order will be given that the record be returned to Montmagny there to be proceeded with according to law. Conviction affirmed. L. J. Cannon, K.C., and Arthur Lachance, for the Crown. Note: Challenge of juror-Duty of the "triers"-Cr. Code sec. 668 (8). The practice before the Code was to select as triers two indifferent persons "not returned of the jury." The Code merely says "two persons present, whom the Court may appoint for that purpose" (sec. 668, subsec. 8). Triers cannot be challenged (1 Chitty Cr. Law 549), but it still remains the duty of the Court to appoint only parties who are indifferent between the prosecution and the accused, and as it is possible that any juror on the panel may be next called and subjected to trial of a challenge for favour, a person on the jury panel should in no case be appointed a "trier." As soon as two jurors have been sworn the office of the two triers ceases, and those two jurors try the challenges until another juror has been sworn, and afterwards the duty devolves upon the two jurors last sworn from time to time as the selection and challenges proceed. The old law made the two jurors first sworn the judges of all challenges for favour of jurymen, afterwards called: 3 Blackstone 363; but this is changed by Code sec. 668, sub-sec. 8, so that as each new juror is selected he and the one last selected before him become the triers of the next one called. The trial of the challenge proceeds by witnesses before the triers in open Court. The oath to the witnesses other than the juror objected to is as follows: "The evidence which you shall give to the Court and triers upon this inquest shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. So help you God." The juror objected to may be examined under oath as to the subject matter of the challenge, the oath to be administered to him being as follows: "You shall true answer make to all such questions as the Court shall demand of you. So help you God." The challenging party first calls his witnesses then the opposite party calls his and the challenging party follows with his witnesses in reply. There seems to be also in strict practice a right of counsel for each party to address the triers before calling his witnesses, but it is not customary for an address to be made. After the conclusion of the evidence on the challenge, the Judge sums up to the triers, and the triers announce their decision, which is final. Roscoe Cr. Ev. 197. [COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO.] BEFORE MOSS, C.J.O., AND OSLER, MACLENNAN, GARROW, and MACLAREN, JJ.A. THE KING v. BULLOCK and STEVENS. Speedy trial-Separate charges against accused for distinct offences-Proceeding with trial of one after hearing evidence in another and before the latter is concluded-Intermixing of trials-Cr. Code, sec. 772. A speedy trial at a county Judge's criminal court and a conviction thereon are not invalidated by the judge having taken evidence upon another charge against the same accused pending an adjournment of the hearing of the principal charge and after part of the evidence therein had been taken, if the charges were different as to time and place and the Judge certifies that he was not influenced as to the principal charge by the evidence in the other. ARGUED September 14, 1903. DECIDED: October 26, 1903. THIS was a case stated by His Honour Judge Chisholm, Judge of the county court of the county of Waterloo, particulars of which are set out in the judgment of MACLENNAN, J.A. TORONTO, September 14, 1903. G. F. Kelleher, for the prisoners, referred to Hamilton v. Walker, [1892] 2 Q.B. 25, 67 L.T. 200; Reg. v. Fry (1898), 19 Cox 135; Queen v. Lamoureux (1900), 4 Can. Cr. Cas. 101; Queen v. Winslow (1899), 3 Can. Cr. Cas. 215. J. R. Cartwright, K.C., for the Crown. TORONTO, October 26, 1903. MACLENNAN, J.A. :-This is a case stated by His Honour Judge Chisholm for the opinion of this Court. The prisoners were convicted before him on two separate charges of receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen, and were acquitted on a third charge of house-breaking and stealing. The first charge was of having, on November 9th, 1902, received tobacco stolen from one James Johns. The second charge was of having on October 23rd, 1902, received three razors stolen from one Leonard A. Macdonald, and the third charge was of having on October 23rd broken and entered the shop of Thomas Hamilton and stolen a quantity of ginger ale and lemon sour soda. The trial took place on the 27th of December. The accusations or indictments on which the prisoners were brought before the Judge were of breaking and entering the shops of the respective parties mentioned with intent to steal, but with consent of the Judge the further charge of receiving was added in the first two cases. After stating the evidence in the first case that is the tobacco case the learned Judge makes the following state ment: "I find in my note-book that at the close of the case for the Crown it is noted that I dismissed the charge of shopbreaking as charged in the first count, and found a prima facie case for receiving stolen tobacco, as charged in the second count, made out. The case was then adjourned to December 30th at 10 a.m., to let in evidence for the defence. This evidence consisted chiefly of evidence of relations and friends of accused as to their character and habits, and shewed that they used tobacco. Evidence for defence made no change in my mind. I still found both prisoners guilty of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen. I remanded the prisoners for sentence until after the trial of the next case." The case states that the second charge, that of receiving razors, was tried on the 27th of December also, whereupon, upon the same day, the learned Judge made up his mind to find both prisoners not guilty of shop-breaking, but guilty of receiving the stolen property knowing it to have been stolen, though he did not so express himself in open Court at the time, and he remanded both prisoners for judgment and sentence. On December 30th both prisoners were tried on the third charge and acquitted. On December 31st the learned Judge sentenced both prisoners to 23 months imprisonment on the first charge, and to the same term of imprisonment on the second charge, the second sentence to run concurrently with the first. These sentences were not passed until after the trial and dismissal on the previous day of the third charge. The learned Judge adds: "I came to my finding in the first case before hearing the second case, and I am not conscious that I was biassed in coming to my conclusion on the second case through the knowledge acquired in the hearing of the first and third cases." He also says that "no objection was taken by counsel to the adjournment or to his remanding the prisoners for judgment and sentence until all the cases were tried." The objection urged before us by counsel for the prisoners to the legality of the convictions was that the learned Judge had mixed up the trials of the several cases in a manner calculated to prejudice the prisoners, and the case of Hamilton v. Walker, [1892] 2 Q.B. 25, 67 L.T. 200, was relied on as requiring that the convictions should be quashed. That was a case in which the evidence in support of two different charges was necessarily nearly altogether the same. Here, however, the circumstances of the three charges were altogether different as to time and place, and the only identity was in the persons charged, and the principal witness was the same in all three, or, at all events, in the first two. There is some confusion in the learned Judge's statement. He appears to have heard the case for the prosecution only in the first case on December 27th, and postponed the defence until the 30th of that month. And, apparently, he completed the trial of the second case on December 27th. It may be that this is an inaccuracy, and that the defence in both cases was heard on December 30th. But however this may be, I think the case is not governed by the case of Hamilton v. Walker, but rather by the later case of Regina v. Fry, 19 Cox 135, and 78 L.T. 717, where judgment was postponed on a charge of unlawfully permitting drunkenness to take place on the prisoner's premises until after the trial and dismissal of two other charges of unlawful selling of liquor on his premises on the following day. There the conviction was upheld, and the statement of the justices that at the close of the first case they were of opinion that there should be a conviction was accepted, and weight was attached to the circumstance that the charges subsequently tried were of acts done upon a subsequent day. Here, in like manner, I think we ought to accept the statement of the learned Judge that he came to his finding in the first case before hearing the second case, and that he is not conscious that he was biassed in coming to his conclusion in the second case through the knowledge acquired in the hearing of the first and third cases. I think, too, as said by the Court in the Fry case, it was easy for the learned Judge to keep the cases distinct, having regard to the difference of time, place, and circumstances between them. It seems proper to call attention to the observations of Wills, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court in that case as to the caution which ought to be observed in such cases. He said (78 L.T. at p. 717): "We should be sorry to give any countenance to the notion that justices may mix up two criminal charges and convict or acquit in one of them with any reference to the facts appearing in the other. Such a course would be contrary to law; and undoubtedly, as a general rule, it will be prudent and right for justices to avoid any course which reasonably bears the aspect of such a mistake. If a prima facie case is made out that such an error has, or may have been, committed, it will in general be upon the justices to shew very clearly that it has not been committed. On the other hand, we should be equally sorry to throw any doubt upon the right of the justices, in any case, for reasons of justice arising out of the circumstances of the case itself, and for its better determination, to adjourn or to postpone their decision; and if their discretion in this respect be honestly |