols. 34c. It was argued, in favour of the insurers, that the plaintiffs "had an ample remedy for the recovery of the contribution due to them in Mobile, and would have recovered if they had not been insured. But if they or their agents suppressed the demand against the vessel and cargo from favour, it was a fraud upon the insurers; and if they did so from negligence, the consequences of their neglect should be borne by themselves." The court, however, held that they were entitled to recover the entire loss in the first instance from the insurers 1735 dols. 31c. Richardson, J., in delivering the judgment, said, "No doubt is entertained that such loss is embraced by the policy." And, "looking at the strict legal right of the insured, and to the unquestionable liability of the insurers upon the policy as a contract of indemnification to the former, the court does not perceive how the insured can be suspended in their right of action by the mere qualified obligation first to demand contribution of the other shippers. I would think, therefore, that the adjustment of average loss among the different shippers and the average agreement are to be considered as a counter indemnity to the insurers after paying the whole loss. Chancellor Kent recognises this as the proper rule of law, and Abbott, p. 396, informs us that in England the average loss is commonly paid in the first instance by the insurers." Wardlaw, J. and Butler, J. dissented from the opinion of the majority of the court on the following grounds, expressed by the former: "It is contrary to the good faith required in all contracts of insurance for the insured to put the underwriters in a worse condition than the in sured would have been if no insurance had been made. The excess of the plaintiff's goods sold for salvage over their share of the average was in truth an advance made by them for the other shippers," and, it might have been added, for the shipowner," and the average bond taken by the master, the common agent, was a mutual Covenant signed by all the persons concerned, binding themselves to pay each his contributory share of the average on demand. The agents of the plaintiffs, when they and all others concerned were together in the port of destination after adjustment of the average, do not appear ever to have made a demand, but have contented themselves by sending the adjustment and average bond to the underwriters, looking to them for an entire indemnity. The underwriters may pay and may recover from those bound to contribute, by suits in the name of the plaintiffs, but now that the shippers (or consignees) are separated, what hope is there for the underwriters that they will be able, at reasonable expense, to procure reimbursement? A demand by the agent of the plaintiffs, at the time when they should have made it, might have effected complete justice without expense or circuity; and I think that without showing that this demand was ineffective, or was in some way excused, the plaintiffs should not be permitted to recover from the underwriters more than their share of the average (2 Marshall on Insurance, 547; 2 Phillips on Insurance, 127).” This judgment is in direct conflict with the English law, which holds that loss by sale of cargo to pay the expenses of a ship at a port of refuge is not a loss by perils of the sea, recoverable from underwriters, but that the value of part of a cargo necessarily sold, and thus applied, is a forced loan which the shipowner is entitled to make for the benefit of all concerned, and for which he is liable to reimburse the proprietors of the goods sold. If part of the cargo was given in kind to salvors instead of a money payment for assistance rendered in rescuing the whole property from total loss, the net market value which the goods sold would have produced on arrival with the ship and the residue of the cargo at the port of destination, is the amount which ought to be reimbursed to the proprietor of the goods sold, together with the freight of them, and to be apportioned on the entire values of ship, freight, and cargo. It is similar to a case of jettison. In the foregoing judgment, the court said that, "Abbott informs us that in England the average loss is commonly paid in the first instance by the insurers." But in the time when Abbott wrote, and ever since, it has been the unvarying practice of English underwriters until now to pay only the proportion of general average loss or expense applicable to the goods insured. This mistake runs through all the leading American cases on the subject in question; and in the recent English case of Dickinson v. Jardine, the mistake has been made of supposing that the Judges in the United States charged the underwriters with the insured value of the jettisoned goods, instead of with the actual loss of them at their market value when it was less than the amount insured. There does not appear to have been any American case in which the merchant was held entitled to recover the amount insured on goods jettisoned when it exceeded the actual loss of them at their market value. In the leading American cases alluded to the underwriters were charged in the first place with the total loss of market value actually sustained or with the total amount of general average expenses disbursed by the assured, leaving them to recover the proportions from the other contributors on the values of ship, freight, and cargo; and in the case decided by Mr. Justice Kent, on which they are all founded, the assured was not allowed to recover a constructive total loss because the corn, for the total loss of part whereof they were charged as general average, was warranted free from particular average. The American authorities, however, draw from these cases the strange deduction that, because according to their law a loss of 50 per cent. occurring before the completion of the voyage gives a right to abandon goods insured free from particular average, and to claim a constructive total loss, if the claim for jettison arising before the termination of the voyage amounts to 60 per cent., the assured may recover a total loss, although he transfers by abandonment a claim for contribution amounting to 20 per cent., thus reducing the actual loss to 40 per cent.; but if he claims and receives the 20 per cent. from the contributors, his loss becomes less than one-half, and cannot be made total by abandonment. He can recover a constructive total loss only by abandoning previously to claiming contribution for the benefit of the insurers, and he is entitled to take his choice, and involve the insurers in the falling state of the market, or to reserve the profit on a gaining market to himself, just as he pleases. We have extended our observations on this subject to a considerable length because of its importance, and because of the anomalous position of the case law in regard to it in this country and the United States. We shall probably conclude with a brief account of the present law of England as to the liability of insurers for loss by jettison, which requires to be understood and acted upon until it is altered by the determination of a court of appeal. THE NEW LAWS OF THE SESSION. (32 & 33 Vict. c 14.) THIS is a compendious Act of thirty-nine sections, embodying the Budget and regulating the altered duties of Customs and Inland Revenue. Some of its provisions and their severe effect upon the tax-payers by the new arrangements for payments of the various taxes were described last week. Other noteworthy provisions are as follows: Sect. 7 abolishes the present parochial assessors of income tax, and substitutes for them the inspectors or managers of taxes. But the taxes are still to be collected by the parochial officers, at a poundage of three half-pence only. 66 Sect. 11 exempts from Inhabited House duty any tenement or part of a tenement occupied as a house for the purpose of trade only, or as a warehouse for the sole purpose of lodging goods, wares, or merchandise therein, or as a shop or counting-house, or being used as a shop or counting-house." Duty on Fire Insurance. The duties on letting horses for hire or hackney and stage carriages and the mileage duties thereon are abolished. The Assessed Taxes are, on and after the 1st Jan. next, to be collected by means of Excise licences, precisely as is the dog tax. Hitherto, the articles kept during one year were paid for in the following year. Thus, if B. kept a horse between April 1867 and April 1868, he was not assessed for it until April 1868. But henceforth he is to take out a licence in January to keep a horse during the coming year, in fact, paying the tax in advance; and if during the year he should keep any exciseable article, he must at once apply to the Excise for a licence to keep it, or be subject to a very heavy penalty should he omit to do so. For facilitating this process, the commissioners are to provide forms of declaration to be made by the taxpayer. By sect. 24 the commissioners may serve a special notice on any person signing such declaration to be made under a penalty of 201. The penalty for omitting to take out a licence for any taxable article is 20., to be recovered before justices. But it is expressly provided that no such penalty shall be enforced if the defendant proves to the satisfaction of the justices that he had delivered a declaration and paid the duties within the time prescribed by the Act that is to any, before the expiration of the month of January, or within twenty-six days from the time of commencing to keep article. such taxable Livery stable keepers and persons letting servants on hire are to keep books of account, stating particulars as to the servants, horses, and carriages so kept by them. The object of this is to prevent the possible fraud of private carriages obtaining exemption by professing to be carriages let for hire (s. 20). Duties may be recovered by distress. Assignees are to pay duties owing by bankrupts. Licences are to be produced when required by any officer of inland revenue. The duty on shepherds' dogs is to be paid by the employer of the shepherd, but the licence is to be granted in the name of the shepherd (s. 38). II. AMENDMENT OF THE LANDS CLAUSES (32 & 33 Vict. c. 18.) This short statute of four sections is designed to amend certain defects in the Lands Clauses Con solidation Act 1845. It enacts that the costs of arbitrations under that Act shall, where either party so requires, be settled by a Master of the Superior Courts. It repeals the 33rd section of the Railways Regulation Act 1868, and provides that any proceedings commenced in pursuance thereof may be continued under this Act. Special provision is made for assessing the value of land held by trustees, and it is to be cited as "The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1869." III. PRESERVATION OF SEA BIRDS. (32 & 33 Vict. c. 17.) This Act is designed for the protection of sea birds during the breeding season. It is contained in nine sections, and dated 29th June 1869. After defining what are to be deemed sea birds, it proceeds to create a close season for them from April 1 to Aug. 1, and enacts that any person who shall kill, wound, or attempt to kill or wound, or take any sea bird, or use any boat, gun, net, or other engine or instrument for the purpose, or "have in his control or possession" any sea bird recently killed, wounded, or taken during such close time, shall be subject for every such bird to a penalty not exceeding 17, and costs to be recovered before a justice. But the section is not to apply to young birds unable to From June 25 this duty is wholly repealed-fly (s. 2). The Home Office may, on application that is to say, on policies issued after that date, from the justices of any county in quarter and on all renewals of policies; but where the duty has been already paid before the 12th sessions, vary or extend the close time. Any April last, even as in some cases for five years abode is to be subject to a further penalty of 21. person offending refusing to give his name and in advance, there can be no return of it: (ss. 10- A moiety of the penalty is to go to the informer, 12). Offences within the Admiralty jurisdiction are and the other moiety in aid of the County rate. to be treated as if they had been committed on land. The Queen in Council may, by order, exempt any remote parts of the sea coasts of the United Kingdom from the operation of the Act. But with respect to policies effected since the 12th April last, a proportionate sum of the duty paid is to be allowed: (s. 13). Tea Licences. sale of coffee, tea, cocoa nuts, chocolate, or Licences are no longer to be required for the pepper (s. 14). Assessed Taxes and Excise Licenses. It is not necessary here to repeat the list of Assessed Taxes as modified. IV. REMOVAL OF PRISONERS IN THE COLONIES. (32 Vict. c. 10.) This Act is intended to facilitate the removal of prisoners from one colony to another for the purpose of punishment. It enacts that any two colonies may, with the sanction of the Privy Council, agree for the removal of prisoners under sentence of transportation, imprisonment, or penal servitude from one of such colonies to the other for the purpose of undergoing their punishments. Such removal is to be by warrant. Prisoners are to be detained in legal custody during the period of such removal. He is to be subject to the laws of the colony to which he is removed, and the last clause legalises all removals heretofore made. SPECIAL BAILS BILL. move the prohibition on attorneys, leaving the WM. E. TATTERSHALL, Solicitor. THE LAW WORK OF THE SESSION. We have received the following letter in reply THE legislative session of 1869 is rapidly drawing to the one which we published last week: TO THE EDITOR OF THE LAW TIMES. 66 Why is this? It is not for lack of work. Whether we narrow our view to Ireland, or extend it to the entire empire, we encounter on every side legal problems of greater or lesser magnitude awaiting the attention of the Legislature. Look for a moment at the vast undertakings to which practical statesmen are afraid to do more than allude, but which have long engaged the attention of law reformers. We are promised an expurgated collection of our statutes. This instalment of justice we may soon obtain. A digest of our law is not an impossibility-about a quarter of a century hence. From a code we are distant-say a century. The Judicature Commission have recommended the conversion of our existing triCourt, administering one uniform system of law, bunals into chambers or divisions of our Supreme and set in motion by a uniform course of procedure and practice. to a close. In less than a month the 12th Aug. will summon our legislators, hereditary and Sir,---I have read a strange letter in your impres-elected, to a slaughter of the innocents more sion of to-day (July 17) on this Bill, signed with attractive than that of which the Palace of St. the initials" S. J. H." The owner of them seems Stephens is annually the scene. Already we may sadly ruffled in temper at an imaginary slight look back on the work of the session as practically thrown on attorneys and solicitors by the Chan- ended, for no Bill now introduced could be carried cellor, in moving the second reading. Having through the necessary stages of first, second, and myself been instrumental in causing the introduc- third readings, committees and reports in both tion of this Bill into Parliament, it may not be Houses, before the close of the session. No new out of place for me to say, that "S. J. H.'s" measure of legislative reform can now be introcomment is, most probably, founded on a very duced. The only question is, how many of the imperfect report of what the Chancellor said; and few already introduced can become law? The further that, even supposing that the report he session of 1869 may fill an important chapter in has seen were exact, I can by no means perceive the political history of the century. But to the that discourtesy on the part of the Chancellor lawyer it will be flat, stale, and unprofitable. which seems to have been discerned by "S. J. H.'s" diseased imagination. The Chancellor's wellknown character would incline any sensible man to believe that he was, when moving the second reading, far more likely to be intent on giving to his audience sufficient reasons for passing the Bill than on making an opportunity to cast an irrelevant and needless slight on absent persons, not to mention that the point of the slight would be sure to be utterly lost on the audience in question-the House of Lords. “S. J. H." asks, “Is any comment necessary ?" I should say "No." It is a fact that solicitors were prohibited from taking out special bail commissions by the Act of William and Mary, which originally authorised the grant of them. Why this was so is not easy now to see, but so it certainly was. It is likewise a fact through changes in legal procedure of late years, and more particularly of the Act for abolishing arrest on mesne process, the necessity for putting in special bails arises but seldom, and that it has thus become no longer worth any one's while to spend money and time in obtaining such commissions, looking only to the remuneration attaching to the performance of the office. Nevertheless such bails are still occasionally required. and there ought to be some one to take them. If no one can be found in the country to take them, an aggregate of cases ma involve much practical inconvenience and useless expense, the attendance in London of at least three persons to each case being then requisite. None but attorneys, however, can be expected to take much notice of so infrequent an inconvenience as regards individual cases. A case having, however, arisen in my own practice, and having been consequently at some trouble myself, I called attention to the subject, that the difficulty I found might be removed for the future from the path of myself and my professional brethren; and this Bill was introduced into Parliament by Mr. Hadfield, M.P., who having been formerly in practice as a solicitor was well qualified to understand and explain the subject. To that gentleman's kindness and perseverance I am now indebted, that the Bill, though brought forward late in the session, has made good progress. The method taken was to submit a Bill which enables all persons authorised to take affidavits in the country under an Act of Charles II.'s reign to take bails. These persons may or may not be attorneys; that Act leaves that point open; but in practice, I believe none but attorneys ever think of applying for appointments under it to the Judges. This course necessarily involved the removal of the prohibition imposed on attorneys by the Act of William and Mary. Attorneys are in reality the only persons who can be expected to feel an What is the cause of this neglect of legal interest, or take trouble about facilitating the reform? The obvious reply is, the Legislature lesser details of legal practice, whether of fre- was engrossed by one great political question, and quent or infrequent occurrence; but they may be had no time to bestow upon such trifles. But expected, and actually do so to a sufficient extent, what was the House of Lords doing while the for the mutual convenience of themselves and Irish Church Bill was before the Commons; and each other, and of course of their clients too; and what was the House of Commons about when the some such idea as this, I am sure, is all the Chan- Bill was before the Lords? Did not the nights cellor would mean to imply, if he did say any spent in debate and in committee form the workthing to the effect that it was not now worth the ing days of the session, and a balance remains while of any but an attorney to obtain power to which, if economically employed, could be rentake special bails. Since, however, the obtaining dered most effective. The true canse is that the a separate commission, as heretofore was needful, Legislature is set in motion for the most part by would, in fact, be as little worth the while of an one or other of the two great political parties, the attorney as of anyone else, so far as pecuniary leaders of which care but little for legal reform, recompense is concerned (as would probably soon pure and simple. To this canse must be added appear, if all that the Bill proposed were to re- the apathy of the public, who do not realise the These are undertakings of first class magnitude and universal application. They embrace every department of our law. But there are others of more moderate dimensions. The marriage laws of the United Kingdom, for example, have been the subject of an elaborate and exhaustive report. Whenever the national conscience is awakened, a commission and a report are the result. The British nation is subject to periodical fits of legal penitence as well as of virtuous indignation. The number of branches of the law which have been sat upon, reported upon, and finally neglected, is truly appalling. The grand jury laws of Ireland were reported upon last year. The Chancery and Common law Commissioners in their second report considered the law of judgments in Ireland, and recommended the appointment of a distinct commission to investigate the question. Nothing has been done since. The new Common Law Procedure Bill is indefinitely postponed, but of this we do not complain. The report of the Judicature Commission afforded a reasonable excuse for the adoption of this course. The English bankruptcy code has been reformed, but that of Ireland neglected. Perhaps our legislators acted on the maxim, fiat experimentum in corpore vili. At all events, whatever be the cause of their neglect of Ireland, it will have this good result in practice, that we shall be able to profit by the experience of our neighbours. The fact, however, remains undisputed that the only considerable measure of law reform which has been passed for Ireland for many years was the Chancery Act of 1867, to which several valuable pieces of patronage were attached. It was edifying to witness the emulation with which the two rival political parties contended for the honour of the parentage of this Bill. extent to which their interests are concerned; the amount of work with which the Legislature is incumbered, of a character not strictly legislative. LEGAL PROCEDURE AND THE PRO FESSION IN SCOTLAND. A PAPER was read last February before the Juridical Society on the above subject, by Mr. William Neish, a barrister, which deserves to be more widely read than it has been. We therefore make some extracts: The subject of the present paper (he says), though referring to the judicatories of Scotland alone, cannot be without interest to the English lawyer, more especially as some of the most eminent members of our Bar are thoroughly conversant with Scotch law and legal forms, from their large practice in Scotch appeals to the House of Lords. The dissatisfaction, long and generally expressed throughout the country, and especially in Scotland itself, with the Supreme Courts in Edinburgh; the publicly avowed opinion of one of the most learned of its Judges, and the pronounced views of English lawyers expressed in Parliament and elsewhere, led to the appointment, under the late Government, of a Royal Commission to inquire into and report upon the whole subject. With all deference, however, to the eminent and very learned gentlemen who are members of it, I venture to think that its composition is not such as to inspire perfect confidence, or to lead to the necessary reforms. It is no disparagement to say that, for the most part, it is composed of gentlemen familiar only with the very courts and forms of procedure now called in ques tion, and having a natural bias in their favour, and whose more immediate interest it is not to infringe on the prestige, patronage, and supposed dignity of their own courts or on their wealth and endowments. Nor is it unfair to remark that the commission is prosecuting inquiries in an atmosphere not the most favourable for seeing things as they are, or for promoting thorough and beneficial reforms. In treating of any Scotch legal subject it is, of course, necessary to use technical language, which, I know, will seem in some instances barbaric to the English ear; but I shall do so as sparingly as art and science has its own peculiar terms-and possible-and it will not be forgotten that every that even the English lawyer is familiar with barbarous Norman French and abbreviated doglatin. The first thing that strikes any one acquainted with the judicial systems of England and Scotland is the disproportionate number of the Scotch judges as compared with the English. In England the number of the judges of the Supreme Courts, including the Lord Chancellor, and the three additional common law judges lately created, is twenty-seven; whilst the number of judges of the Scotch Supreme Courts in Edinburgh is thirteen-namely, five puisne judges, or Lords Ordinary, and two Courts of Appeal of four judges each, known as the first and second divisions of the Inner House; a number too many according to the experience and observation of the learned judge referred to-and as anyone would naturally suppose. The population of England to that of Scotland may be stated at least as six to one, and its wealth and the extent of its business (including legal proceedings), is in a greatly increased proportion. No doubt it has been said that in England there are besides, the judges of the Courts of Bankruptcy, of the County Courts, and of other courts of special and local jurisdic tion; but, on the other hand, there are in Scotland the numerous and powerful staff of sheriffs and sheriff-substitutes in every county-all profes sional men-and, in my opinion, more than a set-off to the English judges referred to. Then, besides the legal business of England proper, there should be borne in mind the onerous and constantly increas ing duties of its judges in appeals from India, China, Ceylon, Australia, New Zealand, the Cape, the West Indies, the Canadas, and our numerous other Colonies, besides Scotch appeals. In many of these cases, no doubt, the valuable assistance of ex-chancellors and retired judges is cheerfully given; but few of them are disposed of without the presence either of the Lord Chancellor for the time being, or of other judges from the courts of Chancery or Common Law. These are duties of which the Judges in Scotland know nothing. It is unfortunate that we have no satisfactory statisties of the judicial business of England and Scot land. Even when such returns are made, however, there is a difficulty in comparing them, owing to the different forms of procedure, and to the Scotch returns being incumbered with much routine and administrative business done by the associates and clerks of court in England; my own long-formed opinion is that the number of the Judges of the Court of Session might safely and with great advantage to the country be reduced from thirteen to seven-that is, there might be four Lords Ordinary instead of five, and one Court of Appeal, or Inner House, of three instead of two Courts of Appeal as now, of four each. Four Judges in each of the two appeal courts are too many, and one court of appeal of three would, in my humble opinion, be quite sufficient to discharge all the duties required of it. In the Inner House each of the four Judges, generally speaking considers it necessary to give his opinion at length, and as might be expected they do not always agree in the result, nor when they do, in their reasons. This, amongst other causes, helps to swell the list of appeals in the House of Lords. In fact, it is not too much to add that the thirteen Judges are not unfrequently in each others' way. I regret, however, to observe that the honourable and learned member for the Wigtown burghs, now second Scotch law officer of the Crown, has already, in a public lecture, pending the inquiry of the commission, announced the foregone conclusion, if I may so call it, that there must on no account be a diminution of the number of Judges in the Court of Session, whatever reforms there may be in other directions. He thinks it would lead to the delay of business, already much complained of. On the other hand, as already said, one of the learned lords (Ormidale), who before he was elevated to the bench had large experience, first as a W.S., and afterwards as an advocate, has publicly and emphatically declared that the number of the Judges is too great for all the duties they have to discharge. One of the best appeal courts in England, and one much relied on, consists, as the meeting knows, of three members. I refer to the Court of Appeal in Chancery. This court, for the most part, consists of only two members-the Lords Justices-and lately, when its business fell into arrear through the illness of Sir J. Lewis Kinght Bruce and other causes, an Act of Parliament enabled the Lords Justices to hold separate appellate courts, which they did, and speedily and satisfactorily cleared off all arrears. I must not omit to notice that some of the Judges of the Court of Session, under the name of Lords Commissioners of Justiciary, act as Judges of the Supreme Court of Seotland; but their duties are not heavy, and might advantageously be made lighter by extending the jurisdiction of the sheriffs in that direction. I was lately struck with a case in this "high court" as illustrative of the economy of judicial time in Scotland. It was an appeal from a decision of the Sheriff-Substitute at Stirling at the instance of a person who had been fined 10s. for fishing with a rod and line in the river Forth for salmon, without the vestige of a title, except (as he contended) such title as belonged to everyone of the public (Anderson v. Anderson, C. of S., 3 Ser.: vol. 6, p. 117), and that even as against the prosecutor, who had an express grant from the Crown of the salmon fishings in that part of the river Forth. The appeal first came before Lord Cowan at the autumn Circuit Court of Justiciary in Stirling, and although the case did not seem to be one admitting of any reasonable doubt (and none was expressed), his Lordship, in Scotch law language, "certified" the appeal to the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh, at a very heavy cost, no doubt, to the litigants. Before the "High Court" in Edinburgh it duly ap peared, and there no fewer than seven grave and learned lords sat in judgment upon it, when without hearing the respondent, each of them considered it necessary, some at length, to express his own individual opinion that the case admitted of no doubt whatever, and that the poacher had been justly amerced in the 10s. Surely a case so small, and, as the decision without hearing the respondent shows, so simple, indeed, the learned Lord who sent it to the High Court in Edinburgh is reported to have said: "To hold that rod and line fishing may be lawfully used by anyone, would destroy the whole salmon fishings in the country"-surely, I say, such a case might have ended with the sheriff, or at most been finally disposed of in the Circuit Court at Stirling, and at any rate did not require seven learned Lords to dispose of it. The Circuit Courts are held in the various assize towns twice a-year-in Glasgow oftener; but the business before them is, with a rare exception, criminal cases, by far the greater number of which ought to be dealt with by the sheriffs. The exception is an occasional appeal of a small debt cause from the Sheriff's Court; for, as it is Homewhat startling to anyone out of Scotland to be told, it is nevertheless a fact that there is very seldom any jury trial in a civil cause set down for hearing except in Edinburgh, however distant the parties and witnesses may be. And this is so, notwithstanding that the Scotch judges have the same power on circuit to try civil causes as the English Judges have. It may not be out of place to remark in passing that trial by jury in civil causes is entirely foreign to the Scotch code, and was engrafted upon it for the first time by an Act of Parliament in 1819. Perhaps it may be in consequence of this that it has never worked well in Scotland, and being there conducted in a cumbrons, dilatory, and expensive way, it is by no means popular. In many cases where formerly a jury his causes in the Sheriff's Court, and when they have run the curriculum there, where he has acted both as counsel and solicitor (or procurator as he is called), that he advises his client at any reasonable sacrifice to avoid the Court of Session, where, whilst the result is uncertain, the expense is not; even when the cause is gained, for in the conduct of it on appeal in Edinburgh the provincial solicitor is not only allowed no fees (except of a nominal amount), on the ground of what is called "double agency," and that, however necessary to the conduct of the cause his correspondence and general assistance may be, but contrary to the general rule of law where an agent discloses his principal, the provincial solicitor in such cases is personally liable to the Edinburgh solicitor for all costs incurred to the latter. The result is that the legitimate business of the Court of Session is in this way really much curtailed. Besides the Edinburgh corporations, there are others in Glasgow and Aberdeen of an equally exclusive character. It is imperative that all these petty monopolies should be abolished, and all members of the solicitor branch of the Profession put upon the same footing in Scotland, as they now are in England. COURTS [CONTRIBUTED BY THE REPORTERS OF THE SEVERAL COURTS.] HOUSE OF LORDS. Again, in questions of account, which frequently involve intricate points of law, it is not an uncommon practice to remit to accountants, not officers of court, except in so far as the remit may make them such, "before answer," to make up a state of accounts betwixt the parties litigating. "Before answer simply means that the remit is made without deciding anything as to the relevancy of the case, or giving any judgment or opinion upon the questions of law involved. Thus the accountant has in his report not unfrequently to present alternative and various views of the questions raised, and even to suggest to the court what the law is or ought to be, though himself not belonging to any branch of the Profession. These reports lead to great expense, which has been known to be ruinous to the parties engaged. In a late appeal from the Court of Session, in which I had the honour to appear with our noble and learned Vice-President, Lord Cairns (then Sir Hugh), he remarked, with reference to this system, that if he were a litigant he would much prefer the accounts being taken in such cases at the SAYINGS AND DOINGS OF THE expense of the country as in England, than at his own as in Scotland! It need scarcely be added that the clerks and assistants in the Scotch courts are not less numerous than those in the English, and that they might be made equally efficient. Nor is it an uncommon thing in Scotch judicial proceeding to allow evidence or "proofs to be fed," as it is called, and other expensive inquiries ON Thursday, July 15, the Lord Chancellor, Lord to be made all before answer, and which, as the Cairns, and Lord Colonsay heard the case of term implies, may be afterwards found to be worse Campbell v. The Earl of Dalhousie and others, than useless, simply because the pursuer, on his raising a somewhat singular question. The appel own showing, has had no case ab initio, a point earldom of Breadalbane. In March 1868, by a lant is the younger brother of a claimant to the equally apparent before the proof of inquiry was allowed as after it. Only to-day my attention has petition to the Court of Session, under the statute been called to the report of a case showing this 5&6 Vict. c. 69 (the Act for perpetuating Testoo common practice of the Court of Session. It timony), the appellant asked the court to order came before the first division of the court on the the respondents, who were trustees of the late 6th of this month, by way of appeal from the Lord Marquess of Breadalbane, to search for and exOrdinary (Manor). It was a claim for 441. inhibit documents contained in the charter room at several small items. The defendants contended Taymouth Castle. The respondents urged that that under the Scotch law the claim could not be they could not get the documents, for though they proved by witnesses, or parol evidence, as being had the key of the charter room, yet the room above 100 pounds Scots (or 81. 6s. 8d.) upon which itself was part of the mansion house of Taymouth, the plaintiff joined issue. Here was a pure point of now occupied by the present heir of entail in poslaw, which the Lord Ordinary ought at once to session of the estate. The Court of Session held that such an order could not be made on the dehave decided; but, instead of doing so, his Lordship's judgment or interlocution was this: "allow both parties proofs, in general terms, before answer, and under reservation of all objections, to competency"thus preferring to postpone consideration to the legal issue, and to send the unfortunate litigants into an expensive inquiry, which, confessedly, might not be of the slightest use, and which in the end it was held not to be; for the defendants having "reclaimed " or appealed against this order to the Inner House (1st division), three of the learned lords out of the four, having at once applied their minds to the legal issue, without the advantage of any opinion from the Lord Ordinary, however, held that any proof on inquiry was of no use and utterly incompetent, except as regarded an item of 30s., which no doubt ended the cause, unless, indeed, it should find its way to the House of Lords (Annand's Trs. v. Annand, 6th Feb. 1869). He concludes thus as to the position of solicitors in Scotland: It would be an omission were I not here to say a word in reference to the anomalous position of the solicitor branch of the Profession in Scotland. This has more to do with the business of the Supreme Courts than at first sight may appear. Instead of all solicitors in Scotland holding their office or diploma direct from the Supreme Courts as in England, it is only the two ancient corporations (with a trifling exception), of the Writers to the Signet and the Solicitors before the Supreme Court; or, in common parlance, the W. S.'s, and the S.S.C's., who do so; and they alone, to the exclusion of all others, are entitled to practise as solicitors in the Supreme Courts in Edinburgh. All other solicitors may practise only in the Sheriff Courts or other inferior courts to which they are attached; and any partnership or alliance betwixt an Edinburgh solicitor and one in the provinces is regarded by the Court of Session as pactum illicitum. It may be, and generally is, that the solicitor in the provinces is equally well qualified with his brother in Edinburgh to conduct business in any court; he has undergone the same course of general and legal education, and passed his required examinations, still he cannot practise in Edinburgh unless he be a member of the close crafts referred to, nor can any one in partnership with him do so. One condition of entering them is, amongst others, that the candidate must have served a long apprenticeship with a member of the corporation he seeks to join. It naturally follows that the provincial solicitor prefers to try mand of a party who had no present title or interest whatever, and this was the subject of the appeal. Their Lordships now, without calling on counsel for the respondents, dismissed the appeal with costs, the Lord Chancellor observing that this was an attempt to strain the statutes beyond that for which they were intended. On Thursday and Friday, July 15 and 16, Massy v. Rowen and others was argued. This was an appeal, ex parte, as to certain of the respondents, from a judgment of the Court of Chancery in Ireland, reported in Ir. Rep. 1 Eq. 110. There was a devise to trustees to hold rents and profits in trust for the sole use of H. E., a woman then unmarried. The court below held that the words of the will were insufficient to indicate an intention to defeat the marital rights of the husband, whom H. E. afterwards married. The House of Lords now affirmed that judgment, and dismissed the appeal with costs. On Monday last the Bishop of Lichfield sat with the Lord Chancellor and Lord Colonsay, in order to make up the requisite number of lords in the hearing of the case of Howden and others v. Rocheid, on appeal from the Court of Session, the object of the action being to acquire certain estates for the benefit of the creditors, on the ground that an entail of them was bad. The question raised was whether lands held by pro indiviso rights (similar to those of co-parceners before partition) could be entailed. The case was partly argued, and will be further heard on Monday next. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL. On Thursday, July 15, judgment was delivered in two important Admiralty appeals, the Lion and the Karnak. In the case of the Lion, a collision had occurred between her and another vessel, for which it was admitted that the Lion was alone to blame. The Lion was at the time of the collision in charge of a duly licensed pilot. The owner claimed exemption from liability, and the question then arose whether it was compulsory on the Lion to take a pilot on board. That depended on whether there were passengers on board, and as to this the facts were these: At the time of the collision the wife and father-in-law of the captain were on board by the invitation of the captain without the permission of the owners. The captain said nothing to them about paying their fares till after the collision, but their fares were paid when the ship reached her destination. Sir Robert Phillimore held (18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 803; 37 L. J. 39, Adm.), that the captain's wife and father-in-law could not be considered passengers under the above circumstances, so as to make the employment of a pilot compulsory, and thus exempt the owners from liability under sect. 388 of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104. Their Lordships now affirmed this judgment with costs. In the Karnak the assignees of a bottomry-bond proceeded against the owners of the cargo. The master having incurred various debts for repairs and necessaries, communicated with the managing owner of the vessel, but failed in an attempt to communicate with the owner of the cargo. The vessel being in danger of arrest, he borrowed money, but not from any of the previous creditors, on a bottomry-bond on ship, freight, and cargo. Two questions arose: first, whether the bond was valid against the cargo? and, secondly, whether certain sums borrowed by the captain from the charterer at the port of loading were to be considered as a loan, or as an advance upon the freight? On the first point, their Lordships now held, affirming the judgment of the court below (18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 661), that the bond was valid, a necessity for hypothecation having been shown, although the repairs were completed before any proposal for the bond was made by the captain, and although the owner of the cargo was not, in fact, communicated with. On the second point, their Lordships now held, reversing the judgment below, that the sums so borrowed were advances on the freight. On Saturday last, judgment was given in a curious case, Reg. v. Murphy, on appeal from New South Wales, the hearing of which was noted in "Sayings and Doings" for June 26. Murphy was tried for murder in Sept. 1867, and after a trial lasting some days, was found guilty and sentenced to death. Afterwards the Supreme Court of the colony made absolute a rule for a venire de novo, in effect, a new trial, on the ground entered on the record, that the jurors, before they had delivered their verdict, were improperly allowed the free use of the newspapers of the day, which contained reports of the trial as far as it had gone, in one of which the heading was "The South Creek Murder Case." This fact depended solely on the affidavit of the prisoner's attorney, on the information of one of the jury, after their discharge. Sir William Erle now delivered judgment to this effect; the venire de novo was bad, because no new trial can be had on the charge of felony, because the Supreme Court had not jurisdiction to grant it, and because the evidence of the fact relied on was mere hearsay and insufficient. The verdict must therefore be affirmed, and the order of the court below be reversed. appeal, but those in the court below must be after their paying legacy duty, then the yearly borne by the appellant. ROLLS COURT. Among the cases worthy of notice which have occurred during the past week, we may in the first place notice three cases in Re Blakely Ordnance Company. In the winding-up of this company, the A list has been settled, and as it appears that the existing members will not be able to satisfy the liabilities of the company, the official liquidator is now settling the B list. The three cases which we are about to mention are all applications to place on the B list past members of the company. The first of these cases was Creyke's case, which was an application to have Creyke's name placed on the B list, in respect of forty shares. He had applied for the shares in June 1865, and they were duly allotted to him, and registered in his name, but were forfeited in the following November in consequence of his having failed to pay a call which was made. The question which arose in this case was, whether Creyke was liable under the 38th section of the Companies Act, member within the period of a year prior to the 1862, to be settled on the list as having been a commencement of the winding-up, which took place in June 1866. His Lordship was of opinion that the present case was governed by Bridger and Neill's cases, L. Rep. 4 Ch. App. 266, and that Mr. Creyke must be placed on list B, notwithstanding the forfeiture of his shares. The next was Bailey's case. Bailey had obliged his friend Capt. Blakely, the managing director of the company by consenting to have 100 fully paid up shares in the company placed in his name, and had signed two transfers, one from Blakely to himself, and the other from himself with a blank Bailey was registered in Aug. 1865, and the transleft for the transferee's name. The transfer to fer from him was not registered till May following, so that his name was on the register for some nine months; moreover the shares contained in the transfers were not fully paid up, but had only 51. paid up per share. His Lordship said that two things were required to make a person a shareholder-he must have agreed to accept the shares, there was registration, but there was no accept and they must be registered in his name. Here ance, for Bailey had agreed to accept fully paid-up shares, and not partly paid-up shares. The contract was in his Lordship's opinion void from the commencement, and Bailey had never been a member at all; his name must, therefore be omitted from list B. income accruing from them to be applied for the In Stebbing v. Martin a motion was made on The third was Holland's case. Holland had transferred his shares in Aug. 1865, within the period of one year prior to the commencement of On Tuesday last judgment was given in the liability to be placed on the B list was, that no the winding-up. His ground for disputing his Bishop of Capetown v. The Bishop of Natal, on appeal from the Supreme Court of Natal. We redebts now existed, which were incurred prior to ported the hearing in "Sayings and Doings" for the time when he ceased to be a member. This July 10. The question, it will be remembered, was was admitted to be true, unless the liability of the company in respect of the debentures which whether the appellant or the respondent had the right to the Cathedral at Pietermaritzburg, which they had issued to Capt. Blakely in part payhas hitherto been used as the cathedral' of the ment of the business purchased of him by the diocese of Natal. The appellant relied on the company, was a liability incurred prior to the time when Holland ceased to be a member. His Crown grant in 1850 of the land, on which the Lordship was of opinion that Capt. Blakely cathedral stands, to himself and successors, accepted the debentures in payment of the bishops of Capetown, in trust for the English amount due to him, and that the debt was Church at Pietermaritzburg. The respondent reV. C. MALINS' COURT. lied on the facts, that the appellant resigned his As it was admitted that no other debt existed in wiped off by his acceptance of the debentures. The past week has not been very fruitful in office of Bishop of Capetown in 1853, that subsequently the old diocese of Capetown was sub-respect of which Col. Holland, as a past member, notable cases, but one or to two may be mentioned. divided into the dioceses of Capetown, Graham's omitted from list B. was liable to contribute, his name must be Re the Macclesfield Brewery Company (Limited) raised the question as to whom the sheriff is to Town and Natal, and that by respondent's own look to for his costs and poundage. In this parti letters-patent it was declared that the church, then This court did not sit on Tuesday or Wednes-cular case, the company being ordered to be woundin course of erection on the said land, should be day, Lord Romilly being engaged on the House of up, several judgment creditors had sued it and the cathedral church of him and his successors, Lords Committee on the Bankruptcy Bill. bishops of Natal. The Supreme Court decreed that the land and the cathedral stand vested at law in the respondent. Lord Justice Giffard now delivered judgment to this effect: There was proof that the respondent was obstructed in his use of the cathedral, and that of such obstruction the appellant was the author, acting under a supposed title in himself. It was competent to the Crown to declare in the letters patent that the church should be the cathedral of the respondent, and the effect was to give him the right of access to and use of the cathedral. On the other hand, the appellant had no estate or interest, as trustee or otherwise, in the cathedral. His interest under the Crown grant ceased on his resignation. And had it continued, he would, as trustee, have had no right to obstruct the respondent. But the Supreme Court had, by its decree, dealt with the actual estate and with the trust, in a manner which could not be properly done in such a suit as the present. The order that their Lordships would recommend Her Majesty to make would be, that the respondent have free and uninterrupted access to the land and the cathedral, and the exercise of all rights in reference thereto which ought to belong to him as Bishop of Natal, and that the appellant abstain from obstructing the respondent in respect thereof. No costs of the V. C. STUART'S COURT. 66 obtained judgment; and the sheriff (of Chester) had seized certain property in the ordinary way. A motion was made under the 163rd section of the Companies Act of 1862, to restrain the sheriff from selling, and asking the delivery up of the property already seized. This was merely met on behalf of the sheriff, with the excuse that his functions were simply administrative, and he would not do otherwise than obey the exigency of the writ; and, there fore, at all events he must have his fees, and poundage, and costs. This was opposed on behalf of the official liquidator on the ground that the Master of the Rolls, in the case of Re The Waterloo Life Assurance Company, had held that the sheriff must look to those who employed him, and, therefore, that in this case the judgment-creditors who had sued the company were the parties responsible to him. The Vice-Chancellor said that that view agreed with his idea, and therefore the sale must be restrained, and the goods delivered up. The next case was a point of practice in Re Woodward, Solicitor, which was an application that a solicitor might attend and be cross-examined, he being subject to the usual summons for taxation. To this he objected, that under the 19th rule of the Act of Feb. 1861, fourteen days had expired before notice given. The answer to that was, that under the authority of The Singer's Sewing Machine Company v. Wilson, 2 II. & M., the old practice |