McCarthy. As proof of the facts stated by McCarthy, this evidence is per se valueless; as an acknowledgment by the accused, to be inferred from his conduct or silence, of the accuracy of the assertions made, the evidence is admissible: Regina v. Smith (1897), 18 Cox C. C. 470; Regina v. Cox (1858), 1 F. & F. 90; Regina v. Mallory (1884), 15 Cox C. C. 456. The weight to be attached to it is wholly for the commissioner. There was competent evidence upon which a magistrate might in his discretion, commit for trial, as affording probable cause for believing the accused to be guilty. Moreover, there was, in the facts which transpired at the time of the arrest of the defendant, as deposed to by the officers, other evidence from which the commissioner might not unreasonably infer the scienter of the accused.

...

3rd. Finally, the learned counsel for the prisoner argues that the charge laid is not within the Extradition Act. The schedules to our Acts of 1886, (R.S.C. 1886, ch. 142); and of 1889, (52 Vict. ch. 36) do not mention this crime, but by the interpretation clauses of the earlier statute, "extradition crime in the application of this Act to the case of any extradition arrangement means any crime described in such arrangement, whether comprised in the said schedule or not." The latter Act is "to make further provision, etc." The "extradition arrangement" of 1890 with the United States of America, though made four years after our Extradition Act of 1886 was enacted, must, in my opinion, be deemed to be covered by the interpretation clause of that statute, and in that arrangement is comprised a crime described as "receiving any money, valuable security, or other property, knowing the same to have been embezzled, stolen or fraudulently obtained." Any offence within this description is, therefore, within the Extradition Act of Canada.

Counsel for the prisoner, however, maintains that the words "other property," applying the maxim, noscuntur a sociis, must be restricted to things of the same type as money and securities for money, citing The Queen v. De Portugal (1885), 55 L.J.Q.B.

as

567. In that case in extradition proceedings sec. 75 of the Larceny Act, "whosoever having been entrusted . banker, merchant, broker, attorney, or other agent, etc.," was held by a Divisional Court not to cover the case of a prisoner charged with "misappropriating certain securities handed to him while engaged in an attempt, under an agreement with the prosecutor, to procure a contract for the construction of certain railways." The Court, emphasizing the word "other," held that the words "or other agent" meant only some agent of a like

kind with the classes before enumerated." The chief value of this case as an authority is that it goes far to establish the applicability to proper cases in extradition proceedings of the strict rule of interpretation generally acted upon in construing criminal statutes. The fair and liberal spirit with which we are told we should approach the construction of a treaty, "not labouring with eager astuteness to find flaws or doubtful meanings in its words," see Re Burley (1865), 1 C.L.J. 50; and Regina v. Morton (1868), 19 U.C. C.P. 20, must not induce the Court to extend its operation to crimes not specified or expressed. Numerous other cases of restricted construction of similar general words are collected in the leading text books: Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 2nd ed., pp. 1359-1366; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, pp. 351 et seq.; Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 3rd ed., pp. 468 et seq.; Hardcastle's Statute Law, 3rd ed., pp. 190 et seq. As a few such cases closely in point and dealing with similar generic words I may refer to Sandeman v. Beach (1827), 7 B. & C. 96; Attorney-General v. Hamilton Street Railway (1895), 27 O.R. 49, 24 A.R. 170, )other person); Clark v. Gaskarth (1818), 8 Taunt. 431, (other products); Casher v. Holmes (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 592, (all other metals); Radnorshire v. Evans (1863), 3 B. & S. 400, (other thing); In re Stockport Schools, [1898] 2 Ch. 687, (other schools); Read v. Ingham (1854), 3 E. & B. 889, (other craft); Willis v. Thorp (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 383, (other charges); Powell v. Boraston (1865), 18 C. B. N. S. 175, (other building); Lowther v. Earl Radnor (1806), 8 East 124, (other labourers);

and Fletcher v. Lord Sondes (1826), 3 Bing. 501, 580, (other cattle).

On the other hand, in numerous instances the Courts have seen fit to give to generic words, following words more specific, a comprehensive meaning. The writers above named give many examples. The Queen v. Edmundson (1859), 2 El. & El. 77, may be referred to as an instance where a statutory provision authorizing search for certain purloined articles "in any dwelling house, outhouse, yard, garden or other place or places," was held to include a warehouse. Of the numerous similar authorities the following seem most nearly in point: Regina v Doubleday (1861), 3 El. & El. 501, (other persons); Young v Grattridge (1868), L.R. 4 Q.B. 166, (other place); Rex v. Shrewsbury (1832), 3 B & Ad. 216; Regina v. Payne (1866), L.R. 1 C.C.R. 27 (other article or thing); Rex v. Norris (1804), Russ. & Ry. 69, (other building); Richmond Hill S. S. Co. v. Trinity House, [1896] 2 Q.B. 134, (other goods).

In Re Miller (1889), 61 L. T. N. S. 367, North, J., says: "You do not use the word 'other' unless there is some relation between the classes of things," and in Leicester v. Brown (1892), 41 W.R. 78, Pollock, B., advances, as a reason for holding the generic word to be of comprehensive meaning, the absence of the word "other." Mr. Maxwell speaks of "the restricted meaning which primarily attaches to the general word in such circumstances," (p. 475); while Lord Esher, in Anderson v. Anderson, [1895] 1 Q.B. 749, 753, says: "Prima facie you are to give the words their larger meaning." His lordship also states that the modern tendency of the Courts has been to construe general words in their ordinary sense.

Lopes, L. J., remarks: "The doctrine of ejusdem generis is a very valuable servant, but it would be a most dangerous master." The Court was in that case construing a voluntary settlement and cites authorities dealing with the interpretation of wills, in which Courts appear to exercise a wider discretion in applying rules of interpretation than they consider themselves to possess when construing statutes, especially those of

a penal character, and ordinary deeds and contracts. As an instance of a notable modern application of an ejusdem generis construction by the highest Courts, indicating that in matters of a criminal character the pristine vigour of that principle of construction remains unimpaired, I would refer to Powell v. Kempton Park Race Course Company, [1897] 2 Q.B. 242, 257, 265-6, 275-6, 301; [1899] A.C. 143.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied this rule recently in O'Dell v. Gregory (1895), 24 S. C. R. 661. In a still later case, Farquharson v. Imperial Orl Co. (1899) 30 S.C.R. 188, reversing the judgment of an Ontario Divisional Court, reported in 29 O.R. 206, the Supreme Court refused to apply this canon of interpretation to R.S.O. 1887, ch. 120, sec. 1, prohibiting the prevention of the passage of saw logs and other timber down a river, creek or stream, by felling trees or placing any other obstruction in or across the same.

Mr. Stroud, in his valuable work, reaches this conclusion at p. 1360: "It is perhaps impossible to lay down any workable rule to determine which of these two interpretations the word should receive in any case not already covered by authority." I have made an exhaustive search for some case in which the words "other property" have been interpreted following specific words in a statute, deed or contract. There seems to be no such case in England or Ontario.

Seeking for other authority covering these very words I find the following: In Hall v. Baker (1889), 74 Wis. 118, 127, the appellate Court held tax certificates to be "other property' within the meaning of a section providing that a county may make a subscription to the capital stock of a railroad company "to be paid in money, lands or other property."

In Grissell v. Housatonic R. W. Co, (1887), 54 Conn. 447, 467, an appellate Court, dealing with a statute providing for compensation by railway companies where any injury is done to "a building or other property." held "fences and forest trees" to be included. The manifest object of the statute determined

this construction.

In People v. New York and Manhattan Beach R. W. Co. (1881), 84 N.Y. 565, a statute authorizing the State to bring action to recover "money, funds, credits and property" held by public corporations, courts, officers or agents for public purposes, which have been wrongfully converted or disposed of, was held not to include real estate, and the word "property" associated with the preceding words of specific description in the Act was construed as referring to property of the same general kind with that previously enumerated. The word "other" is not found in this case.

In First National Bank of Joliet v. Adam (1891), 138 Ill. 483, the Court dealt with a lease reserving to the lessor a lien for rent upon "all goods, chattels, or other property" belonging to the lessee. This clause occurred immediately after a provision for distress. The Court said: "The most natural application of the word 'other' as here used is to refer it back to the words 'goods and chattels,' which immediately precede it. The expression or other property' would seem to have been intended to designate such other personal property as might be the subject matter of a distress for rent. Under the rule of construction that general and specific words which are capable of an analogous meaning being associated together take colour from each other so that the general words are restricted to a sense analogous to the less general, the general words or other property' would be restricted to a meaning analogous to the words 'goods' and 'chattels,' and consequently would not embrace such property as fixtures or chattels real, partaking more of the nature of realty than personalty."

These are the only decisions I can find upon the interpretation of the words "other property," except when used in wills. So much do they depend upon the context and the object of the statutes or documents under discussion that, if binding as authorities, they would be by no means conclusive in the present instance.

It is a universal rule of construction that "all words of a written instrument shall, if possible, be given some effect, so

18-c.c.c.-VIII.