the exclusive privilege of the Postmaster-General sending telegraphic messages, and he is also empowered to transmit foreign messages. The Trersury may raise sums not exceeding 7,000,000l., for the purposes of the Act either by terminable annuities or by the creation of Exchequer bills or bonds, and the moneys raised are to be placed at the disposal of the Postmaster-General under certain regulations. Annual accounts are to be aid before Parliament, as also the regulations made under the new Act. No deed or instrument executed by, to, or with the Postmaster-General is to be liable to stamp duty. Messages are to be deemed post letters, and the provisions of the Telegraph Acts of last year and the present year to be considered as "Post-office laws."

MARITIME LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SALVAGE CORPORATIONS FOR WRECKING PURPOSES-COSTS.-Where a vessel and her cargo, worth 250,000 dollars, was towed off the Romer shoal at the entrance to the harbour of New York, on which she had touched, the service occupying six hours, and being performed by two tugs which were owned by a corporation, incorporated for wrecking purposes, the masters and crews being hired on regular monthly wages, with an agreement that they should not share in any salvage awarded for services rendered by the tugs, and a suit was brought against the ship and her cargo in the names of the masters of the two tugs and the corporation which owned them, for themselves and the crews of the tugs, claiming to recover 25,000 dollars salvage. Held, that under the agreement by which the masters and crews were hired, they must be left out of the case altogether. That the corporation could not claim, as assignee in advance, of what might otherwise be the claims of the masters and crews for salvage, and as the latter had cut themselves off by their contract with the company from making any claim for salvage, such claim never had any existence, so as to be capable of assignment after the fact. That the corporation itself could not be a salvor. That the corporation was entitled to a proper compensation for the use of the two steamers and the appliances on board them for the service rendered, and that the case was to be considered as one of contract for work and labour, without reference to the value of the ship and her cargo. That the hazard to the tugs was also to be taken into consideration, but not the expense to the corporation of keeping the tugs in readiness to perform such work and labour. That on the evidence, 1500 dollars was a sufficient compensation, and as an offer of 2000 dollars had been made as a compromise before suit, no costs were allowed: (The Stratton Audley, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 31. New York Adm. Ct.) SHIP-STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU-CONTINUANCE OF TRANSITUS-ASSIGNMENT BY INSOLVENT ConSIGNEES TO SECURE ANTECEDENT DEBT BEFORE

ARRIVAL OF BILLS OF LADING.-A mercantile firm carried on business at London and Hong Kong. The London firm purchased goods of merchants in Manchester for the firm at Hong Kong. The goods were forwarded to London to the shipping agents of the firm there, and were shipped for Hong Kong on the latter's instructions. The bills of lading were in the ordinary form, but the invoices relating to the greater part of the goods contained the stipulation that the Hong Kong firm should remit the proceeds of sales to the London firm to meet acceptances given to the vendors of the latter. The Hong Kong partner and consignee of the goods had had bill transactions with banking firms there, resulting in a large unsecured debt. Being pressed for payment, the consignee on behalf of the firm executed to the banks an assignment of various other property and all goods and bills of lading to arrive within a certain period. This assignment included the goods mentioned above. Afterwards, on the arrival of the goods, the consignee indorsed and handed over the bills of lading, in performance of the agreement in the assignment. The Hong Kong branch of the firm was at this time insolvent, and had been so at the date of the assignment: The owners of the vessel in which the goods were shipped refused to deliver the goods to the indorsees of the bills of lading, in consequence of notices to stop given them by the unpaid vendors, and the indorsees thereupon brought an action for conversion against the ship owners: On appeal to the judicial committee: Held, first, that the transitus did not terminate till the arrival of the

goods at Hong Kong, for the general rule is that where goods are sold to be sent to a particular destination, named by the vendor, the right of the unpaid vendor continues until they arrive and are delivered there according to the bills of lading; and, second, that as the assignors had not, at the date of the assignment, possession of the bills of lading, and, as nothing was advanced on the faith of them, the effect of the assignment could only be to transfer the interest that the assignors had in the goods expected; this interest being subject to special stipulations as to remittances in the case of part of the goods, and in all to the lien of the unpaid vendors: The general rule is that the assignee of any security stands in the same position as the assignor as to the equities arising upon it. An exception, founded on the negotiable quality of the document, is made in the case of the holder of an indorsed bill of lading, who may, in the course of commercial dealing, transfer a greater right than he himself has. But this exception is confined to the case where the transferror is himself in actual and authorised possession of the bill of lading, and the transferee gives value on the faith of it, without having notice of any circumstance which would render the transaction neither fair nor honest: (Rodger v. The Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 33. Priv. Co.)

MERCANTILE LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-INSURANCE TO SECURE RUNNING ACCOUNT-RECEIPT OF SUM INSURED -OVERPLUS.—The defendant was the agent for an officer in the army, and supplied him from time to time with goods as an army accoutrement maker. Policies of insurance were effected on the officer's life to secure any amount that might be due from him at his death. The premiums paid were carried to the debit of his account. At the death of the officer the debt due to the principal was about 18007. The moneys received from the insurance office were about 3550l.: Held, that the difference between the debt and the money received was a balance due to the estate of the deceased officer: (Bruce v. Garden, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 1002. V.C. J.)

DOMICIL IN FRANCE. A judgment of interest to foreign families of which members have contracted matrimonial alliances in France has been given in the Civil Court of Paris. The facts of the case were these:-M. de Brimont married, about two years ago, a daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Penniman, American subjects. No contract was drawn up, but the parents of the lady promised verbally, according to M. de Brimont, to make the young couple an annual allowance of 50,000f. as a marriage portion. The young wife died a few months back, leaving an infant daughter, and Mr. Penniman, who until then had paid regularly the money, refused to continue it to the son-in-law. The last named now brought a suit to enforce the continuance of the payment, as alimony for himself and daughter. The parents of the deceased lady, while offering to bring up the child, resisted the demand, on the ground that the plaintiff was a spendthrift; that he had concealed numerous debts when he married, and had since contracted might by his labour procure for himself sufficient new ones, and moreover that he was young, and resources. The tribunal, however, decided that, as De Brimont was without means of existence, and that as his own mother was not in a position of fortune to assist her son and granddaughter, the plaintiff had a right to an alimentary pension from his wife's parents; and consequently condemned them to pay an annual sum of 18,000f., of which 6000f. is for M. de Brimont, and 12,000f. for his infant daughter.

6. Geography of Europe and of the British Isles.

7. History. Questions on English History.' 8. Latin.-Elementary knowledge of Latin. 9. 1. Latin. 2. Greek, Ancient or Modern. 3. French. 4. German. 5. Spanish. 6. Italian. The Special Examiners have selected the following books, in which candidates will be examined in the subjects numbered 9 at the Examination on the 9th and 10th February 1870

In Latin-Cæsar, De Bello Gallico, I. II., or Virgil, Æneid, book vi.

In Greek-Sophocles, Edipus Tyrannus. In Modern Greek-Βεντοτῆς Ἱστορία τῆς ̔Αμερικῆς βιβλίον ζ'

In French-Xavier de Maistre, La jeune Sibérienne; or, Corneille, Le Cid. In German-Goethe, Goetz von Berlichingen; or, Wieland, Oberon, Gesang 1 bis 6. In Spanish-Cervantes, Don Quixote, cap. xv. to xxx. both inclusive; or Moratin, El Sí de las Niñas.

In Italian-Manzoni's I Promessi Sposi, cap. i. to viii. both inclusive; or Tasso's Gerusalemme, 4, 5, and 6 cantos; and Volpe's Eton Italian Grammar.

With reference to the subjects numbered 9, each candidate will be examined in one language only, according to his selection. Candidates will have the choice of either of the above-mentioned works. The Examinations will be held at the Incorporated Law Society's Hall, Chancery Lane, London, and at some of the following Towns:-Birmingham, Brighton, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Carlisle, Carmarthen, Chester, Durham, Exeter, Lancaster, Leeds, Lincoln, Liverpool, Maidstone, Manchester, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Oxford, Plymouth, Salisbury, Shrewsbury, Swansea, Worcester, York.

Candidates are required by the Judges' Orders to give one calendar month's notice to the Incorporated Law Society, before the day appointed for the Examination, of the language in which they propose to be examined, the place at which they wish to be examined, and their age and place of All notices should be addressed to education. the Secretary of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery-lane, W.C. E. W. WILLIAMSON, Secretary. Law Society's Hall, Chancery-lane, London, August 1869.

COUNTY COURTS.

THE COUNTY COURTS AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS.

THE County Court Judges ought to feel highly flattered. They are Judges in equity, common law, admiralty and bankruptcy. It is now proposed to add to this trifle, jurisdiction The Select Comover municipal elections. mittee on Elections say in their draft report that "it is difficult to find any more simple or inexpensive tribunal before which such cases could be tried than the County Court." And, again they say, "We see no reason why power to take proceedings in the nature of a petition against the return of a town councillor before the judge of a County Court should not be given."

We observe that this subject has been discussed in the daily press, and the jurisdiction objected to on two grounds, first, that the courts are already overloaded, and secondly that the courts are not properly constituted for the purpose. On the first point there cannot be two opinions. On the second point many will agree with the daily press. It has been said that a single Common Law Judge is not a satisfactory tribunal, and the grounds of objection to the higher jurisdiction apply with greater force to the lower. In all probability there is a stronger political element amongst the County Court Judges, than amongst the Judges of the Superior Courts. Then again County Court Judges of boroughs with corporations are more or less known to the leading inhabitants, and might not be so free from local feeling as to be able to dispose of their new business with satisfaction to themselves and

the persons affected by their decision.

But apart from these considerations we question whether the Judges of the Inferior Courts would accept with any better grace than their brethren of the Superior Courts this invidious jurisdiction. It is eminently desirable that judges of all

kinds should stand neutral in cases affecting communities in which probably there is a balance of delinquency. In municipal contests there is frequently much bitterness and party spirit, and all investigations into the elections would require great care, and the exercise of the most cautious impartiality; and we say, without hesitation, that the addition of this jurisdiction to the others already thrust upon the County Courts would weaken their administrative power.

There is a further consideration. The judges are asking for more salary, and with every right to receive it. One thing at a time. First let them be paid properly for what they are doing and then new jurisdictions might be considered, and perhaps imposed accompanied by appropriate pecuniary considerations -County Courts Chronicle for September.

LEYBURN COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, Aug. 19.

(Before E. R. TURNER, Esq., Judge.) Assault upon a County Court bailiff. An application was made by Mr. Herring, the high bailiff, for an order against Joseph Hammond, of Ilton-cum-Pott, farmer, for an assault upon Joseph Lee, the assistant-bailiff of the County Court of Ripon, whilst levying an execution issued out of this court upon the goods of Joseph Hammond. It appeared that on the 2nd Aug. Mr. Lee went to defendant's house with the execution to levy the sum of 21. 13s. Defendant stated that he had paid the debt and costs to a debt collecting "chap" from Darlington about a week after the court day, which was held in February. This man said that if he did not pay he should go to Leyburn and take out an execution. Hammond was told that the person to whom he had paid the debt had not handed the money over, consequently he must pay it over again. Defendant said he would not believe the laws of England would make him pay the money over again, and in this view he was supported by Verity, his son-in-law. Finding Hammond was determined not to pay, Mr. Lee proceeded to levy and searched for something portable to realise the amount. For this purpose he went into a bedroom, and whilst opening a closet door Verity seized him from behind and prevented him from going near the closet, asking him if he intended to rob them. Hammond then came into the room and attempted to strike the officer with a stick, but was prevented by Verity, and whilst they were scuffling the officer went down stairs, followed by Hammond and Verity, when Hammond put him out of the house by force. The offence was admitted, and his Honour expressed his intention of making the order applied for under the powers of the 14th section of the 9 & 10 Vict.,

c. 96.

repre

Mr. Herring interposed, and said there was no doubt there were extenuating circumstances, defendant having paid the money to a person who signed J. Dargue, pro W. Place, who is sented to be the manager of the Victoria Trade Protection Society Debt Collecting Offices, 50, Dean-street, Newcastle-on-Tyne, and 5, Stationterrace, Darlington. The parties had also agreed to give a public apology for their conduct. He would therefore ask his Honour to mitigate the amount of penalty.

His HONOUR said if Mr. Herring had not interceded he should have made an order for the full penalty of 51.

From defendant's admission the officer had been assaulted, and it was no excuse paying the money to an unauthorised person. He should order them to pay 10s. each and costs.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BANKRUPTCY-CONTINGENT DEBT NOT PROVABLE UNDER.-The M. Insurance Company had, in Jan. 1866, lent a large sum in Consols to be deposited by the promoter of a Bill then before Parliament. The plaintiffs, the defendant, and others, six in all, entered into an undertaking with the company, that if the Bill was thrown out the Consols should be returned, and that if it passed (which was the event that happened), an equal amount of stock should be transferred to the company, and that a sum in the nature of interest on the value of the Consols (at the time they were lent) from the end of six months to the date of the transfer should be repaid to the company. In June 1866 the defendant was adjudicated a bankrupt. In July he obtained his certificate. In August the Bill passed, but the Consols were not transferred till the 8th July 1867, and the plaintiffs were compelled to pay under the undertaking 500l. as an equivalent for interest. Upon an action brought against

the defendant to recover his contribution for one

sixth part of the above sum, he pleaded his bankruptcy: Held, that this claim was not provable under his bankruptcy, and so his bankruptcy was no answer to the action: (Cary v. Dawson, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 23. Q. B.)

JOINT AND SEPARATE CREDITORS.-The case, Re Evans and Evans, which was lately before the Bankruptcy Court, is another illustration of the absurdity of bankruptcy law as to joint and separate creditors. The distinction becomes, under the clauses of the Bankruptcy Acts, a reason for upsetting an arrangement to which the only creditors who ought to be concerned had assented, and which on the face of it appears per deed by which, under subsequent arrangements fectly fair. The case was as to the validity of a for the sale of the property, including the sale of a portion of it to the bankrupts, the creditors on the joint estate were to receive 5s. in the pound, although the assets only showed 3s., while the separate creditors would only receive 4s. 6d. in the one case, and 1s. 6d. in the other. The arrangement was in short in the nature of a composition, by which the bankrupts in exchange for a portion of the joint estate agreed to make up the joint dividend to 5s. Upon these facts advantage was taken by the separate creditors who had not assented to contend that they ought to be counted as among the creditors," joint and separate ; creditors being spoken of indiscriminately in the Act, and that the arrangement being equivalent to a bonus to the joint creditors, the consent of the latter went for nothing, and the deed was invalid, not being agreed to by the requisite number of creditors. Mr. Commissioner Winslow decided that this view was correct, and dismissed the motion of the joint creditors against a petition for adjudication of bankruptcy. Yet it is plain that only the joint creditors should have anything to do with the joint estate, and that under a proper law no harm could come to the separate estates, as the joint creditors should also be entitled to prove against them till they were paid in full. Proceedings have been stayed for the opportunity of appeal, but under the present law it is to be feared such cases of injustice must be unavoidable.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

[Nore. This department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.]

LARCENY BY SERVANT

-

EMBEZZLEMENT.

In your last number, under title "Notes of New Decisions," two heads appear as "Larceny by Servant," and " Embezzlement," and reference is made to the reported case of Reg. v. Dartnell, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 1020. On referring to the first case, your readers will observe that the case Reg. v. Low, cited by Mr. Perkins for the prosecution, is reported as "doubted" by Mr. Justice Byles. As that case and that against Dartnell are very important, and, I believe, of not uncommon occurrence, allow me to explain that the judge asked to see the report of Reg v. Low, but it was not to be had in Huntingdon, and hence his Lordship (as the point was new to him) declined to act upon it; but it can hardly be said that as he never saw it he doubted its authority; and, considering that it was decided by the Court of Criminal Appeal, at which five judges presided (although neither the Lord Chief Justice Cockburn nor Mr. Justice Byles were present), who were unanimous in their judgment, I cannot but think that if the report had been forthcoming, it would have removed all doubt at the assizes. Now, as to the case of "embezzlement," which is reported, "Mr. Justice Byles dubitante," allow me to explain that when it appeared in evidence that the accused had no authority to receive money "by virtue of "his employment" on behalf of Mr. Story, his master, the judge was about to stop the case, when his attention was called by Mr. Heathcote solidation Acts, 2nd edit., p. 156) of those words in to the purposed omission (see Greaves on the Conthe new statute, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 68, that his Lordship sent for, and perused the statutes 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 47; and 9 Geo. 4, c. 55, s. 40, and that of Victoria; and after doing so, thanked Mr. Heathcote for having called his attention to the point, and added that his doubts were removed, and therefore the trial proceeded, and the prisoner was found guilty and sentenced as reported by THE ATTORNEY FOR THE PROSECUTION. you. Peterborough, 7th Sept., 1869.

PROMOTIONS & APPOINTMENTS

83. COUNTY COURTS ACT 1867, s. 2-REGISTRARS' AND bailiff on service of a summons under this section in HIGH BAILIFFS' DUTIES.-1st. Is it the duty of the high the home court to return to the registrar (with the duplicate summons), an affidavit of such service; or is it his duty to wait until required by the piautiff to furnish such affidavit? 2nd Is an affidavit of service by service for all purposes in the cause: e. g., sufficient to the high bailiff of a foreign court sufficient proof of entitle the plaintiff to sign judgment without being required to procure from such high bailiff, and produce a further affidavit ? Vide s. 2.

REGISTRAR.

84. THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 1849 (12 & 13 Viet. c. 106, s. 184.)-Will any of your numerous correspondents kindly inform me whether any decision has been given in a Superior Court affecting the following section, and if so, the case? Sect. 184: "That no creditor having security for his debt, or having made any attachment in London or in any other place by virtue of any enstom there used, of the goods and chattels of the bankrupt, shall receive upon any such security or attachment more than a rateable part of such debt, except in reseizure, and sale upon, or any mortgage of, or lien upon, spect of any execution or extent served and levied by any part of, the property of such bankrupt before the date of the fiat, or the filing of a petition for adjudi cation of bankruptcy." A. holds a bill of sale of B's. chattels, he enters and takes possession, but before sale B. files his petition. Is not the assignee of B. entitled under this clause, to recover the goods or their value AN OLD SUBSCRIBER.

85. WINE AND BEERHOUSE ACT 1869.-A person holding a licence for sale of beer to be drunk on the premises omitted to give twenty-one days' notice to the overseers, &c., of his intention to apply at the annual licensing meeting for a certificate for renewal of his licence as required by the above Act. The meeting was duly adjourned for a month under the Alehouse Licensing Act (9 Geo 4, c. 61), and the beerseller has given the twenty-one days' notice of application at the adjourn ment. May I trouble you to give your opinion whether the certificate can be legally granted at the adjourn ment ? A SUBSCRIBER.

86. TEN YEARS' CLERKS.-Would some of your numerous readers kindly say if it is absolutely necessary for a ten years' clerk to pass a preliminary examination, and, if so, what are the subjects he is to be examined upon ? A. B.

87. MARITIME LAW.-A. holds nine shares of a vessel,

and mortgages them to B. B. is entered on the re gister as mortgagee of these shares. The ship has been insured. A. dies, and the vessel gets lost about the

same time. The mortgagee calls up A.'s share of the insurance money, but is refused it by the ship's husband on the ground that his receipt for it would not be a valid one, and that A.'s administrators are the proper

parties to receive it. Question: Would the ship's husband, under the circumstances, be safe in taking a receipt from B. for A.'s share of the insurance money without his indemnifying him against any future claim that might be made by A.'s administrators? An answer in your next by a correspondent would oblige.

Answers.

I. H. E.

(Q. 77.) LANDLORD AND TENANT.-The question in cases like this is quo animo the rent and keys were received, and what the real intention of both parties was. In the case of Phené v. Popplewell, 6 L. T. Rep. N. S. 247, it was held, that acceptance of the keys by the landlord, together with the other acts therein speci fied, "amounted to a surrender by operation of law, and, therefore, no rent could be recovered which might become due after the keys were left with him." I think the landlord could not succeed with a plea ignorantia I. H. C. legis.

(Q. 78.) ARTICLED CLERK.-I beg to refer "W. O." to N. S. 252, which is the only case I can find relating to the case of Ex parte Walter Peppercorn, 14 L. T. Rep. the subject of his query: (See also the 10th section of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127).

I. H. C.

(Q. 81.) CRIMINAL LAW. - According to the facts stated in this query, C. D. is not liable to any criminal proceeding at the instance of A. B. It should always be borne in mind that concealment and secrecy constitute the very essence of the offence of embezzlement. The bare nonpayment of money received on behalf of another would not be considered in law as an act of embezzlement, if its receipt were accounted for in the ordinary and usual manner, and there was no denial or concealment of the fact: (Sleigh's Criminal Law, p. 61.)

W. H. F.

(Q. 82.) SALE BY SHERIFF.-In the table of fees to be taken by sheriffs, under sheriffs, sheriff's agents, bailiffs and others, the officers or ministers of sheriffs in England and Wales, pursuant to the statute, 1 Vict. c. 55, is the following item:-"For every sale by auction, notwithstanding the defendant should become bankrupt or insolvent, where the property sold does not produce more than 3001, 5 per cent., 4001. 4 per cent., 5001. 3 per cent., and where it exceeds 5001., 23 per

cent. (Gray's Attorney's Practice, 9th edit., p. 516.) W. H. F.

LAW LIBRARY.

An Historical Sketch of the French Bar, from its Origin to the Present Day. By ARCHIBALD YOUNG, Advocate. Edinburgh: Edmonton and Douglas.

(Concluded from page 345.)

another famous oration in 1699, on "The Causes of the Decay of Eloquence," which is deserving of attentive perusal; and, in 1716, composed instructions for the use of his son, which treat specially of the science of law, and in which he particularly recommends the study of the pleadings of the most eminent counsel, and attendance at the conferences of the order of advocates, as the best means of forming a young orator and a young magistrate.

Of Normand, another great name, it is reported that nothing could persuade him to take up a cause which he believed to be unjust, and his scrupulous accuracy with regard to what he asserted was so well known that the judges used to say of him, "Believe a fact at once when Normand attests it. Still more celebrated was his contemporary Cochin, who was numbered on the roll of advocates at the age of nineteen. After one of his great speeches, Normand remarked to him that he had never heard anything so eloquent, to which Cochin, with true French grace, replied, "It is evident, sir, that you do not belong to the number of those who hear themselves."

Of Gerbier, another great advocate of the eighteenth century, it is said that he once received a fee of 40001. from the company of the Indies, and a fee of 20,000l. from a Sieur cadet whose cause he had successfully pleaded.

The Bar, as an order of the State, was swept away in the torrent of the Revolution, its last defender being, strangely enough, no less a personage than Robespierre, whose speech may at no distant future be applicable to ourselves. The resolution putting an end to it was passed upon the report of an advocate of Lyon named Bergasse, who had previously acquired considerable reputation at the Bar. His report of 17th Aug. 1789, concludes in the following terms: Numerous anecdotes are related by Mr. Young Every one shall have the right of pleading his of the great advocates who appeared in the own cause himself, if he thinks proper; and in first history of the Bar. From the very order that the office of advocate may be as free as earliest times they were distinguished for their it ought to be, advocates shall cease to form a independence and courage, never fearing to face corporation or an order, and every citizen having the sovereign in defence of the rights of the made the necessary studies and submitted to the subject. Here is one of Louis Servin in 1620: necessary examinations, shall have the right to Louis Servin, first simple advocate and subse- exercise that profession: he shall be bound to quently Advocate-General, was highly distin- answer for his conduct only to the law." Strange guised for his eloquence and for his resolute and to say, none of the advocates in the Constituent independent spirit. When Louis XIII. came to Assembly stood up in defence of the Bar, and the hold a lit de justice in Feb. 1620, in order to comlaws of 16th Aug. and 2nd Sept. 1790, abolished pel the registration of certain edicts which the the order of advocates. One orator only defended Parliament had declined to register, Servin ad- them in the Assembly, and that orator WSS dressed him in the following plain-spoken terms: Robespierre, with whose true and prophetic, as "Sire, we hold it very strange that your Majesty well as eloquent words, we close the present proceeds to the registration of our edicts by so chapter. "The Bar," he said, "seems still to extraordinary a method as to come to your Court display liberty exiled from the rest of the world; of Parliament, contrary to the ancient forms pre-which dares to proclaim the rights of the weak it is there that we still find the courage of truth To-day, seduced by evil councils, you come into your court, to deprive us of the means of deliberating with freedom of conscience. . . . . If the presence of your Majesty compels us to pass beyond all these considerations, it shall be under protestation.' Six years after Louis held another lit de justice, to procure the registration of eight edicts which had in view the creation and revocation of certain offices, and the establishment of taxes upon a number of articles of consumption. Cardinal Richelieu, the author of the edicts, was present; but Servin, who spoke for the Procureur-General,

served from time immemorial.

was not on that account the less free in his remon

strances. He had just pronounced the words, “You will acquire a more desirable glory by gain ing the hearts of your subjects, than by subduing your enemies," when he was seized with apoplexy, and fell expiring at the feet of the king, and in the presence of the Parliament, on whose behalf he was protesting against the royal edicts. He died on the field of honour in March, 1626.

Among the most famous of the names that distinguished the French Bar previously to the Revolution is that of D'Aguesseau, who was born at Limoges in 1668, and appointed King'sAdvocate at the early age of twenty-one. He was Advocate-General at thirty-two, and Chancellor at forty-eight. Of him it is reported, that his first discourse as Advocate-General had for its subject the independence of the Bar, of which he is a magnificent eulogiser.

says:

In it occur these words, so often quoted: "It is an order as ancient as the magistracy, as noble as virtue, as necessary as justice; it is distinguished by a character which is peculiar to itself, and it alone always maintains the happy and peaceful possession of independence." Of the advocate he Free, without being useless to his country, he devotes himself to the public without being a slave to it, and condemning the indifference of the philosopher who seeks independence in indolence, he laments the misfortune of those who only enter upon public duties at the expense of their liberty." D'Aguesseau pronounced

described:

After the passing of the laws abolishing their order, the former advocates endeavoured to maintain some bond of union among themselves, in hope of better times. But of the 600 names on the roll of 1789, many gave up the Profession, about forty-six accepted some of the newly constituted judicial appointments; and others were elected members of the National Assembly, among whom were Tronchet, Target, Camus, Martineau, Hutteau, Sanson, and Treilhard. There remained about 150, who, while accepting the new designation of hommes de loi, were yet united into a sort of voluntary association, preserving the ancient

customs and discipline. They carefully avoided mixing themselves up with the intruders, without talent, and often without morality, who came forward to practise before the new tribunals. Among the most distinguished in this group of former advocates we find the names of Delamalle, Bellart, Berryer, Billecoq, Delacroix-Frainville, Gairal, and Gicquel.

Here we must pause. Perhaps, if leisure should permit, we may resume this interesting book, to trace the fortunes of the French Bar from its re-establishment by Napoleon the Great to the present time.

A Treatise on the Law and Practice as to Receivers appointed by the Court of Chancery. By WM. WILLIAMSON KERR, Barrister-atLaw. London: Maxwell.

Ir will probably surprise the reader to learn that the law relating to receivers in the Court of Chancery is sufficiently large to fill a volume exceeding two hundred pages, and still more that a number of persons are to be found interested in that law sufficient to justify the dedication to their service of a distinct treatise. Those of the Profession who are dealing practically with the law of receivers will thank Mr. Kerr for the great assistance he has in these pages given to them, and it may be safely prophesied that no receiver or person having to advise the appointment of a receiver, or to be the legal adviser of the receiver when appointed, will fail to possess himself of a work which gives such careful and minute instructions what is to be done and to be avoided.

Mr. Kerr commences by a brief statement, which we will cite as a good specimen of his composition, of

THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A RECEIVER IS APPOINTED BY THE COURT OF CHANCERY.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to appoint a receiver has been assumed for the advancement of justice, and is founded on the inadequacy of the remedy to be obtained in the courts There are few cases of ordinary jurisdiction. that can be stated in which the court has not jurisdiction where it is essential to the justice of the case to interfere by appointing a receiver. If the remedy afforded by the courts of ordinary jurisdiction is inadequate for the purposes of justice, the Court of Chancery will, on a proper case being made out, ex debito justitia, appoint a receiver.

A receiver is an indifferent person between the parties appointed by the court to collect and reproduce of personal estate, or other things in ceive the rents, issues, and profits of land, or the question pending the suit, which it does not seem reasonable to the court that either party should do; or where a party is incompetent to do so as in the case of an infant. A receiver can only be properly granted for the purpose of getting in and securing funds which this court at the hearing, or in the course of the cause, will have the means of distributing among the persons entitled to those funds.

The object sought by the appointment of a receiver may be generally described to be to provide for the safety of property, pending the litigation which is to decide the right of litigant parties, or during the minority of infants, or to preserve property in danger of being dissipated or destroyed by those to whom it is by law entrusted, or by persons having immediate but

partial interests therein.

It is the common

The appointment of a receiver is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court. In exercising its discretion the court proceeds with caution, and is governed by a view of the whole circumstances of the case. No positive or unvarying rule can be laid down as to whether the court will, or will not interfere by this kind of interim protection of the property. Where, indeed, the property is as it were in medio, in the enjoyment of no one, the court can hardly do wrong in taking possession. interest of all parties that the court should prevent a scramble. Such is the case where the receiver of property of a deceased person is appointed pending a litigation as to the right of probate or administration. No one is in the actual enjoyment of property, so circumstanced, and no wrong can be done to anyone by taking and preserving it for the benefit of the successful litigant. But where the object of the plaintiff is to assert a right to property of which the defendant is in enjoyment, the case is necessarily involved in farther questions. The court, by taking possession at the instance of the plaintiff, may be doing a wrong to the defendant; in some cases an irreparable wrong. If the plaintiff should eventually fail in establishing his right against the defendant,