CANN, ROBERT, out of business, Woodchester-st. Paddington, DENT, DIGBY HENRY, lieutenant in H. M. R. Light Infantry, DENTON, JOHN, traveller, Mostyn-ter, North Brixton. Pet. Sept. 23. Reg. Pepys. O. A. Graham. Sol. Charlton, Waterloo-rd. Sur. Oct. 8 DINMORE, JAMES, baker, Woolwich. Pet. Sept. 24. Reg. Pepys, O. A. Graham. Sol. Edwards, Bush-la, Cannon-st. Sur. Oct. 12 ELDRIDGE, JOHN, cowkeeper, Greenwich. Pet. Sept. 20. Reg. Pepys. O. A. Graham. Sur. Oct. 12 Pet. Sept. FISH, FREDERICK, jeweller, St. John-street-rd, Clerkenwell. JACOBS, CLEMENT, farmer, Bohemia Godsell. Pet. Sept. 17. Reg. JOHNS, EDWIN, market gardener, Ealing. Pet. Sept. 23. Reg. Pepys. 0. A. Graham. Sol. Greaves, Essex-st, Strand. Sur Oct. 8 JOHNSON, SYDNEY, brewer's agent, South Norwood. Pet. Sept. 24. Reg. Pepys. O. A. Graham. Sol. Watson, Basinghall-st Sur. Oct. 12 JONES, CHARLES GRUNDY, timber merchant, King-st, Poplar: West Wood - wharf, West India Docks, and Leyton. Pet. Sept. 25. Reg. Pepys. O. A. Graham. Sol. King, Birchin-la. Sur. Oct. 12 LEVY, JOSEPH, retail butcher, Middlesex-st, Whitechapel. Pet. Sept. 25. Reg. Pepys. O. A. Graham. Sol. Padmore, Westminster-bridge-rd. Sur. Oct. 13 Pet. Sept. 20. LOCK, EMMA, governess, spinster, Chatham- rd, Wandsworth. RILEY, DAVID JOHN, commission merchant, Rood-la. Pet. SHAW, WILLIAM, joiner, Dunstable. Pet. Sept. 23. Reg. & O. A. SMITH, ANN, ironmonger, Bristol. Pet. Sept. 21. Reg. & O.A. TATE, ROBERT TIPLADY, brewer, Cleveland. Pet. Sept. 18. TOMLINSON, ELI, cloth manufacturer, Ossett Pet. Sept. 23. 0. A. Young. Sols. Stringer, Ossett, and Bond and Barwick, Leeds. Sur. Oct. 11 WHATLEY, JOHN, fishmonger, Bristol. Pet. Sept. 24. Reg. & BANKRUPTCIES ANNulled. Gazette, Sept. 21. MOORE, ROBERT BENDLE, attorney-at-law, Birkenhead and Liverpool. June 26, 1869 Gazette, Sept. 24. COLTSON, JOHN, commission agent, Hill-st, Peckham. (Dec. 3, 1868, and not Sept. as advertised in Gazette Sept. 17) MATTHEWS, LEONARD EDWIN PERFECT, coal merchant, Chatham and Rochester. May 7. Dibidends. BANKRUPTS' ESTATES. The Official Assignees are given, to whom apply for the Dividends. Air, W. joiner, second 04. Turner, Liverpool.-Andrew, G. F. Chester, second I. Turner, Liverpool-Birkett, H. T. merchant, first 31. Turner, Liverpool.-Elo, T. 8. of Garston, 2s, 4d. Turner, Liverpool.-Christie, C. C. wine merchant, second 44. Turner, Liverpool. Duries, R. farmer, first 38. Turner, Liverpool, -Elliott, E. E. late accountant-general, third 38. 54. Paget, London. -Hindley, E. of Liverpool, second sep. 04. Turner, Liverpool.— Lawson, A. cotton dealer, second 68. Turner, Liverpool - Wilkinson, J. of Brymbo, twelfth 6. Turner, Liverpool.-Wood, H. victualler first 2. 42. Turner, Liverpool. Sept. 24. Reg. Pepys. O. A. Graham. sol. Watson, Basinghall- Assignment, Composition, Jnspectorship, and st. Sur. Oct. 12 SAUL, RICHARD, meat salesman, Albert-ter, Southwark, and Metropolitan Meat Market, West Smithfield. Pet. Sept. 24. Reg. Pepys. O. A. Graham. Sol. Hobbes, North-bldgs, Finsbury. Sur. Oct. 12 STOKER, WILLIAM, watchmaker, New Quebec-st, Portman-sq. Pet. Sept. 23. Reg. Pepys. O. A. Graham. Sol. Poole, Bartholomew-close. Sur. Oct. 8 SURTEES, WILLIAM FRENCH, and MARSHALL, HENRY JOSEPH, builders, Edward-st, Vauxliall-bridge-rd. Pet. Sept. 24. Reg. Pepys. 0. A. Graham. Sol. Webster, Basinghall-st. Sur. Oct. 8 WHITEHORN, JABEZ, baker, Salisbury. Pet. Sept. 24. Reg. Pepys. O. A. Graham. Sol. Rigby, Gresham-st. Sur. Oct. 12 WILLIAMS, BOSSOM, general merchant, Forest Hill, Pet. Sept. 20. Reg. Pepys. O. A. Graham. Sur. Oct. 12 To surrender in the Country. BARNSLEY, ROWLAND GLEGG, malleable iron founder, Birmingham. Pet. Sept. 24. Reg. & O.A Guest. Sol. Powell, Birmingham. Sur. Oct. 8 BLACKMORE, JOSEPH, bootmaker, Barnstaple. Pet. Sept. 24. Reg. & O.A. Bencraft. Sol. Thorne, Barnstacle. Sur. Oct. 9 BLAKEMORE, JOHN THOMAS, plumber, Darleston. Pet. Sept. 23. Reg. Tudor. O. A. Kinnear. Sol. Brevitt, Darlaston. Sur. Oct. 8 BOXALL, HENRY, out of business, Guildford. Pet. Sept. 22. Reg. & O.A. Marshall. Sol. White, Dane's-inn, Strand, and Guildford. Sur. Oct. 9 DEAN, JOSEPH, pavior, Salford. Pet. Sept. 15. Reg. &. O.A. Hulton. Sur. Oct. 9 Reg. & DINSDALE. JOHN, butcher, Liverpool. Pet. Sept. 22. O.A. Hime. Sol. Kitson, Liverpool. Sur. Oct. 8 DUTFIELD, ROBERT, innkeeper, Tewkesbury. Pet. Sept. 18. Reg. Wilde. 0. A. Acraman. Sols. Abbot and Leonard, Bristol. Sur. Oct. 8 EDWARDS, HUGH, pork butcher, Liverpool. Pet. Sept. 18. O.A. Turner. Sur. Oct. 8 EVANS, CHARLES, innkeeper, Llanrechva. Pet. Sept. 23. Reg. & O. A. Edwards. Sol, Bradgate, Newport. Su. Oct. 11 GENTRY, SAMUEL, beerhouse keeper, Great Torham. Pet. Sept. 21. Reg & O.A. Codd. Sol. Digby, Maldon. Sur. Oct. 12 GEORGE, WILLIAM, out of business, Mylor Bridge. Pet. Sept. 16. Reg. & O.A. Tilly. Sur. Oct. 7. HAINSWORTH, BENJAMIN, brewer, Ordsall. Pet. Sept. 27. 0.A. Pet. HEPWOOD, THOMAS, boot maker, Wolverhampton. Pet. Sept. 22. HOLT, JOHN, grocer, Manchester Pet. Sept. 23. Sur. Oct 11 KING, WILLIAM, fish salesman, Buckingham. Pet. Sept. 23. LEIGH, EVAN, machinist, Miles Platting, near Manchester. Pet. NEWBOLD, SAMUEL THOMPSON, broker, Derby. Pet. Sept. 24. RAWSON, WARING, linen draper, Westgate Shipley. Pet. Sept. 24. Reg. & O.A. Robinson. Sol. Hill, Bradford. Sur. Oct. 12 BAYNER, GEORGE MILES, master mariner, Wivenhoe. Pet. Sept. 25. Reg. & O. A. Barnes. Sol. Jones, Colchester. Sur. Oct. 15 REED, JOHN, out of business, Rochester. Pet. Sept. 23. Reg. & O.A. Acworth. Sol. Stephenson, Chatham. Sur. Oct. 8 REYNOLDS, GEORGE, joiner, Middlesbrough. Pet. Sept. 18. O.A. Young. Sur. Oct. 11 RICHARDS, THOMAS, farmer, Llanedarne, and Romney. BALLARD, HENRY, farmer, Chilvers Coton. Sept. 2. Trusts. F. Ballard, officer of inland revenue, Long Ditton; T. Garrett, farmer, Chilvers Coton; and M. Ballard, auctioneer, Nuneaton BASELOW, BERNHARD PHILIP, ship chandler, Sunderland. Sept. 1. 2s. 6d. immediately BRRY, JOHN, brewer, Huddersfield. Aug. 13. Trusts. A. S. L. Melville, esq., Bianston, and J. W. Tempest, accountant, Huddersfield BRINKLEY, WILLIAM, butcher, Woodbridge. Aug. 24. 58. in seven days from registration, and further comp. of 39. before Jan. 1 CARPENTER, CHARLES, wheelwright, Great Grimsby. Aug. 18. FRIEDRICHS, CHARLES AUGUSTUS WILLIAM, draper, Newbottle. HAMMOND, WILLIAM JOHN, brewer, Liverpool. Aug. 26. 48. Gd. Aug. 28. Trusts. J. Hughes, merchant, and T. Houghton, chemist, both Oxford JENKINS, EDWIN WILLIAMS, iron merchant. Stamford st, Blackfriars. Aug. 25. 5s. by two equal instalments, in 7 days and 3 mos, secured JENKINS, JOHN SMITH, late grocer, Pontypridd. Sept. 22. 58. JONES, WILLIAM, grocer, Ilkeston. Sept. 2. 58. by two equal instalments, in 1 and 4 mos. Trust. G. Tooth, currier Notting KERR, JOHY, victualler, Leadenhall-st. Sept. 14. Trusts. S. Vickers, distiller, Victoria-st, Westminster, and A. Taylor, wine merchant, Lea tenhall-st KIDD, ALEXANDER, draper, Droylesden. Aug. 30. Trust. H. Vaughan, accountant, Manchester LANGDALE, WILLIAM, and DOBSON, WILLIAM, cabinet makers, Bradford. Aug. 26. Trust. W. Gilyard, accountant, Bradford LIVESEY, JAMES; THORPE, WILLIAM HENRY; and LIVESEY, THOMAS, Cotton brokers, Liverpool and Manchester. Sept. 22. Inspectors-G. Arkle, banker; E. Bates, merchant, both Liverpool; W. Fisher, and G. T. Tully, both Preston, and J. Sewell, Manchester, all bankers MILLER, ROBERT, farmer, Plungar. Aug. 21. Trusts. J. Hardy, and R. H. Johnston, bankers, Grantham NAY, JOHN, trimming manufacturer, Fore-st. Aug. 24. Trust. F. Taplin, warehouseman, Noble-st NICHOLAS, WILLIAM, furniture broker, Downton, near Salisbury Aug. 28. Trusts. G. Gregory, miller, Fisherton, and C. Mooly, jun., furniture broker, Salisbury NORMINGTON, GEORGE, tailor, Oldham. Sept. 2. Trusts. D. Calverley, Marsh, near Huddersfield, and W. Cumniing, Westhill, near Huddersfield, woollen merchants PATTENDEN, ROBERT, builder, Hastings. Aug. 24. 58. in 1 mo. Trust. S. Banks, corn merchant, Hastings | PAYNE, CHARLES, sen., saddler, Luton. Aug. 30. 10s, by three equal instalments, in 3, 6, and 9 mos from Sept. 26,-secured PETERS, PHILIP, grocer, Oxted. Sept. 17. 8s. by two equal instalments, in 3 and 6 mos from Aug. 16,-secure 1. Trust. J. Bath, accountant, King William-st PHILLIPS, PHILIP, grocer, Risca. Aug. 30. 58. by two equal instalments, in 3 and 6 mos. secured. Trusts. T. Wheeler, miller, Ruckhall-mills, near Hereford, and D. Vaughan, merchant, Newport PITT, CHARLES FREDERICK, metal agent, Sheffield. Sept. 14. 68. 8. in 1 mo POLDING, WILLIAM, commission agent, Cheetham, and Manchester. Sept. 17, Trusts. J. Jackson, cotton manufacturer, POLLOCK, WILLIAM, gilder, Liverpool. Sept. 16. 1s, on Oct. 23 Garstang, and W. Jarvine, draper, Blackburn RATCLIFFE, JOHN, Coachmaker, Great Yarmou h. Aug. 24. 2. 67, by two equal instalments, on Aug. 24 and Oct. 23 REED, WILLIAM, tailor, Sunderland. Sept. 6. 3s. in 2 mos,secured RICKETTS, THOMAS, gas engineer, Merton. Sept. 12. 208., 58. in 6, 12, and 18 inos, and 2 yrs RUSCOE, THOMAS, boot maker, Crewe. Sept. 3. 48., by four equal instalments on Nov. 1, Jan. 1, March 1, and May 1 SANDERSON, MARY, anvil manufacturer, Shefteid. Trusts. H. Unwin and J. Webster, iron merchants, Sheffield SCOTT, WILLIAM, clothier, Braintree. Aug. 27. Trust. W. Knight, clothier, Halstead SMITH, CHARLES, flock dealer, Lindley, near Huddersfield. Sept. 2. Trusts. S. Nicholson, flock dealer, Batley, and W. Moore, nungo dealer, Lindley THORNTON. SAMUEL, publican, Leeds. Aug. 24. 58. in 1 mo TILSTON, WILLIAM HAWKINS, and TILSTON, THOMAS, cheese factors, Wrexham, and Liverpool, trading as W. Henderson. Sept. 4. 7., by three equal instalments, on Oct. 14, Dec. 14, and Feb. 14. Trusts. T. Hammer, secretary and manager of the Sailors' Home, Liverpool, and B. Fowler, gentleman, South port WEBBER, RICHARD, builder, Christchurch. Aug. . 58. by two equal instalments, at 3 and 6 mos.-secured. Trusts. W. WI liams, timber merchant, and W. Hill, agent, Newport YAPP, HENRY, fronmonger, Merthyr Tydfil. Aug. 25. 78. 6d. by three equal instalments, at 2, 6, and 9 mos. Trusts. M. A. Yapp. widow, Cleobury Mortimer, W. Greenslade, brush manufacturer, Bristol, and J. Owens, publican, Merthyr Tydfil Gazette, Sept. 28. BALL, ALFRED, saddler, Bristol. Aug. 31. 4s. by two equal instalments, in 2 and 4 mos,--secured BIDDLECOMBE, WILLIAM GREGORY, draper, Southampton Sept. 6. Trusts. J. T. Stuttard, warehouseman, Wood-st, and J. Barnicot, warehouseman, Friday-st BRASSEY, ROBERT BENJAMIN, manufacturer, Ashton-under. Lyne, and Dukinfield. Sept. 24. Trust. J. Halliday, public accountant, Manchester CLAPHAM, MATTHEW, joiner, Windermere. Sept. 8. Trust. W. Harrison, joiner, Windermere CROWTHER, JAMES, grocer, New Mills. Aug. 28. 10. by two equal instalments, in 3 and 6 mes. DANCE, WALTER DICKENS, diaper, Stourport. Aug. 30. 10. FENN, PATRICK, umbrella manufacturer, Milk-st, Cheapside. Aug. 30. 98. on Sept. 28. Trust. B. Nicholson, accountant, Gresham-st FUGL, HENRY THOMAS, and HAYWARD, JAMES, wholesale ironmonzers, Chenies-st, Tottenham-ct-rd. Sept. 7. Trusts. J. Cartland, brassfounder, and T. Dutson, both Birmingham HAMPTON, CHARGES, panoforte manufacturer, Charlottest, Fitzroy-sq. Sept. 24. 4 by two equal instalments, in 3 and mo from registration. Trusts. A. Letellier, veneer merchant, Burton-st. Burton-crescent, W. Hughes, musical string mand. facturer, D.ury-la, and W. Keith, ivory merchant, Wellclose-sq HARRISON, JAMES, potato merchant, Newport. Sept. 9. S. by two equal instalments, on Nov. 9 aud Jan. 9. Trust. E. W. Rees, potito merch mt, Cardiff HOADLEY, HENRY, grocer, East Grinstead. Aug. 31. Trust. E. Kenward, brewer, Hadlow HOLLINRAKE, ROBERT, and HOLLINRAKE, THOMAS, cotton manufacturers, Canteen, near Todmorden, trading as Sutcliffe and Hollinrake. Sept. 15. 68. 8d. by three instalments, 2, 4d. in 1 week from registration, 28. 4d. in 6 mo, and 28. in 9 mos, -ast two secured. Trusts. J Brown and E. Whitworth, manufacturers, both Manchester, J.. Whitworth, yarn agent, Royton, near Oldham IVES, WILLIAM, builder, Great Yarmouth, Sept. 10. 10s, by four equal instalments, un Oct. 20, Jan. 20, April 20, and July 2. Trust. M. Ives, widow LIDDLE. JAMES, and SUTCLIFFE, JOHN, shipbuilders, North Hy'ton. Sept. 17. Trusts. C. H. Reed, iron merchant, Bishopwearmouth and T. Robson, timber merchant, Sunderland MANDERS, CHARLES, wine merchant, Liverpool. Aug. 27. Trust. W. Alexander, accountant, Liverpool MARCHANT, JACOB, marine store dealer, Glastonbury. Sept. 24. 2. 64. in 14 days from registration MORRIS, CHARLE, innkeeper, Congleton. Sept. 7. 71. 6. by three equal instalments. Trust. J. Thackray, brewer, Maccles field MOSS, ABRAHAM CHARLES, licensed victualler, Cambridge-rd, Mile-end. Sept. 17. Trust. I. Abendana, hospital steward, Mile-end-rd PEARCE, SAMUEL, grocer, Truro. Sept. 13. 6. 8d. by two equal instalments, on Oct. 13 and Nov. 13 RAWSON, WILLIAM, upholsterer, Halifax. Sept. 4. Trasta. A. Wilcoxon, jun., upholsterer, Monument-yd, and E. Laroche, upholsterer, Curt in-rd, Shoreditch REILLY, EDMUND WILLIAM, kecper of refreshment room. Pen- WILLIAMS, JOSEPH, and WILLIAMS, PHOEBE, grocers, Dowlais. WORDEN, THOMAS, bookseller, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. July 9. Trust. J. Greener, public accountant, Newcastle-upon Tyne BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS. BIRTHS. RAY. On the 23rd ult., at Keynsham, Somerset, the wife of J. MARRIAGES. BROCK GRIFFITH.-On the 22nd ult, at St. Stephen's Church, DEATHS. CHESTER-On the Lyskamme, near Zermatt, Switzerland, Henry Cheater, of Poyle, and of Camberwell, Surrey. Esq., many years vestry clerk and solicitor of the parish of St. Mary, Newington COODE. On the 27th ult, at his residence, Roselands, Walmer, aged 62, George Coode, of the Inner Temple, barrister-at-law, and parliamentary draughtsman MACKIE. On the 12th ult, Mr. W., of the Central Criminal Court and the Exchequer Court, Guildhall. SAMS. On the 13th ult., Sarah Elizabeth, eldest daughter of Mr. W. H. Sams, solicitor, Clare, Suffolk. V. C. MALINS' COURT. WESTWOOD T. MCKIE 163 164 165 MR. CHISHOLM ANSTEY, one of the Bridgewater Commissioners, has received a threatening letter. Mr. ANSTEY is about the last man in the world to be intimidated, and he promises to follow up the clue to the author. We hope he will. We are certain he would create a precedent which would be valuable in Ireland. due to tenant's in provements), shown by public valuations. These requisitions are manifestly inconsistent with any rights of property. To compel a man to give to some other man the possession of anything that is his for a long term of years, is sheer confiscation in fact, by whatever mild name it may be called. It may be right to rob owners for the benefit of tenants; but it is not the less robbery. If any person really doubts this, let him try it by a simple application of the same doctrine to himself. He has lent 100%. on mortgage. The mortgagor demands that he shall be empowered by law to keep possession of this 100%. for thirty years; that the owner shall not be permitted to call it in so long as interest is paid, nor to raise the rate of interest, whatever the changed value of money. There is no real difference in the principle, whether applied to a of bargain between the parties. Scarcely less striking in its injustice would be the case of the tenant of a house requiring that the law shall give him a long lease of it, not only without the consent of the owner, but against his will, and not fixity of tenure merely, but fixity of rent! Will-Charity-Gift for the benefit of the Scotch kirk...... 165 topics that we can hope for reform. Conse-loan of money or a loan of land. It is a matter 168 169 178 Ir is only by frequent recurrence to the same quently we are glad to see that in his address to the Jurisprudence Section of the Social Science Congress Mr. HASTINGS has been careful to 167 place his finger on the blots which disgrace our legal system, and more particularly our system of procedure. But we notice one assumption which a lawyer certainly ought not to have made, namely, that "Legislation in a free country is the immediate expression of the popular will." So far from this being the case, English 173 legislation has generally been the dilatory evolution of thought by a fluctuating majority of representatives speaking the will of an educated minority. The fact is, man assists nature when he legislates, and Mr. HASTINGS speaks thus of human intervention: "but when come to man we find a change. A moral element has supervened. The free will, which is the grandest heritage of the race, has opened the floodgates of evil as well as the infinite possibilities of good. The actions of mankind, and the consequent development of society, do not spring from the spontaneity of mechanism, but from the intellect of choice." We must take it, therefore, that laws result from the intellect of choice, which differs from the 407 spontaneity of mechanism, and we think this proves that legislation is not the immediate 410 expression of the popular will. But we confess we should find it hard to associate some of our 411 laws with the intellect of choice. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. R THE LONDON AND NORTHERN ASSURANCE CORPORATION (LIMITED)-STACE AND WORTH'S CASECompanies-Attempted amalgamation-Void or voidable 182 407 407 407 408 409 410 411 411 412 412 Insurance Agencies Digest of Shipping Law Cases 412 414 412 413 414 414 415 415 415 415 we It 411 THE County Courts Chronicle draws attention to a question which it observes must constantly recur if steps are not taken to set it at rest. arose in a case heard at the Darlington Court, where it was contended that the rule which pro412 hibited one attorney from appearing for another The does not apply to equity proceedings. 413 judge, of course, held that the rule applied to proceedings both at law and in equity, and the difficulty was got over by the attorney handing in a retainer from the client. We cannot consider how any doubt could have existed as to the 415 application of the enactment to equity proceeding, for rule 115 says that the provisions of the section (sect. 10 of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 54), shall apply to all proceedings in bankruptcy, and to all other matters which may come before the court. It is quite clear, says the Chronicle, that the enactment ought to be 416 repealed. No protection is afforded to the 417 Bar by its existence, because it is always 418 cheaper and more simple for a retainer to be given by the client to another attorney, and that course would always be taken where the case would not bear counsel's fee. Where it would, we believe solicitors would always feel disposed, being unable to attend themselves, to brief a junior. There is really no more reason why the rule should continue to exist than why there should be a rule made prohibiting one counsel from holding the brief of another. Solicitors have a very simple remedy in their own hands, but it is not always possible to get at the client; frequently, it is very inconvenient. And there being no ground for continuing the rule, we should be glad to see it abrogated. 416 CHARGES FOR ADVERTISEMENTS. Four lines or thirty words..................... ....... 38. 6d Every additional ten words ......... Advertisements specially ordered for the first page are charged one-fourth more than the above scale. Advertisements must reach the office not later than five o'clock on Thursday afternoon. THE Law and the Lawyers. MR. YOUNG late Solicitor-General for Scotland, is the new Lord Advocate, in succession to Mr. MONCRIEFF. As the cold weather is approaching, we wish to call the attention of the Benchers of the Middle Temple to the miserably draughty condition of the library. The building is in an exposed posi VOL. XLVII.-No. 1884. LAND LAW REFORM. THE second demand of the Tablet, representing the powerful Roman Catholic interest in Ireland, is Fixity of tenure, by 1st. Leases for long terms; 2nd. Abolition of the landlord's power of arbitrary eviction; 3rd. Restriction of the landlord's right of raising rents to cases of increased value (not The abolition of the landlord's power to evict scarcely needs separate statement, for it follows from the first demand for compulsory long leases. If a tenant holds under a lease, he cannote it so long as he performs the covemeets the lease; and we presume that our conegy orary does not advocate a general licence to tenants to set aside any covenants inconvenient to perform. Arbitrary eviction can occur only where there is no lease, and the tenant is in only from year to year. As the first proposition is for a compulsory long lease, and that would of itself preclude the possibility of arbitrary eviction, this second one is superfluous. As to the proposed restriction of the power to raise rents, it is certainly as arbitrary an encroachment on individual liberty as either of the preceding suggestions. A law that should attempt it would be a tyrannical law, opposed not alone to every principle of political economy, but to the freedom of contract recognised by all civilised communities. Equally iniquitous, and for the same reason, would be the third proposal, for an immediate new valuation of poor lands with a view to a general reduction of their rents. What are poor lands? What law is to define the soil that is to be deemed "poor ?" Is it to be comparative? If not, by what standard is the poverty to be measured? But farms usually comprise some poor land as well as some rich land, and the rents are calculated upon an average of the whole, the former being set down at less, and the latter at more than their value. How are the poor lands on such a farm to be estimated, for what per centage of poor land is to entitle the tenant to demand a valuation with a view to reduction? Mark, moreover, the consequences that would certainly follow the adoption of such a scheme. Tenants would compete with one another to take a farm at any enabled to go to an arbitrator for relief from price, however extravagant, calculating on being their own deliberate bargain. The other propositions-pecuniary assistance to necessitous tenants, and a simple machinery for carrying out the design, are, on principle, unobjectionable. But there are practical difficulties in their adoption. A loan would not be made to a tenant farmer by the Government without sufficient security, and what could he offer to the State which he cannot, as it is, offer to private lenders? The owner of an estate can give the land Itself as security for money advanced to him by the State for the purpose of improvements, but what security can a tenant give? And as for simplicity in the machinery, it would task the most ingenious to devise a plan whereby all that would be requisite for the proposed transfer of the land from the owner to the tenant could be completed without considerable labour and consequent cost. Such are the suggestions, or more properly the demands, put forth by the Roman Catholic party in Ireland. We purpose next week to review the more rational scheme proposed by Mr. BRIGHT. HOW TO STOP BRIBERY. SUGGESTIONS Continue to be made on the subject of checking bribery and corruption generally; but every one must agree that commissioners may sit until they can sit no more, and the story will never be varied, that that story is But as we have said Judges should be directed We have now plenty of material for an entirely new law on the subject of electoral corruption. That new law should begin by hemming in a candidate in every possible way. He and his recognised agents should be compelled to take an oath of allegiance to purity of election. Paid canvassers and agents should be compelled to take out a certificate which should be liable to forfeiture on conviction of any practice calculated to interfere with freedom of election. And the election being over the individual elected should not be allowed to take his seat until he had verified his accounts by affidavit. Under the existing law there is much that may be done. It is absolutely a farce to issue three commissions when no less than seventy petitions were presented. No commission issues now unless a Judge reports that corrupt practices have extensively prevailed. This he cannot do if evidence is not adduced before him, and people who present petitions are too much concerned for their own interests to let the Judge know all. The fact is, election petitions are a mistake. They may be withdrawn; and the judge is bound to accept the affidavits of the immediate parties that there has been no collusion. His hands are tied, and he certifies to the Speaker that in his opinion no collusion existed. Again, at the trial he is mocked. He knows there is something behind which he cannot get at, but no evidence being presented to justify a report of extensive prevalence of corrupt practices, he makes a return to the Speaker simply as affecting the seat attacked. On this head there cannot be a doubt that petitions ought to be taken out of the hands of private individuals. Or, if that be impossible, it should be open to any twelve inhabitants being voters to present a memorial to Parliament or the Home Office praying an inquiry. A single Judge would effect the objects of a commission just as well, and indeed far better than three barristers he would compel more respect; he would, of course, have more competent assistance than is afforded the commissioners by a single secretary; and, by this arrangement, we might have a score of commissions effectually exposing the rottenness of as many English constituencies instead of threescore petitions (of which twothirds are withdrawn and half the remainder fail), and three commissions sitting all the autumn on three unhappy boroughs, who are the scapegoats of the kingdom. MUNICIPAL AND PARLIAMENTARY (Continued from page 394.) No. IV. TREATING (continued.) THE question of corrupt treating has been dealt In the Bewdley petition Mr. Justice Blackburn directed his particular attention to the force of the word corrupt as applicable to treating. He -8 we have noted that Baron Martin didadopted the view taken by Mr. Justice Willes as to the meaning of the word. "Those who framed the Act," he said, "appear to have intended that it should comprehend almost everything that can by any possibility happen in this way at an election; but they have governed it all by the word 'corruptly.' The interpretation of this word, as explained, and in my opinion And a word about these commissions. The rightly explained, by Mr. Justice Willes, is not gentlemen engaged are remunerated by the pay-wickedly,' immorally,' or anything of that ment of so many guineas per diem. We do not sort, but embraces such conduct as it was evifor an instant say that the present commissioners dently the intention of the Legislature to dishave a conscious desire to receive a single shil- countenance." Then as to what amounts to ling from the country which is not well-earned corrupt treating, and what is merely evidence of and necessarily incurred. But no Judges ought it, his Lordship said, "Where it is shown that to be paid by the day. An inquiry into electoral even the smallest quantity of meat or drink is corruption may be indefinitely prolonged, and supplied that is, of course, admissible as eviwith perfect apparent justification, and the best dence of treating;" but, he added, "more than of us is open to the temptation to justify a pro- that would be required to make out a corrupt longation of an inquiry which is comfortably intention. Each individual case may in itself remunerative. The question is what is the be slight―a mere feather weight-but all taken object of a commission? Is it to convict a together will be of importance if there are many borough of corruption so as to call for disfran- such cases." chisement? Apparently it is, because everyone who gives evidence fairly receives a certificate protecting him from prosecution. Therefore there should be a point at which conviction for the purpose of disfranchisement should be declared. All that the commissions are now doing is to afford amusement to the public by disclosures affecting individuals. Those disclosures cannot punish the members more effectually than the disfranchisement of the boroughs. In Bridgewater the end is attained. The borough is selfcondemned. In Norwich no one will tell the truth, according to the Chief Commissioner, and this being so it is difficult to see how the presence of three virtuous gentlemen and their secretary can instil the necessary amount of veracity into the constituency to bring to light the misdeeds which were undoubtedly perpe trated at the last election. Then comes the question as to the nature of such evidence to satisfy the mind of the Judge. To this an answer is in a measure given by the Wallingford Petition, 19 L.T. Rep. N. S. 767, where Mr. Justice Blackburn based his decision on the quantity of refreshment which was given, and he thought upon the evidence brought forward by the petitioner there was quite sufficient to void the election had it not been contradicted." The evidence in contradiction was that of the respondent and his agents who stated that they had discouraged treating, and it was positively sworn by the agents that they took great care to prevent treating, and to declare that if it was done they would not pay for it. The Judge considered, however, that the sitting member had imperilled his seat by having "scores" at publichouses, and took occasion to say that he would have it laid down as a principle that having a score at a public-house amounted to treating. and as a matter of prudence he advised all candidates to have no score at all. "Let the member pay his agents handsomely, let them pay others, and let everyone find himself in refreshments. Then the candidate's seat could not be imperilled." Further, on the subject of corrupt intentionin giving refreshment, we may notice a discussion between Judge and counsel in the Coventry case (at p. 406 of 20 L. T. Rep. N. S.), from which it appears that a thing is not to be inferred to have been corruptly done simply because an election was going on at the time. Counsel stated his intention to prove that persons to whom, from their position, spirits might be considered a luxury, had spirits supplied to themchiefly gin and water-at all times of the day, and had suppers provided for them, and were then canvassed for their votes. "Numerous acts," said Mr. Justice Willes, "of that scattered kind, and those small quantities would furnish a strong inference of an intention to influence voters, and therefore would amount to treating. But scattered acts of that kind occurring every day are really of no account simply because an election is going on." And in his judgment his Lordship remarked, "Eating and drinking must go on, notwithstanding an election coming, in the ordinary and usual course. When that eating and drinking takes the form of inviting people for the purpose of inducing them to change their minds and to vote for the party to which they do not belong, then it becomes corrupt, and is forbidden by the statute." . It would not occur to many that there is any difference in the offence whether the treating be by means of eating or drinking, but in the Norfolk petition (Part II. printed judgments, p. 276) Mr. Justice Blackburn said, "there is a very great difference between meat and drink, although the statute makes no difference at all as to the law of the matter .. No doubt & man may be influenced as to his vote by giving him a sandwich to eat, and on the other hand, a man may be made extremely drunk without influencing his vote. But when we come to look at the probability of what a man intended, there is a very great difference indeed." And in considering probabilities, this is undoubtedly a matter for consideration. As his Lordship said, "It comes to a question of degree and extent, and the Judges have power to consider whether or not it was intended to produce the effect contemplated." From these authorities this branch of the subject may be easily summed up. Ordinary hospitality is not struck at by the Legislature; and where the giving of drink or refreshment is shown to have gone beyond the ordinary scope of hospitality, it must have been systematic or clearly given with a corrupt intention of making voters vote against the party to which they belong. Keeping scores at public houses, and opening public houses and giving an unlimited discretion to the landlord as to the amount of drink he is to supply without receiving payment, are, the one dangerous, and the other fatal practices. There being a corrupt intention proved, the quantity of meat or drink supplied is immaterial. UNDUE INFluence. Every person who shall, directly or indirectly by himself or by any other person on his behalf. make use of, or threaten to make use of, any force, violence, or restraint, or threaten the infliction, by himself, or by or through any other person, any injury, damage, harm, or loss or in any other manner practise intimidation upon or against any person in order to induce or compel such person to vote or refrain from voting, or on account of such person having voted or refrained from voting at any election, or who shall by abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device or contrivance, impede, prevent or otherwise interfere with the free exercise of the franchise of any voter, or shall thereby compel, induce, or prevail upon any voter either to give or refrain from giving his vote at any election, shall be deemed to have committed the offence of undue influence. That is the definition of undue influence contained in the 5th section of the Corrupt Practices Act 1854, and it has received interpretation at the hands of two most eminent Judges, Justices Willes and Blackburn. Indeed we have only to turn to the Westbury case to find a clear and distinct statement of what is undue influence within the section: (20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 22.) His Lordship was inclined at first to consider the meaning of the words injury, damage, harm, or loss. He said that a question might arise whether not only damage must be shown, but damage the result of some injury for which an action might be maintained at law, and to which it might be pleaded that the damage resulting from being dismissed from an employment where the master had a legal right to dismiss was not a damage coming within that description, and therefore not within the statute. He, however, thought it unnecessary to express an opinion upon that point," because the following words are large enough to include every sort of intimidation, every sort of conduct which would operate upon the mind of another, and terrify or alarm him into doing what the person misconducting himself willed, against his own free will." In the Norfolk (North Divison) petition (Part II., printed judgments, at page 270), Mr. Justice Blackburn also states his view of the Act. He said, "I think there can be no doubt, when you look at the earlier part of it, that it is meant and intended to say, that where there is any force, violence or restraint, or any threat of injury, or any injury, those are cases which of course would embrace all the cases where a wrongful act is threatened; but I do not think the Act is at all confined to that." Further on he said, "I think it would apply to cases where, though a person has a perfect right to do it, if he does not do it with the motive of affecting the vote, yet the doing of it does inflict harm upon the other side." This he applies to the important question as between landlord and tenant. "I take it," he said, "that where a tenant who holds his land from year to year, to whom consequently the landlord can at any moment give six months' notice to quit, the landlord has a perfect aight to choose his tenant and turn him out; but if the landlord threatens to inflict, or does inflict, that turning out of his tenant for his vote, that is inflicting harm or loss within the meaning of the Act." And again as to the question discussed in the Westbury and Blackburn petitions, the act of a master in dismissing his servant, Mr. Justice Blackburn, says that if it is done on account of the vote, and for the purpose of coercing the voter, it is within the statute. Referring to the events which occurred at Blackburn, and to which we shall presently refer, his Lordship said that, in his opinion, it was rightly held "that though the loss and harm to be done to the man is not an illegal harm, not a matter that would be a crime like bribing the man, or destroying his property, yet if it be a loss inflicted for that purpose, viz., to force work people to vote, "it is brought within the statute." And, finally he went to the limit suggested by counsel, of a lady looking at a box of ribbons, and on learning the politics of the tradesman, refusing to purchase. That he held to be such a trifling thing that it could hardly be acted upon; but considered the withdrawal of custom, or the threat to withdraw it, a question of degree, and that where it seriously affected the saleable value of the good will of a man's business it would clearly be a loss within the meaning of the statute. The definition of the compass of the statute given by Mr. Justice Willes, in the Westbury petition, coincides with that of Mr. Justice Blackburn. He reads the 5th section by the light of the 2nd, and held, to use his own not particularly happy but still intelligible expression, "that that which it is bribery to promise the enjoyment of is in this case, and with reference to these circumstances," dismissal of servants by a master, "intimidation to threaten the deprivation of." To promise employment is bribery; to threaten to withdraw employment is intimidation. We now arrive at the most important question which arose in the Blackburn Petition, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 823, regarding intimidation amongst workmen by persons having power to dismiss them, and by fellow workmen. We have already noticed that Mr. Justice Blackburn in the Norfolk petition said that dismissing a man on account of his vote is intimidation. As a commentary on this, the remarks of Mr. Justice Willes, in the Blackburn case, should be considered. They do not, in any degree, conflict with the observations of Mr. Justice Blackburn, but forcibly illustrate them. In the dismissal of a servant for his political opinions, "a good deal would depend," said Mr. Justice Willes (p. 827, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S.), "upon whether the injury inflicted upon him At of Lords; but the procedure is very different in the one case and in the other. In equity an appeal is carried to the Lords Justices or the Lord Chancellor from a Vice-Chancellor or the Master of the Rolls. These are the settled and never changing appellate Judges. common law, on the other hand, we have that ridiculous anomaly the Court of Exchequer Chamber, a fluctuating, shifting, and uncertain body of Judges. We like to hear a lay journal on these matters, and it is the opinion of the Spectator, comparing the Exchequer Chamber with the House of Lords, that "no system can well be devised that is more calculated to produce uncertainty than the one by which the judgments of any court of common law are referred to two other courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The only principle which underlies this system is the numerical principle, and even that not always followed. The House of Lords has at least prestige and authority. The Exchequer Chamber is made up at haphazard, feels that it is free from final responsibility, knows that the judgment it has reversed may be confirmed on another occasion, and acts less by settled rule than by the accident of its composition or of its guiding spirit." was an injury which would make him likely to change his mind in order that he might be received back into the service of the person who had discharged him, or that he might be taken notwithstanding that discharge into the service of some other person of the same political opinions as the master who had dismissed him; and dealing with reference to the individual case or even several cases of dismissal from one mill in Blackburn, for instance, it might be material to consider whether there were not a great many other mills of the same colour as that from which the man or men had been discharged, and at which it might be impressed on their minds by the improper discharge that they were less likely to be received unless they chose to change their political mind, and to give at the election a vote different from that which they had announced their intention of giving; and although with reference to one or more persons who were determined in their political views, the effect might be the very contrary of influence, yet with respect to bodies of persons, and in business where there is a large class of employers of the same mode of thinking as the one who was guilty of the wrongful discharge, it may be that a different result would be produced. But the matter is not at all concluded here, because the section says that the undue influence which is reprehended by it shall not be practised, whether directly, or indirectly, and it is not because the one man who may be shoved or hooted, or pelted with mud, or dismissed from his employment on account of his political opinions may, if he is a man of independence, be only the more fortified in them, and only be influenced against the persons who ill-treated him, that therefore no influence is exercised upon other persons in the same class; on the contrary, whilst the strong-minded would be influenced against the intimidation, the weakminded and the waverers, whether in the same employment or in others, under like circumstances, would or might be deterred. That they might be deterred is sufficient." And his Lordship concluded: "The Legislature, in the 5th section, has used language which makes it undue influence to practise intimidation, directly or indirectly, with intent to influence the vote of a single voter. Whether that voter be the person ill-treated, or whether the ill-treatment be violence or damage done by the removal of custom or business, or employment, is immaterial. If it is done with a view to affect votes, or interfereises our Judges. with the free exercise of the franchise, it is within the prohibition of the 5th section. I think, therefore, that the wrongful dismissal by an employer of a voter or voters from his employment shortly before a general election, upon the ground of his political opinions, is evidence of intimidation within the 5th section, upou which the court is bound to act, if it believes that evidence." (To be continued.) LORD WESTBURY AND THE COURTS OF APPEAL. Ir is a question at present somewhat discussed whether the LORD CHANCELLOR exercised the wisest discretion in recommending Lord WESTBURY to decline the office of Lord Justice of Appeal. And this question gives rise to another concerning the efficiency of the House of Lords as a court of final resort. It is perfectly plain that the House of Lords as a court of appeal is at present in such a condition that it can ill afford to lose so valuable a member as Lord WESTBURY, and that appears to have been Lord HATHERLEY'S only ground for coming to the conclusion at which he arrived. But it seems to us that there is another matter which ought to have received consideration, and that is the waste of judicial power by the confinement of Lord WESTBURY to the House of Lords. A contemporary expresses the regret which every practical lawyer must feel that so good a lawyer as Lord WESTBURY is not more regularly em ployed than in hearing arguments four or five hours four days in the week during the Parliamentary session, and it is correctly observed that in the capacity of Lord Justice he would get through a much larger amount of work without any exceptional strain being put upon either mind or body. But the important matter, to which we not long since directed attention, is the state of all our courts of appeal. Appeals lie from the equity and the common law courts to the House Great injustice is done here to the learned Judges who from time to time sit in the Exchequer Chamber. We believe that they are always, as much from constant habit as anything else, sedulously careful and most painstaking in their judgments, excluding entirely from their minds all calculations concerning final responsibility. Of course it is satisfactory to every Judge, when a difficult point is discussed before him, to feel that if he is wrong in his decision, it can be reviewed by superior authority. But judicial pride is quite sufficient to ensure an avoidance of unsound judgments which must be overruled in the court above. And it is a further mistake to suppose that the court acts "less by settled rule than by the accident of its composition or of its guiding spirit." More particularly does very little depend upon the influence of a guiding spirit. The chiefs are considered, we assume, to be the guiding spirits when they are present, but only recently the LORD CHIEF BARON delivered a judgment with which a majority of the court did not concur. The writer in our contemporary evidently little appreciates the independence of thought and character which happily character There is, however, the need of reform still existing. It would be highly desirable that the intermediate common law court of appeal should be abolished. According to the contemporary whom we have thought worth while to quote, the establishment of one court of appeal, composed of regular Judges, and chosen on the only sound principle of preferment, that of preferment by merit, is the real cure for the evils which have been specified. He would not follow the suggestion of the Judicature Commission as to the annual choice of three Judges, and their return at the end of the year to the court from which they had been taken; but would have the Judges of Appeal chosen from among the Judges of the Superior Courts after a certain period of service, or from among those who had held the post of Lord Chancellor. There is an exploded notion contained in these remarks, namely, that promotion to the judicial bench is in any great degree the reward of political services. We think it may be fairly said that at present there is not a single Judge on the bench who ought not to be there, and if there be, we doubt whether it could be said that he owed his elevation to political service. The chiefs of the three common law courts possibly received their appointments because they were law officers. Can it be said that anyone of the three could be advantageously removed in favour of any member of the Bar to whom a Judgeship has not been offered? We have very little doubt about the answer. Undeniably there is a difficulty about the Chancellorship, which by its nature is a semipolitical office. At present the appeals to the Chancellor being all equity or bankruptcy matters, it is at least unadvisable that a common lawyer should be promoted to the position. The Spectator proposes that Judges should go through a course of training for the Court of Appealthat ex-Chancellors should sit for a time in the Superior Courts of Common Law. Imagine Lord WESTBURY a puisne in the Exchequer, or Lord CAIRNS assisting at a registration appeal in the Common Pleas If, as the Judicature Commissioners propose, there was one regular court of appeal of great strength, to which only Judges of the highest available ability would be promoted, there would never be any difficulty in dealing with the business, wherever it might come from. Our contemporary lastly complains of the time during which the Lord Justiceship has remained unfilled "between the claims of persons and those of the public." The writer does not make his meaning very clear, but the claims of the public have not had any existence, the court having been closed for the recess for nearly two months past. INSURANCE AGENCIES. UNDER this title in our last number we discussed a case of Mackie v. The European Assurance Society, and incidentally, from an inadvertence, stated that the Commercial Union Insurance Company had "ceased to do fire business." This remark should, as appears by the report of the case at p. 104 of 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. have been applied to the European Company. We have been applied to by the directors of the Commercial Union to repair, by the publication of the present article, any injury which the misstatement may have caused, or may be likely to cause that office. The Commercial Union transacts fire business, we are informed, on a very large scale in London and the country, and has agents in most of the principal towns, several of whom are solicitors. We are happy to be able further to state that the agent against whom negligence was alleged by the European ceased to be an agent of the Commercial Union at the instance of the directors, after which he became an agent of the European, never having been agent for both companies at the same time. A remark is fairly made in the letter which we have received from the solicitors of the Commercial Union, that, "the litigation" in Mackie's case "seems to have been caused by his (the agent's) attempt to transfer an insurance from the Commercial Union (with which office the assured was perfectly satisfied) to the European Company." We very much regret that the misstatement complained of should have occurred, but most of our readers being probably well acquainted with the Commercial Union, we trust that the injury sustained may prove to be very small. DIGEST OF SHIPPING LAW CASES. FROM 1860 TO 1864. Edited by F. O. CRUMP, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. (Continued from page 396.) CHARTER-PARTY. 7. Lump freight-Stipulation as to capacity of ship-Remedy of charterer by cross action.-A lump sum of freight, 1500l., was agreed to be paid on condition that the ship took a cargo of not less than 1000 tons weight and measurement. It was held that the stipulation as to the capacity of the ship was not a condition precedent, and the plea that the full cargo was not and could not be shipped was held to be no answer to an action for the freight. The remedy of the charterer was by a cross action, or a reduction of damages: (Pust v. Dowie, Q. B. April 28, 1863; 1 Mar. Law Cas. 333; 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 243; 2 Jur. N. S. 1322; 33 L. J. 172; 5 B. & S. 21, in error; 34 L. J. 127.) 7A. Broker's commission-Remoteness of services -Introducing shipowner to broker.-A shipbroker having introduced a shipowner to another broker, who was also a merchant, and through whose introduction to a London broker a charter-party was entered into, was held entitled to commission on that charter. Evidence as to who was the proper person to receive the commission. Remoteness of a claimant's services in respect of procuring charter: (See "Commission" and "Broker"): (Kynaston v. Nicholson and others, C. E. June 5, 1863: 1 Mar. Law Cas. 350; 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 671.) 8. Shipbroker's authority to bind owner.-A shipbroker has no general authority to charter a ship for a voyage contrary to instructions given by the owner not communicated by the broker to the merchant. Where a broker signs a charterparty "by authority of captain," it has the same effect as if he signed "by procuration," and he is in such a case limited to his specific instructions; and in every such case the merchant should inquire what those instructions are. A ship was chartered to and from Miramichi, the captain having received an unsigned charter-party stipulating for leave to take outward cargo to another port. Loss of market for cargo occurred by delay through ship going on an intermediate voyage. A verdict against the captain for damages on account of loss of market for cargo ordered to be set aside and a new trial had: (Spaight v. Beyer lieb, E. C. Ireland, April 29, 1863; 1 Mar. Law Cas. 375; 9 L. T. Rep. Rep. N. S. 31, affirming judgment of the Court of Exchequer, Ireland, May 13, 1862.) 9. Construction of clause-Description of shipWarranty - Agent's authority. Charter-party entered into between the shipowner's agent at New York and a merchant there, British subjects, described the ship as 66 Held, on the authority of Behn v. Burness, 8 L. T. a British ship, A 1:' Rep. N. S. 207, that this was a warranty that the ship was classed A 1 in Lloyd's register. The agent was authorised under a certain power of attorney, to enter into a charter-party with such an undertaking, and the owners were held liable for the higher rate of premium which shippers had class. The ship was not specified as A 1 in the power to pay in consequence of the ship having run off her of attorney, and the vessel had run off the list in the same month as the power of attorney was dated, and fraud was not alleged: (Routh v. McMillan, C. E. Nov. 3, 1863; 1 Mar. Law Cas. 402; 33 L. J. 38, Ex.; 10 Jur. N. S. 158; 9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 541; 2 H. & C. 750.) 10. Broken stowage.-A charter-party stipulated for a full and complete cargo, and, as regarded freight, it was stipulated that what goods might be shipped as broken stowage, were to pay freight as customary. It was held that broken stowage shipowner was bound to receive it. In Moorsom v. was part of the produce contemplated, and that the Page (4 Camp. 103) the charterer was entitled to ship a complete cargo of tallow, and it was held that the fact that if he had loaded the ship in some other way the owner would have received more freight, did not render it compulsory on him to do so: (Cole v. Meek, C. B., Jan. 14, 1864; 1 Mar. Law Cas. 415; 33 L. J. 183; 15 C. B., N. S., 795.) 11-15.-See future digest-1864 to 1867. 16. Construction of clause to proceed with cargo to a safe port.-A charter-party provided that the vessel chartered should proceed to a safe port in Chili. She was bound for Valparaiso for orders. Arriving there, she received orders to proceed to the port of Carrisal Bajo. Before a port had been named, this one had been stopped up by a prohibition of Government, and the Government refused to give the ship a permit to enter. It was held that the merchant was bound to name a place which at the time he named it was in such a state that the ship could safely enter, and not such a port that, if she had entered, she would have been confiscated: (Ogden v. Graham, Nov. 27, 1861, Q. B.; 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 396; 31 L. J. 26, Q. B.) 17. Memorandum in charter-party Whether part of contract-Whether applicable to homeward as well as outward voyage-Evidence.-This was the clause-" Commission to be paid to charterer, to whom the vessel is to be addressed, on her return to London," the charter being only for an outward voyage, and making no mention of a homeward voyage. It was ruled that the jury must say on the evidence what was the definite and known meaning of the clause: (Hibberd v. Omen, 2 F. & F. 502, Cockburn, C.J.) (This case occurs out of its order in the reports, and is dated 1859.) 18. Claim against broker who had chartered ship without authority, for difference of freight on procuring another ship.-In such a case, the second ship being much larger than the first, it was held that the broker was liable at the utmost for the difference of the freights on the whole of the cargo of the substituted ship, credit being given for the profit on the surplus cargo carried. But it was left to the jury to say whether the plaintiffs might have got a smaller ship, or whether they improperly neglected to give the defendant notice of the substituted charter so as to give him the option of using the surplus space: (Mitchell v. Kahl, 1862; 2 F. & F. 709.) 19. Ship aground-Cargo discharged and transshipped.-An action was brought against charterers for not supplying a cargo pursuant to charter-party. The vessel having taken threefourths of the cargo on board, while proceeding to another part of the river for the purpose of receiving on board the remainder, took the ground and sustained damage. The master thereupon required the charterers' agent to take out what was shipped; he did so, and loaded it on board other vessels. Under these circumstances it was held that the action against the charterers was not maintainable: (Strugnell v. Friedrichsen, May 27, 1862; 12 C. B., N. S., 452; 9 Jur. N. S. 77.) 19A. Case relative to damages and expensesConstruction of clause in charter-party.-A ship was chartered from Liverpool to Puerto Cabello. A clause was added to the charter-party giving the charterer the option of sending a portion of the cargo to Macaraibo, which provided that any and every expense the vessel might incur in consequence of this additional clause should be borne by the charterer. The master was prohibited from landing the cargo for Puerto Cabello on the false ground that some of the goods were contraband; but he was given permission to clear if he Principal and agent, 3. Revocation of order to sail, 1. Sub-charter-party-Injunction-Jurisdiction, 2. Voyage interrupted by war.-Master of an Austrian ship held to be justified in pausing to proceed to Copenhagen, to which port he was ordered, lest he should be captured by French cruisers, war having broken out between France and Austria: (Avery v. Bowden, 6 E. & B. 593.) Orders were afterwards given to go to Plymouth: Held, that it was a proper question for the jury, order: (Pole and others v. Cetcovich, C. B., Nov. whether this was a revocation of the original 23, 1860; 1 Mar. Law Cas. 2; 3 L. T, Rep. N. S. 438.) Injunction granted to restrain defendants from 2. Injunction-Jurisdiction of Rolls Court.entering into sub-charter-party inconsistent with the terms of contract of affreightment with shipowner. The court has undoubted jurisdiction in such a case: (Sevin v. Delandes. M. R., Dec. 13, 1860; 1 Mar. Law Cas. 1.) 3. Principal and agent - Mistake.-Equitable plea that it was understood between the shipowner and the agent of the charterer, before entering into the contract, that the agent should not be personally liable, but that, by mistake, the charter-party was so framed as to make him liable on the face of it. It was held that this was a good equitable defence to an action at the instance of the shipowner against the agent for breach of charter-party. Per Bramwell, B. the above was a good legal plea: (Pym v. Campbell, 9 Ell. & Bl. 370; 25 L. J. 277, Q. B.; Davies v. Stambank, 6 DeG. M. & G. 679; Wake (executor, &c.) v. Harrop and another, C. E., May 1, 1861, and E. C., May 17, 1862; 1 Mar. Law Cas. 81, 247; 6 H. & N. 768; 30 L. J. 273.) CHARTERERS. INDEX TO CONTENTS. Agent-Claim to have goods delivered on payment of bill of lading freight, 4. Bar Insufficiency of water to cross, 5. Copies of bills of lading-Usage, 2. Custom as to handing copies of bill of lading, 2. Demurrage-Delay through refusal to ship danger. ous goods-Set-off, 1. Expense discharging and reloading cargo-Setoff, 6. Freight, 1, 4, 5, 6. Liability to cease after shipment of cargo, 3. Lien, 4. Moorsom v. Page, 7. Principal and agent, 3. Set-off, 1, 6. 1. Set-off against freight-Demurrage-Delay by master refusing to ship acids and gunpowder.— Charterers held not to have a right to set-off against freight as demurrage, a claim on account of delay arising in consequence of master's refusal to take acids and gunpowder on board. It could be only a ground of action against the master for the refusal to take the goods. There was a sti pulation that the master should attend daily at broker's office to sign bills of lading which was not duly performed. It was held that the per formance of it was not a condition precedent to the shipowner's right to sue for freight: (Segur v. Duthie and others, E. C., Nov. 30, 1860; 1 Mar. Law Cas. 3 (Error from the Common Bench). 2. Charterer handing copies of bills of lading to shipowners-Consular manifest-Custom at Liver pool-Action for fraudulent misrepresentation.— Charterers are not bound to hand over to shipowners copies of bills of lading, in order that consular manifest may be made out. It was alleged that there was a custom at Liverpool for shippers of goods to make out for the captain a correct copy of bill of lading, but there was nothing in the declaration to show that this was a duty cast upon the defendant, and it was held that the declaration could not be supported. There was a further allegation that the defendant only handed over copies of six out of the eight bills of lading as for the whole." This was relied upon by the plaintiffs, but it was held to be a mere misrepre sentation, for which, if deceitfully or improperly |