or, if you like to call it so, a cottage loaf, there is more expense incurred, and so the baker may fairly charge more for it than for the ordinary household bread. The question then arises, when a person goes and asks for a 4lb. loaf, does not that indicate that he requires a loaf weighing that weight? Here the baker gives a loaf weighing less than 4lb., without saying that it weighs less. If he has not got any more household bread should he not say, 'I can't let you have it, but if you want bread you must take a cottage loaf?" " Mellor, J. also said, "I think the baker may well sell those loaves" (cottage loaves) "as fancy bread, for it is just that he should not be a loser by the mode of baking; but he should declare at the time that they are fancy bread." Cockburn, C. J., in addition, during the argument, said, "What the statute intended was, to make a distinction between the two descriptions of bread, and although the bread which is sold today as fancy bread, may not be what it was at the time the statute passed, yet if it is now of a fancy character, and differently baked, it is still fancy bread." The court having taken time to consider their judgment, it was ultisaid, "It does not appear to us necessary to go mately pronounced by Cockburn, C. J., who into the distinction between common bread-the ordinary bread-and fancy bread in this case. The facts were that in both cases the party applying to purchase bread asked for bread by weight; in one case for a 4lb. loaf, and in the other case for a 2lb. loaf. The loaves were delivered as such, and, being taken away and afterwards weighed, in each instance it turned out that they were substantially deficient in weight. We think when a customer asks for bread by weight, that clearly is a case in which, whether the baker choose to give him ordinary bread or fancy bread, he is bound to weigh it. Under the circumstances, we by no means say that he was bound to weigh in the presence of the customer; but he was bound to weigh the bread at some time or other before he sold it, and to sell it by weight instead of by denomination. We think, therefore, having been bound to sell by weight, and the loaves having turned out to be deficient in weight, we must take it that they had never been weighed. We think the magistrates were warranted in coming to the conclusion that the bread had never been weighed. That being so, we are of opinion that the baker ought to have sold by weight, and not having sold by weight, the case is within the statute, and the conviction is right."

The law as laid down in the foregoing cases may thus be stated: First, it is the duty of the baker to weigh, before sale, all bread which is required to be sold by weight-that is. all bread which is not within the proviso of the section as being French, or fancy bread, or rolls, and this he must do after the bread is baked, it not being sufficient that he should weigh the dough before it is baked; secondly, it is not necessary that the bread should be weighed in the presence of the customer unless it is so required to be weighed; thirdly, if a customer asks for ordinary bread such as a 4lb. or 2lb. loaf, or a quartern or half quartern loaf, the baker cannot by supplying him with a fancy loaf, protect himself from the obligation of weighing it, but if he has only fancy bread he should so inform the customer so as to give him the option of taking it as fancy bread; fourthly, that "fancy bread is such bread as is considered to be such by the trade and the public at the present day, and not such as it was so considered at the time of the passing of the statute, and that such fancy bread if sold as such, need not be previously weighed. The course to be adopted by a baker upon the sale of his bread is obvious. After the bread is baked he should cause each individual loaf to be weighed, and he should purport to sell it by weight, designating the bread as a 4lb. or 2lb. loaf, or of other weight as the case may be. It may be observed that no penalty attaches under the Act, even if the bread be not of full weight. If the baker knowingly and fraudulently sells bread as of a certain weight when it is not of that weight, he may be liable to an indictment for obtaining money by false pretences, but he is not liable to a summary conviction under the before-mentioned statute. If he has only fancy bread, and yet is asked for the ordinary bread, or for bread without any designation, he should inform the customer that he has only fancy bread, and that that is the only bread with which he can serve him. If the customer then chooses

to take such bread, no penalty will attach on
account of its not having been weighed. By
observing these precautions the baker will
effectually steer clear of the difficulties by which
he is beset.

THE BEERHOUSE ACT.

GREAT difficulties in the operation of this Act
have arisen from the different practice in the
metropolis and in the country as to the time of
holding the licensing meetings; in the former,
March being the licensing month, and in the
latter a later date. The Bill as drawn had
regard to the provincial licences only, but on
notification of the difference in the metropolis,
a clause was introduced, providing for it.
Unfortunately, in this as in other cases, the
other provisions of the Bill were not modified
so as to meet the special requisitions of the
Metropolitan clause, and, as a consequence of
this, many parts of the Act are contradictory
and impossible of application to the circum-
stances of the metropolis. For the purpose of
considering these difficulties and determining
upon the adoption of some uniform practice
throughout London, a meeting of the chairmen
when a communication from the Home Office
of the various divisions was held on Monday,
was read, stating that the Inland Revenue
Board were desirous to assist the magistrates by
any means in their power in carrying out what
were the manifest intentions of the Legislature.
The following is a report of the proceedings :-
elected chairman.
John Fish Pownall, Esq., was unanimously

of the chairman, and read the correspondence
Mr. Francis attended the meeting at the request
between the chairman of the court and the Home
Office on the subject of the transfer of the ex-
isting excise licences to new tenants before the first
meeting of magistrates to grant certificates.

The chairman called attention to the provisions
of the Wine and Beerhouse Act 1869, authorising
the granting of certificates for licences by justices
following cases, viz. :-
in their several special sessions divisions, in the

1. To sell beer and cider to be drunk or con-
sumed on the premises.

2. To sell beer and cider not to be drunk or
consumed in the house or on the premises
specified in the licence.

3. To sell table beer at a price not exceeding
14. the quart, and not to be drunk or con-
sumed on the premises where sold.

4. To persons who shall have taken out a licence
to sell strong beer in casks, containing not
less than four and a half gallons, or in not
less than two dozen quart bottles at one
time, to be drunk or consumed elsewhere
than on the premises; an additional
licence to sell beer in any less quantity and
in any other manner than as aforesaid, but
not to be drunk or consumed on the pre-
mises where sold. Such additional licence
to be granted without the production of any
certificate, or the possession of any other
qualification than the licence first men-
tioned.

the then shrievalty, the practice of allowing the sheriffs to receive and retain felons' goods, fines, and forfeitures be discontinued, and that the city bailiffs collect all such goods, fines, and forfei tures, and pay the same into the chamber of the corporation, to abide the order of the court.

The report led to a short discussion, in the himself acted as under-sheriff, pointed out that course of which Mr. Deputy De Jersey, who had the office involved considerable anxiety and responsibility in disposing of the proceeds of felons' goods among their poor relatives, and that it was only the surplus remaining after such disposal that went into the pockets of the under-sheriffs. The under-sheriffs, he said, had no salaries, but had, notwithstanding, serious liabilities attached to their position, which did not always cease with the expiration of their year of office; and he the fines and forfeitures it ought to relieve them argued that if the corporation took from them of those liabilities.

supported the proposed change, speaking from his
He was followed by Sir Sydney Waterlow, who
experience of the office of sheriff a few years ago,
both in the interest of prisoners and their families,
and in that of the under-sheriffs. He added that
if the report were carried out there might be some
arrangement by future sheriffs to remunerate the
remarked that, on consideration of the circum-
under-sheriffs in a satisfactory manner.
Mr. Bontems, who had brought up the report,
stances, the court would probably in future allow
a sum equivalent to the loss by the proposed
application of the funds in question to be paid to
the under-sheriffs from time to time from the
corporation cash.

founded upon it was read a first and second time
The report was eventually adopted, and a bill
by the court, acting for the time in its legislative
capacity.

After transacting some business of little public interest, the court adjourned.

CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT.-NEW COURT.
Tuesday, Oct. 26.

(Before Mr. Commissioner KERR.)
A curious point was raised in this court in con-
nection with a prosecution on the part of the
Mint.

Charles Thomas Chandler was indicted for feloniously uttering a counterfeit coin, and pleaded autrefois acquit. It appeared that the day before he was charged with a misdemeanor in having uttered this counterfeit shilling, and the offence was charged as a misdemeanor only, because his alleged accomplice, who was tried with him, had never been before convicted. Both prisoners were acquitted; the woman was discharged, but Chandler was detained, and to-day indicted for felony.

In answer to plea of autrefois acquit Mr. Cranford, M.P., who appeared for the prosecution, stated it was quite true the offence was precisely the same, but that the present indictment charged the previous conviction.

Mr. Commissioner KERR said it might become a case for a court of error, but

Mr. Avery, the Clerk of Arraigns, pointed out that if the prisoner was tried and committed on this indictment, the record would show that he was both convicted and acquitted of the same offence.

The learned COMMISSIONER saw the force of this objection, and ordered the prisoner to be discharged.

5. To any person who shall keep a shop for the
sale of any goods or commodities other than
foreign wine, or who shall have taken out a
licence as a dealer in wine, a licence to sell
by retail and in reputed quart or pint
bottles only in such shop foreign wine not
to be consumed on the premises where sold.
6. To any person licensed to keep a refreshment
house, a licence to sell foreign wine by
retail in such refreshment house, to be con-
sumed on the premises, where the same
shall have been sold without producing or Friendly society-Reference to arbitration-Juris-
having any other licence or authority as
aforesaid.

was duly seconded, it was resolved:-"That as to
On the motion of F. H. N. Glossop, Esq., which
new tenants of premises for which a licence under
Beerhouse Act 1869, was in force at the time of
the three Acts first mentioned in the Wine and
the passing of that Act, it is expedient to grant
certificates by way of transfer in the same manner
in all respects as if a certificate had been granted
at the last general annual licensing meeting."
Resolved:-"That it is expedient that appli-
cations for certificates for new licences, and
for transfers to new tenants, be made in writing,
stating the description of licence required, and
left at the office of the clerk to the justices four-
teen days before the general annual licensing
meeting, or the transfer meeting, as the case may

be."

COURT OF COMMON COUNCIL.
FELONS' GOODS.

giving effect to a resolution of the court passed in
Mr. Bontems brought up a report of a committee
May last, that from and after the expiration of

SOHAM COUNTY COURT.
Tuesday, Oct. 12.

(Before JOHN COLLYER, Esq., Judge.)
NEATHERCOAT v. ALDERTON.

diction of County Court.

Held, that as the 69th rule of the society directed
Upon an action by a member of a friendly society
for arrears of sick pay alleged to be due to him:
the reference of all disputes to arbitration in a
manner therein provided, the jurisdiction of
the County Court was ousted, notwithstanding
that the direction as to the appointment of
Reg. v. Evans quoted
arbitrators had not been literally complied with.

coat against Henry Alderton, the secretary of the
This was an action brought by John Neather-
Sons of Benevolence Lodge of Ancient Shepherds,
Isleham, for certain arrears of sick pay alleged to
be due to him.

E. Cross for the plaintiffs. J. W. Cooper for the defendants. Upon the case being called on in July, His HONOUR said he supposed the contention on the part of the defendant would be that the jurisdiction of the County Court was ousted. J. W. Cooper.-That is my defence. By the Tidd Pratt as required by law, all disputes are to 69th rule of the society, which is certified by Mr. be referred to arbitration. The rule is as follows:

"That if any dispute shall arise between any member or person claiming under or on account of any member or under the rules of the society, and the trustees, treasurer, or other officers of the society, or the committee thereof, it shall be referred to arbitration. At the second meeting of the society after these rules are certified by the Registrar, five arbitrators shall be named and elected, none of them being directly or indirectly beneficially interested in the funds of the society; and in each case of dispute the names of the arbitrators shall be written on pieces of paper and placed in a box or glass, and the three whose names are first drawn out by the complaining party, or by someone appointed by him or her, shall be the arbitrators to decide the matter in difference. In case of a vacancy or vacancies another or others shall be elected at a general meeting." The plaintiff had sent in a demand in writing to have his case referred to arbitration. The arbitrators had heard the case and decided that he should be expelled under the 58th rule, as they were of opinion that he had received the benefit of the lodge at the time he was able to

work.

E. Cross, for the plaintiff, contended that the court had power to hear the case; the award of the arbitrators was a nullity, for the rule of the society had not been complied with. The rule said that at the second meeting of the society, after the rules were certified by the registrar, five arbitrators should be appointed, &c. Now this had not been done, therefore the dispute was not properly referred.

J. W. Cooper on the other side.-The court cannot inquire into the award; if the award is fraudulent there is another remedy. The sole question is, whether the rule of the society is not sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the County Court. All had been done properly, although, in fact at the second meeting after the rules were certified no arbitrators had been appointed, yet at that time there were five gentlemen who acted as arbitrators to the old society before it was established under the rules now certified by the registrar. In the next place, the rule gave power to fill up vacancies, and as soon as the submission to arbitration came they were filled up in accordance with the rule. True, one portion of the rule had not been complied with, viz., that the complaining party, or some one on his behalf, attended on the drawing of the names, but this was the fault of the plaintiff, who had notice to attend. Whatever objection might be valid was taken away when the plaintiff demanded a settlement by arbitration in accordance with the 69th rule. The learned counsel quoted Reg v. Evans, 3 E. & B. 363. His HONOUR took time to consider, and on the 12th Oct. nonsuited the plaintiff.

Judgment accordingly.

ELY QUARTER SESSIONS.
Wednesday, Oct. 20.

(Before JOHN RICHARDSON FRYER, Esq.,
Chairman.)

HOBBS v. PELL AND OTHERS, JUSTICES, &c. The Wine and Beerhouse Act 1869-Appeal-Rateable value-House and land rated together. Upon an application for a certificate under the "Wine and Beerhouse Act 1869," the magistrates refused the certificate upon the ground of insufficient proof of rateable value. Upon an appeal to the quarter sessions, it appeared that the appellant was rated for a public house, and six acres, sixteen perches of land all adjoining at Held, that the house itself, without the land, not being of sufficient rateable value that the certificate was properly refused, and that the land, although held with the house, could not be

101.18s.

said to be "premises held therewith" within the meaning of the first section of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 61.

Held also that the quarter sessions had no power

to grant a case, and that the rate book was conclusive evidence of rateable value, and lastly, that the appeal must be dismissed with costs. This was an appeal by William Hobbs, the younger, against the decision of Oliver Claude Pell, Esq., and other magistrates of the Isle of Ely, who had refused the appellant a certificate

under "The Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869," upon

the ground that the house for which he applied for a licence was not duly qualified according to law.

Naylor (instructed by Cross), for the appellant. Mills and Perkins (instructed by Evans), for the respondents.

The appellant William Hobbs, the younger, it appeared occupied a public house together with six acres sixteen perches of land all inclosed in one fence, and had formerly been licensed for the house and premises by the excise. The appellant was rated as follows, from the extract of the rate

book.

No. 129.

Name of occupier-Hobbs, Wm. Jr.
Name of owner-Stevens Jordan.
Description of property rated-Public house and land.

Situation-2nd drive.

Estimated extent-6a. 16p.

Gross estimated rental-1261. 16s.
Rateable value-101. 188.

Naylor, for the appellant, contended that the
house and the land together, being rated at a sum
exceeding 81., it was sufficient, to all intents and
purposes. The land and the house were part of
the same premises, for a sale of beer upon any
part of the land, would be a sale of beer on the
premises.
The CHAIRMAN.-The question is, whether the
house, separated from the land, is sufficient.
whether the house and land being rated together
Mills. We admit the rating. The question is,
is sufficient. We say that the rateable value of
the land being deducted, it leaves only 41. as the
rateable value of the house.

66

Naylor called Alfred Asplen, the vestry clerk of Downham, who produced the rate books, and Dog and Gun." Independent of the land, the stated that he knew the house in question, The house and buildings were worth 81. 10s. a year. that the adjoining land was rated at 23s. an acre; In cross-examination by Mills, witness admitted he considered that the rateable value of the house was 81., and the rental 121. Appellant had never stated he was dissatisfied as to the amount of his rating. Did not know the rent actually paid, but the land was arable.

The CHAIRMAN.-Suppose the case of a lease of this house, surely the house and premises would

not include the land?

largely occupied by persons sent there for comparatively unimportant offences, and that the Secretary of State for the Home Department should be consulted as to whether some provision could not be made for taking them out of this prison, and the space so vacated be occupied by prisoners who had committed graver offences. He found that the parish of Stoke Newington had strongly remonstrated against the proposition for building a new prison in that locality, and no doubt other parishes would be found opposed to it; and even if it were necessary to have a new were built there, there would be a great saving in land were offered for sale at 58. an acre, and if it prison, he said that the other day 100,000 acres of the interest of the money that would be required for building on the site now proposed.

Mr. Frewen seconded the amendment.

Mr. Northall Laurie said that they must meet this case by providing a new prison; but at the police force, so that crime should not be committed same time he advocated a large augmention of the

with the impunity which was inseparable from the present limited number of the police. As to sending old offenders out of the country they would not go; and until they had a larger police force to prevent the commission of crime, he saw no alternative but to erect a new prison.

After a discussion had taken place, the amendment was negatived, and the original motion was adopted.

CONVEYANCER.

Naylor.-Under the peculiar circumstances, it REAL PROPERTY LAWYER AND would. It is not the fault of the appellant that he is rated in one sum, and therefore he ought not to suffer by it. There is evidence that the rateable value of the house alone is 8., and the rate-book is not conclusive as to the rateable value.

Mills.-The court of quarter sessions have no power to alter the rate, and the rate-book is sole

evidence.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. AGREEMENT FOR A LEASE BY LETTERS-PAROL VARIATION. - By three letters which passed between the parties, the defendant agreed to demise to the plaintiff a dwelling-house and its appurtenances. The agreement was in the letters complete, but the defendant refused to grant the lease on the terms which the letters

expressed, on the ground of a verbal understanding that the lease should contain a covenant by the plaintiff to expend 10007. in improvements. The plaintiff denied that this was any part of the terms, and resisted the insertion of such a covenant, but he expended upwards of 500l. on the property: Held (affirming the decision of Stuart, addition failing to establish it, the plaintiff was V. C.), that the evidence in support of the alleged entitled to such a lease as the letters taken alone provided for: Taylor v. Portington, 7 De G. M. & G. 328, commented on and distinguished: (Dear v. Verity, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 185. L. JJ.)

VENDOR AND PURCHASER ACKNOWLEDGMENT.-B. contracted to purchase from S. a freehold property for which an agreement was entered into between them and a deposit paid. It turned out that S. was not entitled in fee, but only to an estate pur auter vie with remainder to the use of him and his wife. The wife's acknowledgment to the conveyance being necessary, this formality could not be completed, the sale was therefore considered as abandoned, and quently sold to W., and the conveyance duly the deposit returned. The property was subseacknowledged by the wife. On bill filed by S. for a specific performance of this agreement, and a declaration that W. was a trustee for B. Held, that he was so, and decree for specific performance made as to such interest as S. had in the property, and reference as to the amount of compensation to plaintiff for the interest not conveyed to him: (Barnes v. Wood, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 227. V. C. J.)

VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT-POWER OF REVO

NEW PRISON FOR MIDDLESEX. A general meeting of the magistrates of the county of Middlesex was held recently at the Sessions House, Clerkenwell, under the presidency of Mr. Pownall, when a report was presented from the special committee appointed by the court to inquire and report where, and on what terms, a site suitable for the erection of a new prison thereon may be obtained. The report was as follows:"Your committee, as the first step in carrying out the order of reference made to them by the court, and received in pursuance of such advertisements caused advertisements to be published for land, offers of forty-six plots. Your committee determined that it would be greatly for the convenience of the county that a site within the metropolitan area should be selected, provided the same could be obtained at a price that was not excessive. They therefore limited in the first instance their inspection to the following sites: Camden-road, about 8 acres; Highbury-vale, between 12 and 13 acres; Mill-hill Park, Acton, about 13 acres; Bedford House, Acton, about 12 acres; West tiguity of the Highbury-vale site to Clerkenwell, CATION.-M. H. having a general power of Brompton, about 6 acres; and from the conthe others do not. They therefore recommend will over 3000l. to be raised out of real estate, they consider it possesses some advantages which appointment by deed or will under her father's that the committee be authorised to enter into a and being separated from her husband, and provisional contract with the vendors, to be sub- lodging with her brother-in-law A., and being ject to the approval of the court, at the next threatened with a suit by her son-in-law B., November session, at a sum not exceeding 12,250." whose wife (her only child) was dead, wished to Mr. Wyatt moved the adoption of this report. ment: "That the Secretary of State having acted his cousin, a solicitor, who prepared, and M. H. Mr. Serjeant Payne moved the following amend put the 30007. out of B.'s power. A. employed upon the principle recently mooted in this court executed, a deed which was an absolute appointby commuting the sentence on Archibald Brown, ment of the 3000l. (subject to her life interest) convicted of forgery, on condition that he imme- to A. M. H.'s husband died, and she married diately quitted England, and remained abroad again, and, as it appeared by evidence, considuring the residue of the five years to which he dering that she had appointed the 3000i. by will, had been sentenced, it is highly desirable that A. was applied to for such will, but he said that this court should confer with the Home Secretary his wife had it, and it was never produced until to ascertain whether a like proceeding cannot be after M. H.'s death, which took place little more adopted with regard to many other persons im- than a year after, she having by will under a prisoned for comparatively small offences, whereby power of revocation contained in the settlement, a sufficient portion of the House of Correction might be cleared for the reception of greater cri- revoked part of the trusts, and given the bulk minals without subjecting the ratepayers of the of the 3000l. to C., and the rest to her second county to the heavy expense of creating a new husband. A. applied for and kept the settleprison." He urged that the prison was at presentment for some weeks, and it appeared in a bill of

costs of his solicitor that he was advised to keep quiet about the appointment. On bill filed to set aside the appointment in favour of A., decree with costs: (Coutts v. Ackworth, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 224. V.C M.)

WILL MORTMAIN- UNCERTAINTY.-B. directed the residue of his personal estate to be converted into money and applied to construct a well, tank, and public pump, and if any surplus, to be paid to the rector of the place for the benefit of a school there. The gift for the well, &c., was held to be void, and as the surplus could not be ascertained, the whole gift was void: (Kirkman v. Lewis, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 191. M. R.) MORTGAGE-EQUITY OF REDEMPTION-RELEASE-AGREEMENT.-Mortgagees brought an action of ejectment, in July 1853, against the mortgagor, who was in possession of the mortgaged property. The action was compromised, upon these terms: that the mortgagor should give up possession to the mortgagees on the 29th Sept. then next, and should release to them (if required) all his right, claim, and interest in the mortgaged property, the release to be prepared at the expense of the mortgagees; the mortgagees agreeing, in consideration of the mortgagor agreeing to give such possession and execute such release, to forego all claim in respect of costs of the action, but in case default should be made by the mortgagor in the giving of such possession, or the execution of such release (if required), the mortgagees should be entitled to the costs: A release was never required, and the mortgagor continued in possession till 1865, when the mortgagees sold the property under the trust for sale contained in the mortgage-deed, and realised more than sufficient to pay their principal, interest, and costs: Held, that the compromise was an agreement in fieri, which had been abandoned by all parties and could not now be carried out, and that the mortgagor was entitled to the surplus proceeds of sale, after paying to the mortgagees their principal, interest, and costs: (Rushbrook v. Lawrence, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 192. M. R.)

SETTLEMENT AFTER ACQUIred Property.— On the marriage of C. and F., 5000l. was vested in trustees on the usual trusts, and C. and F. covenanted with the trustees that if F., her executors or administrators, or C., his executors or administrators in her right, should at any one time become absolutely entitled to real or personal estate of the value of 2001. or more, C. and F., their executors or administrators, should vest it in the trustees, on certain trusts. C. and F., his wife, went to New Zealand, where C. acquired real estate, which he left by his will as F. should appoint by deed or will, and in default to her children. The widow dealt with this property by absolute appointment to herself: Held, that this property was not within the covenant, that the words "during the coverture" were intended to be inserted, and that the words ence: (Carter v. Carter, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 194. "executors or administrators" made no differV.C. M.)

perty by N. to the company before O. became a kept in a strong room with similar boxes of
director. The company having been ordered to other customers, and with property belonging to
be wound-up, an application was made by the the bank. The debentures were stolen by the
official liquidator, under sect. 165 of the Com- cashier of the bank. In an action by the depo-
panies Act 1862, for an order that O. should sitor against the bank, the jury found a verdict
repay the 500l. paid-up for him by N. as being for the plaintiff, but a rule to enter a nonsuit
money of the company retained by O.: Held, was afterwards made absolute. On appeal to
(affirming the M. R), that the sale by N. to the the Judicial Committee: Held, that the bank
company not being repudiated, no such order were not bound to take more than ordinary care
could be made: (Orgill's Case, 21 L. T. Rep. of the deposit entrusted to them, and that the
N. S. 221. L. J. Giffard.)
negligence for which alone they could be made
DAMAGES FROM VIBRATION OF A RAILWAY-liable would have been the want of that ordinary
COMPENSATION.-An action was brought against care which men of common prudence generally
a railway company to recover an amount assessed exercise about their own affairs. It is not, how-
by a jury, as a compensation "for vibration from ever, sufficient to exempt a gratuitous bailee
the use of the railway after construction." The from liability, that he keeps goods deposited
damage did not arise from negligence, but was
with him in the same manner as he keeps his
the inevitable consequence of the proper and own, though this degree of care will ordinarily
ordinary use of the railway: Held (reversing repel the presumption of gross negligence. The
the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber), that, term "gross negligence
" is not intended as a
first, no action would lie for the damages sus- definition, but is useful as expressing the prac-
tained; for the Legislature having given power tical difference between the degrees of negli
to the company to employ locomotive engines, gence for which different classes of bailees are
if such locomotives cannot possibly be used responsible: (Giblin v. McMullen, 21 L. T. Rep.
without occasioning vibration and consequent N. S. 214. P. C.)
injury to neighbouring houses, upon the prin-
ciple of law that cuicunque aliquis quid concedit,
concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse, non
potuit, it must be taken that power is given to
cause that vibration without liability to an
action. The case of Rex v. Pease, 4 B. & Ad. 30,
and Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Company, 5 H.
& N. 679, approved. Secondly (Lord Cairns
dissentiente), that there was no title to compensa-
tion for the damage sustained; for the Railway
Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict.
c. 20), ss. 6 and 16, provides compensation only
for damage caused by the "construction," and
not by the "use," of the railway. The head-
ings to the groups of sections in the above Act
indicate the general object of the provisions
immediately following, and may be usefully
referred to to determine the sense of any doubt-
ful expression in a section ranged under a par-
ticular heading. The Lands Clauses Consolida-
tion Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 68) has no direct
bearing on the above question: (The_Hammer-
smith and City Railway Company v. Brand, 21
L. T. Rep. N. S. 238. H. of L.)

INCREASE IN NOMINAL VALUE OF SHARES

NOTICE TO TRANSFERROR.-The nominal value of
shares had been increased by a company from
207. to 40%. each without formal notice to the
original applicants.
B. had obtained twenty
shares which he transferred to C., but the trans-
fer deed was not executed. B. was held to be
a contributory to the amount of 201. per share
only: (Gustard's case, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 196.
V.Č. J.)

TRANSFER OF SHARES-SET-OFF.-B. applied
for 100 shares; twenty were allotted on 22nd
April 1864. In Nov. 1865 B. contracted to sell
them to C. Calls became due, and B. remitted
the amount to C. to pay to the company, which
was indebted to C. in a much larger sum.
certain coupons of the company which he held,
tendered to the secretary in payment of the calls

C.

and which were refused. The transfer had not

been registered. B. was held to be a contribu-
tory in respect of these shares: (Holden's case,

JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES' LAW | 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 197. V.C. J.)

JOURNAL.

NOTES ON NEW DECISIONS. WINDING-UP-POWERS OF LIQUIDATOR. Sect. 95 of the Companies Act defines the power of the liquidator to be exercised with the sanc. tion of the court; sect. 96 enacts that the court may authorise the exercise of those powers without its sanction or intervention; sect. 160 provides for compromises by the liquidator with the sanction of the court. It was held that to support an order conferring these powers on the liquidator exclusively, there must be a constat justifying the exercise of a judicial discretion on the part of the judge: (Re The South-Eastern Railway, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 220. L.JJ.)

WINDING-UP-MONEY RECEIVED BY A DIRECTOR FROM A PROMOTER.-O., being asked by K., a promoter of a company, to become a director of the company, the qualification for which was the holding of fifty shares of 101. each, declined to do so, and then K. offered to provide the qualification for him. O., under these circumstances, consented, and N., another of the promoters, out of the profit which he made by the sale of certain property to the company, paid up fifty shares in full for O. There was no completed agreement for sale of the pro

PRIVATE BILL-LOCUS STANDI.--The com-
missioners for the township of K. were empowered
to construct waterworks and to levy water rates,
but did not exercise the power, and in default of
such supply, a railway company constructed, at
their own expense, an aqueduct for the supply
of their station within the township. A Bill
was now promoted constituting a new body of
commissioners, and empowering them (inter alia)
to contract with the corporation of D. for a
supply of water for the township, and to levy
for that purpose such rates as the existing com-
missioners were authorised to levy: Held, that
though the Bill proposed to give no new rating
powers, the railway company had a limited locus
standi against clauses relating to water supply
(Kingstown Town Bill, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 199.
Court of Referees.)

MERCANTILE LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LIABILITIES OF BANKERS AS GRATUITOUS BAILEES.-A box containing debentures and other securities was deposited at a bank, the depositor keeping the key. The bank received no payment for their care of the box, which was

PARTNERSHIP-BILLS-GENERAL AND SEPARATE CREDITORS.-K., a member of a Japan firm of merchants, being about to go to England, drew bills in three sets, as representing his share, took one set to New York, and died there. The bills so taken by K. were lost, and another set were indorsed to abide the decision of the court on a question raised in consequence of the subsequent failure of the firm, as between the general and separate creditors of K.: Held, that it being clear on the evidence that the firm was insolvent at the date of the bills, they belonged to the estate of the firm: (Re Kemptner's Mortgage, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 223. V. C. M.)

MARITIME LAW

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.
SALVAGEDERELICT - REMUNERATION.-A

large value of a derelict saved may authorise a
large reward, even in the absence of any great
amount of damage incurred by the salvors.
Where, therefore, a derelict vessel of value
13,000l. was rescued from being wrecked, a
tender of 5001. by the defendant was held insuffi-
cient, and a sum of 1100l. and costs were awarded
232. Adm. Ireland.)
to the salvors: (The Burns, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S.

WHAT AMOUNTS TO A "LANDING" OF GOODS-
TOLLS.-By their local Harbour Act (1 & 2 Geo.
4, c. 99), the defendants are entitled to levy tolls
on goods, &c., "landed," or "shipped within the
cobb or harbour" of Lyme Regis. Cargoes of
limestone, which were dug at the plaintiff's
quarries, situate on the shore to the westward of
boats into the harbour, and, by leave of the
the harbour, were brought thence coastwise in
high and low water mark, there to remain until
defendants, were shot out from the boats into
the water at a spot within the harbour between
they should be reshipped for exportation; and it
majority of the Court of Exchequer (Kelly, C.B.
was held (dissentiente Channell, B.), by the
and Bramwell and Cleasby, BB.), that the
depositing the limestone at the spot in question,
in the manner above-mentioned, was not a
"landing" of the same within the meaning of
the Local Harbour Act, so as to entitle the de-
fendants to levy a toll thereupon as upon goods
"landed" within the cobb or harbour. Leak and
another (qui tam) v. Howel and another, Cro. Eliz.
533, cited and distinguished: (Harvey v. The
Mayor, &c., of Lyme Regis, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S.
227. Ex.)

HARBOUR DUES-LOCAL HARBOUR ACT

COLLISION-NEGLIGENCE--PRACTICE.-Plaintiffs on the 1st Feb. 1869, were, it being then daylight, in their yawl, which was at anchor, fishing in the bay of Dublin, when the defendants steamer, on board of which there was no look-out at the time, bore down upon them. Plaintiffs, to save themselves from a collision, jumped overboard into the water. Said plaintiffs then brought their action, and Pigot, C. B., before whom the trial was had, told the jury that if the plaintiffs, through a reasonable apprehension of danger ensuing to them from the negligent acts of the defendant, committed acts themselves, namely, jumping into the water, whereby they suffered damage, however slight, that the defendants should be liable in damages for the consequences: (Murphy v. Palgreave, 21 L. T. Rep. Ñ. S. 209. Pigot, C. B.)

t

reply to my insufficient query in the LAW TIMES of the
9th inst., on this point; but I am afraid he gave himself
far more anxiety and trouble in the matter than was
needful, seeing that the issue involved is so small. How.
ever, I will, Mr. Editor, with your permission, now pro-
ceed to supply what I was previously aware was omitted
in my query in question. In doing so, I may preface my
quotations by stating that (as your correspondent will
observe), the conveyance in question was not made to
S. B. through the intervention of a trustee, but as
under. The operative words are "grant, release, con-
vey, and assure unto the said S. B., and her heirs, &c.,
to such uses, &c., as S. B., whether married or sole,
should appoint by deed or will, and, in default, to the

use of the heirs and assigns of the said S. B. for ever,'
and not "To the use of the said S. B., her heirs, and
assigns, for ever." as anyone would suppose. At present
S. B. has not made any appointment or other disposition.
Query-Can she do so? If so, it is evident the husband
need not join, and no acknowledgment is necessary.
But I find on reference to Hallilay's Questions and
Answers on Conveyancing, 4th edit. p. 188, that where
a power of appointment over real estate is executed, the
appointee takes in point of estate from the party
creating, and not from the party executing the power,
because no estate, but a use is only passed from the
party executing the power; and estates created by the
execution of a power take effect in precisely the same
manner as if created by the deed which raised the
power: (Sug. Pow. ch. 5. s. 8; Burt. Comp. Pl. 346-787;
1 Steph. Com. 507, 1st edit.; see also query and answer
at the beginning of this page, or supra, and subse-
quently.) If, therefore, your correspondent can throw
any additional light on this point. I shall be very thank
ful; and if I be under any misapprehension on the
subject, I am open to conviction, and to correction. I
take it that, there being no issue of the marriage, if
S. B. dies without exercising her power (if good and
valid), the estate would go to her heir-at-law as mur-
chaser, and not by descent.
W. H.

(Q. 109.) WILL-POWER-CONVEYANCING.-It is quite clear that the trustees have full power to appoint the fee-simple to a purchaser, although there is no express power given to them to revoke the uses to take effect in remainder. "A power to appoint includes in itself a power to revoke; and a power to do an act which can only be effected by appointment, authorises an appointment, and therefore a revocation. Whatever be the form in which a power of sale is given, it will operate as a power of revocation, and new appointment, and may be executed accordingly:" (Sugd. Pow. 196; Bishop of Oxford v. Leighton, 2 Vern. 367.) The following would be the form of the testatum :-"Now this indenture

the infinite varieties of circumstances. It is
indeed more a question for the skilled surveyor
than for the lawyer, although the produc-
tion of experts on
thing is almost sure
one side to prove one
to be met by the
production of an equal number on the
other side to prove the reverse. This some-
what discreditable conflict of testimony in such
cases is mainly due to our English system of
leaving it to the public to fight out questions of
skill and science, instead of looking to the court
to provide experts who shall be the witnesses for
neither party, but the informants of the court.
We believe that the adoption of this excellent
plan of the French tribunals will be recommended
by the Judicature Commission, and it will be a
great improvement in the law.

Mr. Castle's volume is the combined produc-
tion of a surveyor and a barrister, and therefore
it sets before the reader the whole of the in-
formation he requires on a subject which
point of view. It will much assist in the solu-
neither could sufficiently treat of from his own
tion of the problem to which it is directed.

The Vaccination Acts and Instructional Circulars,
Orders and Regulations, with Introduction, Notes
and Index. By DANBY P. FRY, Esq., Barrister-
at-Law. Fourth Edition.

and Co.

Acts, the Railway Clearing House Acts, and not the least important and interesting, as proceeding from so high an authority on these questions as Mr. Glen, the difficult law relating to the assessment of railways to local taxes. The second volume comprises the various Consolidation Acts, similarly annotated, and a collection of useful forms and precedents, and to each volume there is a singularly copious index

It will have a place not in the library of the lawyer alone. It is a book which every railway office should keep on its shelf for reference.

A Dissertation on the History of Hereditary Dignities. By W. F. FINLASON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. London: Butterworths, There is scarcely a topic of public interest, involving principles having their roots in the past, which this laborious writer does not attack and present to his readers in a manner has considered the history of hereditary dignities thoroughly exhaustive. In this dissertation he with especial reference to the case of the Earldom of Wiltes. In his preface he states that the Constitutional history, extremely important, and authorities which he cites demonstrate a fact of of vast interest at the present time, viz., that for centuries creations of peerages were only London: Knight-or usually-for life. This, he observes, is attested by the authority of the great lawyer, Lord Coke, and by historians, such as Mackintosh and Hallam. And he says "There appears, therefore, to be no restriction upon the power of the Crown to limit its grants of peerages, except that they must not be contrary to good sense or reason, which cannot be predicated of grants in any form already held good, or in accordance with ancient usage. Grants of peerages for life, or to heirs male (i. e., to the male heirs, lineal or collateral), are, it is conceived, equally in accordance with authority and reason; inasmuch as they appear to have been made upon the prinform which may appear best calculated to secure ciple that the Crown can grant peerages in any the benefit of those services in the councils of the State, which have always been presumed to be the consideration, and the object of such

The agitation so singularly raised against sani-
tary laws that enforce vaccination on the
wholesome principle that a man has no right to
spread contagion among his neighbours, is not
likely to be successful, and, therefore, this col-
lection of the Acts annotated and indexed will
continue to be as useful as it has proved itself to
be by three editions. Of books thus in daily
use, the latest is the only safe edition to be
consulted.

witnesseth that for effecting the sale, and in conside. Shelford's Law of Railways, containing the whole

ration, &c., they, the said A. B. and C. D., in exercise of the said power contained in the hereinbefore in part recited will, and of every or any other power enabling them, and at the request and with the approbation and consent of the said (the widow) (testified by her being a party to and executing these presents), do hereby revoke, determine, and make void all and every the estates, uses, trusts, powers, provisoes, and limitations by and in the hereinbefore in part recited will limited, expressed, declared, and contained of and concerning the hereditaments and premises hereinafter expressed to be hereby applied, and do limit, declare, and appoint that all, &c., shall henceforth go and remain to the use of the said his heirs, and assigns for ever." As the trustees have the legal estate as well as the power of sale, it would be desirable to confirm the conveyance by a grant, and another testatum can be added, but it is not absolutely necessary. Newport, Monmouth, Oct. 25.

W.W.C.

Every appointment is, in effect, a revocation pro tanto of existing uses and estates, and an express power of revocation is merely surplusage. It is not quite

clear from the statement of the case whether the trustees of the power of sale took the legal fee, or whether

the life estate and remainders were executed at law under the Statute of Uses. It will probably be found that the Statute of Uses did not operate, and that the legal fee remained in the trustees. The trustees, with the consent of the tenant for life, should grant and appoint the fee, and the tenant for life should, as to her estate, grant and confirm. If the conveyance be not simply to and to the use of the purchaser, and there be any doubt whether the trustees take the legal fee, they should appoint to the uses to be after expressed, and by a separate testatum the trustees and tenant for life should grant and confirm the property to the grantee to uses and his heirs with a declaration that the appointment and conveyance should enure to the uses intended. Z. Y.

(Q. 111.) UNSTAMPED GUARANTY-RENEWED ACTION.The 23 Vict. 15, s. 15, only applies when "it shall appear thereby," i.e., by the agreement that the matter thereof is under the value of 201. As that fact is not patent on the agreement, I think the Somerset House authorities correct in requiring the higher penalty. Z. Y.

(Q. 113.) ADOPTION OF CHILD.-B. cannot legally detain the child. A contract by a father not to exercise control over his children is contrary to the policy of the law, unless the father's misconduct has been so gross as to unfit him for the society of his children: (Vansit. tart v. Vansittart, 31 L. T. Rep. 4; Swift v. Swift, 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 435.) Z. Y.

of the Statute Law for the regulation of Railways
in England, Scotland, and Ireland; with copious
Notes of the Decided Cases upon the Statutes,
Introduction to the Law of Railways, and Appen-
dix of Official Documents. Fourth edition.
By W. CUNNINGHAM GLEN, Barrister-at-Law.

In two vols. London: Butterworths.
RAILWAY law has grown to dimensions little
dreamed of by Mr. Shelford when he wrote his
first book upon the subject. He lived to witness
its expansion to a very respectable bulk; but
his treatise there has been a wonderful accretion
even since the production of the third edition of
alike of statute and of case law, and Mr. Glen's
fourth edition, greatly as it has expanded, has
but kept pace with Parliament and the courts.
The cases, indeed, are now so numerous, that
one fourth of the entire business of the equity
courts is said to be, in some form or another,
connected with railways and railway laws.
Being thus in a state of continual growth,
the practitioner is compelled to
latest text-book for his guidance. He must
use the
discard the old edition for the new, and thus at
some cost continually replenish his library, under
pain of mistakes, which, in matters of such
moment as railway questions, might be as ruinous
to his client as to his own reputation. Shelford
was one of the most painstaking of legal authors.
There are no more laborious books than those
which bear his name; and that name was always
in itself a recommendation when citations were
addressed to the court.
wisely in preserving that reputation, and, as far
Mr. Glen has done
as possible, the text of Shelford-though very
extensive alterations and additions have been
required. But he has a claim of his own. He is
possesses much of the same industry, skill in
a worthy successor of the original author, and
arrangement, and astuteness in enumerating the
points really decided by cited cases. But we
have said enough of a work already so well
known. We will now merely give to such
readers as may not be familiar with the book
itself, a short outline of its contents.

the history of railway legislation, taken princi-
The first volume commences with a resumé of
pally from the report of the Royal Commission
successive proceedings requisite to the obtaining
on Railways. It then proceeds to describe the
of Legislative sanction for the construction of a
railway. Then all the statutes relating to rail.
ways are given in their order, with copious notes
of the cases decided on their construction. The
Telegraph Acts follow in the like arrangement
and with the like exposition. Then the Tramways

tion attains the object, at all events for the life

creations. The former of these modes of crea

other, if his heirs are admitted, is most likely to of the eminent man chosen for the honour; the

secure it in the future."

it is remarked in a note that in his reports, be With reference to the authority of Lord Coke creations of barons were by writ of summons; states that until the reign of Richard II. all new and both Hallam and Mackintosh point out that the writ was not deemed to confer an hereditary dignity until the sixteenth century. And Lord Coke says, that although the king cannot create an earl or a baron for years, yet, without ques tion, he may create an earl for life: (Sir George Reynell's case, 9 Coke, 98.)

At page 24 of the text Mr. Finlason observes personal dignities it granted according to its that the Crown might limit the descent of the pleasure, provided there was nothing in the limi tation unlawful, that is contrary to law, as tending to any result injurious to the State. The descent might be limited to any class of heirs. And it was competent to the Crown to attach conditions or qualifications to the inheritance of the dignity, and to make it attach to the possession of an estate by the heirs of the original And at page 25 he says that no statute was estate, but to the possession of it by the heirs. grantee that is, not to the possession of the necessary to allow of any limitations of estates in any particular course of descent, or to any particular class of heirs. This he illustrates by

and which we therefore take the liberty of a very learned note, which is most instructive, quoting: :

There has been much misapprehension on this allow of any species of limitation of the gift of sn point. There was no necessity for any statute to estate, and no such statute was ever passed. The statute de donis conditionalibus, indeed, was passed to protect special limitations of estates intended to take under the gift; but the very from aliens for ever, to the prejudice of the issue as its basis, that such gifts should be observedscope of the statute implied what, indeed, it recited

that is, that such limitations should take effect. Moreover, all that the statute did was to protect necessary to do, for prior to the statute, when such them from alienation, which was all that it was special gifts were construed as conditional fees simple, the only mischief was that they might be altered by alienation, and so the statute merely