a sale of the property had been effected: Held, that the property must be treated as personalty and sold, and the income arising from the proceeds of B.'s moiety paid to her husband for life: (Sharp v. De. St. Sauveur, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 799. V.C. S.) ELEMENTARY PRECEDENTS IN CONVEYANCING. (a) A Collection of practical Forms designed for professional Use, and suited to the Emergencies of actual Practice, with Notes. (Continued from page 228.) PRECEDENTS. POWERS OF ATTORNEY. 113. Power of attorney from owner as to sale and management of a merchant vessel. Know all men by these presents, that I, A. B., of, &c., do hereby nominate, constitute, and appoint C. D., of, &c., to be my true and lawful attorney for me, and in my name, or in his own name or otherwise, to remove the present master Y. Z., of the ship [or barque] or vessel called the or any seaman or officer on board the said vessel; and from time to time to appoint any other master, seamen, or officers, to the same vessel upon such terms as to my said attorney shall seem fit. And also to demand and receive of and from the present or any future master of the said vessel, or from the officers thereof, or any other person or persons whom it may concern, the certificate of registry, log-books, and other papers and documents of or relating to the said vessel; and all papers, documents, goods, chattels, and effects which now are or hereafter may become due, owing, payable, or deliverable by or from the master, officers, or crew of the said vessel or any of them. And upon receiving the same to give proper receipts therefor. And to receive from any person or persons liable to pay the same, all freight and earnings of the said vessel, and to give proper discharges for the same, and for obtaining possession of the said vessel, or, on non-payment or nondelivery of any of the premises, to commence and prosecute all such suits, actions, or legal proceedings as he or they may think expedient. And also to appear to and defend any suits or actions against the said vessel or her owner, and also to receive from any person or persons to whom the same vessel may be sold, the purchase moneys for the same, and to give proper receipts for such moneys, and generally to do all such other acts deeds, matters, and things in and about the premises as amply as I could do if personally present, I hereby binding myself to ratify and confirm whatsoever shall be lawfully done by virtue hereof. In witness, &c. 113* Power of attorney from cestui que trust to two persons to act in respect of his share and interest under a will. To all to whom these presents shall come, I, A. B., of, &c., send greeting. Whereas I am entitled, under the will of Y. Z., late of, &c., to a certain share and interest of and in the estate and effects of the said Y. Z., who died on or about, &c. And whereas, being about to leave England and to reside abroad for some time, I am desirous of appointing C. D. and E. F., of, &c., my attorneys, to act for me during my absence in respect of the said share and interest in manner hereinafter appearing. Now, know ye, that for divers good causes and considerations me hereunto moving, and for effectuating the said desire and purposes aforesaid, I do hereby nominate, constitute, and appoint the said C. D., and E. F., and each of them, my true and lawful attorneys and attorney from time to time, and at all times hereafter until the authority herein given shall be expressly revoked by writing under my hand indorsed on these presents for me, and in my name, place, and stead, to ask, demand, receive, and take possession of all moneys or property whatsoever which now are, or at any time or times hereafter shall or may be due, owing, payable, belonging, or coming to me from the trustees and executors, or other the representatives or representative for the time being of the said Y. Z. deceased, or from any other person or persons whomsoever, for or on account, or in respect of, my share and interest of and in the estate and effects of the said Y. Z. deceased, and whether testamentary, distributive, specific, residuary, or otherwise. And on receiving or obtaining payment, possession, or delivery thereof, or of any part thereof, to give effectual receipts, acquittances, releases, and discharges for the same. And also to commence, institute, and prosecute any actions, suits, or other proceedings, either at law or in equity, against the said trustees and executors representatives or representative, or any other person or persons, on account or in respect of the premises. And to defend any actions, suits, or other (a.) By THOMAS WILKINSON, Esq., Liverpool. under the authority herein contained. (a) In witness, &c. RECEIPTS.(b) 114*. Receipt for purchase-money of stock-inand effects. 18 day of from Mr. A. B. the full purchase Received the money as agreed for the several articles of household furniture, stock-in-trade, and other effects particularly specified in the inventory at foot, this day delivered by me to the said A. B., all which premises are my own property and are unincumbered. And I undertake to execute any further assurance of the premises the said A. B. may require at his expense and request. C. D. [vendor.] [The inventory referred to.] proceedings which may be commenced against me in respect of the premises, or to compromise the same, and to call for, and demand the production of, all proper accounts, statements, and inventories of the estate and effects of the said Y. Z., deceased, from the said trustees and executors, or other person or persons aforesaid, and, if necessary, to institute proceedings for compelling the produc[purchaser], the sum of £ tion or delivery thereof. And to state, settle, adjust, and agree to all accounts and reckonings which are now, or which shall at any time or times hereafter be subsisting or unsettled between me and the said trustees and executors, or other person or persons aforesaid. And also for me, and in my name, place, and stead, and as my act and deed, to sign, seal, make, and execute any ordinary or special release in the law to the said trustees and executors, representatives or representative, or other person or persons aforesaid for, or in respect of the trust and executorship accounts relating to the estate of the said Y. Z., deceased, or for or in respect of the acts of the said trustees and executors, or other person or persons aforesaid in relation thereto, and generally to act in the premises as fully and effectually to all intents and purposes as I the said A. B. could do if personally present and did the same, I hereby giving and granting to my said attorneys and to each of them my full and absolute power and authority in the premises, hereby ratifying, allowing, and confirming, and undertaking to ratify, allow, and confirm all and whatsoever my said attorneys or either of them shall lawfully do or cause to be done in or about the premises by virtue of these presents: and I hereby declare that the power and authority hereby given shall be and continue valid and effectual for all the purposes aforesaid, wheresoever I shall happen to be, and notwithstanding that I may from time to time hereafter return to and depart from England before the said purposes and objects have been completely fulfilled. In witness, &c. 114. Power of attorney from partners to recover debt due from a foreign firm. 115. Receipt for composition on debt and under. taking to execute release. Received the 18 day of from Mr. A. B. [debtor], by payment of Mr. Y. Z., his solici tor, the sum of £ being a composition of in the pound on the amount of my debt of £ against the said A. B., and in full discharge of the same(c). And I undertake, upon request, to exe cute to the said A. B., but at his own expense, a complete release and discharge for my said debt. C. D. [creditor.] 116. Receipt for composition paid by trustee and undertaking by creditors to execute release. We the undersigned, creditors of A. B., of &c. [debtor] do hereby severally acknowledge to have received from Mr. Y. Z., of, &c., the trustee acting under a deed of composition, dated, &c., the several sums of money placed opposite our re spective names in the second column hereunder written being a composition of in the pound upon the amount of our respective debts against the estate of the said A. B. mentioned opposite our names in the first column hereunder written, and we severally undertake and agree to save harm. less the said Y. Z. from all claims and demands for distributing the estate and paying us the said sums respectively not exceeding the sums so paid by him to us respectively, and we hereby discharge the said Y. Z. from all claims in respect of his trust under the said deed of composition. Creditors' signatures. First column. Second column. Amount of composition. Amount of debt. 8. d. £ s. d. deed of assignment to creditors. [debtor], do hereby severally acknowledge to have received from Messrs. W. X. & X. Z., the assignment, dated, &c., for the benefit of creditors trustees acting under a duly registered deed of of the said A. B., the several sums mentioned in and final dividend [or, as the case may be of the second column hereunder written, being a first in the pound on the amount of our respective debts against the estate of the said A. B. mentioned and column hereunder written. set opposite our respective names in the first And we hereby discharge the said W. X. and Y. Z. from all claims, accounts, and demands in respect of their trust under the same deed. We, the undersigned creditors of A. B., of &c. Know all men by these presents that we, A. B. and C. D,, of, &c., trading under the style or firm of A. B. and Co., do for divers good causes and considerations us hereunto moving hereby make, constitute, and appoint Y. Z., of the firm of Y. Z. and Co., of, &c., our true and lawful attorney for us and in our names, or in the name of our said attorney as occasion may require, but for our use and benefit, to ask, demand, sue for, arrest, attach, recover. and receive of and from Messrs. M. N. and Co., of &c., and the person or persons respectively constituting or composing the said firm, all and every debt and debts, sum and sums of money due and owing to us from or by the said Messrs. M. N. and Co., or the person or persons 117. Receipt for dividend paid by trustees under constituting or composing the said firm on any account whatsoever. And also all and every goods, merchandise, chattels, estate, effects, and property whatsoever belonging to us in the hands, custody, or possession of the said firm of M. N. and Co., or any of the persons constituting or composing the said firm, or any of their principals, agents, clerks, or servants. And upon receipt or possession of the said debts, money, goods, and effects, or of any dividend, composition, or satisfaction for the same, or any part thereof, for us and in our names or in the name of our said attorney to give, sign, and execute good and sufficient receipts, releases, acquittances, and discharges for the same. And on refusal to pay or deliver, or on non-payment or non-delivery of what shall appear to be justly due, payable, or belonging to us from or by the said Messrs. M. N. and Co., or the person or persons constituting or composing the said firm, or any of such person or persons respectively for us, and in our names, or in the name of our said attorney, to take, use, institute, and prosecute with effect all proper, needful, and necessary, legal, or equitable ways and means for recovering and compelling payment and delivery thereof, and also to resist and defend any actions, suits, or proceedings that may be commenced, instituted, or prosecuted against us, or against our said attorney, or any of our said property, moneys, estates, or effects. And also to compound, submit to arbitration, or otherwise agree to all or any such accounts, reckonings, and transactions. And for effecting all or any of such objects, to enter into and make and execute any deeds of composition, bonds of arbitration, or other instruments for referring such accounts, reckonings, and transactions, to the decision of any person or persons to be chosen for the purpose. And for all or any of the purposes aforesaid, an attorney or attorneys under him, the said Y. Z. from time to time to appoint, and again at pleasure to revoke such appointment, and to substitute others, as to our said attorney shall seem meet. And generally to do, transact, and manage for us in the premises as fully and effectually to all intents and purposes whatsoever, as we ourselves or either of us might do if personally present. We, the said A. B. and C. D., hereby undertaking to ratify and confirm all lawful acts and matters to be done Creditors' signatures. First column. Second column. Amount of debt. Amount of dividend. (a) Powers of attorney, such as the preceding, are liable to a stamp duty of 11. 10s., but if for use abroad the stamp (if any) will be regulated by the revenne laws of the country wherein the power is to be exercised, on the general principle that no country takes cognisance of the revenue laws of a foreign state, and see James v. Catherwood, 3 D. & R. 190. In practice we believe powers are frequently sent out purposely un stamped. See, however, Bristow v. Secqueville, 19 L. J. 289, Ex., as to possible risk resulting from such a course. (b) A mere acknowledgment of payment, however formal, if not under seal, is not conclusive; and this, even if the parties agree between themselves that it shall be so: (Foster v. Dawber, 20 L. J. 385, Ex.) So that where an estoppel is desired a deed inter partes should be used. (c) See Norman v. Thompson, 4 Ex. 755; Tatlock v. Smith, 6 Bing. 339. 119. Receipt by legatee for share of residuary estate. Received from Messrs. A. B. & C. D., of, &c., intended transferees] by payment of Mr. Y. Z., their attorney, £ being the full principal money (all interest having been paid) due by E. F., on mortgage, dated, &c., of property in street, to our client, Mr. G. H [mortgagee], which sum we are duly authorised to receive on his behalf, and we deliver up the deeds to the abovenamed Mr. Y. Z., and undertake that the said G. H. shall, at the request and expense of the said mortgagor, transfer the said debt and premises to day of the said A. B. and C. D. Dated the 18 M. & N. [mortgagee's solicitors]. tances from thence. He was to pay up at once POWER TO OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR TO COM- JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES' LAW it conferred upon the official liquidator power to JOURNAL. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LITY OF DIRECTORS.-Suit by official liquidator LANDS CLAUSES ACT, S. 92-PART OF PREMISES TAKEN. -Where a railway company has been decreed to take the whole of certain premises instead of part only, the court will compel the company to take the necessary steps for ascertaining the value of the part not taken: (Marson v. The London, Chatham, and Dover Railway, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 773. V.C. J.) compromise claims without the sanction of the MARITIME LAW vessel sued the insurers for a contribution to general average for the above jettison: Held, that he could not recover (Chapman and Foster, JJ., dissenting): (Dabney v. New England Mutual Ins. Co., 14 All. 300.) INSURANCE.-Denial of all liability on a policy on the ground that the loss was not from a peril insured against, is a waiver of proof of loss required in the policy, as also of an allowance therein to the insurers of sixty days in which to pay. A steamer insured against loss by fire was run into by another vessel, which caused her to fill with water, which forced the fire from her furnaces and the fire burned so much of the woodwork that she sank, which she would not have done but for the fire. Held, that the insurers were liable for the loss, except the immediate results of the collision. (U. S. Circuit Court); (Norwich & N. Y. T. Co. v. Western Mass. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. 561), Furniture was insured "free of particular average" (which was taken to mean "against total loss only "). During the voyage the vessel was wrecked and condemned, and said goods were transshipped, parts of sets into one vessel, and parts into another. One of the said vessels was lost with its cargo, the other arrived safely. Held, that the insurers were liable for the goods lost: (Pierce v. Columbian Ins. Co. 14 All. 320). LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL. JULY EXAMINATION On the Subjects of the Lectures and Classes of the Readers of the Inns of Court. held at Lincoln'sinn Hall, on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd July 1869. The Council of Legal Education have awarded the following exhibitions to the under-mentioned students, of the value of thirty guineas each, to endure for two years. Constitutional Law and Legal History.-Thomas Prout Webb, Esq., Student of Lincoln's-inn. Jurisprudence, Civil and International Law.-Archibald Brown, Esq., student of the Middle Temple. Equity.-Charles Henry Turner, Esq., student of Lincoln's-inn. The Common Law.-Henry Hodgson Bremner, Esq., student of the Inner Temple. The Law of Real Property, &c.-Charles Henry Turner, Esq., student of Lincoln's-inn. The Council of Legal Education have also awarded the following exhibitions, of the value of twenty guineas each, to endure for two years, but to merge on the acquisition of a superior exhibition: Equity.-Henry Charles Deane, Esq., student of Lincoln's-inn. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. MASTER'S WAGES-MASTER OWNER OF HALF VESSEL AND CARGO.-F. and S., both residing at Halifax, N.S., were the owners each of a moiety of the cargo and ship Joseph Dexter. F. (as it was alleged) mortgaged his moiety to S. The ship sailed in Nov. 1868, from that port, F. being The Common Law.-George Welby King, Esq., the master thereof. After so sailing, S. assigned his own moiety and the other moiety, of which student of Gray's-inn. The Law of Real Property, &c.-Henry Charles he was, as he alleged, mortgagee, to B., of Liver-Deane, Esq., student of Lincoln's-inn. pool, who, on the arrival of the ship at Cork, By Order of the Council, ordered F. to take her round to Liverpool. F. (Signed) EDWARD RYAN, declined to obey that order, on the ground that Chairman pro tem. he, F., was the owner of a moiety of cargo and Council Chamber, Lincoln's-inn, 15th July 1869. letter to B. that he had mortgaged his moiety to ship, and he denied in strong language in a S. The ship and cargo were arrested by order of the Admiralty Court, and sold, at a price insufficient to cover the expenses. Held, that F. was entitled to his wages as master earned on board the ship, even though he were part owner thereof, and that the owner of the other moiety must pay him a moiety of such wages. Held, also, that the conduct of F., and the strong language used by him towards B., if even B. were the owner of the entire of the ship and cargo, were not such as to cause F. to forfeit his wages under the circumstances: (The Joseph Dexter, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 820, Adm. (Ireland). RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. FREIGHT.—The abandonment of goods sunk in transitu to underwriters, and a receipt of the sum insured as for a total loss, followed by the underwriters taking possession of the goods, the carriers being ready and willing to complete the transportation, may be found by the jury to be an acceptance of the goods by the owner at the place of loss, entitling the carriers to freight pro rata: (McKibbin v. Peck, 39 N. Y. 262.) GENERAL AVERAGE.-A vessel fell in with a ship in a sinking condition. To save the lives of the ship's passengers and crew, the master of the vessel consented to receive them; but as it WINDING-UP-SUB-AGENT-SALARY-CALLS. was necessary to throw overboard part of his -An agent in a colony was appointed by a cargo to make room for them, he began to do so limited liability company for five years, at a so before any of them came on board, and consalary of 7501. per annum, for business to be tinued it while they were coming on board until done in the colony, with commissions on remit-room enough was made. The owner of the COUNTY COURTS. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. of the County Court Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. TOWCESTER COUNTY COURT. His HONOUR now delivered judgment as follows: In this case the plaintiff had been housekeeper to Joseph Arnold. He made his will, dated 7th and leaving all his property to the plaintiff. The May, 1869, appointing one Joseph Gaybell executor, will was not executed in the presence of witnesses, as required by 1 Vict., c. 26; but was sent, after execution, to two persons residing at a distance from the testator, who then attested the will. The result of this strange irregularity was, of course, that, in law, there was no will and no executor; so that any person intermeddling with the effects would be an executor de son tort, and not a mere trespasser. The plaintiff, upon the death of the testator, gave orders for the funeral, which orders were carried out. The testator's son afterwards, learning that the will was invalid, took possession of and intermeddled with the testator's effects, to an extent which I held made him an executor de son tort. The plaintiff then sued him for wages which she alleged were owing to her from the testator at the time of his death, and for the funeral expenses in question, for which the undertaker has recovered judgment against her in this court, although nothing has yet been paid under the judgment. I was of opinion, at the trial, that her claim for the wages failed; not (as was erroneously reported) on the ground that she would not have had a right of action against the defendant if she could have proved her claim, but on the ground that she had not succeeded in proving it. The funeral expenses were proved to have been incurred; and the liability of the defendant for them (which would be the same as that of a rightful executor) depends upon one or two points which it may be worth while to notice. The doctrine, which must now be held to be established, that an executor who gives no orders for the funeral of the testator, and who has assets sufficient for that purpose, is liable (personally-See Corner v. Shew, 3 M. & W., 350) to anyone who, even without the executor's knowledge, furnishes the funeral, up to an amount suitable to the testator's degree and cireumstances, is a doctrine which it is certainly difficult to reconcile with the principles of the common law. In fact, the earliest dictum upon the point-that of Lord Holt, Ashton v. Sherman (Holt 309) is directly the other way. "If A. employs B. to work for C., without warrant from C., A. is liable to pay for it; an executor is not liable to pay for funeral expenses unless he contracts for them." But in more recent cases the Courts of Common Law have held that an implied contract on the part of the executor to pay for funeral expenses incurred under these circumstances arises from the obligation imposed upon him by law with reference to his character and the estate of the deceased. In Rogers v. Price (3 Y. & J. 28), the judgment was put mainly on that ground; though it was also put by Vaughan B. (as by Lord Ellenborough in the previous Nisi Prius case of Tugwell v. Heyman, 3 Campb. 298) on the ground of necessity. It has been held, similarly, that a husband is liable for the expenses incurred in burying his wife, during his absence, by a third party: (Jenkins v. Tucker 1 H. Bl. 90; Ambrose v. Kerrison, 10 C. B. 776.) But these decisions, like the decision that a husband who wrongfully turns away his wife with out giving her a sufficient allowance, is liable to a person who supplies her with necessaries, seem to be based rather on considerations of equity and necessity (notwithstanding Lord Mansfield's observations upon the last of these doctrines, in Ozard v. Darnford, 1 Selw. N.P.), than on any clear principle of law. It is difficult to see how any implied authority or promise to pay to a third party arises from the mere neglect of the obligation of the executor towards his testator, or of the husband towards his wife. The obligation of each is one for the non-performance of which he may be visited in some shape or other by the law; but, as was urged by the late Mr. Justice Maule (then at the bar), in his very able argument in Rogers v. Price, it does not follow that the neglect of even a legal duty makes the person neglecting it liable, on an implied promise, to reimburse a third party who gratuitously intervenes and performs that duty for him. Reliance was placed by the court, in giving judgment in Rogers v. Price, upon the case of Simmons v. Wilmott, 3 Esp. 91, in which parish officers were held liable for the expenses incurred by a private person, not a parishioner, in taking care of a casual pauper for whom the officers were bound to provide. But, in the first place, it is doubtful whether the duty of an executor to bury the testator, though no doubt an urgent duty, is not rather in the nature of a trust than of a positive legal obligation like the obligation of parish officers, and, secondly, whether even the doctrine that a positive legal obligation renders the party bound liable, on an implied promise, to those who voluntarily, and not by compulsion of law, undertake that to which he is legally compellable, is not against the rules of law with respect to implied promises, which are fully laid down in the notes to Lampleigh v. Braithwaite, 1 Sm. L. C. 118. Take the case of a railway company, bound by statute to maintain sufficient fences along their railway. Could it be contended that their neglect to keep the fences in repair would raise an implied promise on their part to pay for the expenses voluntarily incurred by some one else, not even damaged by the neglect, in repairing them? However, the doctrine that an executor is liable under these circumstance is one which, though it has been much questioned (especially by the Court of Exchequer, in Corner v. Show), has never been expressly overruled, and must be held to be law; and my remarks have not been made with a view of questioning the equity and expediency of the doctrine, but only for the purpose of showing what is its nature and probable origin, and that, though it is now a rule of law, it cannot be said to rest upon a strictly legal foundation. An objection was made by the court in Brice v. Wilson, 3 Nev. & M. 512, which is material to the present case, namely, that "there is no case which goes the length of deciding that if the funeral be ordered by another person, to whom credit is given, the executor is liable." But in the subsequent case of Green v. Salmon, 8 A. and E. 343, Patterson J. says, "The judgment" in Bruce v. Wilson "probably means that the executor, when credit has been given to another, is not liable to the undertaker. If it lays down more, the law stated is extrajudicial." And that is the view taken in Williams on Executors (part 4., book 2, chap. 2), namely, that if the person to whom credit is given pays the undertaker, such person may have an action against the executor for reasonable expenses. Now in the present case it was admitted that the funeral hal been supplied on the credit of the plaintiff; and the question therefore is, whether she is in a position to sue the defendant for money paid to his use at his (implied) request. I consider that she is not entitled to do so until she has actually paid the money due from her under the judgment obtained against her in respect of the expenses in question. Her mere liability to pay them is not sufficient to give her a right to sue; she has, therefore, brought her action prematurely and I must direct a nonsuit, unless the parties come to some arrangement. come up to the expected amount. The first ques. tion which arises in this case is, whether the court has power to rehear the order of discharge. That question depends on the construction of sect. 168 of the Bankruptcy Act 1861, which enacts that "The order of dicharge, whether sus pended or not, shall not be revived by the court unless the court see good cause to believe that the order was obtained on false evidence, or by reason of the suppression of evidence or otherwise fraudulently." In the course of the argument I was referred by Mr. Evans to many decisions demonstrating the power which the Courts of Chancery and Bankruptcy possess to rehear their own orders, as well as to the following cases bearing more immediately on the 168th section, viz., Ex parte Whitaker, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 459; Ex parte Atherton, 3 C. B. 142; and Ex parte Green, 13 L. T. Rep. N.S. 414. It appears to me that the cases in the former class are inapplicable to the present question, as I am of opinion that the jurisdiction of this court is limited by sect. 168, Bankruptcy Act 1861. Ex parte Whitaker is an authority in favour of this contention on the construction of the analogous sect. 207 of the Bankruptcy Act 1849, and the decision of Mr. Commissioner Holroyd in Ex parte Green, expressly determines the point, that the Court of Bankruptcy has no power to vary a condition once annexed to an order of discharge under Bankruptcy Act 1861. In Ex parte Atherton, Lord Cairns, L.J., decided that the Court of Bankruptcy had power to review an order refusing discharge of a bankrupt, because the provisions of sect. 168 were limited to a case where the order of discharge had been already obtained, SWANSEA COUNTY COURT.-But few men have and "it was material that the Legislature should worked with greater assiduity in the discharge of provide that in the absence of fraud an their public official duties and given greater satis-order of discharge should not be open to faction to all with whom they have come in con- revocation, so that innocent persons who had tact, than Mr. John Jones, the deputy-registrar of dealt on the faith of it should not be placed in the Swansea County Court. Almost from the peril." There is no pretence for an allegation of establishment of the court has Mr. Jones been in fraud or suppression here, and it is impossible to connection therewith in some form or other, whilst contend that the conditions which are statutably for the past thirteen years he has discharged with attached to an order of discharge, are not a consingular aptitude and ability the onerous duties of stituent part of such order, but, on the contrary, his present post. Under his personal superinten- independent terms, to be connected, or discon dence the whole of the office-work of the large and nected, according to the exigencies of argument. rapidly increasing business of the court has been If that be so, the words of this section, which are conducted in the most satisfactory manner. One not confined to a reversal, but to a review of the would have thought that this efficient and zealous order, strengthened as they are by authorities all discharge of duty in so important a public office confirming this construction, preclude me from would have received some corresponding mark entertaining the application to alter the conditions of recognition and appreciation. But it is not so. of this order of discharge. I regret that I am On the 1st of October next, Mr. Jones will be obliged to arrive at this conclusion, for in many superseded in his office-removed after a servitude cases, as in this, circumstances may incidentally of thirteen years to make room for a son of the arise before the performance of the conditions present chief registrar. Mr. Jones does not resign which may render the alteration of the terms adhis office, as the Western Mail informs its readers. visable, not only as regards the bankrupt, but as The fact is as we have stated. Mr. Jones has no respects the interests of the general body of option the registrar exercising the legal right creditors. vested in him, uses that right in the displacement of Mr. Jones to make room for his own son. have not one word to say in disparagement of the young gentleman about to be appointed in Mr. Jones's place-possibly he will discharge the onerous duties of the office with satisfaction; but we cannot help remarking that the manner in which Mr. Jones, an able and valuable official, is treated after so many years of hard and honest work is not that which will meet with public approval. We can only add that we feel confident that all who have any connection with the County Court will deeply regret the severance about to be made. -The Cambrian. BANKRUPTCY LAW. LIVERPOOL BANKRUPTCY COURT. Tuesday, July 6. We Re WILLIAM ROE DUNSTAN. Bankruptcy Act 1861, sect. 168. Jurisdiction of court to reopen the question of the allowance of an order of discharge: Held, where discharge is granted with certain conditions anncred, the court has no power to modify or vary the same. An application involving the moot question of the power of the court to alter the conditions attached to an order of discharge was heard, and argued by Evans and Christopher Cheshire, solicitors, a few days since, and judgment reserved till this day. His HONOUR now said: An order of discharge was granted by this court on March 7, 1864, to William Roe Dunstan, attorney-at-law, and coroner for the southern division of the county of Chester, subject to the condition that he should pay from his income as coroner an annual sum of 60l. towards the liquidation of all debts owing at the time of his adjudication, on the ground that at the time when he contracted certain debts he had no reasonable or probable ground of expectation of being able to pay the same. An application, supported by affidavit, had been made on behalf of Mr. Dunstan for an alteration in the terms of the order of discharge, inasmuch as the net income anticipated when the order was granted has not Thursday, July 15. (Before Mr. Commissioner THRING.) The B. A. 1849-Application for release under sect. 112-Discretion of the court as to ordering release. A bankrupt, who, being in pecuniary difficulties, leaves the town where he had carried on business, and proceeds to London, and there plays hide and seek with his creditors, cannot be considered a person likely to assist them if released: (Er parte Stuart, re Waugh, 9 L. T. Rep. followed.) This was an application for release. The bankrupt, a prisoner for debt in Whitecross-street Prison, was not present, but the cir cumstances of his application are fully detailed in the judgment of the learned commissioner. Etty appeared for the assignees and a detaining creditor. Nordon, for the bankrupt. His HONOUR who had on the previous day heard the arguments, delivered judgment this morning as follows:-An application has been made to this court for the release of the bankrupt from Whitecross Prison. He was arrested on the 3rd May 1869, and adjudicated bankrupt on 7th May on his own petition. He then made an application for his release before the choice of assignees, but, being opposed, was remitted to custody, according to the ordinary practice in such cases. After the choice of assignees he renewed his application on the 14th June; affidavits were filed by several creditors in opposition, and an affidavit in reply was filed by the bankrupt; the case was fully heard by Mr. Commissioner Bacon, and the application for release dismissed. The circumstances which have led to the present position of the bankrupt are these:-In 1868 the bankrupt resided in a house at Oxton, together with a Mr. Roderick Campbell, who, according to the statement of the bankrupt, assisted him in his practice at Liverpool, where he carried on a large business as an attorney, especially in the Court of Bankruptcy, and occupied offices at 55, South Castle-street, as tenant to Mr. Macfie, the creditors' assignee, who carried on business himself on the ground-floor of the same building. About the middle of January in the present year, the bankrupt, who was then considerably embarrassed and pressed by his creditors, as appears from the evidence before me, as well as his own admission, departed from his house at Oxton for London, under circumstances to which I shall presently allude. About the same time Mr. Campbell packed up the bankrupt's books and papers at the office in Liverpool, and took his departure with them, and has not been seen since either at Oxton or Liverpool. The house at Oxton was closed, the furniture removed by the Great Western Railway, and subsequently discovered in a warehouse belonging to that company at Paddington, deposited in the name of Mr. Roderick Campbell. A boy was left in the office, who stated, in answer to inquiries, that he could not tell where Mr. Best was, but that letters would be forwarded through Mr. Martin Browne, an attorney, of this town. We next find Mr. Best in London, where he resided, according to his own account, in three different sets of lodgings, with the exception of a short time when he was at Southampton. Although some correspondence took place between two of his creditors and himself, yet he did not divulge his real address on any occasion, but either called at a hotel for his letters or received them through his London agents, Messrs. Doyle and Edwards. Mr. Macfie who was subsequently chosen creditors' assignee, went up to London for the purpose of discovering the bankrupt, but was unable to do so. So far he eluded his creditors, but at length his own agents, Messrs. Doyle and Edwards, arrested him. He came up before the court in London, where his application for release was dismissed, and the proceedings were, by order of Mr. Commissioner Bacon transferred to this court. Mr. Nordon, who has argued in support of his client with great energy and ability, has very properly drawn my attention to the authorities which show that the Court of Bankruptcy will, in the exercise of the discretion given to it by sect. 112, Bankruptcy Act 1849, ordinarily release a bankrupt, unless he be found to have done certain things which expressly disentitle him to his discharge. It is contended by Mr. Etty, on the other hand, not only that the conduct of the bankrupt has been such as to disentitle him to release, inasmuch as the evidence leads to the inevitable conclusion that he would, if released, elude his crediters, abscond, and not attend the sittings of the court, but Mr. Commissioner Bacon, has already determined the question, and that no new facts have arisen since which should induce this court to come to a different conclusion. It may well be that the removal of the proceedings to this court alone might render it desirable that the bankrupt should be released in the interest of his Liverpool creditors, besides which it is alleged by the bankrupt, in an affidavit filed since the dismissal of the former application, that it will be impossible for him to prepare the accounts ordered by the court whilst he is in custody. The primary object of a bankrupt's discharge from prison is to enable him to assist the assignees in discovering and getting in the estate, but I am at the same time not unmindful that the law of England is ever jealous of the liberty of the subject. I shall confine myself in considering this application as much as possible to those points which have not been brought under the notice of Mr. Commissioner Bacon, as I should not for a moment think of reviewing any decision of so experienced and distinguished a judge. The Lord Chancellor (Westbury) has most distinctly laid it down in Ex parte Stuart, re Waugh, 33 L. J. 6, Bank., that" The commissioner is authorised to exercise the power of ordering the release of the bankrupt only for the benefit of the creditors under the bankrupty. If he is perfectly satisfied that it will conduce to the benefit of the creditors the power may be exercised." Now, let us look at the circumstances under which the bankrupt left Liverpool, and what he has since done to advance the interests of his creditors. The bankrupt alleges that he left this town solely with the intention of continuing practice either in London or the South of England, that this departure was no secret, that he was not pressed by his creditors, had ample means to pay his debts, bills of costs due to him to the amount of nearly 1000., and that at the time of his departure he deputed Messrs. Martin Browne and Roderick Campbell to make certain arrangements for him. On this it must be remarked that it is somewhat singular that a professional man should leave a large practice in Liverpool with the view of founding a new business without any connection elsewhere, and the allegations of the bankrupt are entirely unsupported by any affidavit from Messrs. Browne and Campbell, or any former clerk, or any other person whatever; whilst his release is opposed by the creditors' assignee, and several other creditors, to all of whom the bankrupt ascribes vindictive motives. But there are certain suggestive facts, apart from the statement of the bankrupt and the Right of a surety to oppose the insolvent's dis opinions of the creditors, from which the motives and intentions of the bankrupt may be strongly inferred. Early in January there were writs and Where 25 per cent is charged upon money advanced opposed by Keatinge Clay, solicitor, on the part of Kernan, Q. C., appeared for the insolvent, and contended that Phillips was not a creditor at all, and of course had no right to oppose. MILLER, J., in delivering judgment, said that Phillips, the person seeking to oppose the discharge of the insolvent, had joined in a bill of exchange along with the M'Guirks, the father-inlaw and the brother-in-law of the insolvent, to a person named Sullivan, for the sole accommodation of M'Guirk, who received the entire proceeds of the bill. Shortly afterwards, and while that bill of exchange was current, M'Guirk assigned, or purported to assign, his cows and all his other property to his son-in-law the insolvent. But it appeared that a man named King, who was a relative of M'Guirk's, so far overreached that assignment as to recoup himself for a claim he had against M'Guirk the elder, by a seizure and sale of some of his cows, which had belonged to M'Guirk the elder; and it further appeared that the insolvent very soon afterwards not only sold the remainder of the cows that belonged to his father-in-law, but also converted his whole property into cash, and applied that cash in payment of the debts of his own, and some of those for which his father-in-law, with the insolvent, were liable; excluding, however, the bill upon which the insolvent and his father-in-law were liable to Sullivan. The insolvent had been arrested under a fiat at the suit of Sullivan, as the holder of the bill having on it the names of Phillips, of the insolvent, and of the two M'Guirks', and an opposition had been entered on the part of Sullivan and of Phillips in respect of that bill. Now, it is not to be lost sight of that I am sitting in a criminal court administering a very penal code. Sullivan, who is a pawnbroker, has very frankly admitted that the rate of interest which he charges is 25 per cent., but that in taking the bill in question, which was a renewal of other bills, he struck off several pounds which he would be entitled to charge on all the transactions. judgments out against him, and within a fortnight COURT OF BANKRUPTCY AND INSOL- Re THOMAS BYRNE (an insolvent). (a) bills. (a) From the Irish Law Times. insolvent under the 212th section. The 253rd section provided that sureties and persons liable for the debts of the insolvent may prove after having paid such debts. Then, under that section, I think, Phillips is not a creditor, and, if he is not a creditor, he cannot be allowed to oppose. A case has been supplied to me by the Chief Clerk in Insolvency, Re Cann, reported in 1 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Reports, 217, in which, under the Protection Act in England, Mr. Commissioner Murphy held that where he found three or four persons returned as sureties on a bill of exchange, the creditor alone who was holder of the bill had the legal right of action in respect to the debt; he alone was entitled to oppose. Looking at that decision, his Lordship said, that although he felt that Phillips had not been fairly dealt with, he did not think that under the circumstances he could remand the insolvent at his suit. The insolvent was discharged. ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PRIVATE CHAPEL, FORMING PART OF PARISH CHURCH-REPAIRS.-The freehold of a lesser chancel or private chapel annexed to, and apparently forming part of, a parish church, may be in a private person. It is not necessarily annexed to the possession of a messuage or manor house, but may form the subject of conveyance separately from other property, like any other freehold land. In an action by a person claiming the freehold of inheritance in a private chapel, apparently forming part of the parish church, against the vicar for trespass in breaking the lock of such chapel: Held, that the facts that plaintiff's predecessors in title had always repaired the chape!, that their tenants had always occupied the sittings within it, and that they had always had a lock upon the door of it, were sufficient evidence to show that the freehold in the soil of the chapel belonged to the plaintiff, and that the action was, therefore, maintainable: Chapman v. Jones, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 811. Ex.) COURT OF ARCHES. (Before the Right Hon. Sir R. PHILLIMORE.) EDNEY AND ANOTHER v. SMALLBONES. Novel church rate case. This was a suit to enforce payment of a church rate to repair and enlarge the church of Whitchurch, Hampshire, in the diocese of Winchester. The promoters were the churchwardens, and the defendant one of the parishioners, who objected to pay the rate. The present application was on the part of the defendant for the production of documents in the possession of the churchwardens. Dr. Swabey said the case was a peculiar one. The rate was for the repairs of the church, and the objection was that it had been applied to repair the chancel as well, and therefore could not be enforced, as the holder of the rentcharge had not been assessed. He asked for a monition to issue for the documents to be produced. Dr. Tristram, for the churchwardens, opposed a monition. The documents would be produced for inspection. His LORDSHIP made an order for the production and inspection of the documents, and expressed his intention to hear the case before the vacation. Order accordingly. CORRESPONDENCE OF THE PROFESSION. [NOTE. This department of the LAW TIMEs being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.] houses forming part of the estate, the tenants in THE FINAL EXAMINATION.-Can you or any "THE WINE AND BEERHOUSE ACT 1869.”—I A CLERK TO MAGISTRATES. NOTES AND QUERIES ON [N.B. None are inserted unless the name and address of the Queries. 56. WILL-PERPETUITY.-A. devised a copyhold estate to his niece B., a spinster, for life. After her decease unto each and every the lawful sons and daughters of B. for life, severally and successively in order and course as they should be in seniority of age and priority of birth; and from and after the decease of all and every the said children or issue of the said B., the testator devised the said estate unto his godchild C., the daughter of his nephew D., and her children or issue, severally and successively in like manner in every respect as is thereinbefore limited and expressed concerning the devise to the said B. and her children of all and every the said children or issue of the or issue as aforesaid; and from and after the decease said C., the testator devised the said estate unto the said D., his heirs and assigns for ever. The testator died in 1822, leaving his niece B., his godchild C., and his nephew D., him surviving. B. after. wards married, and died eight years ago without having had any children. The nephew D. died in 1830, leaving C., his only child and heiress-at-law him surviving. On the death of B. C. entered into possession, and has ever since received the rents of the estate, but has not yet been admitted; she is married, and has a large family. Now, as the testator does not devise the estate over to C. until after the decease of all and every the said children or issue of B., the first question that arises is whether he intended the estate to go to the issue of the ance of premises to an Industrial and Provident Society duly registered under the above Act requires a stamp, such Act, and the 16th and 37th sections of the Friendly or is not same exempt by virtue of the 15th section of Societies Act 1855? The 16th section of the latter Act mentions the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1852, but this Act was repealed by the Act of 1862, and no saving clause enacted,-ALPHA. 59. LENDING A HORSE-LICENCE.-Will the owner of a horse, being without a licence to let, subject himself to a penalty (1) by lending him habitually to his neighbours without any recompense; (2) by so lending him, and receiving similar loans in return, as is customary with farmers; (3) by lending him occasionally or fre quently to one neigbour only, and receiving (a) once after many loans, or (b) on each occasion a gratuity, without any previous promise or agreement; (4) by let ting him occasionally or frequently to one neighbour ouly at a stipulated hire? Perhaps you could refer me to some book or cases which would be an answer to these. D. Q. (Q. 41.) MARRIED WOMEN-REAL PROPERTY.—I am much obliged by "E. H. B.'s" remarks on my answer points raised, and to search for authorities thereon. It to this query, as they caused me to reconsider the D. J." will have the goodness to refer to Macpherson's Law of Infants, he will find under the title "Writ de ventre inspiciando," a full answer to his inquiry, with the law and authorities upon the subject, whereby it appears that the child in question would be held the child of the former husband, and as such entitled to share as coparcener with the sister. W. H. F. (Q. 50.) COPYHOLDS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-In the case stated by A. B. C., an uninterrupted possession for twenty years of the allotments in question, without any acknowledgment will, I apprehend, bar any claim on the part of the lord of the manor, provided he was not under any of the disabilities mentioned in the 16th section of the Statute of Limitations, and forty years' pos session is a bar under any circumstance (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, ss. 1, 2, 17, 34; Shelford's Law of Copyholds, p. 136.) The devisees should convey by a common conveyance, reciting that the testator being seised in fee, &c., their title being a statutory declaration of uninterrupted possession by the testator. LAW SOCIETIES. C. N. THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY. Proceedings and Resolutions at the Annual General Meeting, held the 16th July, 1869. At the annual meeting of the members of the society, held in the hall of the society on July 16, 1869, John Henry Bolton, Esq., President, in the chair. 1. Read the circular convening the meeting as follows: child or children of B., which would be illegal; the giving estates for life to unborn children and the issue of such children tending to a perpetuity. The particular intention thus failing, the next question is, whether the rule will apply which gives such a construction to the will, as will nearest approach to the general intention of the testator, by enlarging the estate for life in the first taker to an estate tail, which would preserve it in the line MR. LOCKE KING'S REAL ESTATE INTESTACY of such first taker so long as there was issue. But ACT.-It has often struck me that the most bene-issue, and without having barred the estate tail (if such the first taker, B., having died without children or volent legislators incur failure and disappointment from insufficient knowledge of remote consequences of their reforms-the power of things which, in Yorkshire phrase, belong to all things. As a constituent of Mr. Locke King may I, through your columns, point out one feature of the working of another piece of his legislation, with the policy of which I find no fault. The only moral I would point out is, that if small holdings are to wax fine by degrees and beautifully less, a small proprietor had better throw his all into the Treasury than incur the vexation, mortification, puzzledom, and madness which must attend the working out of his quota of succession duty. Note the real complication of the present case, which results from dispositions not inconsistent with primogeniture. Two devisees hold some houses and land in common; each creates a mortgage, and each subdivides his moiety, one moiety of the original moiety being divided among nine children, some of whom are private soldiers serving in the colonies. Three 21st June 1869. Sir, I am directed to inform you that, pursuant to the charter, the annual general meeting of the members of the society will be held in the hall of the society, in Chancery-lane, on Friday, the 16th July next, at two o'clock precisely in the afternoon, for the election of a it was), would it revert to the donor, the testator, and president and vice-president of the society; of ten go under his will to the heir of the nephew D., who is members of the council, in lieu of ten members who will C., who would thus become possessed of the fee? On go out of office in rotation; of two members of the the other hand, if the word "issue" is merely intended council, in lieu of Ralph Barnes, deceased, and Edward as a synonym for children, or sons or daughters, then the Leigh Pemberton, resigned; of three auditors, and for life estates would be legal, and C. will hold for life, and other purposes of the society. The following are the her children will take life estates in succession after names of the members who will go out of office in rotaher death. It should be stated that the testator gave tion, and are immediately re-eligible, viz.:-E F. Burton, the residue of his real estate to his nephew D. in fee, J. M. Clabon, J. Leman, P. Nelson, A. Ryland, R. B. so that if there was any estate not specifically disposed Upton, A. W. White, W. Williams, R. Wilson, J. Young. of, it would now vest in his heiress, C. Will any of The name of every person intended to be proposed as your correspondents say what estate C. now takes in president or vice-president, or as a member of the the property devised to B. for life? (Stuart v. Cockerell, council, or as an auditor, must be transmitted in writing 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 513.) Q. to the secretary, seven days at least before the day of 57. FACULTY--Whether before a clock is erected in 58. INDUSTRIAL AND PROVIDENT SOCIETIES ACT 1862. election. A list containing the names of members whose sub scriptions remain unpaid has been put up in the hall, under the 55th bye-law of the society. Such members are under that bye-law liable, by the order and reso lution of a general meeting, to be excluded from the society, and they will cease to be members thereof.-I am, Sir, your obedient servant, E. W. WILLIAMSON, Secretary. 2. The minutes of the last annual general and |