Opinion in Poindexter v. Greenhow.

be declared inoperative and void, because unconstitutional; but these are cases where the parts are so distinctly separable that each can stand alone, and where the court is able to see, and to declare, that the intention of the legislature was that the part pronounced valid should be enforceable, even though the other part should fail. To hold otherwise would be to substitute for the law intended by the legislature one they may never have been willing by itself to enact. An illustration of this principle is found in the Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, where an act of Congress, which, it was claimed, would have been valid as a regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the States, was held to be void altogether, because it embraced all commerce, including that between the citizens of the same State, which was not within the jurisdiction of Congress, and its language could not be restrained to that which was subject to the control of Congress. "If we should," said the court in that case, p. 99, "in the case before us undertake to make, by judicial construction, a law which Congress did not make, it is quite probable we should do what, if the matter were now before that body, it would be unwilling to do."

Indeed it is quite manifest, from the face of the laws themselves, that they are together but parts of a larger whole. By an act of the General Assembly of Virginia, passed February 14, 1882, the Legislature re-stated the account between the State and its creditors on a basis of readjustment which reduced it to the sum of $21,035,377.15, including interest in arrears to July 1, 1882, which was thereby declared to be her equitable share of the debt of the old and entire State, and on which it was also declared that the State was not able to pay interest for the future at a larger rate than three per cent. per annum. The outstanding debt, of which this was a reduction, was then classified, and bonds of the State were authorized to be issued, bearing interest at the rate of three per cent. per annum, in exchange for outstanding bonds of the different classes, scaled at rates of fifty-three per cent., sixty per cent., sixty-nine per cent., sixty-three per cent., and, as to one class, as high as eighty per cent., which were to be retired

VOL. CXIV-20

Opinion in Poindexter v. Greenhow.

and cancelled. The coupons on the new bonds were not made receivable in payment of taxes. To coerce creditors holding bonds issued under the act of March 30, 1871, to exchange them for these new bonds, at these reduced rates, and with them to give up their security for the payment of interest, arising out of the receivability of coupons in payment of taxes, is the evident purpose of the acts of January 26, 1882, and of March 13, 1884, and all together form a single scheme, the undisguised object of which is to enable the State to rid itself of a considerable portion of its public debt, and to place the remainder on terms to suit its own convenience, without regard to the obligation it owes to its creditors.

The whole legislation, in all its parts, as to creditors affected by it and not consenting to it, must be pronounced null and void. Such is the sentence of the Constitution itself, the fundamental and supreme law for Virginia, as for all the States and for all the people, both of the States separately and of the United States, and which speaks with sovereign and commanding voice, expecting and receiving ready and cheerful obedience, not so much for the display of its power, as on account of the majesty of its authority and the justice of its mandates.

The judgment of the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond is accordingly reversed, and the cause will be remanded, with directions to render judgment upon the agreed statement of facts in favor of the plaintiff.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, with whom concurred the CHIEF JUsTICE, MR. JUSTICE MILLER, and MR. JUSTICE GRAY dissented. Their dissenting opinion will be found post, page 330, after the opinion of the court in MARYE v. PARSONS.

Opinion in White v. Greenhow.

WHITE v. GREENHOW, Treasurer.

IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.

This case falls within the decision in Poindexter v. Greenhow, and is decided by it, ante, 270.

Mr. William L. Royall, Mr. Daniel H. Chamberlain [Mr. William B. Hornblower was with him on the brief], Mr. Wager Swayne, and Mr. William M. Evarts for plaintiff in error.

Mr. F. S. Blair, Attorney-General of the State of Virginia, Mr. Richard T. Merrick, and Mr. Attorney-General for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, brought his action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia against the defendant, both being citizens of that State. The declaration, in substance, sets out that the plaintiff, owning property in the City of Richmond, was assessed thereon for the year 1882 for certain taxes to be paid to the State of Virginia, leviable for after December 1, 1882; that the defendant was treasurer of the City of Richmond, and, as such, collector of taxes due to the State assessed on property in that city; that plaintiff tendered to the defendant, on demand being made for payment of said taxes, the amount thereof in coupons cut from bonds issued by the State of Virginia under the act of March 30, 1871, entitled "An Act to provide for the funding and payment of the public debt," which coupons, by the terms of said act, were receivable in payment of taxes by virtue of a contract with the State of Virginia; that the defendant refused to receive said coupons, under color of the authority of the act of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, passed January 26, 1882, which forbade him to receive the same; that the defendant, after refusal of said tender, forcibly and unlawfully entered the premises of the plaintiff, and levied

Opinion in White v. Greenhow.

upon and seized and carried away personal property of the plaintiff of the value of $3,000, in order to sell the same for the satisfaction of said taxes, which he claimed to be unpaid and delinquent; that the acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, specified in the pleadings, which require the tax collector to refuse to receive such coupons in payment of taxes, and to proceed with the collection of taxes, for the payment of which they have been tendered, as if they were delinquent, impair the obligation of the said contract between the State of Virginia and the plaintiff; and that by reason of the said wrongs the plaintiff has suffered damage in the sum of $6,000, for which he brings suit.

To this declaration the defendant demurred generally, the demurrer was sustained, and judgment was rendered for the defendant. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error.

All the questions raised and argued upon the merits of this case have been fully considered in the opinion of the court in the case of Poindexter v. Greenhow, ante, 270.

The present action, as shown on the face of the declaration, was a case arising under the Constitution of the United States, and was one, therefore, of which the Circuit Court of the United States had rightful jurisdiction by virtue of the act of March 3, 1875, without regard to the citizenship of the parties, the sum or value in controversy being in excess of $500.

In conformity with the views expressed in the opinion in Poindexter v. Greenhow,

The judgment in the present case is reversed and the cause is remanded, with directions to proceed therein in conformity with law.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, with whom concurred The CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE MILLER and MR. JUSTICE GRAY, dissented. Their dissenting opinion will be found, post, page 330, after the opinion in MARYE V. PARSONS.

Opinion in Chaffin v. Taylor

CHAFFIN v. TAYLOR.

IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA.

This case fails within the decision in Poindexter v. Greenhow, ante, page 270, and is decided by it.

Mr. William L. Royall, Mr. Daniel H. Chamberlain [Mr. William B. Hornblower was with him on the brief], Mr. Wager Swayne, and Mr. William M. Evarts for plaintiff in

error.

Mr. F. S. Blair, Attorney-General of the State of Virginia, Mr. Richard T. Merrick, and Mr. Attorney-General for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court. This was an action in trespass de bonis asportatis, brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in the Circuit Court for the county of Henrico in Virginia, for the recovery of $150 damages for unlawfully entering upon the plaintiff's premises and seizing, taking, and carrying away one horse, the property of the plaintiff, of the value of $100.

The defendant justified the taking, &c., as treasurer of Henrico County, charged by law with the duty of collecting - taxes due the State of Virginia on property and persons in said county, alleging that the property was lawfully seized and taken for taxes due from the plaintiff to the State, which on demand, he had refused to pay.

To this plea the plaintiff replied a tender in payment of the taxes, when demanded and before the trespass complained of, of the amount due, in coupons cut from bonds of the State of Virginia, receivable in payment of taxes by virtue of the act of March 30, 1871.

To the replication the defendant demurred specially, on the ground, first, that by the act of January 26, 1882, he was forbidden to receive coupons in payment of taxes, and, second, that by the act of March 13, 1884, an action of trespass would not lie in such a case.